The Great Korea Thread

[seanobr]

Since China is reluctant to engage on any aspect of its Korean policy, there has never been confirmation of its position, but the popular assumption is that China was willing to implicitly tolerate the presence of those D.P.R.K. nationals who took care to be as unobtrusive as possible.  It certainly didn't appreciate the self-defeating spectacle outside of the Japanese consulate in Shenyang in 2002; it has attempted to prevent foreign governments from harboring North Korean defectors in their diplomatic missions in the past, and there was a rumor at the end of last year that it had extracted an agreement from Japan never to extend such protection going forward.  The essential quality of China's approach to the D.P.R.K., however, is still pragmatism, and while I don't think it possesses the ability or desire to prevent every refugee from crossing the border, the current arrangement has actually been beneficial for both governments.  The significant ethnic Korean population in China's northeast -- which has been exploited by the North Korean media in the past -- does make it easier than it otherwise would be for someone to migrate over the border, facilitating passage has become a lucrative form of illicit commerce, and the importance of the economic interaction taking place in China to the functioning of the North Korean state has militated against China taking the stringent action that Pyongyang might have once preferred.  Indeed, although Kim Jong-un was apparently responsible for an effort to secure the border during his rise to prominence, and immediately after Kim Jong-il's death there was an attempt to seal it, the latest report was that individuals were being permitted to travel into China without repercussions as long they returned with tribute to the state.  

It's not my intent to downplay the suffering of D.P.R.K. nationals in China -- overwhelmingly women forced into menial labor or sexual slavery and desperate to escape their plight -- or to imply that it is possible to travel back and forth between the two at will, but since the famine, when the number of refugees inside the country reached its peak, it has become increasingly possible for individuals to reach China and take advantage of opportunities there.  It will remain an extremely dangerous, degrading and miserable proposition, as much of the media attention on this subject has highlighted.  China has permitted D.P.R.K. security agents to operate in the border areas to identify transients, and the North is trying to eliminate as many of the traditional crossing paths as possible, but it is no longer uncommon, and the process has even become entrenched to an extent.  Those who do not actively attract attention or disrupt the equilibrium have a reasonable chance of remaining in China for an extended period of time.  Is anyone aware of how this might compare to the situation on China's border with Burma?

If China has elected to re-evaluate its position on the refugee issue, the influence of its own leadership succession turmoil may have played a role, and it's surprising to me that no one here noticed that Bo Xilai's replacement in Chongqing, Vice Premier Zhang Dejiang, was educated in Pyongyang.  I wonder, however, if we are not projecting the abstruse character of China's political scene onto an issue that should be seen as distinct.  China's transition may have forced it into an adjustment, but not in the manner of pure power competition that has been implied here.  In the first instance, whether or not it was because of a specific relationship he cultivated with the Chinese government, Hu Jintao's reluctance for confrontation, the evolving nature of China's D.P.R.K. policy, or his longevity -- being a personal guest of Hu Yaobang and the Chinese leadership on a journey to Shanghai in 1982 -- Kim Jong-il was accorded far more deference in China than he deserved.  Even after the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents of 2010, Kim Jong-il's subsequent travels to China were free of the rancor one might have expected.  China was not as forthcoming with developmental assistance as the D.P.R.K. anticipated, and gracefully parried Kim Jong-il's request to renovate his obsolescent air force, but they immediately sent Kim Jong-un a photograph of Mao and his grandfather to signify their attachment after his unveiling at the 3rd Delegates Conference, and extended an invitation to Jong-un when he was still matriculating under his father.  It would not surprise me if, no longer having to interact with an adroit and senior Kim Jong-il, China is willing to be more assertive with respect to the D.P.R.K.  That is notable, because the substantial refugee repatriation in March of this year engendered an unexpected outpouring of condemnation, including a protracted protest in Seoul, the hunger strike of a South Korean parliamentarian, and even led a Congressional panel here to re-examine China's handling of D.P.R.K. nationals.  After the North declared its intent to launch a satellite to commemorate Kim Il-sung's centennial, China suddenly permitted a North Korean mother -- whose sister had already defected -- and her children that had been inhabiting a diplomatic legation in the country for two years to move on to Seoul, something that was interpreted as a tacit rebuke of Pyongyang.  It's undeniable that China has typically accepted and enabled North Korea's escalation of regional tension as an integral component of Pyongyang's foreign policy.  But at a meeting on April 7th in Ningbo, which was conveniently located in proximity to the rocket's submitted flight path, Yang Jiechi claimed China was 'troubled' by the pending launch, and the alacrity with which the U.N. Security Council issued a Presidential Statement deploring Pyongyang's act suggests to me that China's tolerance is at a minimum.  

Another interesting barometer is the degree to which the Chinese government circumscribes discourse in its media about North Korea, and while I'm not qualified to comment with any specificity, Adam Cathcart has been following this subject regularly since the start of the year.  In the period after Kim Jong-il's death, one of China's state media publications exhorted Kim Jong-un to leave his mark ideologically, much as Kim Jong-il was able to when he was a member of the party's Propaganda and Agitation Department; that statement can be interpreted differently, depending on how you view the D.P.R.K.'s existence, but I doubt that a putative satellite launch and a hypothetical third nuclear test was what the Chinese government had in mind.  I'm presuming that China, more than anything else, would like an international environment that is as stable as possible so its institutions, undoubtedly vulnerable even during an orderly transfer of power, are not overwhelmed by an unforeseen development requiring a decisive response.  North Korea, however, may require exactly the opposite in order for Kim Jong-un and his coterie to feel secure about their position, even though I doubt there is any legitimate challenge to their authority; if there is such a divergence, China will naturally do what is needed to protect itself while not trying to undermine its relationship with the North.  While a third nuclear test will lead to North Korea's denunciation and produce a frantic search for additional punitive measures that can be enacted against it, as much if not more opprobrium will be directed at China for not adequately restraining its ally, and I don't think that's something China would like to deal with at the moment.  If China is going to temporarily uphold non-refoulement, it is a clear admonishment of Pyongyang, seeing as all of the behavior attributable to Kim Jong-un's succession thus far has been in a direction of reasserting state control, including, as I noted above, making border crossing more problematic.  

In my subjective reading, there is more suspicion in their relationship than at any point since the D.P.R.K.'s first nuclear test compelled China to support U.N. resolution 1718, and an increasing sense in China that the imbalance between the two, in that China can neither renounce the D.P.R.K. nor meaningfully inhibit its behavior without imperiling Pyongyang's survival, has to eventually be rectified.  As I have mentioned here before, China will never abandon North Korea so long as America is conveying the impression that it cannot countenance a reduction in its importance to East Asia; that doesn't mean China is going to allow itself to be exploited.  Similarly, Kim Jong-il devoted his entire tenure as paramount leader to vainly attempting to normalize his relationship with America so as to reduce his dependency on China, and I have no doubt he imparted that lesson to Kim Jong-un.  China may take advantage of the next year to illustrate, in its own way, that Kim Jong-un is not his father and cannot take China's role as the North's cupbearer for granted; or this may simply be the natural reaction of a China that is more sensitive about its image than ever before.  I would not overstate the importance of Beijing's leadership succession, and I think it's perfectly explicable in the context of China's interaction with North Korea since Kim Jong-il's demise.