A cyclical theory of modern political alignments

[Scam of God]

I'd like to preface this message with a link to a thread on Democratic Underground, which serves as good an introduction to this idea as any other:

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To simplify somewhat, this poster holds that political periods, at least in the modern era, are structured similarly: they are heralded in by a popular figure championing a new political paradigm (Roosevelt, Reagan), who are succeeded by a less popular and more 'mechanistic' figure with just enough effectiveness to continue to the old policies, but who is much more vulnerable to defeat (Truman, H.W. Bush); these 'bureaucrats' in turn find themselves displaced by moderate members of the opposition ideology (Eisenhower, Clinton), who themselves lead to a radicalization of the existing paradigm and its gradual dissolution (Johnson, W. Bush). And while there are certain elements in the two cycles of the twentieth century that differ from one another - Kennedy's role in the New Deal era has no corollary in our present Reaganist system - the similarities are there, I feel, and bear consideration.

The question in notions such as these, of course, is the placement of the Nixon-Ford-Carter years: it seems to upset the idea that political 'epochs' segue smoothly into each other. I am personally of the opinion that Nixon ought to have held the position of esteem among Republicans and conservatives generally that Reagan holds today; and while it's true that his economic policies were more liberal generally than Reagan's (and his support of liberal institutions like OSHA and the EPA certainly inveighs against his economic conservatism), it is certainly true that his rhetoric, his appeal to the 'Silent Majority', was the beginning of the end of the New Deal coalition. It seems to me that, had the Nixon Administration not ended in disgrace, that we'd have entered the conservative ('Reagan') cycle much sooner, with complete Republican dominance of Washington for the seventies, eighties, and most of the nineties, and we'd have entered a liberal re-alignment that much sooner.

Does that make Obama the Nixon-figure in this theory? I'd say so: Nixon was the first conservative political figure to strike a massive blow against the New Deal coalition; Obama seems to be the first center-left politician to demonstrate the inherent weaknesses of the Reaganite grouping.

Of course, there are parallels with both eras. Like Reagan, Obama's star seems to be ascending at the expense of a hugely unpopular incumbent President; but like Nixon he is running against a non-incumbent member of the dominant political party, who has largely subsumed the role of the President within the party (Johnson-Humphrey; Bush-McCain). Like Reagan, he has enormous charisma and has the ability to galvanize the masses, but again like Nixon, his proposed policies seem more pragmatic and remain located in the opposing (Reaganist) paradigm; just as Nixon was largely a moderate, Obama is more of a centrist than a traditional New Deal liberal, although like Nixon his rhetoric is relatively partisan.

Or perhaps this 'dialectical' mode of political history is bunk, and American politics really is more of a game of personalities than any back-and-forth swing of ideological sympathies. I'd be greatly interested in hearing the thoughts of the board on this matter.

[Matt Damon™]

You and J.J should have a chat sometime. His ideas of realignments every few decades and the possibility that we'll be entering into a new one sometime soon seem alot like your idea.

[Orser67]

I'd be interested in knowing whether or not the poster thinks that this pattern extends to before Roosevelt, since 2 cycles doesn't seem like a very strong pattern.  It was an interesting read, regardless, and I think there's at least some truth in the more general dialectical pattern of ideology.

[Scam of God]

I'd be interested in knowing whether or not the poster thinks that this pattern extends to before Roosevelt, since 2 cycles doesn't seem like a very strong pattern.  It was an interesting read, regardless, and I think there's at least some truth in the more general dialectical pattern of ideology.

One could perhaps make the case that Theodore Roosevelt was a "Prophet", with Taft as his trust-busting "Bureaucrat" and Wilson as his oppositional moderate who, like Clinton, won only because of third-party interference... but it falls apart when analyzing the "Decline", since the Republicans had three Presidents between Wilson and FDR.

I think perhaps the difficulty in tracing such a pattern much before FDR was the lack of ideological distinction between the American parties prior to his emergence; neither could be clearly defined as 'right' or 'left', and both had wings of each (Bryan/Cleveland; Taft/Roosevelt, to a lesser extent).

[Meeker]

Incredibly simplistic and ignores a wealth of important historical facts.

[Lief 🗽]

This sounds very similar to the theory espoused in Dick Stoken's "The Great Game of Politics".

[Matt Damon™]

This sounds very similar to the theory espoused in Dick Stoken's "The Great Game of Politics".

What are the differences?

[Lief 🗽]

Um, I don't really remember, as I read the book like a year ago. But the basic point of his book is that United States political history is divided into paradigms of at least 12 years each. You start with a charismatic leader type, who shifts the country in one direction, then his successor who is usually less successful, then another party takes control (but their policies are still influenced by the policies of the President who began the paradigm). As time goes on, the paradigm becomes less and less popular, the economy worsens, civil unrest occurs (sometimes), until a new charismatic leader is elected, who moves the country in the opposite direction. It works best for the FDR and Reagan eras, though it also kind of applies to the Harding-Coolidge-Hoover era (but without the party switch before the paradigm switch), the Roosevelt era (with Roosevelt as charismatic leader, Taft as less successful successor, and Wilson as the opposition party interim). He applies it to the pre-20th century as well, but has to jump through some hoops to make it work right.

[humder]

 If Gore had won that very close election in 2000, would he have became the disaster?

[Meeker]

If Gore had won that very close election in 2000, would he have became the disaster?

That is one of many problems with this theory.

[12th Doctor]

I'm just shocked that anyone at DU would have anything even remotely nice to say about Reagan.

And oddly... this is not dissimilar to things I have been saying.

[Tetro Kornbluth]

Cyclical theories of history are such mystical rubbish. If there is any truth in them it is because, in this case, the United States hasn't genuinely changed that much.

[Lief 🗽]

If Gore had won that very close election in 2000, would he have became the disaster?

That is one of many problems with this theory.

Yeah, but he didn't win. Obviously the pattern only fits out history, not some other alternate one.

[humder]

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 But it does question the strength of the cycle if an alternative could have easily happened.

[Meeker]

If Gore had won that very close election in 2000, would he have became the disaster?

That is one of many problems with this theory.

Yeah, but he didn't win. Obviously the pattern only fits out history, not some other alternate one.

But to suggest that there is some sort of overall, logical reason to this occurring is silly because it so very easily could've gone the other way.

[Scam of God]

If Gore had won that very close election in 2000, would he have became the disaster?

That is one of many problems with this theory.

Yeah, but he didn't win. Obviously the pattern only fits out history, not some other alternate one.

But to suggest that there is some sort of overall, logical reason to this occurring is silly because it so very easily could've gone the other way.

That's true, but it depends on how one interprets the theory: 'descriptively' (that is, it accurately describes previous events in electoral history, without necessarily assigning to this pattern any inner 'motivation' that required events to transpire the way they did), or 'deterministically' (or the notion that things couldn't have happened any other way, for whatever reason). I'd have no problem accepting the former, and acknowledging that a pattern does exist here, without necessarily embracing the latter proposal.

[Meeker]

I suppose I would dispute the "Interregnum" re: Eisenhower - his election wasn't ideologically rooted, it was a popularity contest.

I suppose the most important point for me is that this theory is certainly not "predictive".

[Scam of God]

I suppose I would dispute the "Interregnum" re: Eisenhower - his election wasn't ideologically rooted, it was a popularity contest.

Yes, but then, neither was Clinton's: he was always very wishy-washy as far his ideology went, doing whatever it took to garner the most support for his ideas, which were always broadly centrist. I think that's integral to the notion of "Interregnum" provided for in the post I quoted. In a way, he was more Reaganist than Reagan, just as Eisenhower largely embraced the New Deal (as evidenced by, for example, his actions in regards to the Interstate highway system).

As far as its predictive power - and hence validity as a 'scientific' theory - we'll have to wait and see how the next four or five elections transpire. You never recognize the mountain you're standing on.

[Meeker]

As far as its predictive power - and hence validity as a 'scientific' theory - we'll have to wait and see how the next four or five elections transpire. You never recognize the mountain you're standing on.

Me making up a random theory has just as much chance of being accurate. There is not enough data to support this being anything but a series of events that can be given an interesting narrative if you ignore large amounts of historical facts.

[Scam of God]

Bump.

Can anybody compare Obama's term thus far to Nixon's?

[Antonio the Sixth]

I'd like to preface this message with a link to a thread on Democratic Underground, which serves as good an introduction to this idea as any other:

To simplify somewhat, this poster holds that political periods, at least in the modern era, are structured similarly: they are heralded in by a popular figure championing a new political paradigm (Roosevelt, Reagan), who are succeeded by a less popular and more 'mechanistic' figure with just enough effectiveness to continue to the old policies, but who is much more vulnerable to defeat (Truman, H.W. Bush); these 'bureaucrats' in turn find themselves displaced by moderate members of the opposition ideology (Eisenhower, Clinton), who themselves lead to a radicalization of the existing paradigm and its gradual dissolution (Johnson, W. Bush). And while there are certain elements in the two cycles of the twentieth century that differ from one another - Kennedy's role in the New Deal era has no corollary in our present Reaganist system - the similarities are there, I feel, and bear consideration.

The question in notions such as these, of course, is the placement of the Nixon-Ford-Carter years: it seems to upset the idea that political 'epochs' segue smoothly into each other. I am personally of the opinion that Nixon ought to have held the position of esteem among Republicans and conservatives generally that Reagan holds today; and while it's true that his economic policies were more liberal generally than Reagan's (and his support of liberal institutions like OSHA and the EPA certainly inveighs against his economic conservatism), it is certainly true that his rhetoric, his appeal to the 'Silent Majority', was the beginning of the end of the New Deal coalition. It seems to me that, had the Nixon Administration not ended in disgrace, that we'd have entered the conservative ('Reagan') cycle much sooner, with complete Republican dominance of Washington for the seventies, eighties, and most of the nineties, and we'd have entered a liberal re-alignment that much sooner.

Does that make Obama the Nixon-figure in this theory? I'd say so: Nixon was the first conservative political figure to strike a massive blow against the New Deal coalition; Obama seems to be the first center-left politician to demonstrate the inherent weaknesses of the Reaganite grouping.

Of course, there are parallels with both eras. Like Reagan, Obama's star seems to be ascending at the expense of a hugely unpopular incumbent President; but like Nixon he is running against a non-incumbent member of the dominant political party, who has largely subsumed the role of the President within the party (Johnson-Humphrey; Bush-McCain). Like Reagan, he has enormous charisma and has the ability to galvanize the masses, but again like Nixon, his proposed policies seem more pragmatic and remain located in the opposing (Reaganist) paradigm; just as Nixon was largely a moderate, Obama is more of a centrist than a traditional New Deal liberal, although like Nixon his rhetoric is relatively partisan.

Or perhaps this 'dialectical' mode of political history is bunk, and American politics really is more of a game of personalities than any back-and-forth swing of ideological sympathies. I'd be greatly interested in hearing the thoughts of the board on this matter.

Very good theory : I just would complete this analysis with most precisions :

	Description	First cycle	Second cycle	Third cycle	Fourth cycle
Period	The name I give to the period.	Progressive era	Keynesian era	Conservative era	?
Dominating party	Party who appears to win the majority of elections	Republican	Democrat	Republican	Democrat
Reformer	Someone who deeply change the country's politics. He is venerated by a generation of americans. His mandate is particularly long.	McKinley, T.Roosevelt	F.Rooseveelt	Reagan	Obama ?
Consolidator	A moderate who consolidates reformer's policies. He manages to create a consensus among the reformer's policies but is unable to be reelected.	Taft	Truman	G.H.W.Bush
Consensual opponent	A member of the non-dominating party who manages to be elected but on a very moderate program. He does almost no reform but is easily reelected.	Wilson ?	Eisenhower	Clinton
Accomplisher	A radical who pursues or improves reformer's policies. He is considered as an ultra-liberal/conservative by following generations. He generally ends his mandates deeply unpopular.		Kennedy, Johnson	G.W.Bush ?
Precursory	An exceptional politician who is able to durably destroy the dominating party's coalition, using particular political events. He does a first realignment, preceding reformer's action and permitting him to be elected later. However, he governs as a moderate and doesn't change a lot the political tradition.	Wilson ?	Nixon	Obama ?
Disastrous	A moderate of the dominating party who is expected to restore his dominacy but drammatically fails due to external events. He definitely disgusts people of the dominating ideology, preparing reformer's arrival.	Hoover	Carter	G.W.Bush ?

Now, the question is : who is Obama ? Is he the beginner of a fourth cycle or is he only the precursory of it ? Did he only destroy republican political dominacy or even conservative ideological dominacy ? We haven't yet the answer of this question, but probably we'll going to know it soon.

[pbrower2a]

If you go by theories by Neil Howe and the late William Strauss in Generations (1989) and subsequent books, you find an 80-year cycle in history that affects politics, culture, economics, and war. Times eighty years apart have obvious parallels. Abraham Lincoln's "Four score and seven years ago" in his Gettysburg Address recalls the American Declaration of Independence in a time similarly dangerous. Roughly 81 years after the Battle of Gettysburg was D-Day. Does anyone want to guess what happens in the next few years? It might not be pretty. Such is a Crisis Era, and in view of what happened in the last one worldwide (World War II, Stalin's forced collectivization and purges, the Holocaust, the atrocities of thug rulers in Japan, and the Spanish Civil War), you might not find it easy to dwell upon. Social life quickly becomes regimented, and merciless persecution of persons deemed evil (gangsters legitimately in America, Jews in Germany) ensues. Wars are waged with the intention of destroying the enemy once and for all. Children of the time don't fully understand the ferocity possible in human nature but tend to become very much unlike the time -- comparatively tolerant, undaring, sensitive, and compliant.

A parallel of 78 years exists between the peak of the Stock Market in 1929 -- and that in 2007, with ensuing declines of great magnitude. The Stock Market Crash of 1929 brought an end to the Devil-may-care "Roaring Twenties", a fun but nasty time of intensifying inequality, witless mass culture, dimwitted hedonism, rising debt, and rampant and ultimately destructive speculation. The Panic of 1857 had similar effects. Children of the time grow up with a desire for structure and certainty and seek it throughout their lives.

If I am to make any analogies between George W. Bush and earlier Presidents, then I would make them to a composite of  Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover -- the worst of all three, perhaps telescoping the corruption, neglect, and incompetence of twelve years into eight while intensifying them. The Roaring 20s were a time of speculation in almost everything -- also involving real estate, as seen in Sinclair Lewis' Babbitt, a tale of a real estate shyster who sells people houses that they can't afford. Does that sound familiar? The 1920s were weirdly analogous to this decade, except the analogy isn't so strange to those who read Generations. Howe and Strauss so predicted. As in the 1920s, so it was with the forgettable Presidents Pierce and Fillmore. People wanted weak leadership that would let them do whatever they wanted so long as they could come up with the money -- especially other people's money (OPM, which sounds much like "opium"). Harsh debates arose between religious fundamentalists and hedonistic youth. Civic life weakens and inequality intensifies as people turn away from the slow-and-steady ways of making good in favor of get-rich-quick schemes.  The civic tendency to see the long term and keep society from fragmenting is no longer present.

Such is a degenerate era (which H&S call an Unraveling) , one in which people dance on a volcano, so to speak. Kids of the time develop a taste for doing things on a large scale and accept the slow-and-steady long-term approach to economic life.

On the other side of a Crisis is a time of reconstruction when people sick of crusades rebuild their lives in attention to material realities. Although society remains regimented in most institutions, it becomes less willing to go to war. Teenagers know enough to not challenge adults who have maximal authority in households. Economic inequality lessens as plenty of jobs appear to meet unmet consumer needs or to rebuild the wreckage of war. People are more patient, and they are more willing to accept long-term, low-yield (but very secure) investments. People trust technology and authority. Culture becomes bland as society commits itself to doing things on gigantic scale. So it was in the 1950s in America -- or the 1870s or 1790s. The people who would stir up controversies are no longer around, and religious fundamentalism is weak.  Such is a Recovery or a High. The Presidents are often war heroes of a conservative bent: Washington, Grant, Eisenhower. 

In between the Recovery and the Unraveling is a time of cultural ferment -- like the (late) '60s
or the "Gay Nineties". (One must be 50 years old or so to recall when the "Gay Nineties" referred to the 1890s, and in no way to homosexuality!) when young adults challenged the blandness of the given society, when they questioned the smug certainties of middle-aged fuddy-duddies, when they men and women began to explore what each other thought instead of accepting the "received wisdom" on the matter.  Art, music, and literature veritably blossom.  New religious movements and importation become commonplace.  The great faults? People lose their realism as young adults still act much like children -- and children get badly neglected, exploited, and abused. A sexual revolution shatters shaky marriages, causing the greatest damage to children. The children of the time will grow up conservative and realistic and will put an end to the experimentation through their non-participation.

Note that the "Reagan Revolution" was possible only because youth then entering voting age had no use for 'Sixties counterculture and wanted economic and personal security, and no "funny stuff" in politics.

... Reagan was a success in part because he rode a wave. Never sympathetic to youthful challenges to adult authority, he found much support from youth who saw college as a place in which to prepare for a job in banking and not a place at which to protest the greed of bankers. Dubya was a disaster because he stood for rapacious and entrenched elites as well as fundamentalist religion at a time in which youth began to realize that unless they were born into the right families they stood to be exploited badly and that pie-in-the-sky religion would solve nothing.

Is Obama the new Hoover or the new FDR? We shall see soon enough. He might prefer to be a composite of Theodore Roosevelt and Dwight Eisenhower (which I would prefer, too) ... but history could deny him such a choice. 



 
 

[Frodo]

Does anyone else here agree with the parallels between President Obama and Richard Nixon?

[Mehmentum]

Does anyone else here agree with the parallels between President Obama and Richard Nixon?

I feel this may be the case.  Nixon was pragmatic, a moderate, and got things done, much like Obama (2009-10 has been among the most active legislative periods, even with how much compromise it took).  Obama is no prophet, he hasn't changed the system and won't even if Democrats somehow regain their supermajority. 

[phk]

There is no "grand" cyclical theory of political alignments.