Why did Obama dump Howard Dean from the DNC in 2009?

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I too think Howard Dean did a fantastic job as DNC chair, and his 50-state strategy push was a necessary corrective to the boneheaded and arrogant "metro vs. retro" electoral strategy the Democrats had been using up to that point.  I supported him in the '04 nomination battle, so I'm a big enough fan of his.

But I'm a little puzzled about the suggestion that seems to be made here that dumping Dean somehow hurt the Obama campaign in '08, or even more dramatically, caused the Democratic meltdown on '10.  

As for the '08 race, I think Obama may have been concerned about how easy it would have been for his opposition to peg him as a far-lefty if he put organizations like Move-on in the driver's seat of the campaign.  Remember that the polls against McCain were very tight all the way through August and September, and Obama had to worry about carrying independents.  

As far as the 2010 losses are concerned, I tend to think the Dems would have taken that thumping no matter who was DNC chair.  The Democrats pushed a stimulus package, a financial regulation bill and a health care overhaul that were bound to be controversial, especially in the throes of a recession, and when the recovery stalled, those pieces of legislation, and the way the last one was finally passed, became easy political targets for the opposition.  Plus, the far-right mobilized with great effect to demonize Obama right out of the gate.  The Democrats did a poor job of defending their legislative accomplishments and Obama because....because they're Democrats, and eating their own young is a much more beloved hobby among them than beating the opposition.  The Move-on crowd, instead of defending the party's accomplishments in those two years, ran primary challenges against their own party's moderates who had ended up supporting the health care bill just because it lacked a public option.  This was wise?  This makes it Obama's and Emmanuel's fault that the midterms were a blowout?  Dean wouldn't have been able to salvage their chances in 2010; he couldn't even salvage his own presidential campaign after an innocent yelp to young supporters after losing Iowa.

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Napoleon,

My feelings about Dean are generally pretty positive.  He appears to have been an excellent governor.  I think he could have stood a decent chance in the general if establishment Democrats like Gephardt and Lieberman didn't trash-talk him, and in fact I think a ticket like Dean-Gephardt stood a decent chance of winning the general in 2004.  Even if they hadn't, Dean's platform would be been clear and the presidential race would have at least been about something important.  Kerry was a soporific, aimless gaffe-machine who, by comparison, made Al Gore's campaign look downright inspiring.  

I also agree, as noted, that Dean's emphasis on the 50-state strategy was a necessary corrective, and his inclination to light up the Democratic base in a way Rove had in 2000 and 2004 for the GOP was good politics.  To a limited degree, the Obama campaign resorted to the latter during the primary season in '08 and to the former in the general that followed.  I therefore don't really agree with his removal from the DNC chairmanship in 2009.  I think the Obama administration could have done things their own way while still calling upon Dean's talents and instincts, and I'm sure the animus that Emmanuel felt toward Dean had something to do with his ousting.  

But Democratic candidates winning general elections in modern politics, and steering legislation through a Congress with a fractured majority both require more than firing up one's own base, and I'm not sure Dean's instincts for either of these were exactly right.  Even for all the poo-pooing of Dean by his 2004 primary challengers, and counting the fact that Dean's campaign organization was not what it was cracked up to be, the fact of the matter was that he was routed in the primaries, by real Democratic votes.   The farther behind he fell, the more outspoken he became, and the more Democratic voters became uncomfortable with him, and I think the Obama campaign was worried about having their own general election campaign steered in that direction if the big lefty organizations ended up navigating it. When someone loses as bad as Dean did, those that follow aren't really tempted to repeat the pattern.

Furthermore, Dean, from what I can tell, wanted to strongarm ten conservative Dems in the Senate on the healthcare legislation, and there were very early signals that none of those ten were going to have any of it.  Since those ten votes were needed, the White House didn't go with Dean's strategy.  I think they could have been more creative and modified their approaches rather than just sacking Dean and ending up having to do lots of very unsavory dealmaking to get the health care bill through in the end.  Unfortunately, in the end, the differences between these two approaches was what would have become a bad failure (Dean) to what became a bad success (Obama).

But the idea that Dean himself, or the general strategy of running primary challenges against moderate Dems, could have stopped the route of 2010 strikes me as not supported by any evidence, but instead by mere conviction.  After the series of bills that were passed in '09-'10 combined with the ongoing recession, I don't see any way the Dems could have held onto the House.