Repeat of 2000 by being controversial?

[Angel of Death]

The phrasing is deliberate in order to account for the odd (sensationalist) media story that is soon forgotten, unlike in the case of 2000.

[tinman64]

I think there will be a clear winner the morning after Election Day.

[zorkpolitics]

I think the election will be close again and that could lead to several possible controversies from most to least probable:
OH or FL is so close another recount controversy ensues.  No paper trail for electronic voting machines
Bush wins EV, Kerry wins popular vote
Bush and Kerry tie: vote goes to House
Bush wins, then loses when CO Ballot measure passes leading to proportional EV assignment
Kerry wins EV, Bush wins popular vote.
Faithless electors sends election to the House

[A18]

I think Bush will have a clear lead by Election Day.

[MODU]

I think the election will be close again and that could lead to several possible controversies from most to least probable:
OH or FL is so close another recount controversy ensues.  No paper trail for electronic voting machines
Bush wins EV, Kerry wins popular vote
Bush and Kerry tie: vote goes to House
Bush wins, then loses when CO Ballot measure passes leading to proportional EV assignment
Kerry wins EV, Bush wins popular vote.
Faithless electors sends election to the House

Actually, most of the electronic machines do provide paper records, a common misconception.  They also provide an electronic back-up system as well.

[Friar]

I think 2004 won't be close.

The winner will have 2 million more popular votes an 50 to 70 more EV than the opponent.

Now, the big Q is who will the winner be? Still too early to tell. 73 more days till we know the answer.

[minionofmidas]

I sure hope it won't be.
I wouldn't rule another Floridan mess out, though. (Doesn't have to be in Florida. Gimme any close state with a Rep administration )
More likely than not everything will be fine, though.

[Andrew]

Actually, most of the electronic machines do provide paper records, a common misconception.  They also provide an electronic back-up system as well.

They provide a paper record of the way that the machine recorded the votes, which is essentially worthless.  What they don't provide is a paper record of each separate vote, verified by the voter.

[zorkpolitics]

I think the election will be close again and that could lead to several possible controversies from most to least probable:
OH or FL is so close another recount controversy ensues.  No paper trail for electronic voting machines
Bush wins EV, Kerry wins popular vote
Bush and Kerry tie: vote goes to House
Bush wins, then loses when CO Ballot measure passes leading to proportional EV assignment
Kerry wins EV, Bush wins popular vote.
Faithless electors sends election to the House

Actually, most of the electronic machines do provide paper records, a common misconception.  They also provide an electronic back-up system as well.

I didn't mean to say they didn't, only that I expect the Democrats to endlessly whine over it creating a controversy

[Andrew]

Actually, most of the electronic machines do provide paper records, a common misconception.  They also provide an electronic back-up system as well.

I didn't mean to say they didn't, only that I expect the Democrats to endlessly whine over it creating a controversy

You should say they didn't--because they don't.  And this is not a partisan issue.

[khirkhib]

It shouldn't be a partisan issue but it is because the machines are being forced on urban areas which tend to vote democratic.  It is Partisan Whining if the machines favor your party.  The priority shouldn't be winning the priority should be getting everybody's vote to count.

[MODU]

I don't see how machines can favor one party or another.  It's a machine.

[Andrew]

A machine can be programmed to favor one party or another, but that's not the issue anyway.

The issue is that these machines, which have proven to be unreliable, do not allow the voter to verify that his vote has been recorded as cast, and cannot produce a record of the votes cast for recount.

In January, there was an election in Florida with only one race on the ballot.  The margin of victory was only 12 votes.  According to the machines, 141 people showed up to cast blank ballots.  Obviously, 141 people did not take the time to go to the polls and submit a ballot with nobody on it.  There was no way to conduct a recount, so the results had to stand:

http://www.browardsoe.org/elections/1-6-04/EL45.htm
http://www.pbcelections.org/ElectionResults/2004/SH91/sh91_dtl.htm

About 30% of American voters will be using this type of machine in November, including most of Ohio and New Mexico, and all of Nevada:

http://www.electiondataservices.com/EDSInc_DREoverview.pdf

This is a very big deal.

[King]

No...Bush or Kerry will have a clear lead by election day...

[MODU]

A machine can be programmed to favor one party or another, but that's not the issue anyway.

Actually, that is incorrect.  As I've posted a few weeks ago, diagnostic tests are performed before, during, and after the election to verify there is no tampering with the systems.  Additionally, the vote data is not connected to an open network, but rather to a local server tied in with the equipment within the voting facility.  Vote records are stored within the server on two separate drives, as well as within each voting machine, so a comparison of the records can be done when questioned.  Also, to ensure there is no tampering involved, the sequential order of the vote records are encrypted and re-arranged, providing an additional layer to protect the records from voter fraud.  And finally, there is a two-tiered voter verification system for the voter can ensure their vote is completely cast:  1)  Before the voter submits their final vote, a summary screen appears to highlight whom the voter has casted their votes for and identifies items which are under-voted, which is, requires action on if they wish to vote for that item, and 2) when the votes are submitted, a coded printout is provided to the voter for their record.  The record allows the voter to access their voting history from a remote site (like a home computer), which lets them know what items they voted on (not who the voted for).

Please, there has been more than enough research done on these systems to verify their accuracy, which is at a higher rate than punch cards and optical scan systems.  As far as the two primary votes you listed in those links, the first link does not account for 138 votes, or 1.34% of votes casted in that primary.  This link does not indicate the method used for casting votes.  Your second link shows 3 votes not counted for, or 0.55%.  This link indicates that multiple forms of voting were involved.  Even if your first link was done by only electronic systems, you cannot fault the system as being faulty, since as you stated, you do not know if they just showed up to vote but decided not to choose anyone (this was just a primary vote after all).

I don't think you have enough here to make a valid argument against the systems.  Sorry.

[Andrew]

. . . diagnostic tests are performed before, during, and after the election to verify there is no tampering with the systems.

These are the so-called "logic & accuracy" tests.  They give no evidence concerning whether or not the machines accurately record votes.

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They don't have to be connected to an open network to be misprogrammed, either accidentally or intentionally.  After all, nobody ever checks the source code.

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All of this sounds very nice.  But the only important part of what you wrote here is at the end:  "not who they voted for."  The voters who use these machines have no way to verify that their votes are going to the candidates that they have chosen.  The "verification" systems in place are as useful as this:  You come to me and say, "I'd like to vote for Bush."  I make a mark next to Kerry's name in my notebook, and say to you, "I've recorded your vote for Bush.  Don't look in my book."

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They have shown a lower error rate than punch cards, but they have had higher error rates than both optical scan systems and paper ballots in each Presidential election since 1988.  Overall, they have been less accurate than lever machines as well.

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News articles describing the election referred to "more than 130" blank ballots, all of which came on touchscreen machines.  I linked the official results to avoid accusations of "spin."

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There was no other race on the ballot.  There was nothing else to vote on.  Do you really think it's reasonable to believe that 130+ people went to the polls to vote for nobody.  I can see casting a blank ballot in one race if you are there to vote for something else--but to show up at the polls just to submit a ballot with no votes for anything?  Over 130 people?  Please.

[MODU]

. . . diagnostic tests are performed before, during, and after the election to verify there is no tampering with the systems.

These are the so-called "logic & accuracy" tests.  They give no evidence concerning whether or not the machines accurately record votes.

Actually, that is incorrect.  The reason why the machines are tested before, during, and after the election is to ensure the system is recording the correct votes.  This ensures that there are no hidden software programs running on a timer that will begin switching votes during the time polls are opened.  

Like you said, the are "accuracy tests" . . . which is, they make sure the system is recording votes accurately.  You need to not rely on what the media is feeding you and go to the manufacturer and better business bureau sites to read the truth.  A lot of what you hear in the media and the critics of the systems are those that fear change.  After all . . . the people who make these machines are also the ones that make your ATM and banking systems.

[Andrew]

The reason why the machines are tested before, during, and after the election is to ensure the system is recording the correct votes.

Machines are sometimes tested before elections, and sometimes--although it's too late to make any difference--after.  They are not tested during elections.  In her book BLACK BOX VOTING, Bev Harris spends four pages listing back door vote-tampering methods suggested by voting machine programmers.  All of them would be undetectable by L&A testing.

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I have never seen any evidence that logic & accuracy testing will detect this type of vote-tampering.  Please provide a source.

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The manufacturers are obviously not impartial, and they have a history of misleading the public.  I would not trust the information from their websites on this issue.  At any rate, I was unable to find any information about L&A testing at either the Diebold website or the ES&S website.  I have also found nothing from the Better Business Bureau regarding these companies and their machines.

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I have noticed--and I am sure you have, too--that these companies do not balk at the idea of producing a consumer-verified paper trail for their ATMs.

[Andrew]

There was no other race on the ballot.  There was nothing else to vote on.  Do you really think it's reasonable to believe that 130+ people went to the polls to vote for nobody?  I can see casting a blank ballot in one race if you are there to vote for something else--but to show up at the polls just to submit a ballot with no votes for anything?  Over 130 people?  Please.

I would like to hear what you think about this, MODU.

[MODU]

Here is some good reading for you to help calm your concerns:  http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20040510-094329-3822r.htm

"In California, machines were even randomly chosen to test during the day just in case their programs miscounted votes only during voting hours. If, say, one out of every 10 votes were switched, it would show up when sample votes are fed into the machines. "

"  So what about the claim that electronic voting machines make recounts impossible because they lack paper records? Each electronic voting machine contains multiple redundant "readonly"memories. These unalterable memories are just as available to be rechecked as paper records."

"    Paper ballots add nothing, except generating unnecessary costs. The redundant "read only" memories also protect against computer crashes or corrupted data. Lever machines also have never used paper receipts. "


Additional information can be found at:  
http://www.vtintl.com/new/vot_advantage_security.asp

http://www.diebold.com/dieboldes/faq.htm

I am familiar with BlackBox's work.  I find the feed the fear of the equipment more than report more of the facts.

As far as the 130 "no votes" go, like I said, you do not know what their intent is.  It could quite possibly be that the voters could not make up their mind on a candidate, and decided not to vote.  Or maybe the candidate they were looking for was not listed, so they chose not to vote.  The systems in use in this current election have the capabilities listed above, to take a snap-shot of the submission screen by the voters in case an audit is required.  From the limited information from the links provided, it does not state whether or not an audit was done on the votes. Your two links only provide limited data.  If you would like to go back and provide further information regarding any audit on those particular votes, that would be great.  But if you do not have that information, you cannot jump to the conculsion that the system merely failed to record the votes. That is why I caution all on listening to the fear rhetoric of others without doing their research.  

Ask yourself this question:  If there was such a major problem with the machines as it is being spread throughout the media . . . then why are more and more counties/states acquire them?

[Andrew]

"In California, machines were even randomly chosen to test during the day just in case their programs miscounted votes only during voting hours. If, say, one out of every 10 votes were switched, it would show up when sample votes are fed into the machines. "

Kevin Shelley has ordered these random tests until such time as all California machines have a voter-verified paper trail.  They are not part of the process in other states and are obviously more inconvenient than a paper trail.  They are a temporary substitute for a paper trail, not an alternative.

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They are unalterable after they have been recorded.  If votes are changed or misrecorded as they occur, then the redundant memories will all record the same incorrect data.  None of the recorded votes will be verified independently by the voter.  This is as useful as this:  You come to me and say, "I'd like to vote for Bush."  I make a mark next to Kerry's name in my notebook, photocopy my book, and say to you, "I've recorded your vote for Bush.  Don't look in my book or at my copies."

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And the opportunity for a voter-verified, independent, recountable record.

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This is a problem with lever machines, not an argument for refusing to have a voter-verified paper trail on electronic machines.

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A simple yes-or-no question:  Do you believe that over 130 people made a trip to the polls to intentionally cast a completely blank ballot?

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VTI machines have this capability; most electronic machines are made by Diebold or ES&S.  This capability is better than nothing, but it's not as good as a voter-verified paper trail, which cannot be corrupted.

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The margin of victory was so small that a manual recount was mandated by law.  But because touchscreen machines don't produce an independent, auditable paper trail, "Broward's canvassing board chose to manually recount only the five invalid paper ballots cast by absentee and not revisit machine-cast ballots." (Jeremy Milarski, South Florida Sun-Sentinal, January 13, 2004)

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States have been acquiring them because they mistakenly believed that these machines were the best way to comply with HAVA.  As more information about the problems surface, more and more states are delaying the implementation of these systems.

[MODU]

Then that is voter error, and not system error.  Just like with any other voting system, voter error occurs.  Unless someone is in the booth with you, and you cast an oral vote, which is recorded by the person and then verified by the voter, you will always end up with some chance of error.  

Yes, I believe it is possible for people to show up and vote, yet not choose to vote on an option, even if it turns out to be the only item on the ballot.

After 20 years, there is enough history for the electronic systems which the states can pull from in order to make a decision on the machines.  I doubt they are purchasing new systems (which costs the states millions of precious dollars) on a fad.

(And personally, I love the lever machines.  Probably the best form of voting machine around.)

I guess we're just both going to disagree on this topic.  I view them as being a better option that most other voting methods out there, and you view the unforseen risks that might surface.  It's a fair view, but not one shared by myself.

[Andrew]

Then that is voter error, and not system error.  Just like with any other voting system, voter error occurs.

Nothing in this topic has anything to do with voter error.

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Thank you for making my point.  It is essential that the voter have the opportunity to verify that his vote has been correctly recorded.  A voter-verifiable paper trail, that is.  

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I didn't ask if you thought it was possible.  Here is my question:  Yes or no:  Do you actually believe that over 130 people actually showed up to the polls in Palm Beach and Broward Counties on January 6 to intentionally cast entirely blank ballots?

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If you have been following this story, you know that the states purchasing these systems have been relying on assurances from the manufacturers that these machines are virtually error-free and uncorruptible.  The evidence shows that these claims are false.

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Optical scan and paper systems both have lower error rates than lever machines.

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These machines have higher error rates than all other systems except for punch cards--and they provide no method for a manual recount unless they produce a voter-verified paper trail.  With that paper trail, they might be a better option than other systems.  Without it, they are a poor choice.

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Do you know what "unforseen" means?

[MODU]

MODU = for electronic machines
Andrew = against

Easy enough.  

[Andrew]

Andrew = against

No. Andrew = for electronic machines with a voter-verified paper trail.