"I want to be an astrophysicist to prove God is real using science."

[muon2]

The Kalam argument, popularized by William Lane Craig (born August 23, 1949), begins by assuming that the universe had a beginning, but can it even be proven that the universe itself has not always existed?

I don't know, but that's the working, accepted theory of the scientific community right now.

Maybe, but it is a theory, and not necessarily a fact.

Actually it's a law of nature. We call it Hubble's Law.

This law/theory distinction is generally misunderstood by the public. The Big Bang is not "theory" in the sense that it is less proven. Science is about discerning the facts of our universe and the relationships between those facts. Those relationships can have different degrees of universality, and be given different labels based on the era when the relationship was noted. For example, the determinists in Newton's time called these relationships "laws". But some of these laws, like Ohm's Law for electrical resistance are known to apply to a limited range of materials and conditions, yet are given the same label as Newton's Law of Universal Gravitation.

By the middle of the 1800's the term theory was being used when the relationship was rigorously derived. It reflected in part the Romantic Era's desire to seek the beauty in nature, with elegant mathematics a part of that. Think of this use of theory as having its root in theorem, the strongest statement of fact in the realm of mathematics. Electromagnetic theory in the form of Maxwell's equations is far more universal in its reach and strength of proof than Ohm's law, but the terms of each era are what we use today. The label law is applied to a single mathematical expression and is often relegated to observational relationships that were not be backed up by rigorous mathematics, such as Ohm's Law.

Think of the "theory" of the origin of the universe in that light. Hubble's Law of the expansion of the universe derives from Einstein's General Theory of Relativity. It is supported with almost a century of confirming observations. Over that century our instruments have made ever more precise measurements of the Hubble constant and other parameters that point to an event at a specific time for the beginning of the universe.

[muon2]

Technically speaking, science cannot ever "prove" anything.

The only things that can be proven are a priori truths, like most mathematical theorems (but even those have to rely on axioms that we basically take on faith). Everything else has to start from our sensory perceptions, which we have no way of knowing are true.

Aren't repeatable observations also a priori truths in the same category as a axiom? It is an axiom of mathematics that when equals are added to equals the wholes remain equal. Is that observation of math (Euclid called it a common notion) any different than an observation that the sun and planets move on a highly regular and predictable schedule? I claim these observations have the same status as mathematical axioms and become the same sort of fundamental truths.

From these observations I can generate the scientific equivalent of theorems, as rigorously tested as one in mathematics. One might interject that these scientific truths are not absolute but change over time, much as Newton's Universal Gravitation gave way to Einstein's General Relativity. I would respond that mathematics was once limited to real numbers, but new observations discovered problems that required complex numbers to be solved, and this made some theorems no longer universal but restricted to real numbers only. In the same way Newton's Gravity remains correct when restricted to its original set of facts.

[muon2]

Technically speaking, science cannot ever "prove" anything.

The only things that can be proven are a priori truths, like most mathematical theorems (but even those have to rely on axioms that we basically take on faith). Everything else has to start from our sensory perceptions, which we have no way of knowing are true.

Aren't repeatable observations also a priori truths in the same category as a axiom? It is an axiom of mathematics that when equals are added to equals the wholes remain equal. Is that observation of math (Euclid called it a common notion) any different than an observation that the sun and planets move on a highly regular and predictable schedule? I claim these observations have the same status as mathematical axioms and become the same sort of fundamental truths.

From these observations I can generate the scientific equivalent of theorems, as rigorously tested as one in mathematics. One might interject that these scientific truths are not absolute but change over time, much as Newton's Universal Gravitation gave way to Einstein's General Relativity. I would respond that mathematics was once limited to real numbers, but new observations discovered problems that required complex numbers to be solved, and this made some theorems no longer universal but restricted to real numbers only. In the same way Newton's Gravity remains correct when restricted to its original set of facts.

That is a very fair way to look at this, yeah. I don't think it invalidates my argument though: the point is that any kind of "science" first requires making some kind of leap of faith. In the case of math, this involves axioms, and in the case of natural sciences, it's trusting that our senses give us a largely correct picture of reality. Neither can truly be "proven" (or disproven) - it's all a matter of how far we can go with them.

Of course the nature of any axiom is that it cannot be proven, but must be assumed to be true. Mathematical axioms are selected such that reasonably educated mathematicians would make the same observation about the truth of the axiom. Scientific facts are based on the same philosophical criteria that reasonably educated observers would come to the same conclusion about the fact.

I guess I'm saying that there is no leap of faith to accept a "common notion" mathematical axiom or measurable scientific observation if I start with the belief that there are true but unproveable statements about the universe. I believe there is a kernel of facts one must accept without proof in order to be rational beings and that includes things like axioms and observations.

[muon2]

Technically speaking, science cannot ever "prove" anything.

The only things that can be proven are a priori truths, like most mathematical theorems (but even those have to rely on axioms that we basically take on faith). Everything else has to start from our sensory perceptions, which we have no way of knowing are true.

Aren't repeatable observations also a priori truths in the same category as a axiom? It is an axiom of mathematics that when equals are added to equals the wholes remain equal. Is that observation of math (Euclid called it a common notion) any different than an observation that the sun and planets move on a highly regular and predictable schedule? I claim these observations have the same status as mathematical axioms and become the same sort of fundamental truths.

From these observations I can generate the scientific equivalent of theorems, as rigorously tested as one in mathematics. One might interject that these scientific truths are not absolute but change over time, much as Newton's Universal Gravitation gave way to Einstein's General Relativity. I would respond that mathematics was once limited to real numbers, but new observations discovered problems that required complex numbers to be solved, and this made some theorems no longer universal but restricted to real numbers only. In the same way Newton's Gravity remains correct when restricted to its original set of facts.

That is a very fair way to look at this, yeah. I don't think it invalidates my argument though: the point is that any kind of "science" first requires making some kind of leap of faith. In the case of math, this involves axioms, and in the case of natural sciences, it's trusting that our senses give us a largely correct picture of reality. Neither can truly be "proven" (or disproven) - it's all a matter of how far we can go with them.

Of course the nature of any axiom is that it cannot be proven, but must be assumed to be true. Mathematical axioms are selected such that reasonably educated mathematicians would make the same observation about the truth of the axiom. Scientific facts are based on the same philosophical criteria that reasonably educated observers would come to the same conclusion about the fact.

I guess I'm saying that there is no leap of faith to accept a "common notion" mathematical axiom or measurable scientific observation if I start with the belief that there are true but unproveable statements about the universe. I believe there is a kernel of facts one must accept without proof in order to be rational beings and that includes things like axioms and observations.

It's a leap of faith in the sense that it is not, in the epistemological sense, knowledge. It is something that you choose to believe in order to give meaning to your sensory experiences that would otherwise lack any. You can defend the validity on your axioms on the ground of "common sense", but "common sense" is, at its heart, nothing more than an intuition, and I don't think it's necessarily a more valuable intuition than the one that draws some people toward religion.

I start with the proposition that there are true but unproveable assertions about the universe. Then the key leap would be that such assertions can be established by a group of appropriately educated observers. After that I wouldn't think that accepting any specific observations, scientific or mathematical, would require a leap of faith as they follow from those propositions.

The classical epistemologist would say that knowledge is justified true belief, and my propositions fall within that definition. I get the sense that you take a more modern approach and would not accept the classical definition. To discuss the point further, I would need to know what epistemological definition of knowledge you favor.

[muon2]

I start with the proposition that there are true but unproveable assertions about the universe. Then the key leap would be that such assertions can be established by a group of appropriately educated observers. After that I wouldn't think that accepting any specific observations, scientific or mathematical, would require a leap of faith as they follow from those propositions.

The classical epistemologist would say that knowledge is justified true belief, and my propositions fall within that definition. I get the sense that you take a more modern approach and would not accept the classical definition. To discuss the point further, I would need to know what epistemological definition of knowledge you favor.

How exactly can you say that the belief is justified, if you yourself admit that it relies on unprovable assertions? If an assertion is unprovable, then by definition it cannot be justified, and so even if you believe it and it is in fact true it still wouldn't qualify as knowledge. So yes, conditional on this initial assertion being true you can then build on it with real knowledge, but it still requires this initial step that still feels like a leap of faith to me.

I'm using the traditional philosophical definition of knowledge from Aristotle through at least the mid 20th century. The phrase "justified true belief" is not mine; here's a Venn diagram of a classical view of knowledge from Wikipedia.


I'm curious as to how you define knowledge? Are there particular philosophers whose definition you find suitable?

[muon2]

I start with the proposition that there are true but unproveable assertions about the universe. Then the key leap would be that such assertions can be established by a group of appropriately educated observers. After that I wouldn't think that accepting any specific observations, scientific or mathematical, would require a leap of faith as they follow from those propositions.

The classical epistemologist would say that knowledge is justified true belief, and my propositions fall within that definition. I get the sense that you take a more modern approach and would not accept the classical definition. To discuss the point further, I would need to know what epistemological definition of knowledge you favor.

How exactly can you say that the belief is justified, if you yourself admit that it relies on unprovable assertions? If an assertion is unprovable, then by definition it cannot be justified, and so even if you believe it and it is in fact true it still wouldn't qualify as knowledge. So yes, conditional on this initial assertion being true you can then build on it with real knowledge, but it still requires this initial step that still feels like a leap of faith to me.

I'm using the traditional philosophical definition of knowledge from Aristotle through at least the mid 20th century. The phrase "justified true belief" is not mine; here's a Venn diagram of a classical view of knowledge from Wikipedia.


I'm curious as to how you define knowledge? Are there particular philosophers whose definition you find suitable?

I'm familiar with the classical definition of knowledge, yes. I'm not sure if I buy it entirely, but I haven't come across a better one so I wasn't going to try and dispute it. Anyway, my argument was rooted in this particular definition and you haven't addressed it.

For the classical definition of knowledge to make any sense then we must agree that there are justifiable true beliefs or there is no knowledge at all. Justification is specifically not proof nor is it intended to be. Otherwise the definition of knowledge can become circular as it would require knowledge to prove the justification that something is knowledge.

So it is part of the classical definition that my propositions need not be proved, just that they are well justified. Are you arguing that either of my propositions are poorly justified?

[muon2]

He might never prove that god exists, but he did prove that geniuses don't have to be very wise.

Mmmmk.

Is "I want to be an astrophysicist to prove God is real using science" wise? I mean, I don't really blame him- he might be a genius but he's still just a child who was indoctorinated into a religion by his parents.

(just realized days later that my previous comment was incomplete )

It might or might not be. I've had students who have said they wanted to go into science to find the God particle (Higgs boson), and some actually did (at CERN). I've had other students who said they wanted to prove some conjecture about the origin of the universe, and some have and others haven't.

[muon2]

He might never prove that god exists, but he did prove that geniuses don't have to be very wise.

Mmmmk.

Is "I want to be an astrophysicist to prove God is real using science" wise? I mean, I don't really blame him- he might be a genius but he's still just a child who was indoctorinated into a religion by his parents.

(just realized days later that my previous comment was incomplete )

It might or might not be. I've had students who have said they wanted to go into science to find the God particle (Higgs boson), and some actually did (at CERN). I've had other students who said they wanted to prove some conjecture about the origin of the universe, and some have and others haven't.

Well, I think there's a difference between these admirable, if ambitious, goals of finding scientific proof for scientific issues, and finding proof for something ambiguous and imo childish like "finding proof that god\santa\zeus exist".

But some of those who got into science initially had equally fanciful ideas about the origin of the universe or the interconnectedness of matter and energy, etc (consider some one wanting to measure The Force). With knowledge they were able to refine their ideas about what to investigate. Does that make them unwise to have started with fanciful ideas?

[muon2]

He might never prove that god exists, but he did prove that geniuses don't have to be very wise.

Mmmmk.

Is "I want to be an astrophysicist to prove God is real using science" wise? I mean, I don't really blame him- he might be a genius but he's still just a child who was indoctorinated into a religion by his parents.

(just realized days later that my previous comment was incomplete )

Fair enough, but while I agree that 'proof' really isn't the right term for what we're working with here, it is true that various theistic arguments are based on research into cosmology and quantum mechanics (regarding origin of universe and free will/determinism), so it doesn't seem that far-fetched for someone to go into physics in part to look for evidence for their faith.

Going into a scientific investigation with the intent of proving something you already believe, rather than finding the truth, is how you get terrible science.

That's what the scientific method is for.

But as long as someone is doing their work honestly, what is wrong with hoping that their results turn out a certain way?  Scientists of all persuasions have wanted certain results to be true (whether they like the mathematical elegance of their hypothesis, or for some other reason).  While not perfect, the forces of peer review should act as a counterbalance to this. 

I would go a step further. In my experience it is rare to find a scientist who doesn't have an expectation for their experiment or theoretical inquiry. It's the initial belief in the underlying theory that drives scientists to better measure and confirm that theory. If I proposed an experiment and had no belief that it would have an expected result, it is highly unlikely that I would get funding or other support for that experiment.

[muon2]

If the creator is unwilling to stop evil, what is the point of believing in such a "person".
I always find it strange that theists who believe that the creator is three separate males
(and no females) refer to this creator using the singular. If this creator three, how can this
creator be one? Three does not equal one, unless truth is not truth, and I guess I must be
pretty stupid because I think that truth is truth and believing in three separate persons is
polytheism* and that's the truth.

*not that polytheism is necessarily worse than theism.

Anyway, the point is simply that religion is useless if we can do whatever we want.

The consubstantial relationship between the three Divine Persons of the Trinity is not polytheism.  Each is part of one God.

Isn't everything "part of God"? Anyway the whole concept is bizarre and is only the result of an obvious over-literal view of the Bible. This "god" is always referred to in the singular and we are, if you believe the Bible, created in the image of god. If that were true.. the image of god is one person, so the whole idea of the Trinity isn't even supported by the Bible anyway which contradicts itself (at least if taken literally). Figuratively speaking I may have different parts to myself, and a person can have a multiple personality disorder, but a person is a person and not any more. So, if you take the Bible figuratively this being could have disparate personalities but not three separate bodies. The point is that there are not three literal persons. I still don't see how this wouldn't be polytheism and I am not the only one saying that.. it is an old controversy.
The trinity was invented long ago and it was political. Another problem is the idea that a finite being can conceptualize an infinite being. You can't put the infinite, by definition in a box, nor can you put the infinite in three separate boxes. In anthropomorphizing god aren't you simply creating this god in a human image? Thus human creates god and not the reverse.

God isn't always singular; John 1:1.

That is an interesting verse to cite when discussing the oneness of God. Is the truth one?
Many people erroneously refer to the book of "Revelation" as "Revelations". Some will speak of the scripture as "the scriptures". Are these "three" persons" the same? If yes, why divide them? If no, why not? The latter would seem to create a problem, a god with a divided mind, like a multiple personality disorder.

The expression of different and at times exclusive aspects is not a sign of disorder. It's part of the nature of the universe. In physics an electron can manifest itself as a concrete particle or a wave, but not necessarily both at the same time. The manifest form depends on the state of the observer. Though this seemed contradictory to scientists 100 years ago, we now understand how to use those different expressions of the electron to power the equipment that allows me to write and you to read this post.

We now regularly find other examples in nature of systems that can appear manifestly different in different situations. Why would that be considered disordered in the Divine?

[muon2]

I will get back to the Trinity, if anyone is interested, at some later point.

I remain interested in why you find the Trinity problematic in comparison to other religious views of God. It is interesting since the concept of divine entities with different manifestations (in time, place, and circumstance) occur in many religions.

Are these "three" persons" the same? If yes, why divide them? If no, why not? The latter would seem to create a problem, a god with a divided mind, like a multiple personality disorder.

The expression of different and at times exclusive aspects is not a sign of disorder. It's part of the nature of the universe. In physics an electron can manifest itself as a concrete particle or a wave, but not necessarily both at the same time. The manifest form depends on the state of the observer. Though this seemed contradictory to scientists 100 years ago, we now understand how to use those different expressions of the electron to power the equipment that allows me to write and you to read this post.

We now regularly find other examples in nature of systems that can appear manifestly different in different situations. Why would that be considered disordered in the Divine?

[muon2]

I remain interested in why you find the Trinity problematic in comparison to other religious views of God. It is interesting since the concept of divine entities with different manifestations (in time, place, and circumstance) occur in many religions.

The simple answer is that a 100% literal concept of God in three persons makes no sense.
Three does not equal one in a purely mathematical sense. Language is limited and can't actually describe the infinite. I am literally one person, but I am made up of various parts and can have conflict between my logical brain and emotional desires. To say that God can be divided makes perfect sense figuratively. The confusion over the trinity is that we need to discern between the literal and the figurative. The sun doesn't literally rise. A person can not literally be born again.
God may exist as a metaphor, but a person who holds such a concept can still be an atheist.
The stories in Genesis are like Aesop's fables. Who would argue that Aesop's fables were literally true?
So, what is problematic is understanding when something is to be taken literally, figuratively, or somewhere in between.
The only person that was traditionally believed to be seen was Jesus; nobody saw the Holy Spirit or the Father. The image of God was only seen in Jesus.
 "For in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily." Colossians 2:9 seems to suggest a oneness to God. Other places in the Bible suggest otherwise. How can these contradictions be reconciled?

The bold is what I disagree with. When I see the phrase three in one, I don't see it as parts like I have hands, head and heart. It is closer to the idea you express that you have a logical and an emotional aspect to your mind.

At times observers may see only your logical nature, yet at others they may only see your emotional nature. Suppose those observers never see both of those natures at once and don't or can't observe the internal conflict between them that you describe. Those observers may describe you as two minds in one and that makes literal sense to me - it's not a metaphor, nor is it disordered; it reflects real observation.

That's why I used the example of an electron, which can either be measured as a particle or a wave but not both at once, so we say it has a dual nature. If the variable affecting observation is temperature, we say that molecular H₂O has a ternary nature - ice, water and steam. Language can express a dual or ternary nature of a single entity.

[muon2]

"The simple answer is that a 100% literal concept of God in three persons makes no sense."

I would clarify that One God in three persons suggests polytheism.
If God can be three separate distinct persons.. and the idea is that these three are different in
the sense that there personalities are not exactly "on the same page".. that is what is problematic.

Yes polytheism can make sense, and perhaps the trinity can make sense, but it is still problematic
in that it deviates from the idea of God as one person. What doesn't make sense is to say that God
is one person and also three persons. The Christian trinity is not congruent with other religions (Islam being a good example) that see God. If each person is god, then that seems to indicate three gods. Also it is problematic to divide God because each part can't be infinite. If God is defined as being infinite then each part can't be. Mathematically you can multiple infinites.. all odd number... all even numbers... but that is a different meaning from the theological infinite... "God" would have to include everything. So a polytheistic or trinitarian views would be that each person or god is more like a demigod.. not the all of god which includes everything.  Pantheism or Panentheism seems to reconcile all of this..

Again it is complex... the idea of God in three persons stretches the mind.. and the problem with the Christian trinity if based no the Bible suggests, as I have stated above three ones which are different even to the point of almost being adversarial to one another. The son wanting one thing and the father wanting something else... The son wanting mercy and the father wanting justice, two different things.

"The simple answer is that a 100% literal concept of God in three persons makes no sense."
Actually too simple, and what is problematic is trying to re-define God as being divided when monotheism seems to suggest God is not divided. What I am saying is that changes the common sense idea of one person into three. It is like saying one  person is really three persons. Generally in the Bible a singular person is used.. in the beginning of Genesis God speaks as "WE" or "US" but that is, as I have said, meant to be figurative. Certainly in the Old Testament God is seen as a single person (or spirit), as suggested by the pronouns. I don't think that it is different in Hebrew, but it has been a long time since I studied Hebrew.

edit: another simpler argument is that three in one is possible, but not three equals one.

I think you are not distinguishing between the concept of separate multiple entities and one entity with multiple separate manifestations. I've given you real examples of the latter, but you haven't suggested how that use of language makes sense while it doesn't make sense when speaking of the Divine.

[muon2]

"The simple answer is that a 100% literal concept of God in three persons makes no sense."

I would clarify that One God in three persons suggests polytheism.
If God can be three separate distinct persons.. and the idea is that these three are different in
the sense that there personalities are not exactly "on the same page".. that is what is problematic.

Yes polytheism can make sense, and perhaps the trinity can make sense, but it is still problematic
in that it deviates from the idea of God as one person. What doesn't make sense is to say that God
is one person and also three persons. The Christian trinity is not congruent with other religions (Islam being a good example) that see God. If each person is god, then that seems to indicate three gods. Also it is problematic to divide God because each part can't be infinite. If God is defined as being infinite then each part can't be. Mathematically you can multiple infinites.. all odd number... all even numbers... but that is a different meaning from the theological infinite... "God" would have to include everything. So a polytheistic or trinitarian views would be that each person or god is more like a demigod.. not the all of god which includes everything.  Pantheism or Panentheism seems to reconcile all of this..

Again it is complex... the idea of God in three persons stretches the mind.. and the problem with the Christian trinity if based no the Bible suggests, as I have stated above three ones which are different even to the point of almost being adversarial to one another. The son wanting one thing and the father wanting something else... The son wanting mercy and the father wanting justice, two different things.

"The simple answer is that a 100% literal concept of God in three persons makes no sense."
Actually too simple, and what is problematic is trying to re-define God as being divided when monotheism seems to suggest God is not divided. What I am saying is that changes the common sense idea of one person into three. It is like saying one  person is really three persons. Generally in the Bible a singular person is used.. in the beginning of Genesis God speaks as "WE" or "US" but that is, as I have said, meant to be figurative. Certainly in the Old Testament God is seen as a single person (or spirit), as suggested by the pronouns. I don't think that it is different in Hebrew, but it has been a long time since I studied Hebrew.

edit: another simpler argument is that three in one is possible, but not three equals one.

I think you are not distinguishing between the concept of separate multiple entities and one entity with multiple separate manifestations. I've given you real examples of the latter, but you haven't suggested how that use of language makes sense while it doesn't make sense when speaking of the Divine.

The difference is between dividing an intelligent being like a human or a god and an inanimate object. That's an obvious difference. I don't know as much about science as you do, but I know that water is made up of two different elements. Dividing a god or a human is different in dividing matter. There is only one of me. I am one person, not three. I don't see how a god can be three if god is an intelligent being. If god is a thing, yes it can be divided into three things/three parts. If god is a living conscious being, he/she is indivisible. That would seem like common sense. This god could have divided thoughts. You could say god the father who is just and wants to punish evil humans, versus god the son who pleads to his father for mercy. This is the problem, a god who uses his own son as a scapegoat and doesn't demand accountability from humans. Why should humans not be held accountable? If the son pays the price, the punishment, why can't humans simply do whatever they want? Hence such a religion does no good and does not encourage good behavior at all.

I don't divide a collection of water molecules in order to have it manifest itself as ice, liquid water, or steam. I don't need to divide you to have you appear as a logical person rather than an emotional person. I'm not talking about dividing anything. I'm talking about a being manifesting itself in different forms. There's no division required.

In the second half of your post it seems that your issue is about whether it makes philosophical or theological sense to have different aspects of God that appear to be at odds with each other. That's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about whether the language makes sense to talk about a being that can have separate manifest forms. I claim that such language is completely sensible in a wide variety of contexts. I don't think it is useful to conflate the plain meaning of the phrase "three in one" and the philosophical or theological implications of it.