Interviews of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Of Commitment and Beliefs

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Interviews of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

Of Commitment and Beliefs

This book is a collection of interviews by various journalists with the late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The interviews (1972-1976) cover a landmark period in the history of Pakistan

BBC correspondent, Jan MacIntyre, conducts an interview with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on February 18, 1972

Question: What are these disputes? (Earlier Mr MacIntyre reminded Mr Bhutto of his book The Myth of Independence in which he had written that relations between India and Pakistan had never been normal, nor were they capable of being normal without the settlement of fundamental disputes, which had smoldered since Independence).

Answer: Basically, it was Kashmir; and Kashmir still remains a basic dispute. But since the last war (1971), the relationship between India and Pakistan has acquired wider dimensions. A major part of our country is under Indian occupation. So, these are the two fundamental disputes now facing the two countries.

Q: You also said in the book, I think, that Indian leaders have come to tolerate Pakistan because they don’t have the power to destroy it, and if they could forge this power they would end partition and reabsorb Pakistan. Even today India has that dream. Do you think it is still so?

A: I am afraid the events have proved it evidently. At that time there was some sort of balance of power. It was not a genuine balance of power but, nevertheless, some kind of a balance of power between India and Pakistan. Since the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 and after the 1965 conflict between India and Pakistan, the military preponderance of India has weighed heavily against Pakistan’s military forces.

Q: If this was, however, still a fundamental aim of Indian policy, couldn’t they have finished the job the last time?

A: Yes, they might have, and I think they intended to, but the world situation was different; the world powers took an active attitude towards the conflict finally; and the United States put its foot down, and so India declared a unilateral cease-fire. I don’t think it was a voluntary declaration.

Q: There has been a little controversy about the nature of this evidence. You would have seen President Nixon’s statement of foreign policy and there is a paragraph in it about the situation we are talking about. During the week of December 6, he writes, “We received convincing evidence that India was seriously contemplating the seizure of Pakistan-held portions of Kashmir and the destruction of Pakistan’s military forces in the West.” When questioned about this subsequently, both Mr Nixon and Dr Kissinger had said that they don’t wish to disclose the nature of that evidence. Do you think that evidence was good?

A: I can understand their reluctance to disclose the nature of that evidence because at present (1972) it is extremely sensitive and it might also affect the United States’ relations with the Soviet Union. So that can unnecessarily aggravate their relations with the Soviet Union especially when President Nixon is going both to China and to Moscow. So, I think there is good reason for him not to disclose the information at this given point of time. But we also have some evidence of this, and this was also told to me by Premier Chou En-Lai, when I visited Peking (Beijing) this month.

Q: When you were in China, last November, you were the guest of honor at a banquet and in the course of his speech, the acting foreign minister had this to say: “Should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression, the Chinese government and people will, as always, resolutely support the Pakistan Government in their just struggle to defend their state sovereignty and national independence. Would you agree that Chinese support in the recent conflict with India fell some way short of that?

A: I would say that within the limitations, China did what she could. Some people think China could have done more, but I think that you have to take a number of factors into account in assessing China’s role in the last conflict, and a series of successive blunders were committed by the Yahya regime. Events moved so fast that other countries did not have time to fully assess them. You have to take all these factors, into account, and as I said, let us not look to the past events. We have to look to the future. But, whatever has been China’s participation, we have not lost confidence in China’s friendship or in China’s words.

Q: When the idea of separation was first seriously mooted at the end of 1970, after Mujib’s election victory, you said you were too passionately committed to the concept of Pakistan to think of such an idea. Well, the idea has now, of course, been rather forcibly brought to your attention and it has become a political reality. Do you intend to spend any time to undo it?

A: Well, I still maintain that Pakistan and its concept are not clearly passing phenomena and that the present reality will not be a permanent reality and so we are trying to make a search — a genuine search to maintain some form of modus vivendi between the two wings. Sooner or later the sentiments for Pakistan will grow again. At the moment we still are making a search.

For this reason in the field of external affairs we had to painfully and regrettably leave the commonwealth on this account and also break relations with certain countries. But even if there is parting of the ways, I think it will not be a permanent parting of the ways. The two of us will come together again in some form or shape. I cannot say what form or shape it will be, but you would see yourself that sentiments for Pakistan will again grow in that part of our country.

Q: Given that something like one in three of the entire United Nations membership has now recognised Bangladesh, isn’t there something to be said for the view that until you do too, you aren’t going to be able to give your full attention to the heavy task of reconstruction facing you here?

A: I think you may have noted that while I have shown my anxiety and my willingness to hold negotiations with Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman on the one hand and with the government of India on the other, and until we hold these discussions I don’t think that it would be fair to us to ask for our final position.

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Q: During the final months of your predecessor’s rule, one of your most insistent demands was for the restoration of democratic processes. What will the main features of such a restoration be and what sort of time scale do you envisage?

A: When I made this demand the war had not taken place and half of our country had not come under the occupation of India. So now also I believe in my demand and I will see to it that people of Pakistan return to democracy soon, and I would like to see that they return to democracy for all time; so that we establish institutions with roots, and that no military or civilian adventurer will ever dare to inject one martial law after another into our country again. I want to build institutions, strengthen existing institutions, including the judiciary. To strengthen the remaining ones we have to have a constitution and we want to have the rule of law restored in the country. We want to have freedom of press, freedom of association, fundamental rights and a viable constitution suited to our conditions.

Q: You have been asked many times since you became president, how long you intend to retain the martial law? You said, very shortly after you become president, “not a day longer, not a minute longer, not a second longer than necessary.” How much longer do you think in fact you are going to need it?

A: I stand by that commitment and I believe in it, I want to withdraw martial law. I am not happy with martial law. I would like to see it gone by yesterday, but the point is that not only do we have certain basic reforms to be implemented, but I must have at least one meeting with the Indian leaders and one with Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman to get a general idea of the situation — to get a firm idea about the general picture.

Now I know that by dialogue alone I won’t get the exact idea, but a politician makes an assessment not only on the words spoken but on the general feel. And I think that the world should be fair to me to get that general feel before I can give a timetable, because I think very few countries have gone through a crisis that my country has gone through. I don’t feel Poland, which was dismembered rather badly, went through a crisis as deep as Pakistan is going through. So I am not trying to procrastinate. I know the danger of procrastination. I am not so foolish as to try and hang on to power by the thread of martial law. I would like to be in a position of responsibility and that can only come through the constitution and I have earned that right in an election. So I am anxious and eager to withdraw it, but I must have to be fair to my people, to be fair to what remains of my country at the moment, to have some idea of the general situation before I can announce the date.

Q: You have always taken a very hard line against India. In 1965 when relations were particularly bad over Kashmir, you called her a “feeble, flippant, decadent society”, and when you were electioneering before the last elections here, you promised your men two things — redistribution of wealth and a thousand year war against India. How important is it to you to be able to work out some sort of modus vivendi with India?

A: This is important. Even when my posture was different, when I was preaching confrontation, there was a theme in that confrontation. The confrontation would be inevitable until the fundamental disputes are settled. Now after this war the fundamental disputes are still to be settled, if not by confrontation by consultations and by negotiations. An imposed peace will simply not work. The situation has changed radically.

In those days we had certain opportunities and our government missed that. Now India, of course, had an opportunity and it didn’t miss it. For instance, in 1962 during the Sino-Indian conflict, when India had vacated most of its forces from Kashmir, our army could have walked into Kashmir. But then Ayub thought, as he was told by others, that the world will call this a “stab in the back.” Now what has India done to Pakistan? Whether it is a stab in the back or even a stab in the front, but nevertheless it has been a mighty stab. But the world tends to, with the passing of time, forget the issue.

So, in 1962 this was an opportunity. In 1965, I think if the war had continued there would have been a better settlement, and Pakistan missed all opportunities. India did not miss any opportunity. So I can’t be held responsible if the other governments have missed opportunities. I was only able to tell them, “this is an opportunity; either you take it or if you don’t take it, then you will finally suffer,” and we have come to that position where we finally suffer. It depends how you go to the peace table.

Q: When you do go to the conference table, will you talk only about the recent conflict or would you hope to cover all outstanding issues?

A: I would like to leave that for the moment, because I would like to see their mood. I would like to see their trend of mind there. That is what I said earlier. It is not exactly what we say but the general impression one gathers; and first I would like to get that general impression. After that, I will be in a better position to know.

[Alcon]

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[Хahar 🤔]

Bump; rather interesting.