Could this system be used for the Electoral College?

[defe07]

Here's my plan: 436 EV allocated per Congressional District or District of Columbia + 102 EV allocated statewide. The 436 CD EV would be allocated using the Instant Runoff Vote and candidates must get 50% +1 or more to win that CD. The 102 at-large EV would be allocated using the 1st preferences with the D'Hondt/Jefferson method but by including any EV the candidate may have won in the calculation. What do you think?

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Could it? Yes, assuming each state uses D'Hondt on its two extra EV's as you described it.
Would it. No.  Maybe a state or two would use it, just as Maine and Nebraska now use FPTP in each CD to choose 1 EV and statewide to choose the remaining 2EV, but it would take a Constitutional amendment to force all States to use such a method, and frankly I can't see an amendment that affects the College passing unless it be to abolish it and go to a direct popular vote scheme.

[Padfoot]

could we merge this with the other thread discussing almost the exact same proposal please?

As for the proposal itself, you seem to be misusing and abusing a lot of terminology which is making it difficult to understand you.  Also If I am interpreting your proposal correctly we would end up with nearly 200,000 EVs which seems just a bit excessive to me.  This proposal seems like an overly complex and convoluted way to combine the district method, IRV, and the proportional method.  I'm also not really clear on what your goal is other than to replace the current system.  And as Verily, Lief, and I stated in your other near identical thread, IRV alone would be enough to solve the popular vote conundrum.  The district method is also a great plan in theory but gerrymandering makes it a horrible idea in practice and the proportional method just doesn't work well with small states.

[minionofmidas]

could we merge this with the other thread discussing almost the exact same proposal please?

As for the proposal itself, you seem to be misusing and abusing a lot of terminology which is making it difficult to understand you.  Also If I am interpreting your proposal correctly we would end up with nearly 200,000 EVs which seems just a bit excessive to me. 

The one abuse of terminology that really tripped you up is his abuse of the word "per".

What he meant was, 436 given out by congressional district winner (Washington treated as a district), using IRV, and the two statewide EVs as top-up proportional seats using D'Hondt, as in Scotland and Wales based on first preferences.
Pretty entertaining variant, actually. Aimed not at proportionality, but at creating a majority while 100% assuring some representation to the loser (a motivation similar to that behind French local elections law, btw.) And not really like his other proposal at all.

I'm also not really clear on what your goal is other than to replace the current system.  And as Verily, Lief, and I stated in your other near identical thread, IRV alone would be enough to solve the popular vote conundrum. 

Thing is, the Constitution is pretty damn hard to change. Any abolition of the EC would require Constitutional Amendment. Changing the way states distribute their EVs doesn't, hence all these proposals.

[defe07]

could we merge this with the other thread discussing almost the exact same proposal please?

As for the proposal itself, you seem to be misusing and abusing a lot of terminology which is making it difficult to understand you.  Also If I am interpreting your proposal correctly we would end up with nearly 200,000 EVs which seems just a bit excessive to me.  This proposal seems like an overly complex and convoluted way to combine the district method, IRV, and the proportional method.  I'm also not really clear on what your goal is other than to replace the current system.  And as Verily, Lief, and I stated in your other near identical thread, IRV alone would be enough to solve the popular vote conundrum.  The district method is also a great plan in theory but gerrymandering makes it a horrible idea in practice and the proportional method just doesn't work well with small states.

I apologize for being vague. What I meant was having the EV that represent either the Congressional District or District of Columbia "House EV" (which are 436) would be allocated by using IRV. Then, your 1st preference helps to determine the remaining 2 EV your state (or DC if you live there) has as "Senate EV".

However, to possibly be a step ahead and clearer with my idea, I suggest that states (or DC) that have 3 EV will allocate all EV using D'Hondt's method but when you vote, you can vote for who you really want to. Your 1st preference can help your candidate get an EV. Using the 92 election as my parameter, Perot would've practically won an EV in every 3-EV state (obviously, Clinton would've won all 3 EV).

I hope my idea is clear now. Again, sorry for the vagueness of my proposal and feel free to ask me any other questions, OK?

[Kevinstat]

The 102 at-large EV would be allocated using the 1st preferences with the D'Hondt/Jefferson method but by including any EV the candidate may have won in the calculation.

Sounds like a variant of Mixed member proportional voting (MMP) to me.  Decoy lists (as described in the Wikipedia article) or other tactics used to allow partisan voters to help their preferred candidate's electors (instead of preferred party in this case) carry those voters' direct (electoral college) seats AND "ideal" (were there no direct seats and potential overhang) statewide proportional seats without "punishing" that candidate in the allocation of the statewide electors designed to increase the overall proportionality of the results within the state...

such tactics would be harder to coordinate with the same votes voters cast in the first ballot being used (the 1st place votes) to calculate the "ideal" proportional results (using D'Hondt/Jefferson as defe07 said).  Without federal regulations prohibiting multiple slates for the same Presidential or Vice Presidential candidate and also prohibiting "faithless electors" (some states have laws requiring electors to vote for the slate which won the state, or in the case of Maine's "congressional district" presidential electors, their congressional district - I'm not sure if Nebraska has an anti-faithless elector law), however, up to (but not including, but even that would work just as well half the time on most tiebreakers) half the voters in favor of one candidate (and his runningmate - different runningmates could give this more credence but would still be manipulative) could vote for one three-member elector "subslate" (two of those members would be on the subslates of the same overall statewide slate of electors for every congressional district in the state, with the third being the congressional district elector) in the name of the candidate they supported (their votes counting towards the statewide tally for their favored candidate), with the other half voting for another slate for the same candidate (or a slate of faithless electors nominally pleged to say a leading official or activist of the state party coordinating this but whom everybody knows they will vote for main Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates of that party if elected to the electoral college) so that these voters' favored candidate can effectively win (provided they have enough support) that district's electoral votes without being considered to having won it (at least not one of the candidate's legally independent statewide slates of electors) when it comes time to allocate the two statewide electoral votes.  Overall losing half the statewide vote would outweigh any gain in not being docked for winning the congressional district's EV, but used in a district or two it could work.

It's past my bedtime, so I'm signing off for the night.

[jimrtex]

Sounds like a variant of Mixed member proportional voting (MMP) to me.  Decoy lists (as described in the Wikipedia article) or other tactics used to allow partisan voters to help their preferred candidate's electors (instead of preferred party in this case) carry those voters' direct (electoral college) seats AND "ideal" (were there no direct seats and potential overhang) statewide proportional seats without "punishing" that candidate in the allocation of the statewide electors designed to increase the overall proportionality of the results within the state...

Missouri elects its electors by CD, but uses the statewide popular vote to determine each winner; thus all elector candidates must be a member of a slate.  So under the proposed system, voters could continue to vote for district and state electors in the name of the Presidential/Vice Presidential candidate just as they do now, so you avoid the problem of decoy lists.

[defe07]

With this system, third parties and independents would be able to get electoral votes more often. With my idea, Nader would've won EV in CA, TX, NY, FL, PA, MA, OH, etc. Just a reminder: I don't support the use of a threshold to get at-large EV and would include all the CDs a ticket has won when it comes to allocating the at-large EV. 

[Kevinstat]

Just a reminder: I don't support the use of a threshold to get at-large EV and would include all the CDs a ticket has won when it comes to allocating the at-large EV. 

Yes, and a quarter (or just over a quarter) of the voters in one congressional district (or just over half half the voters of a candidate who would get just over half the vote in that district if everyone voted honestly) is just over 1/(4n) of the statewide vote in a state with n congressional districts if the total vote in in that district was 1/n of the total statewide vote, which it usually will be approximately.  In a two way race (not likely to happen in a presidential election in any state with a quasi-proportional method in place but anyway), one candidate would get an electoral vote assuming no overhang under the D'Hondt/Jefferson method for every 1/([e] + 1) or 1/((n + 2) + 1) of the statewide vote he received in a state with n seats in the U.S. House and thus e electors.  An overhang elector (even if that elector would really vote for one of the two leading candidates) would reduce the denominator for the remaining electoral votes by 1.  x/((n + 2) + 1) - 1/(4n) is greater than (x - 1)/(n + 2) if... well I have to get ready for bed but I'm sure there is a wide range of x and n such that a candidate's supporters could theoretically at least get an allied elector elected from a decoy list if they took full advantage of the instant runoff voting method used to determine the district winner while still having enough support left over to get an xth elector (counting the puppet elector from the decoy list) that they wouldn't have gotten otherwise.  A candidate could technically get a second elector in a state with four electoral votes this way if they had just over 50% support in one district and between 25 and 30 percent support in the other (again assuming the same number of votes are cast in each district), with the remaining vote going to one other non-decoy candidate.  If it can theoretically work with only two non-decoy candidates than it could with more candidates, although a larger third-party vote might limit the ability for a candidate strong enough to carry a district under IRV to net an additional elector in this way.  It would also be difficult to limit the decoy voting to one or a small number of congressional districts within the state (too much of this could cause the candidate to lose one of the statewide seats).  But the fact that it is theoretically possible makes the method seem slightly flawed in my opinion.  No voting method is perfect, however, and I appreciate defe07 for proposing this method which I have had fun pointing out this arguable defect of.