Line Item Veto, Clinton v. City of New York

[A18]

Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)

...[T]he President exercised his authority under the [Line Item Veto Act] by canceling §4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which waived the Federal Government's statutory right to recoupment of as much as $2.6 billion in taxes that the State of New York had levied against Medicaid providers, and §968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, which permitted the owners of certain food refiners and processors to defer recognition of capital gains if they sold their stock to eligible farmers' cooperatives. Appellees, claiming they had been injured, filed separate actions against the President and other officials challenging the cancellations. The plaintiffs in the first case are the City of New York, two hospital associations, one hospital, and two unions representing health care employees. The plaintiffs in the second are the Snake River farmers' cooperative and one of its individual members. The District Court consolidated the cases, determined that at least one of the plaintiffs in each had standing under Article III, and ruled, inter alia , that the Act's cancellation procedures violate the Presentment Clause, Art. I, §7, cl. 2.

Held: The Act's cancellation procedures violate the Presentment Clause.

[Emsworth]

Partly sound and partly unsound.

Strictly speaking, the Line Item Veto Act does not authorize a "veto," but a cancellation. The Act does not allow the President to veto one part of the bill and sign another. Instead, after the whole bill has been signed into law, the President has the authority to "cancel" any new item of spending. A veto takes place before the bill can become law; a cancellation takes place after it has become law. The cancellation procedure has nothing to do with the presentment, signing, or vetoing of a bill; it is an entirely independent procedure. Thus, it does not violate the presentment clause.

However, the act is invalid for a different reason. It allows the President to amend a statute after it has taken effect. Thus, it constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the executive branch. The President is not directed to make a finding and then act upon it: on the contrary, he has full discretion in cancelling or not cancelling any item of spending. The law therefore violates the separation of powers.

[Peter]

I read this opinion some time ago, and I seem to remember Justice Breyer (dissenting) stating that the President is directed to make a finding: Whether he likes the spending or not, and then act on that. I have to say it is a rather novel way of getting around it and I can't find any reason why it should be invalid.

[Emsworth]

I read this opinion some time ago, and I seem to remember Justice Breyer (dissenting) stating that the President is directed to make a finding: Whether he likes the spending or not, and then act on that. I have to say it is a rather novel way of getting around it and I can't find any reason why it should be invalid.

Before cancelling an item of spending, the President is supposed to determine if the cancellation would "(i) reduce the Federal budget deficit; (ii) not impair any essential Government functions; and (iii) not harm the national interest." Even if one is generous and concedes that this is a finding of fact, the cancellation procedure would still be unconstitutional. The President is not required to act upon any such finding; he has absolute discretion over whether to cancel or not cancel, even if he determines that these three conditions are met.