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Author Topic: Confederate States  (Read 15043 times)
Ben.
Ben
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« on: June 28, 2004, 02:17:10 PM »

Well in the CSA, I could see Conservatives vs Rural Populist with a small Socialist Party (based on the support of urban organised labour).

In the North the Democrats would probably have evolved in a leftward direction (as they did) into a populist party with rural western support and urban blue collar support) mean while the Republican would have been the pro-business and nationalist party (as they where) with strong support in the far west and south west, New England and the MidAtlantic states but party identification would have had less to do with geography and more to do with social status…

The USA (1880’s)…

Blue = Republican leaning areas

Red = Democrat leaning areas

Green = Confederate States of America  

     

The CSA (1880’s)…

Red = Populist Party leaning states

Blue = Conservative Party leaning states

Green = United States of America

           
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Ben.
Ben
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« Reply #1 on: June 29, 2004, 03:49:20 AM »
« Edited: June 29, 2004, 03:57:49 AM by Ben »

At most Lee would have gotten to the outskirts of Washington, to the forts manned by the Heavy Artillery units.  The idea that the Army of Northern Virginia could have taken Washington, DC in 1862 is pure fantasy.  Just as Richmond took a long seige to take, so would have Washington, and the Confederate Army could never have won on a protracted seige because the Union reserves would be mobilzed to break it before it could succeed.  Lee's retreat sfter his invasion would always provide the situation for Lincoln to announce the Emancipation Proclaimation and once that Proclaimation was received in London, any chance that London would recognize the CSA before Washington did was gone.

Lee’s Biographer Douglas Southall Freeman said that Lee’s greatest chance to destroy completely a Union Army came in the Battle of the Seven Days. At Glendale Lee had already mauled the Union Army of the Potomac and sent it reeling back from the gates of Richmond, “Stonewall” Jackson’s “Army of the Valley” had finally arrived and now moved to facing the weak Federal right flank which was accorded along an area of swamp land, the next day Lee ordered classic double envelopment with James Longstreet’s Corps attacking from the South against the Federal Left and Jackson from the North against the Federal Right, the Federal Commander George B McClellan had abandoned the field and fled back to his headquarters on the banks of the James during the night and the Army of the Potomac lacked any leadership with Divisional commanders largely left to fend for themselves, Longstreet’s attack went well but for some reason Jackson’s attack never materialised and Longstreet was forced to end his own attacks, the reason for Jackson’s tardiness at Glendale can largely be attributed to exhaustion he had been deprived of any real rest for weeks and at the same time had lead perhaps the finest campaign of the civil war (“the Valley Campaign” of 1862), so suppose that Jackson gets some rest and attacks?

   



Jackson’s Corps smashes through the Federal Right flank and soon after Longstreet does likewise on the Federal Left, with both Federal flanks torn away it is left to every divisional commander to get out as best they can, the only two who might have achieved this would have been Joseph Hooker who was commanding a division slightly to the South and Phil Kearny who was perhaps the finest commander in the Army of the Potomac at the time (he was later killed at Canntily during the Federal retreat from Second Manassas.

Such a victory would have rendered 2/3rds of the Federal Army destroyed and the Federal Base at Harrison’s landing vulnerable, Lee would probably have easily seized the Federal base along with McClellan’s vast artillery train (which had been intended to reduce the fortifications of Richmond), Kearny and Hooker may have been able to withdraw their troops leaving either French or Sumner to either surrender Harrison’s landing or die defending it, but still that would leave but 20,000 men with little heavy equipment of over 120,000 men who had landed there at the beginning of the campaign. Lee would have moved North. John Pope may still have taken his patchwork command of the “Army of Virginia” out to meet Lee and would have been soundly beaten in fact with a probably noticeably smaller command Pope may well have been completely annihilated by Lee in the area around Manassas leaving only very limited Federal forces within the City of Washington with freshly raised troops forming the bulk, in such a situation Lee could have invaded the North as Braxton Bragg and Kirby Smith invaded Kentucky in Maryland he would have found little to stop him, with either Hooker or Kearny in command of the forces in Washington they would have realised that a force of what would have been about 40,000  could not hope to smash Lee and would have urged that  Union forces from secondary theatre such as South Carolina, North Carolina and perhaps even Louisiana be transported to Washington to reform a credible Army this would have left ports such as Charleston, Williamsport, Savannah, Mobile and even perhaps New Orleans under far less pressure and possibly permitting far more foreign aid to the South to enter the CSA, While at the same time confederate forces from these areas could be moved to Kentucky or Maryland, with Lee free to exploit the rich farmland of Pennsylvania and Maryland and with the likelihood that on entering the Pro-Southern East of the Maryland his Army would have been reinforced with new recruits while at the same time receiving men from along the Eastern Sea Board who had been freed thanks to the Union withdraw from these areas. In Kentucky with Lee dominating the Eastern theatre and reinforcements coming in all the time Bragg and Smith would probably have been emboldened to continue their offensive after the indecisive battle of Perryville and would probably have been able to compel General Buell to withdraw back into the fortifications of Louisville while Bragg’s plans for installing a confederate government in Kentucky to raise troops could have gone a head and within a mouth or so may have furnished the Confederate Army of Tennessee with an additional 5,000 or so men as could well have been the case with Lee in Maryland.

With the Confederates dominating both East and West and only Rosecrans and Grant holding their own at Corinth Mississippi against the Confederate General Van Dorn it is likely the English government (PM Palmerston had said after second Manassas that a second Confederate victory would compel Britain to recognise the South and France was already at this stage very eager to do so), Lincoln faced with the Royal Navy breaking up the Union blockade and with the threat of a British army in Canada (which including Militia number 110,000 men, spread wide but still a powerful force if concentrated) would have been forced to “acquiesce to the good entreaties of the European power” and may well have resigned leaving Hannibal Hamlin to suffer the repercussions of  a treaty with the south which may well have left Eastern Maryland as part of the CSA (the western part of the state remaining in Federal hands and providing a corridor of land around washing DC itself) and Kentucky (or at least the greater part of it) under confederate control). Within a decade or so the Economic ties that would have grown between North and South would have trumped any lingering hostility and while their may have been a friendly rivalry and some suspicion (with the CSA probably unabashedly allied with France and England) relations would not have been very bad between the two nations. However Slavery (Which would probably have come ot a slow end between the late 1880’s and mid 1910’s) would have been a bone of contention.                
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Ben.
Ben
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« Reply #2 on: June 30, 2004, 06:36:26 AM »

I disagree. Both sides were equally drilled. The problem was the flow of new recruits on both sides caused discipline problems. Gilliams tactics were FAR superior to Hardees (what a lousy book). I have read both and they are very interesting.

Hardee would have done a better job than Hood, whether his book sucks or not.

For one thing, I doubt that Hardee would have got half the Confederate command killed in one battle and for another, Hardee wouldn't have been stoned out on opium half the time.

Was Hood stoned on Opium? I suppose his doctors gave it to him for the constant pain he was in due to his amputated leg and arm... quite a tragic figure Hood, great Divisional comander, middling Corps commander, and indecisive and unlucky Army Commander, its actually amazing how close Hood got to destroying Schofield's Army prior to Franklin and then Thomas would have been greatly outnumbered at Nashville...

I would say Johnston should have remained in command at Atlanta his conduct during seven pines in 1862 was exemplary and had he not been wounded (when Lee took over) while he would not have demonstrated the brilliance of Lee he would probably have pushed the Federals back and then taken a defensive stand behind the Rappahannock near Fredericksburg... but perhaps Jefferson Davis' worst decision during his presidency was to remove Johnston from command of the Confederate Armies defending Atlanta, had he remained in command he planed for a series of counter attacks, that unlike Hoods may well have been better coordinated that might well have mauled Sherman's army a little and left it weakened, while a siege would still be likely it is also probable that the siege would have lasted longer and the Confederate Armies would have been in far better shape than they where after Ezra Church and so able to resist Sherman’s’ flanking of the City in September...    

As for Hardee he was a good, solid Corps commander, however at Missionary Ridge he really fowled up the deployment of his Corps, but that aside he was a capable and reliable, Pat Cleburne should most defiantly have received Corps command in the Army of Tennessee (which in saved from destruction on more than one occasion) he was also a good friend of Hardee (did he not marry Hardee’s daughter?) and trusted by his Corps commander implicitly, instead Hood advanced to Corps command, and while Polk was not as bad as many like to argue, Hood did not balance the command of the army and in fact wrecked a number of Johnston’s planned attacks during the Atlanta campaign.  

I always thought Johnston to be a really great person as well as a capable commander, at Sherman’s funeral he was a pawl bearing and, despite being in his 80’s, when it began to pour with rain he refused to put his hat on when friends insisted that he should saying, “where Sherman in my place and I in his he would not put on his hat” he then died shortly after from pneumonia.                

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Ben.
Ben
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« Reply #3 on: June 30, 2004, 09:27:55 AM »
« Edited: June 30, 2004, 09:30:21 AM by Ben »

Joe Johnston and PGT Beauregard. What a duo! Davis did not like either, what a fool he was.

Neither where geniuses, of the standard of say Forest, Jackson or Lee  and on the Federal side Grant and Sherman... But Johnson's actions during the Seven Pines, the Atlanta Campaign and the Bentonville Campaign show that he was indeed a gifted commander while Beauregard is often dismissed as a vain and untalented commander his defence of the port of Charleston from a massive Union Army and even his rescuing of the Army of the Mississippi after the battle of Shiloh show that while he was certainly moody and vain he was also a capable commander.  


In addition he did have a good grasp of “grand strategy” and while at times his recommendations may have been derided as fanciful, with hindsight many where in fact fairly reasonable, at least in their essence and such a broad outlook was something that Lee in particular certainly lacked, sadly.    
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