Major campaign underway to nullify Electoral College

[Beet]

Oh fun, game theory.

Let O = {A, B, C, D} be a set of possible policy outcomes, S = {set of states}, and D_i = {0, 1} be a decision set, where i represents state i.

Let F(x)_i = U_i, where

(1) U is the total benefit gained by state i, measured in terms of the attention that it receives from presidential campaigns, and, by extension, from first-term presidents and political parties.

(2) F(x)_i is a function with a domain as the set of possibly policy outcomes O.

Define
A = Republican candidate is the winner, and the Republican candidate is highly attuned to the needs of the battleground states
B = Republican candidate is the winner, and the Republican candidate is highly attuned to the needs of all the states
C = Democratic candidate is the winner, and the Democratic candidate is highly attuned to the needs of all the states
D = Democratic candidate is the winner, and the Democratic candidate is highly attuned to the needs of the battleground states

Suppose that there are 20 states i=1...5 have a function defined such that
F(A) > F(B) > F(D) > F(C)

i=6...10 have F(x)_i defined such that
F(B) > F(A) > F(C) > F(D)

i=11...15 have F(x)_i defined such that
F(D) > F(C) > F(A) > F(B)

i=16...20 have F(x)_i defined such that
F(C) > F(D) > F(B) > F(A)

Now define
D_i = 0: state i DOES NOT award its votes to the popular vote winner.
D_i = 1: state i DOES award its votes to the popular vote winner.

Now define an aggregate state decision function

Sum(i=1...n=20) {G(X)_i} = O{P(A),P(B),P(C),P(D)}

Where G(X)'s domain is defined over D {0, 1} and its range is a probability distribution of the set of outcomes.
Since F(X)_i takes domain of O, we can simply substitute F(X)_i on the right-hand-side to obtain the aggregate state
decision-->utility function

Sum(i=1...n=20) {G(X)_i} = U_i

It is easy to see that P(A) and P(B) are increasing functions in Sum(i=11...n=20) {G(X)_i}, in the sense that, if the Democratic
candidate were to lose the popular vote but win the electoral vote, outcomes may be shifted from P(C) to P(B).

On the other hand, the Republican candidate's popular vote basis becomes evenly spread across the country, so Democratic states still prefer P(B) over P(A). The same goes
for Republican states with Democratic Presidents for Sum(i=1...n=10) {G(X)_i}.

Furthermore,the likelihood of the popular vote and electoral vote going in different directions, while
possible (and strong in our current memory from 2000) is extremely small, it having occured only once in 112 years, and then under heavy dispute. There
are well documented theoretic reasons for this that apply irrespective of how close an election is.

It is also easy to see that P(B) and P(C) are increasing functions in Sum(i=1...n=20) {G(X)_i}, and they take on significant values as
states that have more electoral votes choose D = 1. For example, if CALIFORNIA were to adopt D = 1, the Democratic candidate's
guarantee-victory threshold under the criteria of winning the electoral vote but not the popular vote increases from 270 EVs to 325 EVs,
causing a substantial shift in the Democratic candidate's calculus towards F(C) over F(D). The same goes with TEXAS on the Republican
side, shifting his calculus from F(A) toward F(B). The probabilities here are NOT extremely small.

Since battleground states have a strict preference F(A) > F(B) and F(D) > F(C) and Sum(i) {G(X)_i} is nonincreasing in utility otherwise,
they have a clear preference for D = 0.

Safe states on the other hand are confronted with a conflicting set of factors. They strictly prefer F(B) > F(A) and F(C) > F(D), but D = 1 is nonincreasing
over the partisan probabilities. If any safe state chooses D = 0 or D = 1, therefore, they are not maximizing their potential utility. The safe states'
ideal would be all-states > battleground-states, yet at the same time without punishing their party relative to the other party.

I argue this is a classic collective action problem easily solved by contract theory. Suppose that New York and Texas, for example, both have roughly an equivalent
number of electoral votes. The legislature of New York can then act unilaterally and pass a bill awarding its votes to the popular vote winner on the condition
that Texas does the same, or on the condition that a list of named states does the same, or on the condition that states satisfying certain characteristics do the same.
Texas then faces a strict preference with no risk to reciprocate by passing a similiar bill of its own, establishing a collective benefit for both states without
sacrificing partisan preferences.

[Beet]

Would you Democrats be OK with keeping the Electoral College if Gore would have won the EV and Bush would have won the PV? You know that many people considered this to be a serious possiblity right before the 2000 election.

Of course not. The Electoral College is an inherently undemocratic system, no matter who winds up winning it.

The executive branch isn't supposed to be fully Democratic, that's the congress' job. Just like a Prime Minister isn't directly elected.

Congress isn't democratic. Are you kidding? A person in North Dakota has 57 times more power than a person in California. And then you have the filibuster, which gives constituents of the minority 50% more power than constituents of the majority. And then you have D.C. which has zero representation period but is taxed like hell. Congress is the biggest joke in history.

[Beet]

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Of course not. The Electoral College is an inherently undemocratic system, no matter who winds up winning it.
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The executive branch isn't supposed to be fully Democratic, that's the congress' job. Just like a Prime Minister isn't directly elected.
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Congress isn't democratic. Are you kidding? A person in North Dakota has 57 times more power than a person in California. And then you have the filibuster, which gives constituents of the minority 50% more power than constituents of the majority. And then you have D.C. which has zero representation period but is taxed like hell. Congress is the biggest joke in history.
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DC should have representatives IMO.

Besides, this is a check on the majority, preventing the tyranny of the minority.

Without the Senate, the big states would get far more than their fair share of federal dollars, at least that would be the logical outcome.
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As opposed to now where they get far less?

And not to be inordinately partisan, which I know I sometimes am, but when it's Dems' turn to be in the minority the moderate heroes always come out to ensure that the majority has its way. Just look at the "gang of 14" from 2005 for instance. Where is the "gang of 14" of 2009???