If you were President in 1980....

[Wrecking Ball and Chain]

Nope, other than the standard condemnations. But I wouldn't have boycotted the Olympics (unfair to the atheletes) and there is no way in hell I'd send any military aid to the religious fanatics in Afghanistan.

[Sibboleth]

there is no way in hell I'd send any military aid to the religious fanatics in Afghanistan.

Why on earth do you continue to peddle pro-Soviet propaganda about Afghanistan?

[afleitch]

I'd have went ahead with the Olympics as there is no right to treat the Olympics as a political circus, excercised diplomatic and trade pressure on the Soviets but not sent a dime to Afghanistan.

[merseysider]

there is no way in hell I'd send any military aid to the religious fanatics in Afghanistan.

At the end of the day, we didn't know then what we know now. The US basically had a choice between shooting itself in the foot (by supporting the Mujahideen and its unsavoury jihadist supporters) and shooting itself in the head (by allowing the Soviet Empire to expand).

[Jack Vance RIP]

I'd have went ahead with the Olympics as there is no right to treat the Olympics as a political circus, excercised diplomatic and trade pressure on the Soviets but not sent a dime to Afghanistan.

^^^^^^

[Dr. Cynic]

Not a dime to Afghanistan, but put heavy diplomatic pressure on the Soviets, and not boycott the Olympics.

[Boris]

Nope, other than the standard condemnations. But I wouldn't have boycotted the Olympics (unfair to the atheletes) and there is no way in hell I'd send any military aid to the religious fanatics in Afghanistan.

Well, that's fine in retrospect, but you have to remember that in 1980 that the Soviet Union was a far bigger threat than a bunch of Mujaheedin rebels. Also, some of the rebels, such as Ahmed Shah Massoud (until his 9/9/01 assassination by Bin Laden), have been key allies with the United States against the Taliban. Those alliances were initiated by our support for them during the 1980s. Alas, in 1980, it was impossible to differentiate which rebels would become our enemies (The Taliban nor Al Qaeda did not exist in 1980) and which would become our allies.

I guess diplomatic pressure is the only viable option. Any military option is completely out of the question, of course. And I wouldn't have boycotted the olympics either.

Out curiosity, when did it come apparent that the Soviets were going to lose Afghanistan?

[The Duke]

there is no way in hell I'd send any military aid to the religious fanatics in Afghanistan.

At the end of the day, we didn't know then what we know now. The US basically had a choice between shooting itself in the foot (by supporting the Mujahideen and its unsavoury jihadist supporters) and shooting itself in the head (by allowing the Soviet Empire to expand).

The ISI are the ones who backed jihdists in Afghanistan.  The US mainly backed the groups that 20 years later would become the Northern Alliance, at the time they were called the Jamiat.  Certainly not religious fanatics.

Not a dime to Afghanistan, but put heavy diplomatic pressure on the Soviets, and not boycott the Olympics.

What exactly would be "heavy diplomatic pressure"?

[Dr. Cynic]

Heavy diplomatic pressure would be to cut any support the government provided, also making threats, and maybe the occassional grandstand. History tells us that the Soviet economy, if pressured hard enough, would fall.

[The Duke]

Heavy diplomatic pressure would be to cut any support the government provided, also making threats, and maybe the occassional grandstand. History tells us that the Soviet economy, if pressured hard enough, would fall.

What support were we providing to the Soviets that you could cut?

And what kinds of threats?  I am dubious that any mere threat would get results, it would probably just be ignored.

And history did not tell us of the vulnerability of the Soviet economy until after the war in Afghanistan was over (until the Soviet involvement was over, anyways).  And one of the things that pressured the Soviets most was their expensive defeat in Afghanistan.

[dazzleman]

Heavy diplomatic pressure would be to cut any support the government provided, also making threats, and maybe the occassional grandstand. History tells us that the Soviet economy, if pressured hard enough, would fall.

In other words, you'd have favored doing nothing.

[© Tweed the Younger]

And history did not tell us of the vulnerability of the Soviet economy until after the war in Afghanistan was over (until the Soviet involvement was over, anyways).  And one of the things that pressured the Soviets most was their expensive defeat in Afghanistan.

The stagnation of the Soviet economy was recognized by western economists in the mid-70s, and minor experimental mini-reforms were tested under Brezhnev (such as partnerships with western multinational companies).  So both the Soviets and the West knew the USSR has major economic issues and Afghanistan just sped up the decline.

[The Duke]

And history did not tell us of the vulnerability of the Soviet economy until after the war in Afghanistan was over (until the Soviet involvement was over, anyways).  And one of the things that pressured the Soviets most was their expensive defeat in Afghanistan.

The stagnation of the Soviet economy was recognized by western economists in the mid-70s, and minor experimental mini-reforms were tested under Brezhnev (such as partnerships with western multinational companies).  So both the Soviets and the West knew the USSR has major economic issues and Afghanistan just sped up the decline.

 That's completely wrong.  The Soviet economy was quite strong in the 1970s, largely due to high petroleum prices (The USSR was and Russia is a major producer).

It was not until 1982, when the "oil glut" began, that the Soviet economy showed major signs of strain.

[dazzleman]

And history did not tell us of the vulnerability of the Soviet economy until after the war in Afghanistan was over (until the Soviet involvement was over, anyways).  And one of the things that pressured the Soviets most was their expensive defeat in Afghanistan.

The stagnation of the Soviet economy was recognized by western economists in the mid-70s, and minor experimental mini-reforms were tested under Brezhnev (such as partnerships with western multinational companies).  So both the Soviets and the West knew the USSR has major economic issues and Afghanistan just sped up the decline.

Still, there was no recognition that the economy was anywhere close to collapse.  The thinking was that the dictatorial regime would muddle through by forcing its citizens to endure deprivation, as it did for a time.

In retrospect, 1975 was the turning point for the Soviet Union, though nobody recognized it at the time.

First, the signed the Helsinki Accords that year, which contained human rights provisions that were unprecendented for the Soviets.  Of course, they had no intention of abiding by them.  But these covenants ignited the unrest that eventually brought down their empire.

Second, they made a decision to divert resources from investment in economic production facilities to their military buildup.  This was effectively a decision to muddle through with the inadequate production means that they had, rather than update, modernize and augment them.

Third, they launched their bid for third world supremacy, that eventually ended up costing them a lot of money without bringing any tangible benefits.

At the time, many viewed the Helsinki Accords as a major defeat for the west, since we agreed de facto to recognize postwar European borders, which some took as recognition of the Soviet subjugation of Eastern Europe.  The second point was not widely recognized at the time.  And the third point was viewed as the beginning of a potentially successful geopolitical offensive against the west.

The grave Soviet weaknesses were not apparent for some time, though.  They were thought to be ascendant in the late 1970s, and in terms of their geopolitical position, they probably peaked in 1980.  They maintained huge amounts of highly destructive weaponry, targeted on the US, right to the end.

It's easy now to be blithe about the Soviet threat as it existed in the 1970s and 1980s, but that's only with the benefit of hindsight.

[Undisguised Sockpuppet]

I'd have went ahead with the Olympics as there is no right to treat the Olympics as a political circus, excercised diplomatic and trade pressure on the Soviets but not sent a dime to Afghanistan.

[dazzleman]

I'd have went ahead with the Olympics as there is no right to treat the Olympics as a political circus, excercised diplomatic and trade pressure on the Soviets but not sent a dime to Afghanistan.

That equates to doing nothing.  Why not just say it, and call a spade a spade?

[Wakie]

I probably would have selectively backed the Muhajehadein but wouldn't have given them stinger missiles.

[dazzleman]

I probably would have selectively backed the Muhajehadein but wouldn't have given them stinger missiles.

Effectively though, that means that you would have given them enough to bleed the Soviets, but not enough to actually drive them out.  That was our policy actually until 1985-86.

[12th Doctor]

The Soviets created the problem in Afghanistan.  Before that, it was a relatively modern and progressive Islamic society.

[© Tweed the Younger]

That's completely wrong.  The Soviet economy was quite strong in the 1970s, largely due to high petroleum prices (The USSR was and Russia is a major producer).

It was not until 1982, when the "oil glut" began, that the Soviet economy showed major signs of strain.

Currently economists agree that the early-to-mid 1970s mark the time when the Soviet economy began to falter.  Since there was no incentive to modernize, the USSR didn't, and was basically in the same place Stalin left it, except for the space program and the military of course (as Stalin modernized by force).  Some even point to Khrushchev's reign as when they started trending downward, but that's more trivial. (see: 'Brezhnev Stagnation')

Gorbachev was the head of agriculture (I forget the exact title, secretary of agriculture maybe) under Brezhnev, and his experiences there convinced him the serious market reform was needed.  He was pretty 'normal' by Soviet standards before that.  It's pretty hard to say that the Soviet economy wasn't heading downhill under Brezhnev, but it's different to say it was difficult to notice it, as dazzleman did.  But that's not entirely relevant in this argument anyway.

[dazzleman]

That's completely wrong.  The Soviet economy was quite strong in the 1970s, largely due to high petroleum prices (The USSR was and Russia is a major producer).

It was not until 1982, when the "oil glut" began, that the Soviet economy showed major signs of strain.

Currently economists agree that the early-to-mid 1970s mark the time when the Soviet economy began to falter.  Since there was no incentive to modernize, the USSR didn't, and was basically in the same place Stalin left it (as he modernized by force).  Some even point to Khrushchev's reign as when they started trending downward, but that's more trivial. (see: 'Brezhnev Stagnation')

Gorbachev was the head of agriculture (I forget the exact title, secretary of agriculture maybe) under Brezhnev, and his experiences there convinced him the serious market reform was needed.  He was pretty 'normal' by Soviet standards before that.  It's pretty hard to say that the Soviet economy wasn't heading downhill under Brezhnev, but it's different to say it was difficult to notice it, as dazzleman did.  But that's not entirely relevant in this argument anyway.

It is relevant to say that it was difficult to notice the decline, since what people think at the time is what drives policy decisions, not what they learn after the fact.

[opebo]

I would have applauded.   

[© Tweed the Younger]

It is relevant to say that it was difficult to notice the decline, since what people think at the time is what drives policy decisions, not what they learn after the fact.

The argument here originated as me challenging that the war in Afghanistan crippled the Soviet economy when in reality in only accelerated the process.  We're not talking about the depths of the Soviet threat to America, in which case, your tidbit would matter.

[The Duke]

That's completely wrong.  The Soviet economy was quite strong in the 1970s, largely due to high petroleum prices (The USSR was and Russia is a major producer).

It was not until 1982, when the "oil glut" began, that the Soviet economy showed major signs of strain.

Currently economists agree that the early-to-mid 1970s mark the time when the Soviet economy began to falter.  Since there was no incentive to modernize, the USSR didn't, and was basically in the same place Stalin left it, except for the space program and the military of course (as Stalin modernized by force).  Some even point to Khrushchev's reign as when they started trending downward, but that's more trivial. (see: 'Brezhnev Stagnation')

Gorbachev was the head of agriculture (I forget the exact title, secretary of agriculture maybe) under Brezhnev, and his experiences there convinced him the serious market reform was needed.  He was pretty 'normal' by Soviet standards before that.  It's pretty hard to say that the Soviet economy wasn't heading downhill under Brezhnev, but it's different to say it was difficult to notice it, as dazzleman did.  But that's not entirely relevant in this argument anyway.

It is false to say that all economists agree with you.  The Soviet economy had a final hurrah around 1980 when oil prices spiked.

[© Tweed the Younger]

That's completely wrong.  The Soviet economy was quite strong in the 1970s, largely due to high petroleum prices (The USSR was and Russia is a major producer).

It was not until 1982, when the "oil glut" began, that the Soviet economy showed major signs of strain.

Currently economists agree that the early-to-mid 1970s mark the time when the Soviet economy began to falter.  Since there was no incentive to modernize, the USSR didn't, and was basically in the same place Stalin left it, except for the space program and the military of course (as Stalin modernized by force).  Some even point to Khrushchev's reign as when they started trending downward, but that's more trivial. (see: 'Brezhnev Stagnation')

Gorbachev was the head of agriculture (I forget the exact title, secretary of agriculture maybe) under Brezhnev, and his experiences there convinced him the serious market reform was needed.  He was pretty 'normal' by Soviet standards before that.  It's pretty hard to say that the Soviet economy wasn't heading downhill under Brezhnev, but it's different to say it was difficult to notice it, as dazzleman did.  But that's not entirely relevant in this argument anyway.

It is false to say that all economists agree with you.  The Soviet economy had a final hurrah around 1980 when oil prices spiked.

Certain fluctuations in an economy will occur even while in the midst of a greater steady decline.