Major campaign underway to nullify Electoral College

[Bo]

Would you Democrats be OK with keeping the Electoral College if Gore would have won the EV and Bush would have won the PV? You know that many people considered this to be a serious possiblity right before the 2000 election.

Of course not. The Electoral College is an inherently undemocratic system, no matter who winds up winning it.

The executive branch isn't supposed to be fully Democratic, that's the congress' job. Just like a Prime Minister isn't directly elected.

Because it's Democratic to have the 21 least popular states block any legislation in the Senate.

I think the 21 least populous states account for only 11% of America's population.

[Vepres]

Then we have no reason to continue debating here.

I disagree that states deserve any representation whatsoever on principle.

Indeed, that is what I was trying to say earlier to Xahar.

[Χahar]

Now, my argument, put, well... better

A huge % of a state's budget is imposed by federal mandates. Now, that's not fair to my state government, nor its people.

Fair enough, If you feel that way, then leave the federation, since it's clearly not working for Colorado.

You don't understand that my arguments are philosophical and not political

As are mine. If a place isn't getting a good deal in the situation it's in, it ought to change that.

Colorado actually gets it pretty fair, being right in the middle in terms of population. You're the one with the problems with the status quo, not me.

Yes, Colorado gets it fair. You are thus admitting that the system is unfair.

A program that benefits Californians may not benefit North Dakotans, but because of California's huge influence, they can force ND to spend that money (they do this despite being a blatant violation of states' rights), despite the fact that a Californian gives no money to ND, nor lives there. Thus, ND may have to raise taxes, but California doesn't care because it doesn't affect them.

The same is true anywhere. A county government will do things that affect some areas of the county but not others.

That is a poor analogy. States share all domestic sovereignty with the federal government, a county is not such a separate institution.

So, then, change "county" to "state".

As for the military, that does not make sense. Each state gives the same amount of money proportionately,

Indeed. Therefore, they should also have a proportionate say, yes?

They do. It's called, the House and Presidency. The two can easily pressure the Senate to do what they want.

Let me refer you to this:

Do you not understand this?

Underrepresentation in some areas combined with adequate representation in others is still net underrepresentation.

Read it well.

Now, I don't think it is fair that California, for instance, gives more the federal government than it receives, but that is due to corrupt Senators, and is their fault, not one of the system's design.

You seem not to understand that my objections here are philosophical, not political.

It's suspect that you are from the largest state, that's all.

I fail to see how that affects my argument.

You're only arguments are, frankly, poor analogies and emotional arguments, Xahar.

My arguments are emotional! Yes! I believe in democracy and equality. The idea that some people have more votes than others goes against that.

It is my belief that the Senate is an equalizer, not giving some people more influence.

I don't know how you can say these things with a straight face. In 1820, the British parliamentary constituency of Old Sarum had seven voters and returned two members to the Commons, and the constituency of Westminster had 9,280 voters and also returned two members to the Commons. Presumably this was also an equalizer and not giving some people more influence?

The rural areas would be just be ignored, face it.

That's not true; rural areas are not ignored in the House, and many of its most powerful members come from rural areas. If it were true, than it would mean that rural areas were so insignificant that they deserved to be ignored.

Oh, and you believe it equality and democracy and stuff, but I recall you calling voters idiots on multiple occasions.

Oh, certainly. But rule by idiots is better than any other sort.

Here's a question, do you believe in federalism at all? If not, there is no point in us debating this.

It depends on the situation. Do I believe that Singapore ought to have a federalist system? Of course not. Do I believe that Russia should have a federalist government? Obviously. For America, federalism is preferable to a unitary state, given America's size. But federalism means that areas within the state decide local matters. I see no relation between federalism and the apportionment of representatives in a central legislature.

Xahar, perhaps you and I should just acknowledge that this is very very subjective (more so than many other issues) and that it is futile to debate it

Isn't debate the (theoretical) point of this forum?

[Vepres]

Colorado actually gets it pretty fair, being right in the middle in terms of population. You're the one with the problems with the status quo, not me.

Yes, Colorado gets it fair. You are thus admitting that the system is unfair.

Maybe, maybe not

A program that benefits Californians may not benefit North Dakotans, but because of California's huge influence, they can force ND to spend that money (they do this despite being a blatant violation of states' rights), despite the fact that a Californian gives no money to ND, nor lives there. Thus, ND may have to raise taxes, but California doesn't care because it doesn't affect them.

The same is true anywhere. A county government will do things that affect some areas of the county but not others.

That is a poor analogy. States share all domestic sovereignty with the federal government, a county is not such a separate institution.

So, then, change "county" to "state".

The thing is, the states established the federal government, they're approval is required for constitutional changes, counties were established by the states.

Now, I don't think it is fair that California, for instance, gives more the federal government than it receives, but that is due to corrupt Senators, and is their fault, not one of the system's design.

You seem not to understand that my objections here are philosophical, not political.

It's suspect that you are from the largest state, that's all.

I fail to see how that affects my argument.

I'm just explaining why I thought you were arguing it from a political point of view originally.

You're only arguments are, frankly, poor analogies and emotional arguments, Xahar.

My arguments are emotional! Yes! I believe in democracy and equality. The idea that some people have more votes than others goes against that.

It is my belief that the Senate is an equalizer, not giving some people more influence.

I don't know how you can say these things with a straight face. In 1820, the British parliamentary constituency of Old Sarum had seven voters and returned two members to the Commons, and the constituency of Westminster had 9,280 voters and also returned two members to the Commons. Presumably this was also an equalizer and not giving some people more influence?

No, because the commons are supposed to be like the US house.

This is how I see it. The states, for all domestic purposes, are mini-countries that have agreed to establish a federal government that has sovereignty over them on important issues that must be dealt with nationally. The Senate ensures that the big states don't walk over the small ones. California has 53 people earmarking for it, yet Utah only 3. I wish legislating didn't occur that way, but it is a reality.

The Senate also ensures there's consensus among many different groups of people on legislation. Now, I think that procedural filibuster is stupid, but still. Imagine all the stuff that would have passed under the Bush and under Obama without the Senate. Like it or not, it prevents radical change unless there is a clear consensus for radical change.

I admit the Senate is obstructionist at times, but I blame the politicians and parties for taking advantage of the institution.

The rural areas would be just be ignored, face it.

That's not true; rural areas are not ignored in the House, and many of its most powerful members come from rural areas. If it were true, than it would mean that rural areas were so insignificant that they deserved to be ignored.

I do agree that they have their influence, but perhaps not enough IMO. After all, the speaker is from downtown San Francisco.

I was exaggerating, in hindsight.

Here's a question, do you believe in federalism at all? If not, there is no point in us debating this.

It depends on the situation. Do I believe that Singapore ought to have a federalist system? Of course not. Do I believe that Russia should have a federalist government? Obviously. For America, federalism is preferable to a unitary state, given America's size. But federalism means that areas within the state decide local matters. I see no relation between federalism and the apportionment of representatives in a central legislature.

To ensure the interests of the member states of the federation receive equal treatment. Now, in practice this doesn't always happen, but that's due to stupid political stuff like bribing Senators and such.

I would like to add that members from large states are usually very influential in the Senate. Your two Senators are. Look at Durbin, Schumer, Hutchinson, "Big John" Cornyn.

Generally, if two members have similar seniority it seems, at least to me, that the ones from big states have more influence.

Xahar, perhaps you and I should just acknowledge that this is very very subjective (more so than many other issues) and that it is futile to debate it

Isn't debate the (theoretical) point of this forum?

Indeed. I've been enjoying this one. You're one of the more reasonable (if not moderate) and logical Democrats on the forum (though most posters here are indeed intelligent).

[I left.]

I think one thing you're confusing is federalism and federal elections.

It's completely possible to have equal representation at federal level and still allocate significant power to the states. One thing doesn't really have much to do with the other.

[Vepres]

I think one thing you're confusing is federalism and federal elections.

It's completely possible to have equal representation at federal level and still allocate significant power to the states. One thing doesn't really have much to do with the other.

I'm not. I realize they're not mutually exclusive. The equ representation contributes to the overall cohesiveness. The Senate brings a sense of equality and cohesion to the people of the various states. We already have significant region divides, NAFTA, for example, which the border stats like but industrial Midwest states don't. It legitimizes the federal government, and creates national unity.

[I left.]

I think one thing you're confusing is federalism and federal elections.

It's completely possible to have equal representation at federal level and still allocate significant power to the states. One thing doesn't really have much to do with the other.

I'm not. I realize they're not mutually exclusive. The equ representation contributes to the overall cohesiveness. The Senate brings a sense of equality and cohesion to the people of the various states. We already have significant region divides, NAFTA, for example, which the border stats like but industrial Midwest states don't. It legitimizes the federal government, and creates national unity.

I don't feel unified, to be honest. In fact, it offends me greatly that a voter in North Dakota has the same representation in the Senate as I do.

[Vepres]

I think one thing you're confusing is federalism and federal elections.

It's completely possible to have equal representation at federal level and still allocate significant power to the states. One thing doesn't really have much to do with the other.

I'm not. I realize they're not mutually exclusive. The equ representation contributes to the overall cohesiveness. The Senate brings a sense of equality and cohesion to the people of the various states. We already have significant region divides, NAFTA, for example, which the border stats like but industrial Midwest states don't. It legitimizes the federal government, and creates national unity.

I don't feel unified, to be honest. In fact, it offends me greatly that a voter in North Dakota has the same representation in the Senate as I do.

First, you worded that poorly

Perhaps you're offended, but most Americans agree with the system. I have never met a person in real life opposed to the Senate. Personally, I really don't care that New Mexico gets the same representation as my state.

Besides, one of your Senators is the Majority whip, and as I said earlier, Senators from big states tend to be more influential (though seniority trumps that).

[I left.]

With all due respect....the fact that most Americans approve of the system is hardly an argument in favor of said system

[Vepres]

With all due respect....the fact that most Americans approve of the system is hardly an argument in favor of said system

Nice subtle reference to one reform plan

[beneficii]

The pace to nullify the EC is picking up, so far this year:

Colorado House Passes National Popular Vote Bill
Oregon House Passes National Popular Vote Bill
New Mexico House Passes National Popular Vote Bill
Arkansas House, Washington House, and Vermont Senate Pass National Popular Vote Bill


I think there is a good chance this plan will be in effect by 2012

Even if enough states pass it, don't forget that tthis is done by state statute. Any legislature that doesn't like the way 2012 might turn out can just as easily repeal their state law before the electors would be certified. Only a constitutional amendment can change the system and not leave it open to partisan whim.

Not true.  A state may not break a compact it has signed onto.  An interstate compact is like an international treaty and supersedes state law:

An interstate compact is an exception to the rule that one legislature may not restrict its successors. 3 More than mere statutes, compacts are contracts that are binding on the member states and their citizens. 4 Like any other statute, an interstate compact supersedes prior law. 5 But as with other contracts, the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution 6 protects compacts from impairment by the states. Although a state cannot be bound by a compact to which it has not consented, 7 a compact takes precedence over the subsequent statutes of signatory states. 8 A state may not unilaterally nullify, revoke, or amend one of its compacts if the compact does not so provide, 9  and the extent to which a compact may constitutionally permit any alteration by less than unanimous consent is unclear.

(emphasis added)

https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=49+Fla.+L.+Rev.+1&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=04a01655420564f0c293e096df74fc67

An approved compact establishes a contractual relationship between the signatory states which is protected from impairment by the contract clause of the constitution.  In common with an international treaty, a compact supersedes existing state laws and hence compacting states surrender part of their respective sovereignty.

http://books.google.co.jp/books?id=qWehEho4Vu4C&lpg=PA34&ots=6cgZc015m8&dq=impairment%20clause%20interstate%20compacts&pg=PA34#v=onepage&q=impairment%20clause%20interstate%20compacts&f=true

[beneficii]

With all due respect....the fact that most Americans approve of the system is hardly an argument in favor of said system

That is true, but it is also true that there 70%+ public support for a direct national election of the president:

http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/polls.php

[beneficii]

Hm. To me, it seems that there's a problem with a bare majority of the states deciding to completely change the way we elect a President, especially if the other states have opposed this compact. I really don't want half the states telling the other half of the states that they don't have a say anymore, especially if they have rejected this compact.

But they are not completely changing the way.  We have been electing the president the same way since 1804 and this compact does not propose to change that.  It simply allows for a group of states to sign onto a compact where they will use their plenary powers to decide the method of the appointment of their respective electors.

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . .

U.S. Const., Article II, Section 1.

Under the second clause of Article II of the Constitution, the legislatures of the several states have exclusive power to direct the manner in which the electors of President and Vice President shall be appointed.

McPherson v. Blacker (1892), SCOTUS

The source for the statement in McPherson v. Blacker … that the State legislature's power to select the manner for appointing electors is plenary.

Bush v. Gore (2000), SCOTUS

These sources were taken from nationalpopularvote.com in their FAQ.

[True Federalist]

The pace to nullify the EC is picking up, so far this year:

Colorado House Passes National Popular Vote Bill
Oregon House Passes National Popular Vote Bill
New Mexico House Passes National Popular Vote Bill
Arkansas House, Washington House, and Vermont Senate Pass National Popular Vote Bill


I think there is a good chance this plan will be in effect by 2012

Even if enough states pass it, don't forget that tthis is done by state statute. Any legislature that doesn't like the way 2012 might turn out can just as easily repeal their state law before the electors would be certified. Only a constitutional amendment can change the system and not leave it open to partisan whim.

Not true.  A state may not break a compact it has signed onto.  An interstate compact is like an international treaty and supersedes state law:

An interstate compact is an exception to the rule that one legislature may not restrict its successors. 3 More than mere statutes, compacts are contracts that are binding on the member states and their citizens. 4 Like any other statute, an interstate compact supersedes prior law. 5 But as with other contracts, the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution 6 protects compacts from impairment by the states. Although a state cannot be bound by a compact to which it has not consented, 7 a compact takes precedence over the subsequent statutes of signatory states. 8 A state may not unilaterally nullify, revoke, or amend one of its compacts if the compact does not so provide, 9  and the extent to which a compact may constitutionally permit any alteration by less than unanimous consent is unclear.

(emphasis added)

https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=49+Fla.+L.+Rev.+1&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=04a01655420564f0c293e096df74fc67

An approved compact establishes a contractual relationship between the signatory states which is protected from impairment by the contract clause of the constitution.  In common with an international treaty, a compact supersedes existing state laws and hence compacting states surrender part of their respective sovereignty.

http://books.google.co.jp/books?id=qWehEho4Vu4C&lpg=PA34&ots=6cgZc015m8&dq=impairment%20clause%20interstate%20compacts&pg=PA34#v=onepage&q=impairment%20clause%20interstate%20compacts&f=true

A compact requires the consent of Congress as well. (Article I Section 10 Clause 3 of the Constitution.)  These State laws are as far as I can tell, not being enacted in the form a a compact that would be sent to Congress for approval, and even if they were, I see no chance that this would pass the Senate anytime soon.

[beneficii]

The compact would not need Congressional consent to take effect.  SCOTUS has ruled that the requirement for consent cannot be read literally:

Read literally, the Compact Clause would require the States to obtain congressional approval before entering into any agreement among themselves, irrespective of form, subject, duration, or interest to the United States.

The difficulties with such an interpretation were identified by Mr. Justice Field in his opinion for the Court in [the 1893 case] Virginia v. Tennessee. His conclusion [was] that the Clause could not be read literally [and this 1893 conclusion has been] approved in subsequent dicta.

U.S. Steel Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission, SCOTUS

This would be a compact among those states to exercise powers that already exist within the exclusive domain of the states, that of the method of appointing presidential electors.  The Court's rulings have only required consent where the compacts encroach on the supremacy of the U.S. government.  Would such a compact need consent, if it is only to coordinate the exercise of a power the states already have exclusively?

Either way, just to be safe, the NPVIC advocates are seeking such consent.

Sourcing taken from this page:

http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/answers/m15.php#m15_4

You may want to try reading through this, as it is well-sourced. 

[True Federalist]

Neither Virginia v. Tennessee nor United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n would be applicable in a the case of an irrevocable binding agreement between the States as to how they choose electors.

In Virginia v. Tennessee, the Court found that the Congress had given its assent, albeit informally, to the border agreement made by the States.  In mentioned in passing that there were classes of interstate agreements that did not require Congressional approval.

In the other case, since a state may withdraw from the Multistate Tax Commission at any time, it is not cogent either.

Certainly the States may choose to jointly agree on a method of choosing electors, but that agreement cannot be made irrevocable, nor can it be made enforceable absent Congressional approval of the compact.  States would be free to leave at any time.

[yougo1000]

I hop these campaigns succeed.

[True Federalist]

I hop these campaigns succeed.

What do pancakes have to do with politics?

[beneficii]

Neither Virginia v. Tennessee nor United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n would be applicable in a the case of an irrevocable binding agreement between the States as to how they choose electors.

In Virginia v. Tennessee, the Court found that the Congress had given its assent, albeit informally, to the border agreement made by the States.  In mentioned in passing that there were classes of interstate agreements that did not require Congressional approval.

In the other case, since a state may withdraw from the Multistate Tax Commission at any time, it is not cogent either.

Certainly the States may choose to jointly agree on a method of choosing electors, but that agreement cannot be made irrevocable, nor can it be made enforceable absent Congressional approval of the compact.  States would be free to leave at any time.

First, the NPVIC is not an irrevocable binding agreement, as a state would be free to withdraw at any time; the only proviso is that if the state enacts a withdrawal within six months of the end of a presidential term, the withdrawal may only take effect when a new president-elect shall have qualified:

Any member state may withdraw from this agreement, except that a withdrawal occurring six months or less before the end of a President’s term shall not become effective until a President or Vice President shall have been qualified to serve the next term.

http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/misc/888wordcompact.php

Under the Impairments Clause of the Constitution, because a compact is like a contract a state cannot just violate the terms of the contract.

The other question is one of whether Congressional consent is required for the compact to take effect.  In the case of U.S. Steel named above, that compact at the time of the SCOTUS ruling had not received even implied consent from Congress, yet the Court upheld the compact.  (That the compact had not received that consent was at the heart of the controversy in that case.)

Of course, the NPVIC is likely to be challenged anyway, so the case bears watching, but in accordance with previous cases, since the compact is limited to one subject and is simply an agreement between states concerning how they will use powers that are already exclusively in their domain, consent would likely not be required.  Either way, so that D.C. can become part of the NPVIC and just to be sure, the supports of the NPVIC are still seeking either implied or express Congressional consent.

[True Federalist]

... a state would be free to withdraw at any time; the only proviso is that if the state enacts a withdrawal within six months of the end of a presidential term, the withdrawal may only take effect when a new president-elect shall have qualified:

Any member state may withdraw from this agreement, except that a withdrawal occurring six months or less before the end of a President’s term shall not become effective until a President or Vice President shall have been qualified to serve the next term.

http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/misc/888wordcompact.php

Under the Impairments Clause of the Constitution, because a compact is like a contract a state cannot just violate the terms of the contract.

Without Congressional approval, the six month deadline is non-enforceable as the contract would not have been validly entered into.

The other question is one of whether Congressional consent is required for the compact to take effect.  In the case of U.S. Steel named above, that compact at the time of the SCOTUS ruling had not received even implied consent from Congress, yet the Court upheld the compact.  (That the compact had not received that consent was at the heart of the controversy in that case.)

State withdrawal was not at issue in the U.S. Steel case.  From the syllabus of that case:

Under the test of whether the particular compact enhances state power quoad the Federal Government, this Compact does not purport to authorize member States to exercise any powers they could not exercise in its absence, nor is there any delegation of sovereign power to the Commission, each State being free to adopt or reject the Commission's rules and regulations and to withdraw from the Compact at any time.

(Bold and underline emphasis added.)

The six month withdrawal proviso of the NPVIC does not meet the standard of the holding in the U.S. Steel case.

Of course, the NPVIC is likely to be challenged anyway, so the case bears watching, but in accordance with previous cases, since the compact is limited to one subject and is simply an agreement between states concerning how they will use powers that are already exclusively in their domain, consent would likely not be required.

As I pointed out, that six month proviso is invalid without Congressional consent.  The rest of the NPVIC should survive any court challenge.  Besides, the six months is more like three and a half months.  If any State tried to change its method of selecting electors after Election Day, it wouldn't meet the standard for incontestability in the Congress.

[beneficii]

... a state would be free to withdraw at any time; the only proviso is that if the state enacts a withdrawal within six months of the end of a presidential term, the withdrawal may only take effect when a new president-elect shall have qualified:

Any member state may withdraw from this agreement, except that a withdrawal occurring six months or less before the end of a President’s term shall not become effective until a President or Vice President shall have been qualified to serve the next term.

http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/misc/888wordcompact.php

Under the Impairments Clause of the Constitution, because a compact is like a contract a state cannot just violate the terms of the contract.

Without Congressional approval, the six month deadline is non-enforceable as the contract would not have been validly entered into.

The other question is one of whether Congressional consent is required for the compact to take effect.  In the case of U.S. Steel named above, that compact at the time of the SCOTUS ruling had not received even implied consent from Congress, yet the Court upheld the compact.  (That the compact had not received that consent was at the heart of the controversy in that case.)

State withdrawal was not at issue in the U.S. Steel case.  From the syllabus of that case:

Under the test of whether the particular compact enhances state power quoad the Federal Government, this Compact does not purport to authorize member States to exercise any powers they could not exercise in its absence, nor is there any delegation of sovereign power to the Commission, each State being free to adopt or reject the Commission's rules and regulations and to withdraw from the Compact at any time.

(Bold and underline emphasis added.)

The six month withdrawal proviso of the NPVIC does not meet the standard of the holding in the U.S. Steel case.

Of course, the NPVIC is likely to be challenged anyway, so the case bears watching, but in accordance with previous cases, since the compact is limited to one subject and is simply an agreement between states concerning how they will use powers that are already exclusively in their domain, consent would likely not be required.

As I pointed out, that six month proviso is invalid without Congressional consent.  The rest of the NPVIC should survive any court challenge.  Besides, the six months is more like three and a half months.  If any State tried to change its method of selecting electors after Election Day, it wouldn't meet the standard for incontestability in the Congress.

Just because there are provisos on withdrawal in the law does not mean the compact requires Congressional consent for those provisos to have force of law.  For example, the Multistate Tax Compact (MTC) does have a proviso on withdrawal, signifying where the compliance of states would matter the most for the purposes of that compact.  Here is the MTC on the matter of withdrawal:

2. Any party State may withdraw from this compact by enacting a statute repealing the same. No withdrawal shall affect any liability already incurred by or chargeable to a party State prior to the time of such withdrawal.

http://www.mtc.gov/About.aspx?id=98

The presence of such provisos does not make the compact require Congressional consent.

As I pointed out, that six month proviso is invalid without Congressional consent.  The rest of the NPVIC should survive any court challenge.  Besides, the six months is more like three and a half months.  If any State tried to change its method of selecting electors after Election Day, it wouldn't meet the standard for incontestability in the Congress.

If a compact requires Congressional consent, then none of it can take effect without that consent.

I agree with you, however, on the period following Election Day.  The NPVIC would provide some redundancy for that period.

EDIT: Changed "approval" to "consent" to be more consistent with terms.

[True Federalist]

Just because there are provisos on withdrawal in the law does not mean the compact requires Congressional consent for those provisos to have force of law.  For example, the Multistate Tax Compact (MTC) does have a proviso on withdrawal, signifying where the compliance of states would matter the most for the purposes of that compact.  Here is the MTC on the matter of withdrawal:

2. Any party State may withdraw from this compact by enacting a statute repealing the same. No withdrawal shall affect any liability already incurred by or chargeable to a party State prior to the time of such withdrawal.

http://www.mtc.gov/About.aspx?id=98

The presence of such provisos does not make the compact require Congressional consent.

That proviso is a simple restatement of the Constitutional ban on ex post facto laws.

If a compact requires Congressional consent, then none of it can take effect without that consent.

Not so.  The NPVIC includes a severability clause.   If the limitation on withdrawal were held to be invalid, then the rest would still apply, assuming that there were still 270 EVs in the agreement.  Not that I think the NPVIC will go into force any time soon.  It won't be in place for 2012 and until we get another case where the popular vote and electoral vote disagree there won't be much impetus for it.

At best, advocates of a national popular vote have something in place that could be quickly enacted after the next time the EV and the PV disagree.

[yougo1000]

I hop these campaigns succeed.

What do pancakes have to do with politics?

Sorry my keyboard is messed up.

[beneficii]

Just because there are provisos on withdrawal in the law does not mean the compact requires Congressional consent for those provisos to have force of law.  For example, the Multistate Tax Compact (MTC) does have a proviso on withdrawal, signifying where the compliance of states would matter the most for the purposes of that compact.  Here is the MTC on the matter of withdrawal:

2. Any party State may withdraw from this compact by enacting a statute repealing the same. No withdrawal shall affect any liability already incurred by or chargeable to a party State prior to the time of such withdrawal.

http://www.mtc.gov/About.aspx?id=98

The presence of such provisos does not make the compact require Congressional consent.

That proviso is a simple restatement of the Constitutional ban on ex post facto laws.

If a compact requires Congressional consent, then none of it can take effect without that consent.

Not so.  The NPVIC includes a severability clause.   If the limitation on withdrawal were held to be invalid, then the rest would still apply, assuming that there were still 270 EVs in the agreement.  Not that I think the NPVIC will go into force any time soon.  It won't be in place for 2012 and until we get another case where the popular vote and electoral vote disagree there won't be much impetus for it.

At best, advocates of a national popular vote have something in place that could be quickly enacted after the next time the EV and the PV disagree.

Here is a discussion that should give a good introduction to the question:

http://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008-R-0221.htm

[True Federalist]

Here is a discussion that should give a good introduction to the question:

http://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008-R-0221.htm

Not really, because it does not touch upon the sole point of disagreement between us concerning the constitutionality of the NPVIC, the six month waiting period to revoke membership.  The rest of the NPVIC is constitutional, but the severable provision that bars a State from exiting the Compact in that six month window is not unless Congress gives its assent to the Compact.  That limitation on when a State can withdraw is what makes the NPVIC a delegation of sovereign power, which under the holding of the U.S. Steel makes it a compact that requires Congressional approval.