Talk Elections

For all things Korean - North and South.

At the moment there is some North Korean stuff in the China GD thread and it should be moved
The two North Korea threads about the regime's possible collapse and it's unusual execution methods could also be put here.

So, do you think the Norks are going to launch the satelite (test the missile) next month?  And if so, will the Japanese/US shoot it down?  Will the PRC and Russia back sanctions against them like they are claiming now?

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When was the last time you posted something useful?


Anyway, US Suspends Food Assistance to N.Korea (http://www.voanews.com/english/news/US-Suspends-North-Korea-Food-Aid-144680865.html)

The Norks have started fueling the rocket.  Launch expected sometime between Thursday and Monday.

I will be shocked if they don't attempt a launch on Sunday, as that is the 100th birthday of their Eternal President.

And much more importantly, it is my 16th birthday :P. I'm almost 100% certain that they will launch of the 15th.

A big-ass bronze statue of Kim #2 has been unveiled next to the equally big-ass statue of Kim #1:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QoJTptIV38k&feature=player_embedded

Does anybody know the military song that begins at 0:25 in that video. I have seen it in their military parades, and I must admit---I like it :P

Yesterday, Kim Jong-Un gave a 20 minute speech.

Wouldn't be shocking in most places, but Kim's dad Kim Jong-Il didn't give a single speech in his 17 years running North Korea.

He once said "Glory to the Peoples Army" but that was it.

It dependens how you define a speech. He often visited factories and collective farms and gave "advice" to the workers - sometimes in the form of peptalks.

China has suspended its agreement to repatriate illegal North Koreans. Officially this is over the rocket "launch", but one anonymous government official said he "can't ignore" the fact that repatriated North Koreans are jailed or worse. Will we see a rush across the border similar to the rush of East Germans into Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1989?

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jJITPOH0kU5F5f0tK3EgikhNrBmA?docId=CNG.a8c1c3e2edf92a30cc1b3c9bd5ed11c1.1f1

I doubt the Chinese will accept mass exodus. They will probably shut the border again, if refugees start coming in huge numbers. But if they don't, this could potentially be the "beginning of the end" for the regime.

I think this decision was driven by the internal power struggle within the Chinese Politburo and not out of any particular humanitarian concerns. And besides, most North Koreans who do cross into China nowadays are informal traders who see border guards merely as toll collectors, which never happened in East Germany. We have no idea of figuring out what North Koreans think, but they have much less access to foreign information than East Germans did. Kim Il Sung was definitely popular among North Koreans and his family may retain some loyalty among the population. AFAIK this was never true about the SED leadership.

That's obvious. Unsure what your point is? Do you support my view that they will shut the border again if the refugees start coming in large numbers or ...

Nah, but we do know that living conditions are pretty horrible, which is always a powerfull motivator for human action. The regime is also not able to shut out all info to the degree they used to do.

This decision is very clearly another slap in the face committed by the Hu/Wu faction in the Politburo against Bo Xilai's people since he was fired. From now they'll probably tolerate North Koreans who quietly make their way to foreign embassies or find menial jobs. They definitely won't tolerate a high-profile rush across borders. Kim Jong Un needs face, after all.

Besides, in many dictatorships the central leadership retains considerable popularity and the local officials are blamed for any problems. East Germany was a rare exception thanks to the widespread availability of western media. In North Korea, radio sets are pre-tuned to government stations.

Don't forget the in-house speakers as well.

So we basically agree that the Chinese will shut the border if things start to get serious. Just didn't understand the "not out of humanitarian concerns" remark. It was pretty weird in this context since no-one in their right mind would argue that the Chinese regime does anything out of humanitarian concerns.

Regarding info level I think its pretty obvious, that NK is not nearly as secluded as it used to be. I cant currently find the references I am looking for, so Ill just quote our "resident Korea expert" seanobr from the North Korean Collapse thread.

"With respect to the question of ideological indoctrination, the foundation of the state is already being penetrated by hallyu, the proliferation of outside media, increasing personal interaction with China, cynicism engendered by the government's dysfunction, and the D.P.R.K.'s own attempt to embrace technology, such as the Orascom mobile network. How the information gleaned from such experience will interact with the perception of North Korean reality is entirely subjective.  On the one hand, there is probably a degree of self-selection, in that those who communicate regularly with the South and dance along the Chinese border are not illustrative of broader D.P.R.K. society; at the same time, the North's narrative of injustice, the memory of Kim Il-sung, Korean nationalism, and America's own role in the division of the peninsula still can be an extremely poignant combination. By tolerating the jangmadang, the North has tacitly accepted that its writ is no longer incontrovertible, and since I believe the state will never resurrect its command economy, the deterioration can only continue and even accelerate".

To be fair, his analysis continues:

"The issue, however, is not exposure to the outside in and of itself, but whether it will ever become actionable -- the potential for discontent and antipathy targeted at the current regime to manifest given the proper context, and that is unknowable, which is why I wouldn't formulate foreign policy with it in mind. The North's complete suppression of civil society and extreme social regimentation make the coordination required for an organic movement to extend itself nearly impossible, its manipulation of ideology is unparalleled, and a credible argument can be made that almost everyone in a position of substantial influence has a reason to preserve the state. Authoritarian rule is inherently fragile, but it can be sustainable".  

I am not sure I agree 100% with his evaluation. I think testimonys from refugees from NK show a high level of discontent with the regime, which could translate into spontaneous acts of desperation such as a huge wave of refugees trying to escape the country. But of course the views of refugees are far from unbiased.

The fact that the regime has proved so stable over time seems to convince everybody, that NK will stay the same forever, but the fact is that even NK is not immune to the effects of globalization.
Change is far from given, but not nearly as unlikely as most people tend to assume.'

Regarding SK popculture in NK see: http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=8112 (http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=8112)

Since China is reluctant to engage on any aspect of its Korean policy, there has never been confirmation of its position, but the popular assumption is that China was willing to implicitly tolerate the presence of those D.P.R.K. nationals who took care to be as unobtrusive as possible.  It certainly didn't appreciate the self-defeating spectacle outside of the Japanese consulate in Shenyang in 2002; it has attempted to prevent foreign governments from harboring North Korean defectors in their diplomatic missions in the past, and there was a rumor at the end of last year that it had extracted an agreement from Japan never to extend such protection going forward.  The essential quality of China's approach to the D.P.R.K., however, is still pragmatism, and while I don't think it possesses the ability or desire to prevent every refugee from crossing the border, the current arrangement has actually been beneficial for both governments.  The significant ethnic Korean population in China's northeast -- which has been exploited by the North Korean media in the past -- does make it easier than it otherwise would be for someone to migrate over the border, facilitating passage has become a lucrative form of illicit commerce, and the importance of the economic interaction taking place in China to the functioning of the North Korean state has militated against China taking the stringent action that Pyongyang might have once preferred.  Indeed, although Kim Jong-un was apparently responsible for an effort to secure the border during his rise to prominence, and immediately after Kim Jong-il's death there was an attempt to seal it, the latest report was that individuals were being permitted to travel into China without repercussions as long they returned with tribute to the state.  

It's not my intent to downplay the suffering of D.P.R.K. nationals in China -- overwhelmingly women forced into menial labor or sexual slavery and desperate to escape their plight -- or to imply that it is possible to travel back and forth between the two at will, but since the famine, when the number of refugees inside the country reached its peak, it has become increasingly possible for individuals to reach China and take advantage of opportunities there.  It will remain an extremely dangerous, degrading and miserable proposition, as much of the media attention on this subject has highlighted.  China has permitted D.P.R.K. security agents to operate in the border areas to identify transients, and the North is trying to eliminate as many of the traditional crossing paths as possible, but it is no longer uncommon, and the process has even become entrenched to an extent.  Those who do not actively attract attention or disrupt the equilibrium have a reasonable chance of remaining in China for an extended period of time.  Is anyone aware of how this might compare to the situation on China's border with Burma?

If China has elected to re-evaluate its position on the refugee issue, the influence of its own leadership succession turmoil may have played a role, and it's surprising to me that no one here noticed that Bo Xilai's replacement in Chongqing, Vice Premier Zhang Dejiang, was educated in Pyongyang.  I wonder, however, if we are not projecting the abstruse character of China's political scene onto an issue that should be seen as distinct.  China's transition may have forced it into an adjustment, but not in the manner of pure power competition that has been implied here.  In the first instance, whether or not it was because of a specific relationship he cultivated with the Chinese government, Hu Jintao's reluctance for confrontation, the evolving nature of China's D.P.R.K. policy, or his longevity -- being a personal guest of Hu Yaobang and the Chinese leadership on a journey to Shanghai in 1982 -- Kim Jong-il was accorded far more deference in China than he deserved.  Even after the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents of 2010, Kim Jong-il's subsequent travels to China were free of the rancor one might have expected.  China was not as forthcoming with developmental assistance as the D.P.R.K. anticipated, and gracefully parried Kim Jong-il's request to renovate his obsolescent air force, but they immediately sent Kim Jong-un a photograph of Mao and his grandfather to signify their attachment after his unveiling at the 3rd Delegates Conference, and extended an invitation to Jong-un when he was still matriculating under his father.  It would not surprise me if, no longer having to interact with an adroit and senior Kim Jong-il, China is willing to be more assertive with respect to the D.P.R.K.  That is notable, because the substantial refugee repatriation in March of this year engendered an unexpected outpouring of condemnation, including a protracted protest in Seoul, the hunger strike of a South Korean parliamentarian, and even led a Congressional panel here to re-examine China's handling of D.P.R.K. nationals.  After the North declared its intent to launch a satellite to commemorate Kim Il-sung's centennial, China suddenly permitted a North Korean mother -- whose sister had already defected -- and her children that had been inhabiting a diplomatic legation in the country for two years to move on to Seoul, something that was interpreted as a tacit rebuke of Pyongyang.  It's undeniable that China has typically accepted and enabled North Korea's escalation of regional tension as an integral component of Pyongyang's foreign policy.  But at a meeting on April 7th in Ningbo, which was conveniently located in proximity to the rocket's submitted flight path, Yang Jiechi claimed China was 'troubled' by the pending launch, and the alacrity with which the U.N. Security Council issued a Presidential Statement deploring Pyongyang's act suggests to me that China's tolerance is at a minimum.  

Another interesting barometer is the degree to which the Chinese government circumscribes discourse in its media about North Korea, and while I'm not qualified to comment with any specificity, Adam Cathcart has been following this subject regularly since the start of the year.  In the period after Kim Jong-il's death, one of China's state media publications exhorted Kim Jong-un to leave his mark ideologically, much as Kim Jong-il was able to when he was a member of the party's Propaganda and Agitation Department; that statement can be interpreted differently, depending on how you view the D.P.R.K.'s existence, but I doubt that a putative satellite launch and a hypothetical third nuclear test was what the Chinese government had in mind.  I'm presuming that China, more than anything else, would like an international environment that is as stable as possible so its institutions, undoubtedly vulnerable even during an orderly transfer of power, are not overwhelmed by an unforeseen development requiring a decisive response.  North Korea, however, may require exactly the opposite in order for Kim Jong-un and his coterie to feel secure about their position, even though I doubt there is any legitimate challenge to their authority; if there is such a divergence, China will naturally do what is needed to protect itself while not trying to undermine its relationship with the North.  While a third nuclear test will lead to North Korea's denunciation and produce a frantic search for additional punitive measures that can be enacted against it, as much if not more opprobrium will be directed at China for not adequately restraining its ally, and I don't think that's something China would like to deal with at the moment.  If China is going to temporarily uphold non-refoulement, it is a clear admonishment of Pyongyang, seeing as all of the behavior attributable to Kim Jong-un's succession thus far has been in a direction of reasserting state control, including, as I noted above, making border crossing more problematic.  

In my subjective reading, there is more suspicion in their relationship than at any point since the D.P.R.K.'s first nuclear test compelled China to support U.N. resolution 1718, and an increasing sense in China that the imbalance between the two, in that China can neither renounce the D.P.R.K. nor meaningfully inhibit its behavior without imperiling Pyongyang's survival, has to eventually be rectified.  As I have mentioned here before, China will never abandon North Korea so long as America is conveying the impression that it cannot countenance a reduction in its importance to East Asia; that doesn't mean China is going to allow itself to be exploited.  Similarly, Kim Jong-il devoted his entire tenure as paramount leader to vainly attempting to normalize his relationship with America so as to reduce his dependency on China, and I have no doubt he imparted that lesson to Kim Jong-un.  China may take advantage of the next year to illustrate, in its own way, that Kim Jong-un is not his father and cannot take China's role as the North's cupbearer for granted; or this may simply be the natural reaction of a China that is more sensitive about its image than ever before.  I would not overstate the importance of Beijing's leadership succession, and I think it's perfectly explicable in the context of China's interaction with North Korea since Kim Jong-il's demise.

Activists from South Korea sends balloons carrying anti-regime pamphlets across the border. Norks are pissed and threatens to stop talks with South Korea.

The defector-led group Fighters for Free North Korea released 200,000 leaflets condemning the regime encased in helium-buoyed balloons.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/25/north-korea-condemns-anti-government-leaflets (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/25/north-korea-condemns-anti-government-leaflets)

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/26/northkorea-kim-idUSL3N0RR2ZU20140926

How does a 28 year old manage to be that unhealthy?? Was he strung out on crack from 2001 until 2011 or something?

It may have been a botched assassination attempt.

Uncle Jang strikes from beyond the grave, perhaps?

Several members of the National Defense Committee (including the entire Jang faction) have been purged, and there are reports that a palace coup has occured, removing Kim Jong Un of real power.

Source. (http://www.forbes.com/sites/donaldkirk/2014/09/26/n-korea-leader-kim-jong-uns-uncomfortable-illness-deepens-mystery-of-power-struggle/)

Kim Jong Un still MIA.


http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/north-korean-officials-pay-surprise-visit-to-the-south/2014/10/04/383e76f1-f39c-4c10-9889-12bfce88e150_story.html

Most likely, Kim Jong Un ate too much stuff, which combined with his giant-sized ego, cause his inside to rupture.

So literally what happened to Henry VIII.

Extreme field guidance can severely damage your ankles.

Wouldn't it be interesting to see Kim Yo-jong ascending to power? It's about time we'll have a female dictator.

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North Korea and South Korea exchange fire after patrol boat violates sea border (http://www.news.com.au/world/asia/north-korea-and-south-korea-exchange-fire-after-patrol-boat-violates-sea-border/story-fnh81fz8-1227082501055)

North Korea just admitted to their labor camps for the first time ever (http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/UN_UNITED_NATIONS_NORTH_KOREA?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2014-10-07-16-39-41) and also apparently someone fairly high up visited the EU

This is very strange.  I suppose North Korea does have a model of "military dictatorship mysteriously deciding that it wants to actually be more free and democratic and stuff and then no-really-actually we're following through on that" in Myanmar if it decides to go that route.

Koreas exchange fire (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-29568533)

Did he show up? Doesn't seem like it...

No. "An official state media dispatch listed senior government, military and party officials who paid their respects at the ceremony, but not Kim." He would have been on it, if he was present.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/kim-jongun-misses-workers-party-event-amid-rumours-north-korean-leader-has-been-deposed-9786422.html (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/kim-jongun-misses-workers-party-event-amid-rumours-north-korean-leader-has-been-deposed-9786422.html)

For historical interest, I scanned an English-language book published in Pyongyang in 1979 titled "Modern History of Korea" which some of you may find slightly interesting, although I don't have twenty posts so I can't directly link to it: archive [dot] org/download/ModernHistoryOfKorea/Modern%20History%20of%20Korea.pdf

An interesting document.  Beyond the expected excesses of propaganda in anything produced by True Korea, I have to wonder why they devote a half page in the foreword to explain why "chajusong" can't be adequately translated into English.  From the description, it seems that "self-determination" would be an adequate translation, and that the only real reason for not translating it was to point out that in the official True Korean POV, individual self-determination can only be achieved once national self-determination is achieved.

What I find amusing is that it more or less claims that Kim Il Sung began founding the "real" Korean communist movement at the age of 14 (the Down-with-Imperialism Union.)

According to KCNA Kim Jong-un has just visited a research center and a housing estate, if true that would be his first public appearance in three weeks.

Kim Jong Il also went absent for short periods. I think a coup would require not just absence, but also a cessation of praise for Kim Jong Un (which wasn't the case, his name continued to be constantly mentioned in DPRK media.)

North Korea seems to be struggling with its economics more than ever now, having been shut out by China, Russia and other countries during the last year. Some think the Organization and Guidance Department (OGD) of the Korean Workers Party might have decided to take the power away from Kim and into their own hands, perhaps because Kim might have refused a closer cooperation with archenemy South Korea: https://news.vice.com/article/why-a-very-specific-kind-of-coup-may-explain-kim-jong-uns-disappearance

"An elite group of exiles from North Korea gathered in September in the Netherlands to discuss the state of the regime they used to serve. The conference included top diplomats, an ex-senior official of the Ministry of Security, and a high-ranking military officer, but the keynote address was given by Jang Jin-sung, formerly a key member of Kim Jong-il's propaganda machine. Included in Jang's speech was a surprising assertion: North Korea is in the midst of a civil war." More here: https://news.vice.com/article/former-top-official-says-kim-jong-un-is-no-longer-in-control-of-north-korea

Here is a link to New Focus International, the site run by high ranking defector Jang Jin-sung, who claims OGD has taken over.

http://newfocusintl.com/ (http://newfocusintl.com/)

Perhaps Kim Jong-un's biggest obstacle was the fact he never got time to build his own power base. When Kim Jong-il came to power, there was a lot of scepticism and predictions he won't hold onto it, but he was very busy consolidating his position during his period as designated successor.

Of course, Kim Jong-il had twenty years for this, while his son was too young and hadn't been selected until a few years before his father's death.

And Kim Jong-Il didn't have the OGD to deal with.

Twice in the last day a small squad (10ish) well armed Norks were seen inside the DMZ.  First time the South fired warning shots, the Norks didn't return fire but hung around checking sh**t out.  The second time there was a small firefight and then they left.

The Korean Demilitarized Zone being called "demilitarized" is perhaps the greatest of all unintentional ironies.

Perhaps the most feasible way for the OGD fellows would be either to retain Kim Jong-un as ceremonial figurehead or to somehow share power with him. After all, the whole North Korean system is being build on having one (living) Godlike leader, so it can be difficult to replace this with some faceless collective.

Of course if Kim Jong-un has to go, some other member of the Family would do.

South Korea now has a contingency plan of economic reforms to be implemented in case of Korean unification.

If it happens South Korean tax payers are in for a nightmare. BRD was 2-3 richer than DDR. South Korea is 14-30 times richer than North Korea depending on how you count. The largest wealth gap between two countries with a shared border.

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/11/dream-korean-unification-2014111565039906410.html (http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/11/dream-korean-unification-2014111565039906410.html)

What would be preferable for South Korea, if they had a choice: a North Korea publicly seeking reunification on the South's terms, or a North Korean puppet state that remains independent but the South controls behind the scenes?

Option two, but I don't even think they care that much about controlling it. Any scenario in which North Korea would remain stable after a regime change, open its borders and economy and develop gradually on its own terms would be preferable to getting the responsibility after a collapse.

Option 2, but it would require the intervention of Alien Space Bats for that to happen.

Of what?

AH.com term for the impossible.

Putting a price tag on unification: "Around 500 billion $"

http://news.yahoo.com/korea-puts-economic-unification-tab-500-billion-031557279.html (http://news.yahoo.com/korea-puts-economic-unification-tab-500-billion-031557279.html)

Your latter option sounds a lot less like a "puppet state" per se than it does a "gradual/controlled reunification", which is what I think is most likely to happen as is: that the North becomes a de facto Southern protectorate after the "fall of the regime" (whatever that entails) in a nominal confederation but essentially separate from the South. Over a period of 10-20 years North would be developed to a level where full reunification would be non-cataclysmic. 

The Northerners would still experience a dramatic rise in liberties, their standard of living, but would at the same time be used to (for a time) by sheer custom to curtailments on their rights that most would consider excessive but would prevent the sort of catastrophe most imagine happening in the case of a sudden reunification (for example, I imagine people needing a permit, much as is the case with the Chinese Houkou system, to move to the South). I easily see the North, which was historically the more industrially active of the two regions, becoming the next massive center for low cost manufacturing.

The most likely regime "change" in North Korea is a military takeover with a Burma style social order. In this case South Korean conglomerates would invest and be quite influential , but the government would still be very adverse to outright Southern political interference.

Well if that happened then yes, that is what would happen. But isolation has its benefits- clearly, or else they would have changed by now; Burma was pretty isolated under the military as well, under Than Shwe and so forth (I assume you mean Burma before a few years ago).

North Korea has defeated James Franco. Who will be next?

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 South Korea's dark descent back into authoritarianism continues.  (http://m.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30544469)

That's worrying (and also stupid, since it's such a small and unimportant party). Your headline is hyperbolic (as usual), but the human rights situation is definitely getting worse.

They got 10% in the last parliamentary election; hardly minor.

In the grand scheme of things it is not a party that could "threaten" the South Korean established order. They have a limited electoral potential (among other things because they are too "Nork-friendly").

I suppose South Korea is now at BRD post-1956, pre-Willy Brandt democracy level. Not authoritarian, but not really a full democracy either and the reasons for banning those guys are far less reasonable than the arguments behind the Cold War ban on the KPD.

99.97% turnout in the North Korean local elections. The Norks truly are world leaders in get out the vote operations!

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/20/north-korean-elections-draw-9997-turnout-says-state-media (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/20/north-korean-elections-draw-9997-turnout-says-state-media)

I wonder whom Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il voted for.

You counterrevolutionary traitor, the Great Leader and the Dear Leader do not need to vote. Even in death, they still guide the glorious Korean people to vote to continue their glorious policies as personified by their glorious successor!

Now this way to the train station...

NK celebrates the 70th birthday of the Workers' Party of Korea. Time to retire... (nah, but one can dream).

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http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/11921914/North-Korea-gears-up-for-70th-anniversary-of-Workers-Party-in-pictures.html (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/11921914/North-Korea-gears-up-for-70th-anniversary-of-Workers-Party-in-pictures.html)