Civil War in Syria

[ingemann]

That map doesn't distinguish al-Nusra from the other rebels, but perhaps any such distinction would be a dubious notion in the first place.

Not dubious, Al-Nusra are clearly not part of FSA, which is just a common term for groups which seek western support, and their claimed territory is not meaningless. But as FSA group are more likely to fight each other than JAN, it makes sense to just call them rebels on some maps. There's also other distinctions, JAN are more a party, while FSA are mostly local groups of militias, who just use FSA as common term. But if you want to know their territory, you can use Wikipedias map.

[ingemann]

The idea that al-Nusra should be distinguished from the other rebels came up about one year ago when there were violent clashes between al-Nusra and rival rebel groups like the SRF and the Hazzm Movement.

Many observers at that point thought that al-Nusra was trying to establish an IS-like mini-caliphate in the province of Idlib.

But after al-Nusra's victory against SRF and Hazzm, it went on to form a military alliance together with the other remaining rebel groups. In my view a territorial distinction between the different components of this alliance has become close to impossible.

Yes to some degree, but the "Turkmen" rebels are one of the more interesting "new" groups, as they clearly have direct Turkish support. They're mostly Islamist and local Turkmens are part of them (they're mostly a Turkmen-Arab mix). Of course the difference between Turkmen and Arabs are often unclear, they share faith, practice intermarriage with each others and as a border population theyu're usual bilingual in Arab and Turkish, which is why the number Turkmens lies between a few hundred thousand to the Turkish number of 3-4 millions.

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I'm a little careful about the whole SDF thing, I'm not sure how much it's independent Arab groups, or simply a few Arabs backed by Kurds for PR purposes. We should also remember that many Syrian "Arabs" in the north are simply Kurds who have adopted the Arab language, and as they lack connections with Arab tribes and are connected to Kurdish tribes, this makes the identities of Kurds, Turkmen and Arab very fluid.

[ingemann]

That map doesn't distinguish al-Nusra from the other rebels, but perhaps any such distinction would be a dubious notion in the first place.

Not dubious, Al-Nusra are clearly not part of FSA, which is just a common term for groups which seek western support, and their claimed territory is not meaningless. But as FSA group are more likely to fight each other than JAN, it makes sense to just call them rebels on some maps. There's also other distinctions, JAN are more a party, while FSA are mostly local groups of militias, who just use FSA as common term. But if you want to know their territory, you can use Wikipedias map.

You are right that Al-Nusra is not part of FSA. At the same time different rebel groups (including Al-Nusra) are fighting side on side and often share control of places. That is why from a military/territorial point of view distinguishing between all the rebel groups (including al-Nusra) turns out to be difficult. That's also the reason why I think that distinguishing between Syrian Army and Hezbollah is impractical, although some maps make this distinction.

Yes the Hezbollah-SAA distinction is just weird, NDF-SAA would make more sense, but it's impossible to show.

I'm a little careful about the whole SDF thing, I'm not sure how much it's independent Arab groups, or simply a few Arabs backed by Kurds for PR purposes. We should also remember that many Syrian "Arabs" in the north are simply Kurds who have adopted the Arab language, and as they lack connections with Arab tribes and are connected to Kurdish tribes, this makes the identities of Kurds, Turkmen and Arab very fluid.

The SDF still stands and falls with the Kurds. At the same time some of its Arab components are somehow relevant militarily, although much weaker than the YPG:
- Shammar tribal militias have been backing the YPG in Hasakah province almost since the beginning, and the Shammar tribe is quite powerful.
- The anti-IS rebels in Raqqa province might fit your description.

I know Shammar are official part of SDF, but I wouldn't count them, there's really not many other SDF forces in that part of the country, and most of the Arab SDF around Kobane are remnants of FSA groups, which ISIS drove out, Shammar on the other hand I'm rather sure if the regime had been stronger in Hasakah and the Kurds weaker, they would have joined the regime. I'm sure they don't really have a problem with Kurdish autonomy (especially because in that case they can share the sweat oil and gas money with the Kurds), but they're seem weird to include in SDF, as their militias are a major force on their own.

[ingemann]

I believe it when I see it. "Western sources" have not proven to be reliable very often over the last five years when it comes to interpreting the situation in Syria. It could also be that Iran was using its own IRGC forces for immediate response after the fall of Idlib and Jisr-ash-Shogur and that the plan was from the beginning to replace the lower ranks with Iraqis, Afghans and Pakistanis when available.

Yes, I can't really see the sources as reliable, plus Putin have the entire time sought a negotiation solution (just one which included Assad and ensured a pro-Russian regime in power afterward). We also have the problem that the two strongest rebel fractions (I don't count the Kurds as rebels) are JAN and ISIS, which the West won't and can't accept taking part in negotiations. In fact in ISIS case not even the Gulf states would accept them taking part in negotiation (Turkey may)

Also the largest non-ISIS non-JAN Islamist group (Harakat Ahrar Al-Sham) taking part in negotiation have here set up its 9 demands. The group are a major part of Islamic Front, the Saudi supported coalition.

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I don't speak or read Arab, so if the summary is wrong please tell me.

[ingemann]

A interesting report about Syrian rebel groups from the Tony Blair Faith Foundation

http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/sites/default/files/If%20the%20Castle%20Falls.pdf

I know that Blair is really not very popular right now, but the rapport are a interesting look into the ideology of the different groups. So read it with a open mind.

[ingemann]

Honestly I didn't see the Russian intervention coming when I stated that Assad was losing slowly on August 07. (And it was in preparation at least since July, in coordination with Iran.)

Assad's fate depends on the commitment of both Russia and Iran (+ its proxies). For the next months I would expect them both to stay in Syria and maybe even expand their forces. As long as no other foreign force (Turkey? Not too likely...) intervenes directly against Assad (not counting supporting rebels), I expect continued advances for the regime. (Remember that I might be proven wrong again.) For the moment Russian and Iranian interests in Syria are not the same, but perfectly reconciliable, let's see what happens on the long run.

I personal think one of the most interesting development in the last month are not the regimes successful but glacial advances, but the Kurdish conquest of Tishreen Dam and their crossing of the Euphrates, which Turkey have set as a red line for the Kurds. The Kurds seem to have decided that it's better to keep ISIS alive as a bogeyman, while they expand their area of control rather than decapitate ISIS by taking Raqqah, losing western support and having to deal with the post-ISIS warlords. At the same time they place Erdogan in a situation where he either have to show himself as impotent or official support ISIS.

The Kurds have historical been lousy players on the international scene, but now... wow... they have shown themselves to be masters of strategy, the Syrians, Iraqi and Iranian all dance after their melody, and all the Turks attempts to limit the Kurds result in them losing face or alienate their allies and friends. Of course a element are that the Kurds simply are better people than the Sunni Arabs (who right now come across as orcs out of a Tolkien book). But it's also because the ideology (a form of left libertarian decentralism) the Syrian and Turkish Kurds sell, while threatening under the Cold War, simply come across as both nicer but also non-hypocritical, compared to what most national liberation movements usual sell, and to make it even better, the Iraqi Kurds have now begun to attempt to get Iraqi/Kurdish Jews to migrate back to Kurdish areas (it will fail, but the message are more important than success).

[ingemann]

If Obama didn't hesitate at first to bomb Syria & went ahead with the initial war, like advisors told him too, this would of been avoided. But, Libya was mishandled.

It would have been a bigger failure than this miserable war have been. Just look at LIbya and imagine that Libya had 4 times as many people plus simmering ethnic and religious conflicts. If you think this conflict have been bad, iot would have been nothing compared to the mess Obama's advisors suggestion would have caused.

 But you want to know how this conflict could have been a lot less bloody? If we had said to Assad "we look the other way while you end this conflict". The result had been another Hama Massacre, but several hundred thousand fewer people would have died, we would not have millions of refugees in Syria and abroad and it would all have been over in 2012.

[ingemann]

Do Syrian and Iraqi Kurdistan in any way act like a single entity?

Not at all.

Their leaders are in fact quite hostile toward each others, the Iraqi Kurds have always been close to Ankara (the ruling KDP had it own civil war with PKK backed PUK in the 90ties), while the Syrian Kurds are part of Turkish Kurdish movement (PKK) and rather close to the Assad regime. But here's the thing while the leaders of the Iraqi Kurds don't like PKK/PYD, the common Kurds doesn't share this antipathy and feel a strong national brotherhood, which mean that the ruling KDP in Iraqi Kurdistan have had to support Rojava.

Put in another context KDP are conservatives, while PKK/PYD are libertarian socialist and PUK social democratic/democratic socialist.

[ingemann]

[...]

Western (and Russian) countries will for sure push for a post war regime that 80% of the fighters of the ground disapprove. We have many more years of mess in front of us...

Any government in Syria are likely to have 80% disapproval.

[ingemann]

So only Fallujah left, and then Mosul awaits (I don't believe that Mosul liberation actually will be next goal as Iraqi authorities says)
Good, Iraqi Army with Iranian support actually can do something positive. Although I heard that

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it's not true and any militias were not supporting army in this final offensive. Anybody knows which one is true?

The absence of militias was reported on Newshour last night as well.

Okay this is complex, there's suspicions that the reason that we don't hear about Shia militias are because they have been "integrated" into the army (de facto they have just gotten a more military sounding name instead being named after some martyr). Of course at the same time it's believed that the army integrated militias which was used in Ramadi was tribal Sunni ones from the Saudi border. These Sunni tribal groups have been loyal to the Iraqi government, since Salafists/Al Qaeda/proto ISIS took over their area around a decade ago, their behaviour pissed the local (very conservatives) tribes off enough to, that they drove them off and allied with the Shia government, who have treated them with kid's gloves ever since, and now use them when they reconquer Sunni areas. Of course there's not enough off them when Iraq are going to retake Mosul, so it may be Shia and Sunni units who will retake that areas, worst case are that the Kurds use Yadizis and Assyrians militias.

[ingemann]

I hope they're right:

Syria's chemical weapons destroyed, monitoring group says

Honestly it doesn't make a lot of difference, it haven't been used on large scale in this conflict (for PR reasons and because chemical weapons are lousy to anti-partisan warfare, it's mostly useful as part of a MAD doctrine) and the Syrian regime have all the know how to make new ones, when they doesn't have to deal with this civil war anymore.

[ingemann]

Also in other news the Kurds are making gain in northeastern Aleppo Governorate, while the regime are doing well in Latakia Governorate, where the rebels are in disorder in the Turkmen Mountains. Getting rid of the rebels there will free up government forces.

Also ISIS have had to cut their warriors salaries in half. The only reason ISIS may survive this year are because no one are really interested in their Syrian territories.

[ingemann]

Government gain around Aleppo since september



The most strategic significant gain is the connection to the Shia enclaves Nubl & Zahraa, as it cut off the rebels in north east from the Turkish border, forcing them to transport over the Turkmen mountains instead, which are much worse for transport.

The gain against ISIS on the other hand was a much bigger moral gain, as the Kuweries airbase was full of pro-government refugees (mostly government officials and their families). If it had fallen to ISIS it would have hurt the moral of the government supporters.

The gain south of Aleppo are not especially important, it's relative easy to take lowland, but it show a increased weakness on the rebel side, that the regime have made significant gains in one of the rebel strongholds

[ingemann]

These "Turkmens" aren't actually Turkmens, right?

Turkmen in this context are just Turks who dwell in post-Ottoman Arab territories. They're not more related than the average Anatolian Turk with the central Asian Turkmens.

As for how many of them there exists it's rather unclear, the only difference between them and the average Syrian Sunni Arab are their patrilineal ancestry, they share religion and both they and their Sunni Arab neighbours are likely both bilingual in Arab and Turkish (and often trilingual in Kurdish too).

[ingemann]

What I'm worried about is the Mosul Dam. That wasn't stable even at the best of times, and given that I assume "dam maintenance" isn't high on anybody's priorities at the moment, it's basically a ticking time bomb (especially if Daesh decide to go out with a bang)

Mosul Dam are to my knowledge under the control of the Kurds and have been since 2014. So I don't think you need to worry over it.

Probably Benwah is right and "The battle of Aleppo is the center of the Syrian Go board" is a better title.

With regards to "If I were IS I would try to attack Damascus": The so-called IS has already been weakened by Western and Russian airstrikes and Iraqi, Kurdish and Syrian ground fighting. I doubt that they have the military capacity to launch an open assault on the Syrian capital. Both regime and rebels have at least 20.000 fighters engaged in Greater Damascus (probably more), but it's rarely in the news because it's not chess but some extreme variation of Go (see the picture of Yarmuk you posted). What the IS has already tried and what it is still trying is the infiltration and takeover of besieged rebel-dominated suburbs of Damascus. The future of IS is to spread like cancer, the biggest tumors will be cut.

I don't really think that ISIS are any major threat in this conflict. We focus on it because of its success in Iraq, but their success in Syria have been on secondary fronts, where it have focused on weaker and more disorganised rebel groups and besieged government enclaves. The moment they attacked the more well organised Kurds, they lost many of their best soldiers and they have been on retreat ever since.

The most important conflict area in Syria are around Aleppo, the moment the government have ended the rebels there, the rest of the conflict will just be a clean up and a potential agreement between the regime and the Kurds about autonome kurdish area. ISIS don't really matter, they control areas with little value to the regime or the Kurds, which is why they been ignored in favour of the rebels in the Syrian heartland.

Also a interesting fact the villages of Dael and Ibta in southern Syria have driven the local rebels out and raised the Syrian flag. The area have little importance, it's poor and populated by Sunnis, the rebel offensives in the area have been complete failures and the government have mostly ignored it, except for beating the the rebel offensives. But the fact that the local have tired of the rebels to the point, where they expel them and join the government, are interesting and could mean that we could see a complete collapse of the rebels in the area. 

[ingemann]

A interesting pre-war ethnic/religious map of Syria



http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml

There's also a map which also show population density of the different groups

[ingemann]

U.S., Russia and other powers agree on ‘cessation of hostilities’ in Syria’s civil war

By Karen DeYoung
February 11 at 7:04 PM

MUNICH —

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Russia and Syria only agree to "cessation of hostilities" against groups which aren't international recognised as terrorists, which mean that they will continue to bomb ISIS, JAN  and several other groups, including several which are active around Aleppo.

Translation: this agreement are worth less than toilet paper.

[ingemann]

https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/02/18/the-media-are-misleading-public-syria/8YB75otYirPzUCnlwaVtcK/story.html

A interesting pierce on the "siege of Aleppo"

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I have also found a piece from Washington Institute
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/ethnic-cleansing-threatens-syrias-unity

What makes its interesting is not so much the article (which I still recommend people read), but more the demographic graphs in the article.

As example they have quite different projection of the Syrian demography than the we usual see (the traditional are usual based on the last census in 1960)



But it also show the ethnic make up of the government controlled regions



and the percent of the population living in areas controlled by the different fractions.



Also in general news from Syria.

The government seems to keep the ceasefire with "FSA", while they attacking ISIS east of Aleppo.

The Kurds on the other hand are attacking first "FSA" and second ISIS east of Aleppo. ISIS seems in a state of near collapse on these fronts.

The Turks seems to have transported JAN (better known as Al Qaeda)troops from Idlib province (through Turkish territory) to the town of Azaz to defend it from YPG. 

[ingemann]

Kurds are attacking the FSA?

In Northern Aleppo they are allied with some part of opposition forces and they are not fighting against FSA but most often some minor Islamist guerrillas like Islamic Front or Jaysh al-Mujahedeen.

kataak are mostly correct (the Kurds in Aleppo are fundamental a neighbourhood militias, who have tried to stay neutral, but de facto have been allied with the regime), but this is a little more complex. This isn't happening in the Kurdish enclave in Aleppo, but at the Afrin canton, and the term FSA are rather meaningless, the groups kataak mention are often include when people talk about FSA.

For some more context, we tend to see the Kurds as a unified whole, but even through the three original cantons (Afrin, Kobane and Jazira) was under PYD/YPG control, they had different local leaders and interest. Kobane and Jazira have more less united now with Jazira saving Kobane from ISIS.

But there was some important demographic difference. Kobane was religious homogene with the local Kurds being Sunnis, Jazira was more heterogene, but Sunni still dominated (especially as religious minorities was mostly non Kurdish). Afrin on the other hand are much more heterogene, with the population being a mix of Sunnis, Alevis (official Shia de facto a kind of Anatolian folk religion which mix Islam with Kurdish pre-Islamic paganism, Turkic shamanism and Christianity to my understanding) and Yedizi. This mean that Afrin from the start was more pro-regime than the other two cantons and much more hostile toward the Sunni Arab rebels (even Sunni Kurds tend to look down on Arabs, as the Kurds was used by the Ottomans to beat down Arabs when they became uppity). Afrin stayed mostly neutral but kept a good relationship with the government (Shia) enclaves on its eastern border, regime loyalist fleed into Afrin as other government base fell to the rebels early in the conflict.

But a few month ago FSA (IF and some Turkmen Islamist groups if I remember correctly) declared that if Afrin didn't give up several villages to them they would attack Afrin. The Kurds asked them to f**k off, and FSA attacked them. The result was that the Afrin Kurds conquered several villages from FSA (surprise). As the goverment cut of the rebels east of Afrin from the rest of rebels in Idlib. The Kurds stated a new offensive and have conquered the southern part of the strip, while Turkish artillary keep them from conquering the northern part. Instead they have continued into ISIS territory, where they have conquered several villages.

[ingemann]

I am wondering what's the %age of Syrians living in government controlled areas?

10 million out of the 16-17 million people in Syria.

[ingemann]

Clashes between pro-regime militias and the Kurdish-dominated police force Asayish in the city of  (province of Hasakah, north-eastern Syria) are escalating. There have been minor incidents in the past, and temporarily stable truces imposed by the regime and PYD/YPG. This time the will to compromise on both sides seems to be questionable, and the party that would benefit is Daesh who are already moving troops in the direction of Shaddadi.

(For some general background, see also ingemann's post from February 22, 2016, 03:31:51 pm)

I read up on this, and it seem to have started with some NDF guard began the fighting and it's here it becomes complex and ugly.

The local NDF are from the Tayy/Shammar tribe. They're Sunni Arabs. This tribe have been closely allied with the regime for decades and was settled in the area for that reason and as part of the Arabization process. They took part in the 2004 Qamishli massacre against the local Kurds, in fact they may have started the conflict which lead to massacre.

In general the local NDF are your typical Sunni Arab paramilitary (or soldiers) group, chest beating thugs who's useful against unarmed civilians, who they can terrorize, rape and plunder, but mostly useless against organised forces. The only difference from the rebel groups (outside JAN and Daesh) are that they "fight" under the regime's banner. It's a typical example in the difference between the NDF groups, NDF recruited among Druzes, Alawites, Christians and Ismailittes are better organised, through we also have example of Sunni NDF who's better than this.

[ingemann]

The Kurds have a few days ago started a offensive on Raqqa. It seems to have ended again. The offensive have in general been a success, and seem to mostly have ended because the Kurds are unwilling (wise enough) to attack Raqqa yet. According to "Raqqa is being slaughtered silently" a anti-ISIS resistant group, the people of Raqqa seem more terrified of a Kurdish conquest than continued ISIS rule.

At the same ISIS is on the offensive against FSA in north Aleppo, where Azaz may fall in a close future (unless we see a Turkish intervention). This may also be why the Kurds have stopped their offensive at Raqqa, as the destruction of FSA north of Aleppo would leave them and SAA as the only alternative to getting rid of ISIS in the area and it would make Turkish threats against Kurdish expansion in the area seem to be pro-ISIS. Also it's unlikely the Turks will intervene, as the Russians will likely shoot down any Turkish plane in Syrian territory and may even attack Turkish ground units (and no it wouldn't allow Turkey to call on NATO).

[ingemann]

palandio bring up some good points.

I think the three most important fronts the rest of the year will be the Kurd attempts to cut ISIS off from Turkey and connect Afrin with the rest of Rojava. This will weaken ISIS to the point where it may collapse before Christmas

Whether East Aleppo end up completely besieged. This will strengthen the regimes position in the north and enable the regime to use Aleppo more offensive

The potential fall of Eastern Ghouta. A third of the regimes forces are around Damascus. The fall of EG would free up thousands of soldiers to use on other fronts.

[ingemann]

We are betraying the Kurds for Erdogan and will almost certainly come to regret this.

Unlikely while I despise Erdogan and think the Kurds are the best faction in the entire region (including Israel). The Kurds are used to be betrayed, and doesn't have a tradition of terror outside the region. Also USA seem (to for once) smart enough that they keep supporting the Kurds, they just limit the Kurdish influence, until they have a excuse to nsupport YPG again. Also the Germans seem to have decided to simply throw their vallet after the Kurds.

[ingemann]

Why is no one talking about this? This is a problem.

It's not a problem, in a few weeks this will be mostly forgotten.