Would you support the CD method if all states used it?

[defe07]

I was wondering how many of you would support the Congressional District if every state used it for Presidential elections? Obviously, from 3 electoral votes on (unless you want to divide states with 3 EVs into special districts) and the states with 3 EVs would be winner-take-all.

[Padfoot]

I could only support this method if every state had anti-gerrymandering laws that were enforceable as well as enforced.  Otherwise we're going to end up with a lot more presidential races in which the party that wins the popular vote loses the election.

[Undisguised Sockpuppet]

Only if socially conservative states were mandated to use it and not socially liberal/moderate zones.

[nclib]

First of all, I support replacing the EC with a national popular vote.

However, having every state do the CD method would not be an improvement over the current system, even if anti-gerrymandering laws could be enforced.

I doubt the CD system would be significantly more likely to elect the winner of the popular vote, especially given the fact that Democratic CD's tend to be won by a larger margin than Republican CD's.

[Peter]

The impact of gerry-mandering on Congressional districts makes the use of the NE/ME method too risky - it could lead to States which are currently very sensible about their redistricting, being targeted by national parties for gerry mandering.

A much preferable system is the system proposed as Colorado Amendment 36.

For example, if a State has 5 EVs and the result is as follows:
Bush - 55%
Gore - 45%
then each 20% gained by a candidate gets one EV, so Bush and Gore both get 2 to start with.
Then we go to the residual %s:
Bush - 55-40 = 15%
Gore - 45-40 = 5%
Bush has a higher residual and gets the final EV.

Total:
Bush - 3
Gore - 2

Certainly it overcomes any gerry mandering argument, and any districts which go Dem/Rep by lop-sided margains tend to be evened out by other districts in the State.

According to the great Dave Leip's own calculations, the EC in 2000 would have gone:
Gore - 269
Bush - 263
Nader - 6
The academic, yet interesting question, is whether Nader's electors might have gone faithless...

[jimrtex]

The impact of gerrymandering on Congressional districts makes the use of the NE/ME method too risky - it could lead to States which are currently very sensible about their redistricting, being targeted by national parties for gerrymandering.

Gerrymandering for presidential elector purposes could be harmful for congressional elections.  You want a number of narrow majorities for your party to be effective.  But this could put your representatives in jeopardy in close elections, or make it harder to knock off an incumbent of the other party.

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Even if you wanted proportional apportionment of electors, you wouldn't want to use the calculation that was used in Colorado.

If a state had 6 representatives and 8 electors, then under a rational system (St.Lague) a candidate would get 4 electors with between 43.75% and 56.25% of the vote.   In a reasonably moderated state, you would usually have a 4:4 split, unless there was a national landslide, in which case it wouldn't matter how the state split.

And if a state had 7 representative and 9 electors then you can present a nice example showing how if a state had a 55:45 popular vote split, then it would have a 5:4 elector split, which is also 55:44.  But any victory from 50+:50- to 61:39 is going to produce the same 5:4 split.

For a different example, Nebraska would be ignored because it would be locked in 3:2, with almost no chance of 4:1 or 2:3 split, while Idaho might get attention because there would be a chance for a 3:1 or 2:2 split, if the Democrats could keep within 25%.  But when Idaho gains a 3rd representative, and Nebraska lose its 3rd, the situation will be reversed.

But the proposition in Colorado didn't even use a rational scheme.  It used an ad hoc scheme that would round each candidate's number of electors independently (if the fractional apportionment was greater than 0.5 or not).  If this resulted in too few electors, then any extras would be given to the leading candidate.  If rounding resulted in too many electors, then any extras would be taken from the trailing candidates.

For example: 44:43:6:4:3% popular vote; 3.52, 3.44; 0.48; 0.32; 0.24 raw electors; 4:3:0:0:0 after rounding.  The leading candidate is given the 8th elector, disregarding that they had already been rounded making the final split 5:3.

Or: 44.2:44.1:11.7% popular vote; 3.54, 3.53; 0.94 raw electors; 4:4:1 after rounding, and the extra elector is taken from the last place candidate, even though they he had almost 1/8 of the popular vote.

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This is not the method proposed in Colorado.  But even under St. Lague, any winning percentage between 50% and 70% produces the same 3:2 split.

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Oddly enough Colorado would have split 5:3.

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More interesting is whether more voters would have voted for Nader if they thought that they could gain an electoral vote, or not cost Gore the entire state delegation (see for example Washington, Oregon, Colorado, Califormnia, Minnesota, Wisconsin, New Mexico, Illinois, and Ohio).  Could Georgia and North Carolina have kept Nader off the ballot, if the number of petition signatures was anywhere comparable to the number of votes needed to get an elector?

If 1% of those who voted for Gore, switched to Nader, Bush has a popular vote victory.  Would this have been reflected in the distribution of the EV?

Or notice that the 25th EV in Florida (and 270th overall) would have hinged on the recount, and how many other recounts would have been triggered?  Picking up 5 electors in NM was inconsequential in 2000, but picking up one might have made the difference under a proportional system.   And Bush was 1519 votes short of an 11th elector in Ohio.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Frankly, I'm surprised that no one has tried a suit to force single-member districts for the EC in those States that choose to let the people elect the college directly.  Besides State legislatures, such suits have forced some State judgeships to be elected from single member districts IIRC, so I can't think of any reason why similar arguments could not be used for the EC.

However, I figure after we have several gerrymandered elections in a row in which the winner of the PV loses the EV, we'll end up with a strong reform effort that will change how the President is elected, either to direct PV, some sort of moderated proportional system, or perhaps election by Congress itself.

[Verily]

or perhaps election by Congress itself.

Parliamentary now!

[Хahar 🤔]

No.

I would rather see electors chosen by state legislatures.

[minionofmidas]

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This is not the method proposed in Colorado. 

Except that it is, just using a fairly ideal (but more realistic than your comparatively contrived scenarios, except for the total absence of minor parties) example.

EDIT: No. No it isn't. Not sure how I missed that. The method Peter proposes can have some pretty effing weird results once you have more than two parties.

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Well, yes.

State-by-state 2004 (comparing Colorado method, D'Hondt, Ste Lague, Hare). (Not complete yet.)
ME 2-2 2-2 2-2 2-2
NH 2-2 2-2 2-2 2-2
VT 2-1 2-1 2-1 2-1
MA 8-4 8-4 8-4 8-4 first time we get a residual seat, although it goes to the Dems under all systems
RI 2-2 3-1 2-2 2-2 first time we get different results
CT 4-3 4-3 4-3 4-3
NY 19-12 18-13 18-13 18-13 a residual seat does something strange. Under Hare we're very close to 18-12-1.
NJ 8-7 8-7 8-7 8-7
PA 11-10 11-10 11-10 11-10
OH 10-10 10-10 10-10 10-10
IN 4-7 4-7 4-7 4-7
IL 12-9 12-9 12-9 12-9
MI 9-8 9-8 9-8 9-8
WI 5-5 5-5 5-5 5-5
MN 5-5 5-5 5-5 5-5
IA 3-4 3-4 3-4 3-4 technically another residual seat, although where it's going is so bleeding obvious on these figures that it hardly matters what you call the seventh seat
MO 5-6 5-6 5-6 5-6
ND 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2
SD 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2
NE 2-3 1-4 2-3 2-3 contrary to Jim's claims, Nebraska is far from locked into 3-2. A few more percentage points shift (3.39 under Hare, 3.11 under Sainte-Lague, 2.69 under Colorado) to the right gets it to 4-1 under other systems as well.
KS 2-4 2-4 2-4 2-4
DE 2-1 2-1 2-1 2-1
MD 6-4 6-4 6-4 6-4
DC 3-0 3-0 3-0 3-0
VA 6-7 6-7 6-7 6-7
WV 2-3 2-3 2-3 2-3
NC 7-8 7-8 7-8 7-8 Under D'Hondt, Bush needs just 640 votes more for an extra EV.
SC 3-5 3-5 3-5 3-5
GA 6-9 6-9 6-9 6-9
FL 13-14 13-14 13-14 13-14
KY 3-5 3-5 3-5 3-5
TN 5-6 5-6 5-6 5-6
AL 3-6 3-6 3-6 3-6
MS 2-4 2-4 2-4 2-4
AR 3-3 3-3 3-3 3-3 Yeah, a ten point lead is not enough to get an EV advantage. To get to 4-2 the Reps need, depending on system used, a 14-18 point lead. Think they might have campaigned for that EV? Nobody campaigned in Arkansas in rl.
LA 4-5 4-5 4-5 4-5
OK 2-5 2-5 2-5 2-5
TX 13-21 13-21 13-21 13-21
MT 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2
ID 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3
WY 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2
CO 4-5 4-5 4-5 4-5
NM 2-3 2-3 2-3 2-3 see Iowa
AZ 4-6 4-6 4-6 4-6 another residual seat actually. Swings required to make it 5-5 vary from 0.24 (Hare) to 0.72 (D'Hondt). (St Lague 0.27, Colorado method 0.60). Still, 0.24 is almost 5000 people (to change from R to D - to change from nonvoting to D it's almost twice as much.) Outside of reasonable recount territory unless there's been Florida style ballotrigging madness (alas, can't rule that out. See Arizona 1972.), but certainly attainable by better GOTV etc.
UT 1-4 1-4 1-4 1-4
NV 2-3 2-3 2-3 2-3
WA 6-5 6-5 6-5 6-5
OR 4-3 4-3 4-3 4-3
CA 31-24 30-25 30-25 30-25 A residual seat doing funny things again. Here and in NY, a truth about the Colo. method may be emerging - it may be getting quirkier when more seats are being distributed (though probably only up to a point), unlike the other systems.
AK 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2
HI 2-2 2-2 2-2 2-2
sum total
Bush 278
Kerry 260
As it turns out, the other three systems all give Bush 280, Kerry 258, but I would not follow that the Colo. system has a systematic pro-Dem bias.
Even the EC was pretty close to these results, at 286-252.
National PR btw is Bush 273, Kerry 260, Nader 2, Badnarik 2, Peroutka 1 (under Hare or Colorado. D'Hondt has Bush 274, Kerry 261, Nader 2, Badnarik 1. Saint-Lague has Bush 273, Kerry 259, Nader 2, Badnarik 2, Peroutka 1, Cobb 1.)

[minionofmidas]

And just for the hell of it, I'll compare the four for the last real three-party election, 1992 (Clinton-Bush-Perot):

ME 2-1-1 2-1-1 2-1-1 2-1-1
NH 2-2-0 2-1-1 2-1-1 2-1-1 fun with Colo's healing mechanism for too many seats.
VT 1-1-1 2-1-0 1-1-1 1-1-1 Clinton had more than twice Perot's vote, but under 50% (and less than three times as much).
MA 6-3-3 6-3-3 6-3-3 6-3-3
RI 2-1-1 2-1-1 2-1-1 2-1-1
CT 3-3-2 3-3-2 3-3-2 3-3-2
NY 17-11-5 17-11-5 17-11-5 17-11-5
NJ 7-6-2 7-6-2 7-6-2 7-6-2
PA 11-8-4 11-8-4 11-8-4 11-8-4
OH 9-8-4 9-8-4 9-8-4 9-8-4 Incidentally, in each of the latter four states there's a residual seat that goes the "right" way.
IN 4-6-2 5-5-2 5-5-2 5-5-2 Undeserved residual seat gain for Bush (Perot as well as Clinton had a higher residual percentage than Bush)
IL 11-8-3 11-8-3 11-7-4 11-7-4 Fun with the removal rule again, although D'Hondt gives the same result anyways
MI 8-7-3 8-7-3 8-7-3 8-7-3
WI 5-4-2 5-4-2 5-4-2 5-4-2
MN 5-3-2 5-3-2 5-3-2 4-3-3 That's a new one - Hare as the odd one out. Residual seat.
IA 3-3-1 3-3-1 3-3-1 3-3-1
MO 5-4-2 5-4-2 5-4-2 5-4-2
ND 1-1-1 1-1-1 1-1-1 1-1-1
SD 1-1-1 1-1-1 1-1-1 1-1-1
NE 1-3-1 1-3-1 2-2-1 2-2-1 Fun with a residual seat, although D'Hondt gives the same result.
KS 2-2-2 2-2-2 2-2-2 2-2-2
DE 1-1-1 2-1-0 1-1-1 1-1-1 See Vermont.
MD 5-4-1 5-4-1 5-4-1 5-4-1
DC 3-0-0 3-0-0 3-0-0 3-0-0
VA 5-6-2 5-6-2 5-6-2 5-6-2
WV 2-2-1 3-2-0 2-2-1 2-2-1 Clinton's got a little over three times what Perot got.
NC 6-6-2 6-6-2 6-6-2 6-6-2
SC 3-4-1 3-4-1 3-4-1 3-4-1
GA 6-6-1 6-6-1 6-5-2 6-5-2 See Illinois. Not that Clinton deserves more EVs than Bush in Georgia.
FL 10-10-5 10-10-5 10-10-5 10-10-5
KY 4-3-1 4-3-1 4-3-1 4-3-1
TN 5-5-1 5-5-1 5-5-1 5-5-1
AL 4-4-1 4-4-1 4-4-1 4-4-1
MS 3-3-1 3-4-0 3-3-1 3-3-1 I find it hard not to consider D'Hondt actually fairer in this case...
AR 3-2-1 4-2-0 3-2-1 3-2-1 I don't find it hard in this one.
LA 4-4-1 4-4-1 4-4-1 4-4-1
OK 3-3-2 3-3-2 3-3-2 3-3-2
TX 12-13-7 12-13-7 12-13-7 12-13-7
MT 1-1-1 1-1-1 1-1-1 1-1-1
ID 1-2-1 1-2-1 1-2-1 1-2-1
WY 1-1-1 1-1-1 1-1-1 1-1-1
CO 3-3-2 3-3-2 3-3-2 3-3-2
NM 2-2-1 2-2-1 2-2-1 2-2-1
AZ 3-3-2 3-3-2 3-3-2 3-3-2
UT 1-3-1 1-3-1 1-2-2 1-2-2 See Nebraska.
NV 2-1-1 2-1-1 2-1-1 2-1-1 Technically a residual seat, actually, that second Clinton seat.
WA 5-4-2 5-4-2 5-3-3 5-3-3 See Illinois.
OR 3-2-2 3-2-2 3-2-2 3-2-2
CA 25-18-11 25-18-11 25-18-11 25-18-11
AK 1-1-1 1-1-1 1-1-1 1-1-1
HI 2-1-1 2-2-0 2-1-1 2-1-1 Bush has more than twice Perot's share.

totals:
235-204-99 Colorado
240-199-99 D'Hondt
236-197-105 Sainte Lague
235-197-106 Hare.
231-202-102-2 Marrou-1 Gritz Hare, applied nationally.
Either way it goes to the House, as, really, it should have.

[jimrtex]

I've done a lot of snips.

EDIT: No. No it isn't. Not sure how I missed that. The method Peter proposes can have some pretty effing weird results once you have more than two parties.
...
NE 2-3 1-4 2-3 2-3 contrary to Jim's claims, Nebraska is far from locked into 3-2. A few more percentage points shift (3.39 under Hare, 3.11 under Sainte-Lague, 2.69 under Colorado) to the right gets it to 4-1 under other systems as well.
...
AZ 4-6 4-6 4-6 4-6 another residual seat actually. Swings required to make it 5-5 vary from 0.24 (Hare) to 0.72 (D'Hondt). (St Lague 0.27, Colorado method 0.60). Still, 0.24 is almost 5000 people (to change from R to D - to change from nonvoting to D it's almost twice as much.) Outside of reasonable recount territory unless there's been Florida style ballotrigging madness (alas, can't rule that out. See Arizona 1972.), but certainly attainable by better GOTV etc.
...
Bush 278
Kerry 260
...
As it turns out, the other three systems all give Bush 280, Kerry 258, but I would not follow that the Colo. system has a systematic pro-Dem bias.

The claim is not that the Colorado-system has a systematic pro-Democratic bias, but rather that it is non-systematic, capricious and arbitrary.  I truly believe that it was devised because it showed a decisive result for 2000 in the state that it was proposed for use in 2004.  Under St. Lague, the winning candidate would need a 12.5% margin in a 8-elector state to avoid an even split in an even race.  But in this case, an 8% margin was enough.  If pressed, the backers might have even blamed the Nader voters.

The backers did use the 55-45 example in their advertising, for a state that had by then received a 9th elector, and failed to mention that the same would happen for any result betwee 61.1% and 50%.  They then mentioned that in 2000 that it would have produced a 5:3 split, without going into the math.

In the absence of 3rd parties, the Colorado method is the same as St.Lague.  Yet because of the 3rd party, it produced a result that was more favorable to the largest party than D'Hondt.

Nebraska has only produced a voting percentage that would would trigger a 4:1 split twice.  But Idaho being a bit more right leaning might be more in play.

The Arizona results demonstrate another flaw with the Colorado proposal.  It didn't recognize the real boundary conditions that should trigger a recount.

How much of a shift, and where, would produce a 269-269 tie?

Inqilab Zindabad.  It's kind of odd to have a 1942 magazine article with 2007 advertisements.

[○∙◄☻¥tπ[╪AV┼cVê└]

Of course not, it makes the gerrymandering problem be even worse.

[minionofmidas]

I've done a lot of snips.

EDIT: No. No it isn't. Not sure how I missed that. The method Peter proposes can have some pretty effing weird results once you have more than two parties.
...
NE 2-3 1-4 2-3 2-3 contrary to Jim's claims, Nebraska is far from locked into 3-2. A few more percentage points shift (3.39 under Hare, 3.11 under Sainte-Lague, 2.69 under Colorado) to the right gets it to 4-1 under other systems as well.
...
AZ 4-6 4-6 4-6 4-6 another residual seat actually. Swings required to make it 5-5 vary from 0.24 (Hare) to 0.72 (D'Hondt). (St Lague 0.27, Colorado method 0.60). Still, 0.24 is almost 5000 people (to change from R to D - to change from nonvoting to D it's almost twice as much.) Outside of reasonable recount territory unless there's been Florida style ballotrigging madness (alas, can't rule that out. See Arizona 1972.), but certainly attainable by better GOTV etc.
...
Bush 278
Kerry 260
...
As it turns out, the other three systems all give Bush 280, Kerry 258, but I would not follow that the Colo. system has a systematic pro-Dem bias.

The claim is not that the Colorado-system has a systematic pro-Democratic bias

Yeah, that was a joke. More aimed at the fact that it somehow ended up being the most Dem-friendly system in 2004 than at anything else.

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This is technically true - obviously so - but the whole point of the exercise was to show how rarely this is relevant.*

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Don't you mean Hare?

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Yeah, but it still came close in 2004, didn't it?

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Why? Did it include some recount provisions or something? (And what does it do if there's two residual seats - both to the largest party, or one each to the two largest parties? This is extremely unlikely to occur in the US, but in as fractured an environment as, say, city of Frankfurt precincts, it's fairly easy to find examples actually. It's even technically possible to contrive of a scenario with two seats too many.)

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Eh... might do that another time.


* In other words:
St Lague
Hare

D'Hondt
 

Colorado









CD method with anti-gerrymandering reform





CD method without











































































































































Current System

 

[zorkpolitics]

I like the allocation by congressional districts. 
It would mean that in addition to the 10 or 12 swing states each election, we would add 30 or 40 swing districts.  Hence campaigning would be more varied.  Moreover, as a strong supporter of the Federalist Constitution, continuing to spread power between states and people is much preferable to a single popular vote campaign that would focus disproportionally on urban areas.

[Јas]

...much preferable to a single popular vote campaign that would focus disproportionally on urban areas.

Is there a particularly strong focus on rural areas in Presidential elections under the current system?

[Verily]

I like the allocation by congressional districts. 
It would mean that in addition to the 10 or 12 swing states each election, we would add 30 or 40 swing districts.  Hence campaigning would be more varied.  Moreover, as a strong supporter of the Federalist Constitution, continuing to spread power between states and people is much preferable to a single popular vote campaign that would focus disproportionally on urban areas.

I find the whole idea of "States' rights" abhorrent (and not at all because it is strongly associated with racism, though there's that, too). States exist for the purpose of providing localized governance because the federal government cannot account for all local factors when considering national laws. However, the idea of states as independent political entities is absurd; it suggests that we are dividing ourselves into mini-countries all squabbling with each other over pieces of pie.

Moreover, current state boundaries are so hopelessly arbitrary, only occasionally following geographic boundaries and never following human cultural boundaries, that  the very concept of the state as exists in American government is defunct. If we are to even continue with effective federalized government, we need to abolish the current states and draw new ones.

And I am back to my litany of, "I will not support any plan to reform the method of electing the President if it does not involve abolishing the Electoral College and/or the institution of IRV."

[muon2]

...much preferable to a single popular vote campaign that would focus disproportionally on urban areas.

Is there a particularly strong focus on rural areas in Presidential elections under the current system?

The point is that the current system concentrates national campaigns in a few states that are relatively competitive. A single national vote would concentrate campaigns in areas with the greatest vote concentrations -- the large metropolitan areas. A CD-based system would move campaigns to those districts that were most competitive, and in principle they would be spread more than either the battleground states or the major metropolitan areas.

Any division into districts tends to enhance the margin of victory. In 2004 Bush went from 50.7% of the popular vote vs. 48.3% for Kerry to 53.2% of the electoral vote. It also acts to enhance the margin for candidates under 50%, such as Clinton in 1992 going from 43.0% vs. 37.4% for Bush to 68.8% of the EV.

The weakness of district splits occurs in a nearly two-person race when both candidates are very close in percentage. At that point the fluctuations in votes from district-to-district will statistically dominate over the enhancing effects. The result can be an election where the PV and EV disagree. For instance Gore had 48.4% to 47.9% for Bush, yet Bush took 50.4% of the EV.

[jimrtex]

In the absence of 3rd parties, the Colorado method is the same as St.Lague.

Don't you mean Hare?

In the absence of 3rd parties, St.Lague and Hare are the same.

With two candidates, Candidate A will have a vote equivalent to  M+x electors, and Canditate B will have N+y electors, where M and N are whole numbers such that M+N+1 = total number of electors, and x+y = 1, and x > 0.5 > y (ignoring special cases where x = y = 0 or x = y = 0.5)

Under Hare, candidate A will get M+1 electors since x > y.

Under St.Lague, A will get M+1 electors since (M+x)/(m+0.5) > 1 and (N+y)/(N+0.5) is < 1.

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Why? Did it include some recount provisions or something?  (And what does it do if there's two residual seats - both to the largest party, or one each to the two largest parties? This is extremely unlikely to occur in the US, but in as fractured an environment as, say, city of Frankfurt precincts, it's fairly easy to find examples actually. It's even technically possible to contrive of a scenario with two seats too many.)[/quote]
Under the Colorado scheme (this is a misnomer since it was backed by California Democrats), any extra EVs would be taken from the candidate with the fewest votes.  That's correct -  2.54 : 2.53 : 2.52 : 2.51 : 1.90 gets rounded to 3 : 3 : 3 : 3 : 2 and then reduced to 3 : 3 : 3 : 3 : 0.  There is a second paragraph that then repeats the procedure with the next to last candidate if the last candidate is reduced to 0  2.53 : 2.52 : 2.51 : 0.73 : 0.71 rounds to  3 : 3 : 3 : 1 : 1 and then is reduced to 3 : 3 : 3 : 0 : 0.

In the case of an deficit, winner takes all.   2.49 : 2.48 : 2.47 : 2.46 : 2.10 gets rounded to 2 : 2 : 2 : 2 : 2 and then the extra two EVs are given to the winner to produce 4 : 2 : 2 : 2 : 2.

The recount provision applies if two candidates are closer than 1/2% of the total vote, and a change in order would cause one or the other to get more EVs.  So it could cover a case where a change would flip 5:4 to 4:5; but not 5:4 to 6:3.

There was also a recount provision that purported to apply to passage of the initiative itself.    Colorado has legal provisions for when an initiated amendment take effect and also for conducting canvasses and recounts on measures elections.  These could have caused the amendment to go into effect after the the deadline for the electors casting their vote.

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Eh... might do that another time.

* In other words:
St Lague
Hare
D'Hondt
Colorado
CD method with anti-gerrymandering reform
CD method without
Current System
[/quote]
No single member ED's or multi-member ED's using STV?

[minionofmidas]

In the absence of 3rd parties, the Colorado method is the same as St.Lague.

Don't you mean Hare?

In the absence of 3rd parties, St.Lague and Hare are the same.

Yeah, I figured that out last night while trying to fall asleep.

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No single member ED's or multi-member ED's using STV?
[/quote]the list is not exhaustive. Of course there are other conceivable methods.