Mexican Elections 2017-18

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My impression from the debate is that Anaya probably won, although it doesn't really matter much, largely because he was good on the offensive (against both AMLO and Meade) and appeared to be the most prepared. AMLO clearly didn't prepare for the debate and sleepwalked through much of the first half, showing how little he really cares (or knows) about foreign policy (like answering a question about opioids by rehashing his stump speech on corruption and the 'mafia del poder'), but unlike in the first debate he got feistier and began answering Anaya's attacks in kind ('mentiroso y farsante', plus the trolling of 'safeguarding my wallet'). Meade could have done well since he's obviously smart, but he probably ruined it all when he defended EPN's 2016 invitation to Trump, and got hounded for it by Anaya (who brought a picture of the infamous handshake). El Bronco was true to his style.

On a sidenote, it remains distressing how little any of these candidates understand about any of these issues and how most of their 'proposals' are nonsensical or besides the point entirely. I guess this is especially true for AMLO and El Bronco.

I doubt 'Massive Caller' is a real pollster, particularly at the rate at which their call centre is able to churn out all kinds of polls for every state or how they conveniently hide their methodology behind a sketchy paywall. There does seem to be some fairly believable evidence that they're just fabricating their numbers as they go along. Maybe we should just ignore their junk.

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I don't know much about that pollster, but their polls do seem to yield a number of outliers: AMLO appears too high and Anaya too low, and some of their gubernatorial polls have been outliers too. I'm instinctively suspicious of pollsters which can claim to break down their polling numbers for every single state (I didn't really dig too deep, but their methodology is very unclear and their state samples seem to be based on a very poorly defined 'access to social networks' without providing real sample sizes). If it is indeed an online poll where state results are somehow drawn from 'social media presence', then in poor southern states with low internet access, I'd imagine that samples would disproportionately favour AMLO. I don't know much about Mexican pollsters, but I trust those whose polls are published by the mainstream media groups (Reforma, El Universal, El Financiero) and Consulta Mitofsky, as they tend to be a bit more forthcoming with their methodology.

At least in Chiapas, I have little doubt that, in reality, El Güero Velasco's powerful PVEM machine is behind AMLO despite public claims to be supporting Meade and Albores Gleason: to begin with, both of Morena's senatorial candidates in the state are former PVEM operators close to Velasco, including Eduardo Ramírez Aguilar (former president of the state party and former state deputy), while Morena's gubernatorial candidate Rutilio Escandón is known to be close to Velasco (certainly much closer than the PRI-PVEM-Panal's official candidate, Albores Gleason).

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Yet another turnaround in the Chiapas gubernatorial election: the PVEM, with two satellite parties (Partido Chiapas Unidos and Podemos Mover a Chiapas), has broken off the coalition with the PRI-Panal and registered its own gubernatorial candidate, Tuxtla Gutiérrez mayor (on leave) Fernando Castellanos.

As a bit of background here on why this is relevant: Chiapas was the strongest state for the faux Greens in both 2012 and 2015, thanks to the election of PVEM governor Manuel 'El Güero' Velasco Coello in coalition with the PRI in 2012. Although the PRI has been claiming that, as part of the deal six years ago, it is their turn now, the PVEM - which is the dominant party in the state - was understandably unwilling to play along, particularly since Manuel Velasco (the Potemkin governor) is ambitious. In January, as it became clear that PRI senator Roberto Albores Gleason would be imposed as the gubernatorial candidate by Los Pinos and the PRI's powers that be, 14 out of 16 PVEM state deputies led by state party president Eduardo Ramírez Aguilar resigned. However, in early February, the PRI-PVEM-Panal-CU-PMC coalition was formalized... until about two weeks later, the state PVEM broke off the coalition with the PRI... but within a week they were forced to get back in line by the national PVEM. Therefore, it seemed that the Greens would go in coalition with the PRI et al. in Chiapas under priista gubernatorial candidate, Roberto Albores, who in the polls is a distant second to Morena's candidate Rutilio Escandón (as I wrote in my last post, the morenista candidate is seen as being close to Velasco). Velasco's maternal grandfather is supporting AMLO and, tellingly, Velasco declined an offer from the PVEM to run for Senate.

About two weeks ago, the TEPJF invalidated the 'Todos por Chiapas' PRI-PVEM et al. coalition in Chiapas over some rather minor legal screw-up (the Panal wasn't part of the coalition for the state legislature) and gave them some days to get their ducks in a row. However, the PVEM - now backed by the national party - took advantage of this to break off the coalition with the PRI and launch their own gubernatorial candidate, Fernando Castellanos. Initially, the state electoral institute invalidated Castellanos' registration (because he didn't leave office 120 days before the election), but the state electoral tribunal has approved his registration on appeal. Amusingly, Albores re-registered his candidacy claiming the support of the PVEM and the two local parties.

There are rumours that Albores wants to drop out, but that would be an even greater disaster for the PRI. For a different take on the current crisis, EPN's trusted operator Luis Miranda Nava (former secretary of social development), who is in a feud with Velasco, may have killed the local coalition because he claimed that the PVEM's candidates weren't campaigning.
 
The local leader of the PRD sees Velasco's hand in this latest crisis, arguing that the governor wants Castellanos to campaign for a bit to finish off the PRI and bring people to the PVEM, before Velasco gets him to drop out in Morena's favour (claiming that the state government is operating for Morena's gubernatorial candidate and AMLO). I can't say that I disagree with this interpretation...

As a sure-sign that the PRI is in very dire straits, the typically 'loyal' PVEM has its own candidates in Puebla, Tabasco, Guanajuato, Jalisco and CDMX (and, desperate to win votes, the Greens have dusted off their old proposal for the death penalty).

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It seems the PAN-PRD-MC candidate for governor in Puebla is the wife of the PAN governor in 2010-2016 period.  Just like the PAN-PRD-MC candidate for Veracruz is the son of the PAN governor of 2016-2018.

Yes, Martha Erika Alonso is the wife of former governor Rafael Moreno Valle, who has been the effective panista political boss of Puebla since 2010 (the current governor, Tony Gali, elected in 2016, is also from Moreno Valle's group). She has never held elected office, but was leader of the state party from 2015 and 2017, and as first lady she spent a lot of money to promote her own image and build her stature using the state DIF (family development agency). Moreno Valle himself is a pluri candidate for Senate on the PAN list.

It is widely suspected, although those involved deny it, that the gubernatorial candidacy of Moreno Valle's wife (and Moreno Valle's pluri spot), was the compensation prize given in exchange for Moreno Valle dropping his presidential bid.

Moreno Valle is a particularly cunning political operator. He was a priista (until 2006), close in his time to La Maestra, and has retained most of his old priista political habits -- that is, autocratic, corrupt, incompetence/ineffectiveness concealed by profligate government ad spending, working to the benefit of his own image and a favoured clique and operating on the margins between legality and illegality. He was the first non-priista governor in the state's history, coming after the scandal-ridden administration of the fabled 'gober precioso' Mario Marín, but it was a change in name only: the old habits, and the old authoritarianism, survived.

Before leaving office, he too arranged for the adoption of an "impunity package" (a 'pocket' attorney general), and got his hand-picked successor - Tony Gali, who was mayor of Puebla (city) and infrastructure secretary before that (and a business magnate running offshore businesses in Panama), elected as governor in 2016. The personal imperative for retaining political control is obvious.

Here is a particularly thorough Proceso article from 2017 which rips Moreno Valle's record apart: https://www.proceso.com.mx/472201/moreno-valle-riesgo-pais

In both Puebla and Veracruz, Morena is attacking the 'dynasty politics' of the PAN -- Morena et al.'s candidate in Puebla, old senator Miguel Barbosa (ironically a former ally of Moreno Valle until 2016... and a former opponent of AMLO) has repeatedly claimed that Moreno Valle is seeking reelection through his wife and controversially drew historical references to the Mexican Adventure/the Battle of Puebla by comparing Moreno Valle to Maximilian and that Puebla would not accept another monarch.

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A new scandal hits Anaya where a video allegedly shows that money laundry was used to disguise campaign fiance for Anaya's campaign.     Aanya blames PRI for this "hatchet job".  Of course the person that gains from all this is AMLO.

https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/pri-blamed-for-video-accusing-candidate-of-money-laundering/

Not so much a new scandal as the revival of the old money laundering scandal from February, now with the added substantiation of a damming video and the claim that the money laundered was not only to enrich Anaya but also to finance his campaign.

The original scandal was a complex money laundering/triangulation scheme from the sale of property in Querétaro. With the help of a businessman/real estate developer specialized in tax schemes, Manuel Barreiro, Anaya sold an industrial property he got for 10 million pesos for 54 million pesos in 2016. The money, sourced from and travelling through tax havens and foreign countries, made its way to Anaya through shell companies created by front men for the purpose of transferring funds to Anaya. The new video shows a man identified as Barreiro's brother discussing his family's ties to Anaya, the scandal, the modus operandi and how it is to allegedly finance his campaign.

Anaya, then as now, has responded with renewed anger and indignation against what he has always insisted is a sinister priista plot concocted between Meade, Videgaray, EPN and the federal government in their 'dirty war' against him. He has also reiterated that he would throw EPN in jail if he was to be proven guilty. Meade has fired back, reusing Anaya's "insulting and unacceptable" line (in English) against him, while AMLO is trying very hard not to laugh. Given that both political money laundering schemes and priista dirty tricks are part and parcel of Mexican politics, it is hard to determine who to believe, but the revival of an old scandal will probably block any polling gains by Anaya. In February, the scandal didn't really help Meade, but it did block his momentum and stop his growth in polls. Obviously, this is a stupid thing to be doing if the end goal is to keep the runaway favourite from winning, particularly given that the campaign is basically over.

Jorge Castañeda, who is one of Anaya's leading surrogates now, claims that there is an "impunity pact" between EPN and AMLO. The federal government says this is 'fake news', and the claim is also denied by the AMLO campaign, which retorts that the only story here is that Anaya has gone rogue and broken the old 'PRIAN' pact.

http://www.aztecanoticias.com.mx/se-revela-nexo-entre-ricardo-anaya-y-manuel-barreiro/2460353
https://adnpolitico.com/presidencia/2018/06/07/difunden-nuevos-datos-de-presunta-corrupcion-de-anaya-el-panista-culpa-a-epn

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Third debate took place.  Was suppose about economic issues but ended up with all 3 major candidates throwing accusations of corruption at each other.   Net winner should be AMLO since the narrative of the election really did not change.

Well, they did talk about economic issues (as well as education, healthcare, poverty etc.), but the media's main takeaways were obviously all the mudslinging and free-for-all exchange of accusations between the three major candidates. Anaya went for the big theatrics, to the point where he challenged AMLO to drop out if the claim he was making against him was proven; AMLO got a bit riled up but took it in strides, and ended up saying that he wouldn't put Anaya in jail. Meade went against AMLO and Anaya, but his attacks were weak and unimpressive, even going to the point of holding up a fake DVD cover for a fake movie about AMLO's 'catastrophic' 2018-24 presidency which mostly generated memes and people asking for it on Netflix. Anaya reiterated his big Trumpian theatrical claim to go after EPN and Meade (i.e. lock them up), which I find to be very irritating, as well as his claims of a 'EPN-AMLO pact' to which AMLO had a good comeback. I won't bother thinking about 'who won' since it doesn't matter.

The discussion of the actual topics of the debate further revealed, once again, that none of these clowns have any coherent idea about what to do or any depth of understanding about the reality of the issues. AMLO's go-to answer to every question is 'end corruption', occasionally with some stuff about 'neoliberalism'. Anaya speaks well and presents himself well, but he is basically proposing unrealistic nonsense which may work in Norway or Liechtenstein -- last night, for example, he basically promised tablets/smartphones for everyone, giving away tablets to all high school and post-sec students, free public internet in every school and public place (!?) and having every kid learn English thanks to technologies and/or Mexicans in the US (all of this, of course, without even raising taxes!).

Because of my interests and my own experience working in a public school in Mexico, I paid attention to their comments on education (and, even more specifically, whatever they said about English classes), and I can certify that none of them have any idea what they're talking about (except, maybe, Anaya, who kind of spoke some sense for once). AMLO's 'views' on education are particularly horrifying, especially since it's pretty clear he has no idea what he's talking about and buys into claims that the education reform is some sort of sordid neoliberal plot imposed by the IMF (when in reality the education reform is a whole bunch of nothing which had good intentions on paper but has amounted to jack squat in practice).

As always, El Bronco was just there for the memes and comedic relief. Still can't get over his own FBI, 'Facebook Bronco Investigation'.

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A new Reforma poll on the Morelos gubernatorial race: nothing to see here.

Cuauhtémoc Blanco 'Cuau' (Morena-PT-PES) 50%
Rodrigo Gayosso (PRD-PSD) 15%
Víctor Caballero (PAN-MC) 14%
Jorge Meade Ocaranza (PRI) 8%
Nadia Luz Lara (PVEM) 5%
Fidel Demédicis (Ind.) 4%
Alejandro Vera (Panal) 3%
Mario Rojas (PH) 1%

Morena-PT-PES' gubernatorial candidate and runaway favourite in the state is Cuauhtémoc Blanco 'Cuau', mayor of Cuernavaca since 2015. Blanco is a former professional footballer, who played for the América and the national team (until 2014), before getting into politics as mayor of the state capital of Cuernavaca, elected for the small 'Social Democratic Party' (PSD). 'Cuau' is a populist loudmouth and the arch-nemesis of incumbent governor Graco Ramírez (PRD). Graco, who thinks 'Cuau' is a boor, has accused him of being connected to organized crime and drug trafficking (in March 2017, the secretary-general of the municipality resigned, accused of having been a lawyer to three brothers connected to the Beltrán Leyva cartel). In 2017, the state attorney general - the cousin of Graco's ex-wife - began investigating Blanco's connection to the assassination of a local businessman. 'Cuau' is also accused of having been paid 7 million pesos by the PSD to be the party's candidate in 2015. In December 2016, the state congress opened three procedures to remove Blanco from office: definitive suspension, an impeachment trial (juicio político) and 'revocation of mandate', which were all expeditiously approved by large majorities. 'Cuau' obtained an injunction and the Supreme Court later suspended the impeachment trial, a suspension which the Court earlier this year.

The PRD candidate is Rodrigo Gayosso, the stepson of incumbent (and very unpopular) governor Graco Ramírez. Besides the accusations of nepotism, Gayosso - who is a former priista who greatly benefited from the stepdad's help - is also accused of, among other things, corruption, threatening opponents and a ridiculously expensive marriage. Gayosso is again accusing 'Cuau' of ties to organized crime and narcos, but those claims probably ring hollow given the explosion of drug-related violence in the state under Graco Ramírez. His controversial candidacy broke up the Frente in Morelos, with the PAN and MC supporting Víctor Caballero, a former health secretary under PAN governor Marco Antonio Adame Castillo (2006-2012). He has accused the incumbent governor of illegally using public resources to favour Gayosso, but Caballero himself has been accused of having authorized undue severance payments to six civil servants in his final days as health secretary in 2012 (at a loss of nearly 3 million pesos to public coffers).

Standing little chance, the PRI's candidate Jorge Meade Ocaranza is an old priista apparatchik who was most recently federal delegate of the SEDESOL in Morelos from 2012 to 2017.

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Because of my interests and my own experience working in a public school in Mexico, I paid attention to their comments on education (and, even more specifically, whatever they said about English classes), and I can certify that none of them have any idea what they're talking about (except, maybe, Anaya, who kind of spoke some sense for once). AMLO's 'views' on education are particularly horrifying, especially since it's pretty clear he has no idea what he's talking about and buys into claims that the education reform is some sort of sordid neoliberal plot imposed by the IMF (when in reality the education reform is a whole bunch of nothing which had good intentions on paper but has amounted to jack squat in practice).

How interesting.  Any thoughts from you on the education reform EPN put in place? SNTE is up in arms over that and it seems is backing their ancient enemy AMLO just to overturn it.  Do you think AMLO will overturn those reforms if and when he gets into office ?

I think that the education reform began with good intentions and most of its elements are, on paper  and in theory, good ideas - open to some debate, but generally going in the right direction. However, it was poorly implemented both in the secondary legislation and on the ground, and its shortcomings have become more obvious.

Given how it used to work beforehand, the creation of 'professional teaching service' (as a regulated public sector career) and the idea of independent, mandatory teacher evaluations to control and determine hiring, promotions, continuation of employment and to provide incentives and recognition was a good idea and long overdue. The other parts of the reform -- matters like school autonomy, technical assistance to schools and teachers, new funding programs to improve infrastructure or IT access -- were also good idea, if only in theory.

I think there are fair criticisms to be made about the virtues of evaluating teaching solely by arbitrary and impersonal numbers, statistics and tests -- and that may be one of the main defects of the evaluation system as implemented by the law. In a country with such massive inequalities in educational coverage, quality, achievements and with vastly different regional realities, not adequately taking into account the specific context of each specific school (and I mean schools, not just 'states' or 'municipalities') was a mistake (I know the law makes passing mention of context being objectively considered). It becomes obvious that the reform was designed by technocrats who don't understand realities on the ground, and who quickly became more preoccupied with churning out numbers and indicators for their databases than making sure the education reform actually fulfilled its stated objective, improving the quality of education - which it hasn't done. Indeed, even as the implementation has clearly failed badly and the reform has turned into a wet pizza with every passing day, the federal government has desperately tried to keep putting a positive spin on it, using misleading or incomplete numbers and statistics to paint a positive image of what isn't all that positive.

Some of the left and AMLO's criticisms against the reform are valid, particularly the idea that it imposes a one-size-fits-all reform model across the board without considering regional differences or specific contexts, but a lot of those criticisms are crowded out by yelling 'neoliberalism', IMF or OECD very loudly without bothering to explain exactly how it is neoliberal (or why that may be bad) and never proposing acceptable alternatives. The claim made by opponents that they don't disagree with evaluations but don't want them to determine teacher dismissal is a bit disingenuous - since that is a return to the old system, and I think most schools and workplaces would laugh at you if you told them "I agree with being evaluated, but only if I can't be fired even if I'm incompetent!".

I don't like to make claims or generalizations on the basis of personal, perhaps anecdotal, evidence, but it's clear to me that some teachers are incompetent, poorly trained, bad at their job, lazy or uninterested/careless. Stuff like ringing the bell early everyday (which is breaking federal law), leaving entire classrooms unattended to share some lunch in a teacher's lounge, educational authorities arbitrarily deciding on long weekends and days off from the federal calendar or even charging students to write a test (banned by the reform) are, in my experience or that of others, still quite common. Shoddy, minimal infrastructure built in a rush is very common in certain parts - and I worked in a relatively well-off state in a suburban area which wasn't extremely poor, so states like Oaxaca, Guerrero and Chiapas have it even worse.

AMLO's claim that the reform was more of a labour reform than an education reform has some validity to it as well: it didn't really touch on the quality or suitability of education, teaching methods, curriculum etc. (at least initially) besides just "evaluate the teachers and fire the sh**tty ones". Mexico's education system - at least in primary schools - is based heavily on robotic memorization, repetition, copying and rote learning with extremely little room for independent learning, development of critical thinking capabilities, attention for students with learning difficulties or even much regard for whether the students actually learned anything while copying stuff down. The reform didn't do anything to change that. A new curriculum has been adopted (and is to be implemented, apparently) after the SEP made a big show about it (the 'New Education Model'). I'm not a pedagogue or even all that well-informed about education, but I took a look at the English curriculum of the 'New Education Model' which I imagine will replace the current program (adopted under Calderón, I think). Unfortunately, from a quick look at it, they haven't learned their lesson (probably didn't bother): the curriculum is still an unrealistic and largely inapplicable bunch of fancy words and jargon largely lifted from the EU's common framework on languages. The current program is an unrealistic and unworkable pile of nonsense which was a nightmare to teach from -- it makes Mexico's technocrats and other geniuses look good, able to peddle garbage like "Mexico's education system is a model for the 21st century" (I think then-education secretary Aurelio Nuño, who is now on Meade's campaign instead of finishing his job, said something like that), while not working in practice (and nobody cares).

Mexico's education system has made lots of progress over the past 18-20 years, notably in terms of coverage and increasing graduation/completion rates, but still has lots of distance to cover, both in terms of matching HS graduation rates of other OECD countries and massively improving on the quality of the education.

It is the dissident CNTE (based primarily in Oaxaca) which has been leading the rowdy opposition to the reform since 2013. The leadership of the SNTE, after Elba Esther Gordillo was turfed out in pure Salinas style by EPN, has remained with the government and 'favourable', in theory, to the reform, which has meant that the government has agreed to water down the reform and stuff like evaluation so as to keep the SNTE's leadership and most of their largely membership content. There are dissident factions of the SNTE, mostly La Maestra loyalists (her relatives), who are supporting AMLO and opposed to the reform. The CNTE isn't officially supporting AMLO, and has criticized his proposals on 'cancelling' the education reform, but AMLO's opponents have all accused him of being sympathetic to the CNTE. It isn't very clear what AMLO will actually do about it, since 'cancelling' it would mean repealing or amending laws and perhaps relevant sections of the constitution.

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Reforma poll in Puebla:

Martha Erika Alonso (PAN-PRD-MC) 41%
Miguel Barbosa (Morena-PT-PES) 38%
Enrique Doger (PRI) 18%
Michel Chaín (PVEM) 3%

In the presidential election in the state, AMLO has 52% against 27% for Anaya and 17% for Meade.

Barbosa's problem is that, as a known quantity and a longtime politician who doesn't have a particularly impressive or productive career, he isn't all that popular -- he leads on negative attributes, while his opponent leads on positive attributes. While most voters, according to the poll, want a change of government in the state and disagree with the ex-governor's wife running, the incumbent governor is not unpopular (tied 44-44 approval) and Moreno Valle's record gets 44-50 approval. But AMLO's massive lead and Morena's big advantage in the 'generic state congressional ballot' may help put Barbosa over the top...

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The PAN-PRD-MC alliances is having a lot of defections.  Some of this are old new but it seems that President of the Senate who is from PAN said he will back Meade.   And the PAN governors of Baja California Sur and  Aguascalientes have pretty much broken with Anaya and said that Aanya cannot win and that PAN has to start from scratch after the elections that Anaya has led PAN to disaster.  Both seems to lean Meade without saying so.  PRD governor of Michoacán also has came out for Meade.   And the PRD governor of Morelos and the PRD-PSD governor candidate for Morelos (running separately from PAN-MC) has endorsed AMLO even as he is still running against the MORENA-PT-PES candidate

The President of the Senate, Ernesto Cordero, was elected in September 2017 following some underhanded funny business with the PRI. Taking advantage of the PAN's internal divisions, the PRI agreed to cede the presidency of the Senate for the final year to the PAN, on condition that it be a less anti-priista panista like Cordero, who had already criticized in pretty strong terms Ricardo Anaya. Cordero was therefore elected president of the Senate by the PRI-PVEM, and four other dissident PAN senators, while the majority of the PAN caucus, led by its coordinator, senator Fernando Herrera, angrily denounced the 'traitors', refusing to recognize Cordero's election. Nevertheless, Cordero is still in the PAN caucus and internal procedures to expel him are dragging along very slowly, which suggests to me that everyone is waiting until the election before shooting off the fireworks at one another.

Cordero is an old calderonista, who was twice cabinet secretary under Calderón and was Calderón's unlucky favourite in the PAN's 2012 presidential primary. He supported Zavala's candidacy for a time, but is now openly supporting Meade: after all they're former ITAM classmates. Adding insult to injury, Cordero also formally denounced Anaya for the money laundering scandal before the PGR.

Besides Cordero, ex-PAN senator Javier Lozano (who used to be close to Moreno Valle but is now distanced from him) has been a senior member of Meade's campaign for a few months and the other 'Rebeldes del PAN' senators who starred in the party's mini-crisis last year are focusing most of their energies in going after Anaya and implicitly or explicitly supporting Meade. However, the vast majority of the PAN's caucuses in both houses remained oficialista, loyal to Anaya (at least until next Sunday).

Most of the PAN's governors have never been particularly close to Anaya - many were seen as closer to Calderón/Zavala or Moreno Valle, or in a group of their own. It also doesn't help that Anaya, on his way to the top, has tripped up and betrayed an innumerable amount of people who aren't exactly rushing to his side in his time of greatest need. Granted, in some cases, for the sake of partisan unity in an electoral moment, he has patched up old wounds with some people, like his former ally and mentor Gustavo Madero (who a few months ago was pretty pissed off with Anaya because of the PAN's pluri list for Senate). Given that, with the election basically over, Anaya's defeat seems inevitable, it's no surprise that the governors and other senior party elected officials are already preparing the inevitable post-electoral internal warfare.

The PAN governor of BCS, Carlos Mendoza Davis, claims to have made his peace with Anaya has publicly appeared with him at an event, but most are suspicious because he's good friends with Meade. But the damage was already done. The PAN governors of Durango (José Rosas Aispuro) and Aguascalientes (Martín Orozco) seem to be on a similar strategy: publicly appearing to support Anaya, but having in the past criticized him or spoken preemptively about the post-electoral scenario. In any case, Mendoza, Orozco and Rosas Aispuro were closer to Calderón's group. The PAN governor of Querétaro, Francisco Domínguez, has publicly given his support to Anaya, but it's obvious that there's no love lost between the two, who have long been political rivals.

When Anaya registered his candidacy in March, he was accompanied by only 6 of the PAN-PRD's 16 governors - Miguel Márquez (Guanajuato), Francisco Kiko Vega (Baja California), Francisco García Cabeza de Vaca (Tamaulipas), Antonio Echeverría (Nayarit), Miguel Ángel Mancera (CDMX) and Arturo Núñez (Tabasco). PAN governors Miguel Ángel Yunes (Veracruz), José Rosas Aispuro (Durango), Francisco Domínguez (Querétaro), Carlos Mendoza (BCS), Martín Orozco (Aguascalientes), Tony Gali (Puebla) and Javier Corral (Chihuahua) didn't show up, although most did send 'messages of support'.

Yunes is a group of his own, and obtained what he wanted from Anaya (a gubernatorial candidacy for his son), which has been his natural priority in this election. Given Corral's public feud with the federal government and the PRI a few months ago, he could have been expected to back up Anaya amidst his own travails with the PRI, but Corral was also pissed off with Anaya because of the PAN's senatorial pluri candidates. They have since made up. Rafael Moreno Valle got what he wanted out of Anaya (his wife's candidacy and his own pluri candidacy), and he has clearly turned his attention to what matters more for him - his wife's victory in the short-term and seizing control of the party in the long-term, eyeing 2024.

From the PRD's side, Mancera was convinced to drop his own presidential candidacy (in exchange for a Senate pluri candidacy) and has joined Anaya's campaign, actively promoting the idea of a coalition government. Last year, both Graco Ramírez and Silvano Aureoles briefly toyed around with the idea of their own vanity presidential candidacies, and neither appear to be too happy about having been forced to bow out (moreover, in Graco Ramírez's case, the PAN refused his stepson's gubernatorial candidacy). The PAN-PRD governor of QRoo, Carlos Joaquín González, criticized Anaya last year and has certainly not devoted much time or energy to supporting him now -- but he's a former priista (the half-brother of Pedro Joaquín Coldwell, former governor and current energy secretary), who left the PRI because of an internal succession conflict in 2016, but doesn't really seem to have any real beef with the federal government.

I think the Frente was poorly conceived, poorly marketed and poorly portrayed from the very beginning. Instead of being some sort of broad, civic, democratic coalition united by some common policy goals and altruistic objective, no matter how vague (change), from the get-go it was portrayed and even conceived as a wobbly, desperate political deal between weakened parties who were desperate to win and felt that they could only do so in some sort of coalition, no matter how incoherent. It very quickly got bogged down, losing precious time, with internal divisions and horsetrading over the presidential candidacy, which caused a fairly nasty crisis within the PAN and public disagreements between the PAN and PRD, resolved only at the last minute amidst rumours that everything was about to collapse. Initially branded as a 'civic front', it quickly became obvious that 'citizens' were not to have their say in all this (granted, 'citizens' didn't have their say in any of the other candidacies): Anaya, like a panista Roberto Madrazo, was only interested in his own presidential candidacy, regardless of the costs or how many people he stepped on. Without primaries or any sort of democratic mechanism, Anaya was basically 'selected' by himself as the PAN's candidate, following deals with Moreno Valle and others, and accepted by the PRD-MC following deals with them. I don't think it gave a very good look for what was supposed to be a broad, democratic coalition surpassing old partisan divisions.

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Gubernatorial candidates in Chiapas:

Rutilio Escandón (Morena-PT-PES): Morena's candidate, handpicked by AMLO, was president of the state supreme court until last year. A former priista, he was a PRD first minority senator (2000-2006) and PRD federal deputy (2006-2009), but distanced himself from the PRD in 2012 and, as president of the state's judiciary, has been close to governor Manuel Velasco. Given that Escandón has little electoral experience and lacks a political structure of his own, his imposition as Morena's gubernatorial candidate and his strength as apparent frontrunner owe to factors other than himself -- like, for example, Velasco's duplicitous underhanded support... Indeed, Morena's candidates in Chiapas are a real who's-who of the state PVEM: Eduardo Ramírez Aguilar, former president of the state PVEM and state deputy (until just a few weeks ago seeking the PRI-PVEM's gubernatorial candidacy), is now Morena's first candidate for Senate (Morena's second candidate for Senate is a former PVEM federal deputy).

Roberto Albores Gleason (PRI-Panal): The PRI's candidate, imposed by the PRI/Los Pinos, is senator Roberto Albores Gleason, the son of former interim governor Roberto Albores Guillén (1998-2000). His father broke with the PRI and supported the PRD's gubernatorial candidate, incompetent drunk crook Juan Sabines Guerrero, in 2006, which got his son a job in the new governor's administration before being elected federal deputy in 2009. Albores Gleason's candidacy was opposed by local factions in the PRI, but imposed from above, and was also seen as unacceptable to much of the local PVEM (as I discussed in an earlier post). Given how the PRI is now quite weak in the state since 2012-2015, with the PVEM bolting from the coalition, Albores Gleason should probably be expected to perform quite poorly. Paradoxically, he is now said to be the only candidate who isn't in one way or another backed or favoured by governor Manuel Velasco, and has stepped up his attacks against the incumbent governor recently.

José Antonio Aguilar Bodegas (PAN-PRD-MC): The Frente's candidate resigned from the PRI in December 2017, after four decades as a priista. Aguilar Bodegas is a former PRI federal deputy (1997-2000) and senator (2000-2006). He was the PRI-PVEM's gubernatorial candidate in 2006, narrowly losing - by less than 1% - to the PRD's candidate, Juan Sabines Guerrero, and thereafter decrying (à la AMLO, ironically) fraud. Aguilar's 2006 candidacy was betrayed by Albores Guillén (see above) and his opponent benefited from the active support of outgoing governor Pablo Salazar Mendiguchía (who was in turn later betrayed and ed over by Sabines). He was a state cabinet secretary under Velasco until last fall. He resigned from the PRI in December 2017, opposing the imposition of Albores Gleason. He was acclaimed as the PAN-PRD-MC's candidate, although this wasn't to everyone's liking (particularly MC owner Dante Delgado, who supported María Elena Orantes López, the PRD-PT-MC's 2012 gubernatorial candidate and former PRI senator). The state prosecutor's office has opened a corruption investigation against him, the real motives for which are unclear (with rumours of a 'pact' between Velasco and Dante Delgado, or because the state attorney general - elected PVEM federal deputy in 2012 but never serving - has state AG since 2009, under Aguilar Bodegas' enemy Sabines).

Fernando Castellanos (PVEM-local satellites): As I discussed in a post a few pages back, after some dizzying back-and-forth and contradictory plot twists worthy of a telenovela, the PVEM finally abandoned its coalition with the PRI and registered its own candidate, Fernando Castellanos Cal y Mayor, mayor (on leave) of the state capital, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, since 2015. There was some legal controversy about his candidacy, with the state electoral institute originally denying his candidacy claiming that he hadn't resigned his office 120 days before the election, but the state electoral tribunal overturned the decision and its verdict in Castellanos' favour was upheld earlier this month by the TEPJF. There is confusion about what purpose Castellanos' candidacy serves: some versions claim that he is only a tool used to attack Albores Gleason and therefore ensure Rutilio Escandón's victory, while other versions claim that his candidacy has changed the situation and activated PVEM machines in his favour (in public, he claims to have made up a lot of ground and be roughly tied for first, confident of victory on Sunday). A lot of PVEM members and cadres in Chiapas are openly supporting AMLO -- although Castellanos himself has personally denied that he is supporting AMLO -- and promoting the voto cruzado (vote splitting) between AMLO for president and the PVEM for local/gubernatorial races.

Jesús Alejo Orantes Ruiz 'Chus Orantes' (Independent): 'Chus Orantes', a crazy hick with a cowboy hat, is a sugarcane producer/peasant leader and former PRI state deputy from the municipality of Venustiano Carranza. He is the son of the late infamous Carmen Orantes Alegría, a local cacique who was said to have had over 100 children and who illegally appropriated huge tracts of land in the region. His father was also accused of assassinating local peasant leaders and political opponents. 'Chus Orantes' is a paternalistic populist demagogue who 'gave up' his entire salary as state deputy to give to the poor and donated tracts of his land to poor local families. His candidacy received the support of the most famous crazy cowboy of them all, 'El Bronco'.

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Does anyone have any information or perspectives on the Social Encounter Party, from what I understand it's a religiously conservative party (Evangelical) that's aligned with AMLO's coalition. If I understand correctly, PES is trying to ride on their cotails while AMLO accepted them in order to gain broad-based appeal, is that accurate?

Who do you think would be the best President for Mexico? And which parties should win the most seats?

PES is, at least in theory, a Christian evangelical party, founded and led by Hugo Eric Flores, a former evangelical pastor from Baja California in the 'Casa sobre la Roca' church. 'Casa sobre la Roca' is a rather shady neo-Pentecostal church/scam (it is actually registered as an 'asociación civil', rather than religious association), owned by Alejandro and Rosi Orozco, who have made a fortune in public contracts with their businesses and foundations 'against human trafficking'.

Flores is a political opportunist who has worked for all sides: a former priista who allied with Calderón in 2006 and, in exchange, getting a patronage appointment in SEMARNAT -- although he was dismissed a year later, accused of modifying official documents and other misconduct. He later worked in the administration of Marcelo Ebrard, the PRD head of government of the DF. The PES was first recognized as a state party in Baja California in 2006, and has been a federal party since 2014.

The other part of the story is that the party was founded under the auspices of the 'Hidalgo Group', a shrewd and influential regional factional grouping in the PRI led by former interior secretary Miguel Ángel Osorio Chong and former attorney general Jesús Murillo Karam. The PES' former secretary general and lower house coordinator, Alejandro González Murillo, a wealthy construction businessman, is Jesús Murillo Karam's nephew; the party's state president in Hidalgo used to be Natividad Castrejón Valdez, a former PAN and PRD political operator who went to work with Osorio Chong in the SEGOB; the PES mayor of Huejutla in Hidalgo is Raúl Badillo Ramírez, the brother of a former PRI federal deputy whose family is described as the priista caciques of the Huasteca hidalguense region. In 2015, Hidalgo was the PES' best state, with 9.4% - nearly finishing third ahead of the PRD (without such support, it might not have saved its new registry). By Flores' own admission in November 2017, Osorio Chong is a 'friend' of the party. Now, Osorio Chong is a PRI 'pluri' candidate for Senate and publicly supports Meade, but he was passed over by the 'dedazo' and one version of the PES' alliance with Morena is that it is part of Osorio Chong's underhanded 'revenge' (and it is always useful to have friends in different places). However, another version claims that the PES genuinely distanced itself from the PRI, probably because the PRI largely ignored them and did not reward them in kind for their critical support in the Edomex eleciton last year. In Congress, the PES had, more often than not, voted with the PRI-PVEM-Panal, until they broke with them, because, Flores claims, the PRI didn't keep their word and support their 'legislative agenda'. Alejandro González Murillo has also left the party, protesting the alliance with Morena (and is instead running for Panal).

The PES' alliance with AMLO was a bit of a surprise -- not so much because they're right-wing socially conservative evangelicals, but rather because the party had been sending mixed signals and Flores had criticized AMLO in the past -- but, basically admitting their opportunism, Flores said that he wanted to be "on the right side of history". Like every other minor party in Mexico, the PES' true raison-d'être and ultimate objective above all else is now to keep its lucrative legal registration as a federal political party, by selling itself to the highest bidder, and the alliance with Morena (and PT, another scam) is a fantastic way not only to keep its registry but significantly increase its influence. I don't know enough about their candidates, but they do seem to be accepting anyone willing to don the party label without much regard for their evangelical or social conservative credentials -- most notably 'Cuau' in Morelos or disastrous former priista governor (and friend of the narcos) Fausto Vallejo in Morelia (Michoacán) after Morena rejected him. Their top 'pluri' candidate for Senate is Adriana Sarur, a PVEM federal deputy (the PVEM, of course, the eternal paragon of moral and ethics in politics) Moreover, the PES has also signalled that it wouldn't join common parliamentary blocs with Morena-PT in either house of Congress after the elections, calling their alliance an 'electoral alliance', which basically further confirms what I've said.

As for their ideology, the PES denies being a 'religious party' but Flores has a very strange understanding of 'secularism' or 'secular state'. The little it offers in the way of a coherent declaration of principles mostly consists of meaningless fluff, with a particular emphasis on the theme of 'families' which reveals their socially conservative orientation. The PES and its legislators are strongly opposed to abortion, same-sex marriage or LGBT rights in general -- which has been cause for concern and dismay among AMLO's more left-wing progressive followers, like Elena Poniatowska, but at the end of the day AMLO has never actually given a shit about any of these issues and won't do anything to favour them (PES or no PES). In this election, AMLO has shown that he really doesn't care who allies with him, or even their interests in doing so. The PES isn't even his most reproachable alliance.

I would still hesitate to call PES an 'evangelical party'. According to an article in Reporte Indigo, the head of the largest evangelical federation in Mexico says that the PES doesn't represent even 1% of evangelicals and has nothing to do with Christian evangelical politics. It is unclear how deep the PES' ties with specific evangelical churches run, and there do not appear to be any direct links between specific evangelical churches and PES leaders/officials, unlike with most other evangelical parties in Latin America. In its demeanour and behaviour, it has much more in common with other minor parties in Mexico than with, say, Don Fabricio's PRN in Costa Rica or MIRA in Colombia.

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Further proof that some PAN governors are dropping Anaya and covering their asses for the future: 7 of 12 PAN governors have signed a document published in Excélsior in which, under lots of fluff and verbosity, they are saying that they'll work with the next government 'for the good of the country'. Ricardo Anaya's name, or that of any other candidate, isn't mentioned. Some of the governors who signed have denied that they're supporting another candidate and reiterated their support for the Frente... but anyone can say anything on Twitter.

The governors who signed are:
Martín Orozco Sandoval (Aguascalientes)
Carlos Mendoza Davis (Baja California Sur)
José Rosas Aispuro (Durango)
José Antonio Gali Fayad (Puebla)
Francisco Domínguez Servién (Querétaro)
Carlos Joaquín González (Quintana Roo)
Francisco Javier García Cabeza de Vaca (Tamaulipas)

Those who didn't sign are:
Francisco Vega (Baja California)
Javier Corral (Chihuahua)
Miguel Márquez (Guanajuato)
Antonio Echevarría (Nayarit)
Miguel Ángel Yunes (Veracruz)

If you read my other effortpost a bit up on this page, you'll notice that the governors are signed are pretty much the same who were seen as anti-Anaya or at least unenthusiastic in their support for the Frente's candidate. It's interesting that Tony Gali, Moreno Valle's governor in Puebla, is on the list: further proof that Moreno Valle has turned his attention to what matters more for him!

https://adnpolitico.com/presidencia/2018/06/27/sin-mencionar-a-anaya-7-gobers-panistas-ofrecen-trabajar-con-nuevo-presidente

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Newbie to Mexican politics here: Why did PRI and PAN nominate such terribly unpopular candidates? AMLO is running away with this thing.

Well, hindsight is 20/20. AMLO's always been the favourite, but when this started his lead wasn't as unassailable.

In any case, neither the PAN or PRI really 'nominated' their candidates in the sense Americans (and others) would understand it.

Like in the good old days, Meade was picked by EPN's dedazo last November, as if it was the 1960s. Other priista presidential hopefuls, notably Osorio Chong, were informed of the dedazo and obediently (at least in public) stepped aside. In EPN's galaxy brain, Meade was supposed to be the Mexican Macron: the independent, (competent?), reformist technocrat with no partisan ties (Meade isn't a card-carrying priista apparatchik, and served in cabinet under both Calderón and EPN) who could distance himself from the recent stench of priismo and then polarize the election between him and AMLO, the dangerous radical populist demagogue. But Meade was unable to distance himself from the PRI, EPN and the toxic unpopular technocratic faction in cabinet (Videgaray and Nuño), and still ended up being dragged down by the PRI and EPN's massive unpopularity. He began the campaign in third place, but all his moves to climb into second failed. As his name recognition increased, his negatives increased too, but his positives didn't really. Osorio Chong was polling better than Meade at the time of the dedazo, but I still think that was mostly down to higher name recognition so I'm unsure if Osorio Chong would have been a better candidate. As a priista apparatchik and traditional political operator, he would certainly have had an easier time working the PRI machines, but at the same time his image and record in SEGOB would probably have dragged him down.

Anaya, following the mantra of o te chingas o te jodes, bulldozed his way to the nomination, commandeering the party and shoving opponents and rivals to the side before imposing himself as the PAN's, and then the Frente's, sole candidate. There was no way he would have let an internal party primary go ahead, and in the end he didn't need to. Before she quit the party, Zavala was polling better than Anaya, but again I'm not sure if she would have been a better candidate, particularly seeing as her independent candidacy was a disaster and her campaign was a joke (her first and only debate performance was embarrassing). She may have gotten more active support from the PAN's governors, but that wouldn't have made much of a difference. Anaya is an intelligent and cunning young politician, who could possibly make a halfway-competent president, but it seems as if voters never really came to fully trust him or perceive him as particularly likeable. Certainly the 'dirty war' tricks (the money laundering scandal), be it true or not, hurt him and stopped his momentum.

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I saw a video on the election and am now curious as to why AMLO is calling for austerity and PAN's candidate is calling for higher taxes and UBI.

Austerity kind of means something else in a country as corrupt as Mexico, where everyone knows or suspect that governments are wasting money on corrupt schemes, white elephants or splurging on personal image promotion/ads (as is very common at every level -- I know, since I kind of was part of a corrupt personal image promotion scheme)*. In AMLO's case, this goes along with his "end corruption" pledge, which is his answer to everything.

It has indeed been said that Anaya is a centre-right candidate with a centre-left platform. There's not really anything traditionally conservative about Anaya (except perhaps social conservatism, but so is AMLO), although compared to other Latin American right-wingers nowadays (like uribismo), the PAN hasn't been particularly conservative/right-wing/far-right for years now (except, again, on social conservatism). Not quite sure if Anaya wants 'higher taxes' - the relevant section of the Frente's official platform document vaguely says it wants an "efficient, effective, progressive tax system with a large tax base [i.e. more taxpayers, incorporating informal sectors]". Expanding the tax base isn't a 'left-wing thing' here - for example, Iván Duque proposes pretty much the same thing, with a very neoliberal economic platform. In Latin American countries with large informal sectors and poor populations who don't pay income taxes (or any sort of corporate/business tax, or evade VAT), expanding the tax base is a pretty common policy idea.

* Each successive administration - federal, state or local - gets its own logo, which they then plaster everywhere to make sure people know who they can thank. In Solidaridad (Playa del Carmen), then-PRI mayor Mauricio Góngora (who ran for governor in 2016 but lost, and is now in jail for being a crook) plastered not only his administration's logo but also his own Twitter handle on the covered basketball courts he built in my neighbourhood. It's only one example I'm personally familiar with, but there are thousands of other. Or, for another, how the PVEM is spending its public money on backpacks, water bottles, notebooks and other cheap sh**t.

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District counts (official counts) begin tomorrow. The PREP only runs for 24 hrs. after the end of the election.

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Martha Erika Alonso is not the wife of the current PAN governor, Tony Gali, but rather of the current governor's predecessor (and likely senator-elect), Rafael Moreno Valle. Tony Gali is a rather irrelevant stand-in for his predecessor, so the confusion is natural.

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Martha Erika Alonso is not the wife of the current PAN governor, Tony Gali, but rather of the current governor's predecessor (and likely senator-elect), Rafael Moreno Valle. Tony Gali is a rather irrelevant stand-in for his predecessor, so the confusion is natural.

Ahh ... you are right.  I got that mixed up.  Did I get it right on Veracruz where the PAN candidate is the son of the incumbent PAN governor ?

Yes, that's correct.

The voto cruzado in favour of PAN governors' machines in local races is not unique to Puebla: in Chihuahua, PAN-PRD-MC won 35 municipalities (running separately in some cases) against only 5 for Morena et al (and 11 fptp state congress districts v. 10 for Morena et al. and 1 for the PRI). In Anaya's native Querétaro, whose PAN governor is no great friend of the ex-candidate, the Frente took 10 of the fptp state congress districts against 3 for Morena et al., as well as a large majority of municipalities. In Tamaulipas, PAN et al. won 31 municipalities against only 5 for Morena.

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Why didn't "El Bronco's" campaign get a lot of traction, it appears that even the North was sweep up by the ALMO "revolution" but I thought that the more developed North is more "conservative" or at least PAN affiliated than the South, could El Bronco have ran a regionalist campaign which could have exploited a possible North-South divide within the country? It appears that ALMO fever is everywhere. Or did the Anti-Amloites really shoot themselves in the foot?

El Bronco is an egocentric clown who has been a pretty poor governor -- investing more time in promoting his image and polishing his constructed persona than actually running the state, before breaking his promise and ditching his job mid-way for a vanity presidential candidacy. His record as governor has been quite mediocre, certainly disappointing many. His presidential campaign, meanwhile, will be mostly remembered for proposing to literally chop people's hands off and his clownish meme-generating debate performances (Facebook Bronco Investigation).

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What were the dynamics in the Jalisco race that MC won?

The victorious candidate, Enrique Alfaro (former mayor of the suburban town of Tlajomulco from 2009 to 2012), was the strong runner-up in the 2012 gubernatorial election and was elected mayor of Guadalajara in 2015, his success carrying the MC to victories in the federal and state elections in 2015 (primarily in the Guadalajara metro and the tourist resort town of Puerto Vallarta). After his 2012 result and his success in 2015, Alfaro was always the favourite in this election and no other candidate had much of a chance of catching up with him.

Alfaro was rather popular as mayor of Tlajomulco (for the PRD), claiming that he transformed one of the "most corrupt municipalities" to the most transparent in the state, although his recent record in Guadalajara appears more controversial and divisive, receiving criticisms for his apparent inability to combat insecurity/criminality and several unpopular policies. He markets himself as a dynamic, young reformist with a strong social media presence, opposed to the old partidocracia and more directly in touch with 'average citizens'. Time will tell if this is genuine or total horsecrap. Shortly before the election, investigative journalist Anabel Hernández (who has published some hard-hitting and thoroughly researched books on political corruption and drug trafficking) published an article in Aristegui Noticias (which the state electoral institute ordered be taken down) which linked Alfaro - and several other former civil servants in Tlajomulco - to drug trafficking on the basis of a DOJ internal report and an older internal report from the Mexican SEMAR, basically accused of receiving money from two drug cartels (CJNG and Sinaloa) in exchange for protection and letting them go about their business.

The PAN in Jalisco has been nearly entirely destroyed by the last panista governor, Emilio González Márquez ('el gober piadoso'), whose administration was marred by massive corruption, wasteful spending, rising debt, higher criminal/narco violence, economic stagnation and several memorable controversies (proposing to donate a huge sum of public money for the construction of a sanctuary to Cristero martyrs, and an infamous drunk speech in 2008 which just underlined the callousness, arrogance and vulgarity of the governor). The PAN was highly divided in the 2012 elections (in which it finished a poor third with less than 20%), with outgoing governor González Márquez said - like Calderón federally - to have betrayed the party's own candidate and operated in Alfaro's favour.

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Is there a website to follow the official count live?

For federal elections: https://computos2018.ine.mx/#/presidencia/nacional/1/1/1/1

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Two quick charts from me:

State governors by party:


Lower house vote since 1991:

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Do all these new PT/PES deputies actually originate from those two parties, or are they AMLO loyalists who were imposed on those parties to mess with the 8% rule?

I haven't sorted through the list yet, but given that 'PES deputies' seem to include Zoe Robledo (ex-PRD/Morena-PT senator from Chiapas), Gerardo Fernández Noroña (former ex-PRD/PT deputy) and Benjamín Robles Montoya (Morena-PT senator), I strongly suspect the latter (in most cases).

Edit: Marybel Villegas, 'PES senator' for QRoo, has previously run for the PRD, PAN and PRI (yes!).

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Brief overview of the results in the municipal elections in the various states -- municipal presidents (mayors) in the largest cities in each state.

Inc. def. means an incumbent mayor who lost reelection
Reelec. means an incumbent who won reelection

These results are based on the PREP, so some very close races may have changed so I can't vouch for the 100% accuracy of what I write below.

BCS

La Paz: Morena-PES gain from PAN
Los Cabos: Morena-PES gain from PAN (inc. def.)

Campeche

Campeche: PAN-MC gain from PRI
Carmen: PAN-MC hold (may change; reelec.)

Chiapas

Tuxtla Gutierrez: Morena-PT-PES gain from PVEM
Tapachula: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI
Ocosingo: Morena-PT-PES gain from PVEM
San Cristóbal de las Casas: Morena-PT-PES gain from PVEM (inc. def.)
Comitán de Domínguez: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI (inc. def.)
Chilón: Morena-PT-PES gain from PVEM
Las Margaritas: PRD gain from PVEM
Palenque: PVEM hold (reelec.)

Chihuahua

Cd. Juárez: Morena-PT-PES gain from Ind. (inc. def.)
Chihuahua: PAN-MC hold (reelec.)
Cuauhtémoc: Morena-PT-PES gain from PAN (inc. def.)

Coahuila

Saltillo: PRI-PVEM-Panal hold (reelec.)
Torreón: PAN-UDC-MC hold (reelec.)
Monclova: PAN-UDC-MC hold (reelec.)
Piedras Negras: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI (inc. def.)
Acuña: UDC-PAN-MC hold (reelec.)

Colima

Manzanillo: Morena-PT-PES gain from PVEM
Colima: MC gain from PAN (inc. def.)
Villa de Álvarez: MC gain from PAN (inc. def.)

CDMX

Morena gain from PRD. I will go over the local mayoral (ex-delegates) results in the delegations later.

Guanajuato

León: PAN hold (reelec.)
Irapuato: PAN hold (reelec.)
Celaya: PAN hold
Salamanca: Morena-PT-PES gain from PAN (inc. def.)
Silao: PAN hold
Guanajuato: PAN gain from PRI
San Miguel de Allende: PAN hold

Guerrero

Acapulco: Morena-PES gain from PRD
Chilpancingo: PRD-PAN-MC gain from PRI
Iguala: Morena-PES gain from PRI

Jalisco

Guadalajara: MC hold
Zapopan: MC hold (reelec.)
Tlaquepaque: MC hold (reelec.)
Tlajomulco de Zúñiga: MC hold (reelec.)
Tonalá: MC gain from PRI
Puerto Vallarta: MC hold (reelec.)
El Salto: MC gain from PRI
Lagos de Moreno: MC gain from PRI

Michoacán

Morelia: Morena-PT gain from Ind. (inc. def.)
Uruapan: PRD hold (reelec.)
Zamora: Morena-PT gain from PRI
Lázaro Cárdenas: Morena-PT gain from PRI
Lázaro Cárdenas: Morena-PT gain from PRD (inc. def.)

Morelos

Cuernavaca: Morena-PT-PES gain from PSD (winner's candidacy was cancelled but name remained on the ballot)
Jiutepec: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRD (inc. def.)
Cuautla: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRD

Edomex

Ecatepec: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI
Nezahualcóyotl: PRD-PAN-MC hold
Naucalpan: Morena-PT-PES gain from PAN
Toluca: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI (inc. def.)
Tlalnepantla de Baz: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI
Chimalhuacán: PRI hold
Tultitlán: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI
Cuautitlán Izcalli: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI
Atizapán: Morena-PT-PES gain from PAN (inc. def.)
Ixtapaluca: PRI hold
Nicolás Romero: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI
Tecámac: Morena gain from PRI
Valle de Chalco Solidaridad: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRD
Chalco: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI
Coacalco: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI
La Paz: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI
Huixquilucan: PAN hold (reelec.)
Texcoco: Morena-PT-PES hold
Metepec: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI
Chicoloapan: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI
Zinacantepec: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI (inc. def.)
Zumpango: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI
...
Atlacomulco: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI

Edomex is the most populated state in Mexico, and always a key political battleground. The results of the local elections were a colosal disaster for the PRI, PAN and PRD, particularly the PRI. Morena and friends won 48 municipalities against 28 for the PAN-PRD and just 23 for the PRI. In 2015, PRI-PVEM won 84 municipalities against 35 for the PAN and PRD (then separate) and 5 for Morena-PT-PES (then separate, with just one - Texcoco - for Morena).

This year, Morena swept nearly every major city, including the state capital (Toluca) and the vast majority of suburban municipalities in the Valley of Mexico. Morena gained Ecatepec, the stronghold of former PRI governor Eruviel Ávila and one of the largest cities in Mexico (pop. 1.6 million). In Metepec (near Toluca), Carolina Monroy del Mazo, the cousin of PRI governor Alfredo del Mazo and President Enrique Peña Nieto, was defeated by nearly 15 pts. by Morena. In Atlacomulco, the cradle of the PRI's (in)famous Grupo Atlacomulco - which, among other nice things, produced EPN - the PRI was defeated by Morena. The old 'blue corridor' is now mostly Morena, with the exception of Huixquilucan and Jilotzingo, but with Morena winning in Naucalpan (an historically panista municipality). The PRD held the traditional perredista stronghold of Neza, but with only a small margin over Morena (it also held Tultepec).

Nuevo León

Monterrey: PAN gain from PRI (inc. def.)
Guadalupe: PAN gain from PRI
Apodaca: PRI hold
San Nicolás de los Garza: PAN hold
General Escobedo: PRI hold (reelec.)
Santa Catarina: PAN hold (reelec.)
Juárez: PRI hold (reelec.)
García: Ind. hold
San Pedro Garza García: Ind. gain from PAN

In NL, the PAN defeated the incumbent PRI mayor of Monterrey Adrián de la Garza and gained Guadalupe. However, the PAN suffered a major defeat in San Pedro Garza García, where independent Miguel Treviño (El Bronco's former head of the executive office, who resigned in early 2016) ended nearly 30 years of panista rule; the defeated PAN candidate was Rebeca Clouthier, daughter of Manuel Clouthier 'Maquío' and sister of Tatiana Clouthier (now one of AMLO's top operators). Of the so-called 'Bronco candidatos' (El Bronco admin civil servants and officials who resigned to run), all those who ran for mayor were defeated except in El Bronco's native García, where he himself had been mayor.

Oaxaca

Oaxaca: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI
San Juan Bautista Tuxtepec: Panal hold (reelec.)
Juchitán de Zaragoza: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRD
Salina Cruz: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI (inc. def.)

Puebla

Puebla: Morena-PT-PES gain from PAN
Tehuacán: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI
San Martín Texmelucan: Morena-PT-PES gain from PAN

Querétaro

Querétaro: PAN hold
San Juan del Río: PAN hold (reelec.)
Corregidora: PAN-PRD-MC hold

Quintana Roo

Benito Juárez (Cancún): Morena-PT gain from PVEM
Solidaridad (Playa del Carmen): Morena-PT gain from PAN-PRD (inc. def.)
Othón P. Blanco (Chetumal): Morena-PT gain from PAN-PRD
Cozumel: PRI gain from PAN-PRD (inc. def.)

San Luis Potosí

San Luis Potosí: PAN-MC gain from PRD
Soledad de Graciano Sánchez: PRD hold
Ciudad Valles: Ind. gain from PRI

Sinaloa

Culiacán: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI (inc. def.)
Mazatlán: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI (inc. def.)
Ahome (Los Mochis): Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI (inc. def.)
Guasave: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI (inc. def.)

Sonora

Hermosillo: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI
Cajeme (Cd. Obregón): Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI
Nogales: Morena-PT-PES gain from PAN (inc. def.)
San Luis Río Colorado: Morena-PT-PES gain from PAN
Navojoa: Morena-PT-PES gain from PAN
Guaymas: Morena-PT-PES gain from PAN (inc. def.)

Tabasco

Centro (Villahermosa): Morena-PT gain from PRD
Cárdenas: Morena-PT gain from PRD (inc. def.)
Comalcalco: Morena hold
Huimanguillo: Morena-PT gain from PRD (inc. def.)

Tamaulipas

Reynosa: PAN-PRD-MC hold (reelec.)
Matamoros: Morena-PT gain from PRI (inc. def.)
Nuevo Laredo: PAN-PRD-MC hold (reelec.)
Victoria: PAN-PRD-MC gain from PRI (inc. def.)
Tampico: PAN-PRD-MC gain from PRI (inc. def.)
Altamira: PAN-PRD-MC hold (reelec.)
Cd. Madero: Morena-PT gain from PAN (inc. def.)

Yucatán

Mérida: PAN-MC hold
Kanasín: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI
Valladolid: Morena-PT-PES hold
Tizimín: PRI-PVEM hold

Zacatecas

Fresnillo: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI
Guadalupe: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI (inc. def.)
Zacatecas: Morena-PT-PES gain from PRI

Brutal stuff for the PRI.