UNEPSE v. Northeast Region

[Purple State]

I thank the court for their time.

[Marokai Backbeat]

I would like to state, this opinion was posted in haste, and there will likely be a 'correction' of sorts. Stay tuned, please.

(By 'correction' I mean additional details.)

[opebo]

Here is the addendum to the Court's ruling that A.J. Marokai Blue mentioned:

Further at issue to the court is the Northeast's "Practical Labor Policy Act" which, according to the Union Representative, prompted the strike in question.

Article VI, Clause 10 States: Persons in employment shall have the right to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining, with such exceptions as the Senate may provide for by Law on the grounds of vital national interest.

The Court believes that this would clearly infer at least some level of constitutional protection for striking, as "organizing for the purposes of collective bargaining" is an empty statement without the ability to organize and use their power to bargain for benefits the workers in question view as necessary.

It is because of this Clause that we find much of the Practical Labor Policy Act unconstitutional. For example,

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Clause 3 of the Practical Labor Policy Act clearly is an effort to intimidate workers from striking or work stoppages, and it effectively boxes the union in question into a position to where they can't strike, or they will be crippled financially, it basically reverses the point of striking to begin with, since it changes unions striking to force the business/region to cave to their demands to the region/business being able to hold out and cripple the union instead.

This is, for lack of a kinder term, ass-backwards, and eerily reminiscent of an attitude plucked from the 19th century. The Northeast Region is too fearful to simply outlaw striking completely, preferring to try and find ways to punish people for exercising their right to organize and strike. It goes without saying that any government cannot cleverly evade issues of constitutionality by punishing someone for exercising their rights as opposed to outright banning something.

We strike down this clause as unconstitutional.

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We take a balanced line on this clause.

The point of a strike is to put pressure on the employer to gain concessions. The union depends on this power as their last-resort measure when all other options fail. It puts considerable pressure, however, not only on the employer, but also the employees.

The ability to immediately replace employees with cheaper labor not only does considerable harm to the strikers, but it most importantly effectively neuters the point of striking to begin with. What power do unions have to strike, if it came to such, if those workers could just be immediately removed from employment?

We find such a policy in direct contradiction with Article VI, Clause 10.

However, this ruling does not grant the ability for endless striking. Some level of pragmatism is necessary for the security of the government and the economy of the Republic of Atlasia. On one hand, we must protect the right to use their striking power to force concessions as it is their constitutional right, yet on the other, consideration must be given to national security.

We also believe this is entirely within the boundaries of Article VI, Clause 10, that, while protecting organizing and collective bargaining, includes the statement: "with such exceptions as the Senate may provide for by Law on the grounds of vital national interest."

We therefore would suggest that the Senate of Atlasia determine a reasonable "time limit" for striking, which would put a ceiling on the amount a strike can go on, so that it would preserve the power a union has in striking, but also protect the economic and national security.

(Different distinctions could be given to the size of the union or business in question, but it must be a reasonable limit that balances both of these concerns and stands the test of future possible legal challenges.)

In any case, however, we strike down Clause 4 of the Practical Labor Policy Act as unconstitutional.

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Purple State, representative of the Union of Northeast Public Service Employees, stated this in regard to Clause 5:

"..Section 5 creates an environment for a "free rider" dilemma to emerge, in which there is no incentive to join a union if one benefits equally from the union's activities without paying the costs of dues. However, this inevitably undermines the relative bargaining power of the union, thus reducing the benefits gained from unionization. Lower benefits produce fewer and fewer that wish to pay the costs, further undermining the ability of the union to bargain effectively.

If I am reading Section 5 correctly, you are specifically enshrining a vicious cycle which will inevitably infringe upon the right of workers to organize for the purposes of collective bargaining, albeit indirectly."

We could not agree more.

Such a clause is a backhanded way, like much of the Act in question, of skirting Article VI, Clause 10 of the Constitution, and it cannot stand.

Unions exist to lobby and act (through various means) for greater benefits and improved workplace safety standards. Members of unions are, in theory, expected to work together for their greater good, and employees who do not join a union do not have those perks. This is a simple concept and the clear observable point of unionization in the first place.

Without the ability for unions to provide a unique set of benefits, there is no incentive to join a union in the first place. In Article VI, Clause 10 of the Constitution, it is important to remember "..for the purpose of collective bargaining." Removing that ability, or in the Northeast's case, making it irrelevant, is an infringement on a union's unique power.

We therefore strike Clause 5 of the Practical Labor Policy Act as unconstitutional.

In concert with the final clause of the Practical Labor Policy Act, all clauses that have not been specifically mentioned in this ruling shall stand.

Opinion joined by J. Opebo and J. Marokai Blue

[Marokai Backbeat]

Thanks, Opebo. And everyone else, for their patience.

[cinyc]

I thank the court for their time and their excellent opinions.

[Purple State]

I thank the court for their extended opinion.

I find it amazing the way the dynamics in this game can differ so dramatically from real life because someone managed to include one extra line in a constitution.

[Rowan]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the case in front of me was not whether the bill itself was unconstitutional. The only question in front of me was whether the union should be held liable for the damages. I don't see why the court took it upon themselves to rule on the constitutionality of a bill that wasn't even presented to them for consideration.

[Marokai Backbeat]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the case in front of me was not whether the bill itself was unconstitutional. The only question in front of me was whether the union should be held liable for the damages. I don't see why the court took it upon themselves to rule on the constitutionality of a bill that wasn't even presented to them for consideration.

It was presented to us by the union, debated behind the scenes between the Justices, defended by Cinyc. It's directly related to the case, and just because it wasn't discussed in the previous ruling by you, doesn't mean we don't have the power to address it ourselves if we think it's appropriate.

Also, if you have these sort of concerns, how about bringing them up before we write an opinion.

[The Age Wave]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the case in front of me was not whether the bill itself was unconstitutional. The only question in front of me was whether the union should be held liable for the damages. I don't see why the court took it upon themselves to rule on the constitutionality of a bill that wasn't even presented to them for consideration.

It was presented to us by the union, debated behind the scenes between the Justices, defended by Cinyc. It's directly related to the case, and just because it wasn't discussed in the previous ruling by you, doesn't mean we don't have the power to address it ourselves if we think it's appropriate.

Also, if you have these sort of concerns, how about bringing them up before we write an opinion.

The ruling was what was being appealed, not the legislation.

[Marokai Backbeat]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the case in front of me was not whether the bill itself was unconstitutional. The only question in front of me was whether the union should be held liable for the damages. I don't see why the court took it upon themselves to rule on the constitutionality of a bill that wasn't even presented to them for consideration.

It was presented to us by the union, debated behind the scenes between the Justices, defended by Cinyc. It's directly related to the case, and just because it wasn't discussed in the previous ruling by you, doesn't mean we don't have the power to address it ourselves if we think it's appropriate.

Also, if you have these sort of concerns, how about bringing them up before we write an opinion.

The ruling was what was being appealed, not the legislation.

We know that.

[Rowan]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the case in front of me was not whether the bill itself was unconstitutional. The only question in front of me was whether the union should be held liable for the damages. I don't see why the court took it upon themselves to rule on the constitutionality of a bill that wasn't even presented to them for consideration.

It was presented to us by the union, debated behind the scenes between the Justices, defended by Cinyc. It's directly related to the case, and just because it wasn't discussed in the previous ruling by you, doesn't mean we don't have the power to address it ourselves if we think it's appropriate.

I disagree on its appropriateness. It had nothing to do with the question at hand. The question at hand was whether the union was liable for the damages. That's it.

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Not sure how I was supposed to know that you would go beyond the actual ruling just so that you could strike down a law that you perceive to be "anti-union."

[Marokai Backbeat]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the case in front of me was not whether the bill itself was unconstitutional. The only question in front of me was whether the union should be held liable for the damages. I don't see why the court took it upon themselves to rule on the constitutionality of a bill that wasn't even presented to them for consideration.

It was presented to us by the union, debated behind the scenes between the Justices, defended by Cinyc. It's directly related to the case, and just because it wasn't discussed in the previous ruling by you, doesn't mean we don't have the power to address it ourselves if we think it's appropriate.

I disagree on its appropriateness. It had nothing to do with the question at hand. The question at hand was whether the union was liable for the damages. That's it.

Rowan, the union claimed to be striking for a reason, that reason being the Practical Labor Policy Act. They were taken the court, and you ruled the strike illegal and ordered the union to pay back the damages. They appealed.

This was not strictly about the strike damages, this was about the strike entirely. Nothing prevents us from going into more in each case, and in fact, it would be stupid to expect us to not evaluate the underlying reasons for the strike in the first place, especially since Purple State presented his arguments on the Practical Labor Policy Act in his submission to the court, and we decided to address it. There is nothing that prevents the Court from doing that, case closed.

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Not sure how I was supposed to know that you would go beyond the actual ruling just so that you could strike down a law that you perceive to be "anti-union."
[/quote]

As I said before, we were arguing over the Act, PS submitted arguments on the Act, I asked questions on the Act, cinyc defended the Act. No clearer indication could be given that we were evaluating the constitutionality of the Practical Labor Policy Act.

Realistically though, the Act was very likely to be challenged by someone else. Purple State had every reason to challenge it and did so, but Barnes was almost surely going to go after it as well, and this ruling would've just been delayed by a few weeks. You win nothing by complaining about a case that is 100% over.

[Purple State]

Also, I do believe I sought a counter-suit in the original case before Rowan asking that the law be ruled unconstitutional.

[Sam Spade]

Should have something up today.

[Rowan]

Also, I do believe I sought a counter-suit in the original case before Rowan asking that the law be ruled unconstitutional.

I would have taken it up right after the case. I was then waiting for the appeal to finish.

[Sam Spade]

C.J. Sam Spade, concurring in part and dissenting in part,

I. The Northeast Judicial Decision

I think the end result held by the majority is correct on this matter, but the reasoning is particularly atrocious.

It is a well-established rule in Anglo-Saxon law and American jurisprudence that where a matter may be decided by the common law or statute without resort to the Constitutional question that the Court should rule based upon the narrower ground.

Undisputed evidence was presented at oral argument that a written contract did not exist between UNEPSE, its employees and the Northeast Region.  As such, employees who were members of UNEPSE were retained by the Northeast Region an implied contract, not an express contract.

At common law in American jurisprudence, with which our Constitution and Laws are based upon, such employees function as "at-will employees" of their employer, the Northeast government, and are thus free to leave the "contract" at any point of their employment, without consequences.  No statute of the Northeast Region or of the Atlasian government has been attested to which changes this result.

Accordingly, when UNEPSE employees left their jobs and started striking, they merely exercised this lawful right and did not violate any statute or regulations.  They cannot be fined for this unilateral action, as the Northeast Region could, similarly, not be fined for firing the UNEPSE employees from their jobs.  The Practical Labor Policy Act does not impact this decision, as it deals with "new" contracts solely and Section 4 was not utilized.

Therefore, I agree with the majority that the damages imposed by the Northeast CJO must be struck down and the decision vacated.  I disagree, however, with the majority's reasoning that a right to strike or a right to collectively bargain is found fully within Article VI, Section 10 or that such a rule is relevant or applicable to adjudication of this contract dispute.

II - The "Practical Labor Policy Act"

I dissent in full with the Court's decision on the Act as the issue of the Act's constitutionality is not yet ripe for adjudication.

III - Article VI, Section 10

Since the majority has touched upon this Section, I believe that I should put forth my general thoughts on its interpretation, which conflicts greatly with the majority's reasoning.

The key mistake by the majority, in my view, lies in a misreading of the actual text of the  Constitutional provision in question.  Whether this error is driven by force of politics or legal confusion, the fact is that it will lead to incorrect judicial decisions and stifle lawmaking.

The text of Article VI, Section 10 says:

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The majority seems to think that "persons in employment shall have the right to..." also means that "unions shall have the right to..."  Under this reasoning, inclusion of the union's "right to strike" and the union's "right to collectively bargain" naturally follows from the incorrect conclusion that the language protects the collective rights of the union.  I cannot agree with this reasoning.

Rather, I think that the "right to organize" protects individual rights, not collective rights.  The language of the text specifically grants the right to "persons in employment", not to unions or organizations.  If it did, it would have made explicit the groups that deserve protection.  Since it does nothing of the sort, it therefore follows that no protections have been granted to these collective organizations. 

Moreover, the term "person", in the many instances where it appears in the Bill of Rights, should, in most these instances, refer to individuals.  Although the question of "corporate personhood" may well appear before the Court in the future when addressing provisions of the Bill of Rights, the additional language "in employment" gives clear guidance that the persons described in Article VI, Section 10 are individuals, not corporations or other organizations.

In short, the right of "persons in employment" to "organize for purposes of collective bargaining" consists of three basic rights.  Since the text "organize for purposes of collective bargaining" is akin to "unionize", the Constitution, therefore, protects the right of any individual who is employed to:

1) Create/form a union;
2) Join a union (or not join a union); and
3) Leave a union (or join another union).

These are the boundaries to which the right found in Article VI, Section 10 forms and to which only the Senate is allowed to regulate or restrict only "on the grounds of vital National interest".  Any legislation, therefore, whether regional or federal, which touches directly upon the individual worker's right to do either of these three things must be unconstitutional save the sole limited exception mentioned above.

Admittedly, much labor law does not touch directly on these rights.  Indeed, 99% of laws which regulate collective entities (i.e. unions or similar organizations), such as The Practical Labor Policy Act or other laws which may limit the right to strike or define the terms of collective bargaining, do not directly impact an individual's right to engage in the aforementioned three rights. 

However, this does not necessarily mean that such laws always escape the grasp of Article VI, Section 10.  Rather, I believe that in certain instances, laws passed by the legislature or the Senate may run afoul of the Constitution even though they only indirectly impact an individual's right to unionize, as outlined above. 

For example, if a law or regulation in question unnecessarily restricts (1) the ability of the union to take action to benefit its members, (2) the ability of the union maintain negotiations in collective bargaining, or (3) the rights of union members in daily work activities, then such a law may indirectly punish those individuals who wish to exercise the right to unionize to such an extent that it constitutes an infringement of their right to organize outlined in Article VI, Section 10.

In other words, I would hold that any labor laws which indirectly impact an individual's right to unionize are unconstitutional as violations of the "right to organize" under Article VI, Section 10, if they fail this test:

1) The challenger of the law must show that it renders an individual's right to organize substantially meaningless (i.e. one of the three basic rights listed above);
2) If this burden is met, the government must, in turn, provide an compelling government interest for the regulation and show that the regulation is narrowly tailored to that interest. (the only compelling government interest being "a vital national interest")

Part of me wishes to make a few more comments about the faults of the majority decision, but I think this describes my position accurately, and there is no need to bore anyone.

[Marokai Backbeat]

II - The "Practical Labor Policy Act"

I dissent in full with the Court's decision on the Act as the issue of the Act's constitutionality is not yet ripe for adjudication.

It's a shame this opinion never came up during our private deliberations..

[Purple State]

It's funny, only after the fact did I remember that there exists a Workers' Bill of Rights in Atlasia statute, which I assume extends to the regions. That includes, "The right of workers to organize and act in concert shall not be impeded by the government of Atlasia or any institution under the jurisdiction of Atlasian Law."

[Marokai Backbeat]

It's funny, only after the fact did I remember that there exists a Workers' Bill of Rights in Atlasia statute, which I assume extends to the regions. That includes, "The right of workers to organize and act in concert shall not be impeded by the government of Atlasia or any institution under the jurisdiction of Atlasian Law."

I did bring that up in private and I actually included a paragraph referencing it in my initial draft of the 'addendum' but, for some reason, I scrapped it. Not entirely sure why, in retrospect.