Civil War in Syria

[Grand Wizard Lizard of the Klan]

Well, I don't know if all know but there were parliamentary elections in Syria yesterday.
http://alwaght.com/en/News/48938
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKCN0XA2C5

Aleppo


Damascus



As-Suwayda



Tartus



Homs



I wonder what will be result for ar-Raqqah *canned laughter*

[swl]

I am wondering what's the %age of Syrians living in government controlled areas?

[Grand Wizard Lizard of the Klan]

I guess on territories controlled by Syrian Republic lives majority of population (which remained in Syria).

[ingemann]

I am wondering what's the %age of Syrians living in government controlled areas?

10 million out of the 16-17 million people in Syria.

[palandio]

Clashes between pro-regime militias and the Kurdish-dominated police force Asayish in the city of Qamishli (province of Hasakah, north-eastern Syria) are escalating. There have been minor incidents in the past, and temporarily stable truces imposed by the regime and PYD/YPG. This time the will to compromise on both sides seems to be questionable, and the party that would benefit is Daesh who are already moving troops in the direction of Shaddadi.

(For some general background, see also ingemann's post from February 22, 2016, 03:31:51 pm)

[ingemann]

Clashes between pro-regime militias and the Kurdish-dominated police force Asayish in the city of  (province of Hasakah, north-eastern Syria) are escalating. There have been minor incidents in the past, and temporarily stable truces imposed by the regime and PYD/YPG. This time the will to compromise on both sides seems to be questionable, and the party that would benefit is Daesh who are already moving troops in the direction of Shaddadi.

(For some general background, see also ingemann's post from February 22, 2016, 03:31:51 pm)

I read up on this, and it seem to have started with some NDF guard began the fighting and it's here it becomes complex and ugly.

The local NDF are from the Tayy/Shammar tribe. They're Sunni Arabs. This tribe have been closely allied with the regime for decades and was settled in the area for that reason and as part of the Arabization process. They took part in the 2004 Qamishli massacre against the local Kurds, in fact they may have started the conflict which lead to massacre.

In general the local NDF are your typical Sunni Arab paramilitary (or soldiers) group, chest beating thugs who's useful against unarmed civilians, who they can terrorize, rape and plunder, but mostly useless against organised forces. The only difference from the rebel groups (outside JAN and Daesh) are that they "fight" under the regime's banner. It's a typical example in the difference between the NDF groups, NDF recruited among Druzes, Alawites, Christians and Ismailittes are better organised, through we also have example of Sunni NDF who's better than this.

[ingemann]

The Kurds have a few days ago started a offensive on Raqqa. It seems to have ended again. The offensive have in general been a success, and seem to mostly have ended because the Kurds are unwilling (wise enough) to attack Raqqa yet. According to "Raqqa is being slaughtered silently" a anti-ISIS resistant group, the people of Raqqa seem more terrified of a Kurdish conquest than continued ISIS rule.

At the same ISIS is on the offensive against FSA in north Aleppo, where Azaz may fall in a close future (unless we see a Turkish intervention). This may also be why the Kurds have stopped their offensive at Raqqa, as the destruction of FSA north of Aleppo would leave them and SAA as the only alternative to getting rid of ISIS in the area and it would make Turkish threats against Kurdish expansion in the area seem to be pro-ISIS. Also it's unlikely the Turks will intervene, as the Russians will likely shoot down any Turkish plane in Syrian territory and may even attack Turkish ground units (and no it wouldn't allow Turkey to call on NATO).

[palandio]

During the last week the Kurdish-dominated SDF have been advancing towards the Daesh-held city of Manbij near the Turkish border from the east and are already encircling it from the north, south and east.

This is interesting for several reasons. Turkey has said in the past that it would not allow the Kurds to cross the Euphrates, because the area between Azaz in the west and the Euphrates in the east which currently is mostly under control of Daesh should become a Turkish-influenced "safe zone".

- But Turkish proxies (FSA etc.) in the area around Azaz and Marea are now in a dire situation (see ingemann's post) and everyone sees that there is no realistic chance that they could conquer the "safe zone". So if Turkey continues preventing the Kurds from attacking Daesh in the "safe zone", this would be perceived as even more blatantly pro-Daesh than in the past.
- The SDF forces that are engaged in the battle of Manbij are at most 20% Kurdish, at least the SDF say so.
- SDF seems to have American backing.

Not too much attention has been paid to the Eastern Ghouta campaign. Eastern Ghouta is a rebel enclave east of Damascus, in fact the biggest of the Damascus suburb enclaves and also the only one that includes vast agricultural areas. For over one month Nusra-affiliated groups and the long-dominating Salafi Islamist group Jaish al-Islam have fought each other in a bloody conflict until they reconciled two weeks ago. But the Syrian Army has already profitted from the weakened rebel defense and conquered large swaths of land in the south of the enclave, including valuable farmland. From a broader perspective the Syrian Army has been continuously advancing in the Damascus suburbs over almost the whole duration of the war, dividing rebel-controlled areas and besieging the remaining enclaves. In other parts of the country the development has been much less continuous.

South of Aleppo rebels have conquered some villages during the past weeks, the cease-fire seems to matter no longer. Russia has detached some of its troups from Aleppo due to the cease-fire and Hezbollah has detached troups due to a potential hot conflict with Israel looming on the horizont. We see that without friends the Syrian Army in Aleppo is in difficulties. On the other hand the rebels are not achieving that much, if that is the strongest attack they can mount.

For the first time in two years the Syrian Army has entered Raqqa province from Ithriyah in Hama province and is advancing towards Daesh-held Tabqa. Has the race towards Raqqa begun? Is this the begin of a major offensive? Will there be coordination with the SDF? In other news Syrian Army advances around Palmyra and toward Deir ez-Zor are slow and there are set-backs like the repeated loss of the Shaer gas field.

[palandio]

Being under attack from the SDF in Manbij, Daesh is retreating from the Azaz/Marea front, hence allowing the pro-Turkish rebels to reverse their recent losses (mentioned in ingemann's post) and even to gain further territory. This strengthens the pro-Turkish rebels and their backers and might raise the tensions between Turkey and SDF even more. Very clever.

[Mehmentum]

Syrian Civil War + Spillover, January 2016.


June 2016

[Associate Justice PiT]

     ISIS is finally giving way!

[swl]

It looks good in Iraq, I guess Mosul should be taken in the next months... However in Syria the Syrian army seems to weak to take back Raqqa.

[palandio]

The Syrian Army's Raqqa offensive seems to have turned into a costly desaster, due to strategic mistakes, a surprise Daesh counter-attack, lack of communication between different units and an un-coordinated retreat that left some units behind enemy lines. One might almost say 'business as usual'. While lifting the sieges of Kuweires and Nubl/Al-Zahraa has been a major moral boost for pro-regime fighters, recent events once again might give them the sentiment that in critical situations their commanders tend to waste their lives due to military incompetence.

[Green Line]

I don't see how the Iraqi Army is going to retake Mosul and actually hold it long term without US troops doing the heavy lifting.  This is the army that broke almost immediately when ISIS moved in.  I fear any Iraqi gains are going to be fragile and easily reversed.  This is going to be a problem for a long time to come.

[Ebsy]

http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/06/26/iraq_takes_back_full_control_of_fallujah_from_isis.html

Fallujah has been retaken by the Iraqis with relatively little damage to the city itself.

[palandio]

The most important development of the past two weeks has probably been the advance of the regime forces in the Mallah farms north of Aleppo, supported by the Russian Airforce. The effect of this is that now the Castello Road, which was the last supply-line to insurgent-held Eastern Aleppo, is under fire control by the regime, effectively cutting it and laying siege on Eastern Aleppo. Prices in Eastern Aleppo are already skyrocketing.

Insurgents so far have been unable to reverse these gains and might instead try to make further advances in the Southern Aleppo countryside.
There has also been an insurgent offensive in Latakia province, which has resulted in the gain of the town of Kinsibba, but which now has stalled.

The regime on the other hand has continued its advances in the Damascus suburbs, in particular the Eastern Ghouta.

Attempts by ISIS to break the siege of Manbij have been unsuccesful, and the SDF are slowly advancing into parts of the city.

An attempt by the American-supported "New Syrian Army" to cut the connection between the ISIS-occupied parts of Iraq and Syria at al-Bukamal on the Euphrates has resulted in failure.

Also regime operations against ISIS near Deir ez-Zor and Palmyra seam to be purely defensive for the moment, the offensives being postponed due to the army being busy in Aleppo and Damascus.

[ingemann]

palandio bring up some good points.

I think the three most important fronts the rest of the year will be the Kurd attempts to cut ISIS off from Turkey and connect Afrin with the rest of Rojava. This will weaken ISIS to the point where it may collapse before Christmas

Whether East Aleppo end up completely besieged. This will strengthen the regimes position in the north and enable the regime to use Aleppo more offensive

The potential fall of Eastern Ghouta. A third of the regimes forces are around Damascus. The fall of EG would free up thousands of soldiers to use on other fronts.

[palandio]

I think the three most important fronts the rest of the year will be the Kurd attempts to cut ISIS off from Turkey and connect Afrin with the rest of Rojava.

I think that the recent succesful SDF/Kurdish offensives against ISIS have shown that from a military standpoint they could cut ISIS off from Turkey within a short time. The question will be if Turkey will permit it like it is reluctantly tolerating the current offensive on Manbij. If no, the question might also involve players like Russia and the US and things could get really complicated.

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ISIS is already far weaker than it was one or two years ago. But who is ready to take over its remaining territory? Will the Iraqi Army be able to find enough Sunni allies in Niniveh province? Will the non-Kurdish component of the SDF be strong enough to fight battles that for the Kurds are not a priority? Will the Syrian Army have weakened the rebels enough that it can deploy more forces to the East?

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What do you mean? Offensives from Aleppo towards the east? Or towards the west? In any case it's interesting to see how much both regime and rebels are investing into the battle of Aleppo.

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Yes, that seems to be the primary motivation of the regime in their recent Eastern Ghouta and Daraya offensives.

[Californiadreaming]

The Syrian Army's Raqqa offensive seems to have turned into a costly desaster, due to strategic mistakes, a surprise Daesh counter-attack, lack of communication between different units and an un-coordinated retreat that left some units behind enemy lines. One might almost say 'business as usual'. While lifting the sieges of Kuweires and Nubl/Al-Zahraa has been a major moral boost for pro-regime fighters, recent events once again might give them the sentiment that in critical situations their commanders tend to waste their lives due to military incompetence.

Out of curiosity--did Russia help the Syrian Army in its failed Raqqa offensive?

[Californiadreaming]

     ISIS is finally giving way!

Yep, thankfully.

[Californiadreaming]

Syrian Civil War + Spillover, January 2016.


June 2016

What exactly explains the ISIS retreat in southern Syria and western Iraq, though?

[palandio]

What seems to be the loss of a huge territory by ISIS in Southern Syria and Western Iraq is just the loss of some desert outposts, sadly.
In Southern Syria the US-backed and Jordan-based New Syrian Army has captured the al-Tanf border crossing from ISIS, but overall success has been limited so far. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Syrian_Army
In Western Syria the Iraqi Army and allies have made progress in the densely populated parts of Anbar province (Ramadi, Fallujah etc.) which has allowed it to take back some desert outposts.

But maps like these can be really deceiving. Optically they give too much value to deserts and wasteland on the one side, and on the other side important devolopments like the encirclement of East Aleppo, the SAA progress in the Damascus suburbs or the future capture of Manbij by the YPG are barely visible.

[Californiadreaming]

What seems to be the loss of a huge territory by ISIS in Southern Syria and Western Iraq is just the loss of some desert outposts, sadly.
In Southern Syria the US-backed and Jordan-based New Syrian Army has captured the al-Tanf border crossing from ISIS, but overall success has been limited so far. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Syrian_Army
In Western Syria the Iraqi Army and allies have made progress in the densely populated parts of Anbar province (Ramadi, Fallujah etc.) which has allowed it to take back some desert outposts.

But maps like these can be really deceiving. Optically they give too much value to deserts and wasteland on the one side, and on the other side important devolopments like the encirclement of East Aleppo, the SAA progress in the Damascus suburbs or the future capture of Manbij by the YPG are barely visible.

Thank you very much for this information!

Also, though, off-topic, but out of curiosity--given your extremely large amount of knowledge about this topic, can you please respond to this question of mine here?:

https://uselectionatlas.org/FORUM/index.php?topic=241654.0

[Angel of Death]

It's worth mentioning that al-Nusra has now dissociated itself from Al-Qaeda, although the consensus seems to be not to overstate the importance of this.

[palandio]

Recent devolopments:

In Aleppo the Syrian Army was able to complete the siege of East Aleppo at the end of July, cutting the last rebel supply line in the north-west.
But within the next few days a long-prepared, massive rebel offensive, headed be the ex-Nusra Front (now Levant Conquest Front), resulted in a rebel breakthrough in the south-west, establishing a new (unsafe) supply line and cutting the main regime supply line towards West Aleppo.
The result is that now both sides have only unsafe new supply lines through recently conquered territory and the fighting is far from being over. The north-western rebels (Army of Conquest, Conquest of Aleppo) have once again shown that they are one of the strongest military actors on the ground.

Continued government advances in the Damascus suburbs (nothing new).

Heavy clashes are going on between regime forces and Kurds in al-Hasakah. In principle these are similar to the clashes in Qamishli in April which were ended by a ceasefire, but now there is the potential to develop into an all-out war with serious repercussions in other parts of Syria. In al-Hasakah it is probably the Kurds who have the upper hand, but this may not be the case in Sheikh Maqsoud and Afrin, when fighting against everyone else. A useful background article might be this:
http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/64375

Which leads us to the recent diplomatic developments between Turkey and Assad's foreign backers. As a result Turkey might not support the rebels anymore (except for its proxies in the Azaz-Marea pocket), and in turn Russia, Iran and Assad might become very hostile towards the Syrian Kurds in general. But this would both be a 180 degree turn-around, I don't know how likely this is.