Do you have a soul?

[Win32]

John Dibble,

In order to vindicate reductive materialism, you have to show more than that material states cause mental states. You have to show that material states are identical to mental states. Everything you stated is consistent with mind-body dualism, from epiphenomenalism to versions that incorporate free will.

I recommend two great books to anyone who's interested: David Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness; and Robert C. Koons and George Bealer, eds., The Waning of Materialism.

[Win32]

You do not show that two things are identical by showing that one gives rise to the other. You're again ignoring the difference between nomological supervenience and logical identity.

I did not cite your facts as evidence of mind-body dualism. The point is that (contrary to your earlier suggestion) they in no way favor reductive materialism over its rivals.

[Win32]

You do not show that two things are identical by showing that one gives rise to the other. You're again ignoring the difference between nomological supervenience and logical identity.

I did not cite your facts as evidence of mind-body dualism. The point is that (contrary to your earlier suggestion) they in no way favor reductive materialism over its rivals.

I'm a reasonably intelligent human being who's seen this debate more than a few times, and I'm not familiar with this terminology -- or sure why you're assuming your audience here is.

A nomological truth is a law that does not express a logical necessity. The laws of electromagnetism and gravity are good examples: though true, there is no logical reason that they had to be true.

As for supervenience: A-properties supervene on B-properties if there cannot be a difference in A-properties without there being a difference in B-properties. (In this case, the A-properties are mental phenomena, while the B-properties are the physical processes that give rise to them.)