Republicans can still win in 2012 with PA or VA without winning CO, NM and NV. Not the other way.
Some things to keep in mind about PA is that it was one of the states that was targeted heavily by Mccain in 2008, since he basically gave up on Wisconsin and Michigan (and the results show that). Also Obama’s problem with blue collar workers manifested itself in PA before the rest of the midwest, particularly the upper midwest, due to his gaffe about western PA. So the swing against him that we saw in Wisconsin and Michigan had already happened in PA. Rather it will again be the Philly burbs who decide the winner, and if Obama is losing there he is losing the country. PA is close to being a tipping point state, but not quite. When John McCain worked on trying to get Pennsylvania to go against the national trend, it served as an alternative to Michigan. His efforts were good for, perhaps, a full percent with the margin (John Murtha’s district was the only one in the country that flipped from the 2004 Democratic to 2008 Republican column).
Pa. has a partisan ID of a few more points more Democratic than on average to the rest of the country. Trendline in 2008 didn’t live up to 2004: 3-plus points, compared to 5-plus. But that’s a matter of the campaiging.
It’s important to note that, since the Republicans and Democrats first matched up in 1856, Pa. and Mich. have been likeminded — they’ve disagreed only in four elections. Two of those were ones in which each had been the home state of a party’s nominee: 1856 James Buchanan (D-Pa.) carried his home state while Mich. said no; 1976 Gerald Ford (R-Mich.), the incumbent who was never elected to the vice presidency and/or presidency, carried his home state while Pa. flipped to Jimmy Carter (D-Georgia) in a Democratic pickup of the White House. The other two presidenial disagreements were with the Franklin Roosevelt White House years: they both gave him carriage in 3 of his 4 elections — but not at the same time. (Pa. held in 1932 for unseated Republican Herbert Hoover; Mich. flipped in 1940 for GOP challenger Wendell Wilkie.)
The map has been realigned: When Republicans win the presidency, they carry all of the south (and/or border-south). When Democrats prevail, they pick up a select few in this area. (It was the opposite when the south was Solidly Democratic.) The GOP wins with such full support because, mathematically, they must; but, also, because of realignent with the “Southern strategy.” While Tricky Dick’s strategy was good for Electoral College blowouts exceeding 400 during the 1970s and 1980s, the charm wore off. With exceptions of New Hampshire and rising bellwether Iowa, the northeast, mid-Atlantic, upper midwest (Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin), and the pacific rim have not given a Republican presidential candidate carriage since the 1980s. And what really stood out, among these states, was Vermont. It is, historically, the most reliably Republican-voting state since the party became established in the 1850s: all elections, 1856–1988, with exception of 1964. Again, Richard Nixon’s “Southern strategy” worked only for a while—and then the north caught on to the change in the GOP’s platform. And it is highly likely these string of states won’t color red unless fundamental changes are made in the party’s platform.
