Bulgarian Parliamentary Election, 26 March 2017

[Beagle]

Here’s a basic lowdown for the upcoming election, which is shaping up to be rather competitive, consequential… and dispiriting (at least for me). Please refer to the Presidentials/referendum thread for background info.

Where we are: Newly elected President Rumen Radev is in his honeymoon and currently can do no wrong. The caretaker government he appointed is also enjoying decent approval ratings – not surprising, as it was designed to give something to nearly everybody, even though this meant an overreliance of ex-NDSV (Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha’s party) old faces. Pretty much the only ones who are disappointed are those who expected some radical break with the status quo from Radev, who has demonstrated that he is quite comfortable with the establishment.

Despite everything I said re: electoral rules referendum pt.2 - electric boogaloo, the election law was not changed. The election will be held in the familiar 31 multi-member districts, with a 4% nationwide threshold and Hare-Niemeyer distribution. The party lists are almost-but-not-entirely-closed – if you need an explanation, ask. As none of the referendum’s proposals was adopted in time for the election, the talk-show host, who organized the signature gathering, is now spewing invective on a nightly basis against the corrupt political system and has issued an ultimatum to the next parliament to take up and approve the demands of their sovereign – the people – within two weeks from convocation and then dissolve, so that new elections are held under the new rules. Or else. Nobody actually knows what the ‘or else’ part is, but we will probably have to find out.

The election is being fought on personalities, innumerable scandals, various past and current abuses of power , as well as on security & foreign policy – the economy is doing OK-ish and there is broad consensus on refugees (everybody wants them kept out), domestic policy (everybody wants to appear tough on crime and has bright new ideas to improve healthcare and education, none of which seem remotely likely to achieve results), the EU (everybody supports membership, but wants it to a) stop airing our dirty laundry as a part of the monitoring mechanism and b) stop blocking funds when fraud get uncovered) and corruption (everybody’s for it*). In addition, everybody is trying to claim the anti-systemic mantle.

* That is actually untrue, as there is a huge difference both in degree and in kind between the various types of corruption the parties espouse, but I don’t want to write another 6000 words on corruption, so this will have to do.

So, on to the parties that stand a chance of getting at least 2% of the vote, going in the approximate order of current polling.

Note: I am using a rather inconsistent mix of abbreviations/party designations here – in general, when the party’s acronym is intended to spell out a word in Bulgarian l give the English translation of that word, but use the Bulgarian word throughout the text. For the new(ish) parties, I give their names in English (e.g. New Republic). However, the abbreviations of the established parties are in their Bulgarian form – it seems unnatural to me to talk of the CEDB (Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria – GERB’s actual name which I don’t think even they use any more).

GERB (leader: Boyko Borisov, 2014: 33%, 84 MPs, 2016: 22%): The Fidesz-isation of the party continues unabated. After the loss in the Presidential, the intra-party civil war has simmered down, but from the party lists it is fairly obvious that the modernizing Western-style faction has lost.

Coalition: GERB has a policy of not entering coalitions, but recruiting vote-getters from other parties, who get top spots on the GERB party lists. This time the recruits are mostly from the anti-liberal spectrum.

Stance on electoral system reform: Borisov is (acting?) scared and his public position is that the demands of Slavi Trifonov have to be met in full, including the dissolution and new elections. GERB will also support the complete abolishment of the party subsidy and the reduction of MPs – the latter requiring a Grand National Assembly.

Chances of being in government after the election: fairly high

Why they will be in government:  They have all the structural and financial advantages of a party that has governed for 6 of the past 8 years and, unlike the presidentials, they have BSP’s record to run against. All other parties in parliament will be potential coalition partners.

Why they will not be in government: according to most polling, fatigue with Borisov is at an all-time high – even higher than in the aftermath of his 2013 resignation. Since the caretaker government is running the elections, the instruments of control over the election process are mostly outside GERB’s hands for the first time since 2009. The faction which has emerged on top in the intra-party struggle has put rather unpopular and/or unknown candidates at the front of the party lists. There are signs of demoralization following the first loss in the party’s history.

Absurd pledge: If GERB do not come first in the popular vote, even by one vote, they will stay in opposition and not even attempt to form a government.

BSP (leader: Kornelia Ninova; 2014: 16 %, 39 MPs; 2016: 25%): Buoyed by Radev’s victory, the BSP is having a resurgence – practically doubling its support in polls over the past 3 months. Ninova has taken advantage of the situation and introduced changes to strengthen her control over the unruly party – instituting term limits^** for socialist MPs, reducing the influence of local party barons and demoting supporters of ex-leader Mikov. As a result, the party lists contain a relatively large amount of new candidates, ex-MPs' kids and celebrities.
** the term limits apply selectively

Coalition: Ninova also shook up BSP’s traditional coalition, shedding several parasitical crony parties (the only ones worth mentioning are the two Roma parties) and renegotiating the party subsidy agreement, so that the BSP no longer has to fork out most of their subsidy to non-entities. No party of any substance has joined the coalition, which changed its name from “BSP – Left Bulgaria” to, wait for it, “BSP for Bulgaria”.

Stance on electoral system reform: the BSP realize that they will be probably be at a disadvantage if single member districts are introduced, so they have come out in favor of an unspecified mixed system, but mostly they are trying to dodge the question.

Chances of being in government after the election: high, but a bit lower than GERB

Why they will be in government: They are the only serious alternative to GERB and, thanks to Radev’s popularity, they have crowded out all challenges on the left. Ninova is a canny politician, who can wheel and deal with the best of them. After the lean years of Mikov, the party has access to substantial funding – both from within and from outside Bulgaria.

Why they will not be in government: the generally disastrous record of BSP in power was not improved by Plamen Oresharski’s government of 2013-2014. They will almost certainly be outmatched and outspent in the ground game by GERB. It will be more difficult for Ninova to find coalition partners than for GERB.

Absurd pledge:  Ninova has pledged to enter coalition negotiations only with parties that are approved by a party-wide referendum after the election. This gives her an out from her earlier commitment that there will be no coalition with the DPS, but any (non-manipulated) referendum will produce overwhelming majorities against working with anyone who is likely to be in parliament bar the nationalists.

United Patriots (leaders: Karakachanov, Simeonov, Siderov, 2014: 7%+4%, 19+11 MPs, 2016: 15%): Following the presidential campaign, Karakachanov is enjoying a substantial boost to his personal popularity (indicating he was probably the second choice for many Radev/Tsacheva voters). The nationalists are sticking together for the election, even though they are quite open that it is just for expediency.

Coalition: VMRO + NFSB + Attack. The three parties are united by common hatreds, e.g. Turkey (and Turks), the Roma and George Soros (duh), otherwise they differ on pretty much everything and have produced nothing even vaguely resembling a platform. Karakachanov is angling for a coalition with the BSP, Simeonov has been negotiating with GERB and Siderov… has been uncharacteristically quiet. The coalition lists seem to show a few more VMRO people in electable positions, but it’s very hard to predict the distribution of seats under the present system.

Stance on electoral system reform: the erstwhile Patriotic Front (NFSB+VMRO) has been consistent against the adoption of single member districts and any significant reform. The Attack people hate Slavi Trifonov, but they also hate the current system, so… [shrug emoji]

Chances of being in government: It seems inevitable that at least one of the parties will have at least a supply and confidence deal with the eventual government.

Why they will be in government:  Both GERB and BSP have ‘borrowed’ some rhetoric from the nationalists in the past 18 months, especially on refugees. Given the likely configuration of the next parliament, the United Patriots will almost certainly be the only way to form a government without the DPS or a broad coalition.

Why they will not be in government: The pundits seem to think that the EU/the European party families will veto any attempt to bring the nationalists in. Each of the three leaders has produced statements that would put Jörg Haider to shame within the past year, but I personally doubt that there will be an intervention.

[Beagle]

DPS (leader: Mustafa Karadayi; 2014: 15%, 38 MPs; 2016: 6%)

After their crisis of 2014-15, the dominant faction in the DPS has adopted Stalinist tactics – both in ruthlessly culling anybody who exhibits independent thought and potential to challenge for the leadership, and in being absolutely brazen about their capture of certain sectors of the state.  They are attempting to portray themselves as indispensable to whoever wins the election.

Coalition: None, unless you count Slavcho Binev (Attack MEP 2007-2014, Patriotic Front MP since 2014) and one other ex-Attack MP, who are running for the DPS this time (see: brazenness)
   
Stance on electoral system reform: No public position, presumably their vote on this issue is a bargaining chip in the coming negotiations.

Chances of being in government: Extremely low as a formal coalition.

Why they will be in government: The DPS-controlled sectors are powerful and Borisov or Ninova might be tempted to take the path of least resistance.
 
Why they will not be in government: The DPS has taken part in 3 governments this century. After each of these governments, their coalition partners lost at least half their popular vote and 60% of their MPs.

The parties from here on are not guaranteed to make it into parliament.

Volya (leader: Vesselin Mareshki; 2014: N/A; 2016: 11%)
Volya/Воля in Bulgarian means ‘will’/ ‘willpower’

The fourth iteration of Vesselin Mareshki’s personalist party, they are enjoying a boom after his much better than expected showing in the Presidential election. If I were a disinterested observer, they would be a fascinating experiment to view from afar, but I’m not and I’m quite concerned. While unabashed populism and incoherent policies are nothing new, there are several firsts for Bulgarian politics: most notably, the party lists are composed entirely of Mareshki’s employees and relatives.  Volya is also a rare new(ish) party that doesn’t seem to care for recruitment or party infrastructure – presumably they believe that the network of Mareshki branded pharmacies and gas stations is enough.

Coalition: None. Mareshki did announce a network of “advisers” – an eclectic mix of ex-NDSV/UDF people, genuine fascists ™ and Freemasons – but none of these is getting into Parliament, as they probably had hoped.

Stance on electoral system reform: [shrug emoji]

Chances of being in parliament: extremely high – the campaign promise for lower price/more accessible/free^*** medicines apparently works well
^*** the promise varies from day to day

Why they will be in government: Mareshki has expressed a preference for GERB and in the likeliest post-election configuration GERB would need a third partner besides the United Patriots. But the Volya door for a coalition with the BSP is not completely closed either.

Why they will not be in government: It is not 100% certain that Will makes it into parliament. Even if they do, Mareshki’s, um, colorful past and murky present do not make him into the ideal coalition partner.

Absurd pledge: If Will do not come in 3rd place or better, Mareshki has promised to leave politics.

The Old Right – I will indulge in writing far more about the fight over the legacy of the 2013-2017 Reformist Bloc (leader: haha, no; 2014: 9%, 23 MPs; 2016: 6%) and the pathologies of the Old Right in general than merited according to current poll numbers, but w/e, I need to vent.

Reformist Bloc Mk.2 (leaders: Kuneva, Lukarski, Vitkov)

The RB-parties had been out of power for so long that when they finally got back in, they demonstrated why they should never get in power again. In 2014 Boyko Borisov wisely gave the RB leaders, who all became ministers, enough rope (e.g. appointments in their departments), but no protection from the DPS-controlled media. As a result, their ample failures and personality flaws became public knowledge and GERB insulated themselves from a possible threat to their right. The current RB Mk.2 is composed of the people who have hitched their wagon to the GERB train and want to cling on to whatever power they can get in a continued coalition with the larger party.

Coalition: 3 of the 5 original RB parties remain, but only 2 of those have any electoral influence. In order to stand a chance of making it into parliament, they struck opportunistic coalition agreements with another 4 minor parties. The only one worth mentioning is the party of the aging-rock-star-what-will-shake-up-the-rotten-system-(Pay-no-attention-to-the-man-behind-the-curtain).

Chances of being in parliament: middling – they seem to be either at or fall just under the threshold in poll released so far.

Why they will be in parliament: The RB Mk. II are the only Old Right faction to have a plausible path to actually implementing any of the policies in their platform (through a coalition with GERB). The RB candidates who advocated cooperation with GERB had far more success than their more confrontational counterparts in the 2015 locals. Even by sheer mechanical addition, there should be enough voters behind all of the parties in the RB Mk. II to get past the 4% hurdle, if only just.

Why they will not be in parliament: A record of failure, little money and uninspiring candidates. Most importantly: little reason to vote for them over GERB.

New Republic (leader: Radan Kanev)

A new project designed to give the disenchanted urban professionals, who were at the forefront of the 2013-14 protests against the Oresharski government, somebody to vote for after GERB+RB failed to pass any significant reforms and collaborated with the oligarchy. Despite their rather extensive platform and despite (or rather because of) their uncompromising attitude, it feels more like the leader’s ego trip than an actual attempt to govern Bulgaria. Radan Kanev, who is a rather abrasive character, is feuding with Borisov and his former RB colleagues, so the entire campaign is based on the idea that the BSP+DPS on the one hand, and GERB+RB Mk.2 on the other, are two sides of the same coin ^**** [/size].
^**** [/size] So you don’t get the wrong impression – all other parties are also sides of that coin. It must be a rather oddly shaped coin.

Coalition: Er, the New Republic coalition consists of Kanev’s Democrats for Strong Bulgaria (DSB) party… and that’s pretty much it, so I’m not sure if it can really be called a coalition. The 2014-2017 ‘unaffiliated’ RB MPs, who were not members of any of the 5 parties, have joined up, as has the 2016 RB presidential nominee Traikov, but the entire new project was created in the expectation that Hristo Ivanov (see below) would also join. As he didn’t, New Republic became just a pretext for Kanev to settle scores within the DSB, as local party leaders suddenly discovered they were not members of the regional New Republic organization.

Chances of being in parliament: slim to none

Why they will be in parliament: The DSB has about 50k devoted followers (mostly people enthralled by former PM and party leader Ivan Kostov). In previous elections the DSB has underpolled.

Why they will not be in parliament:  A messianic arrogance + very little money + strong competition for the Sofia center-right vote, where they need to break 12% to stand a chance of having 4% countrywide.

Yes Bulgaria (leader: Hristo Ivanov)

A new project designed to give the disenchanted urban professionals, who were at the forefront of the 2013-14 protests against the Oresharski government, somebody to vote for after GERB+RB failed to pass any significant reforms and collaborated with the oligarchy. Despite their rather extensive platform and despite (or rather because of) their uncompromising attitude, it feels more like the leader’s ego trip than an actual attempt to govern Bulgaria. Hristo Ivanov, justice minister from 2014 to 2015, saw his judicial reform pet project sabotaged by the GERB-DPS-ABV unholy alliance and since then has run a private vendetta against the respective people and parties, which turned into a political party in early 2017.

Coalition: The Greens and the Gays ^***** [/size] a miniscule NEOS (Austria) clone – originally Yes Bulgaria was supposed to run alone, but they started the party organizing process too late, leaving themselves vulnerable to rogue legal challenges – which is exactly what happened.
^***** [/size] But seriously, they are the Bulgarian gay rights party

Chances of being in parliament: slim to none

Why they will be in parliament: The project has generated a fair bit of enthusiasm and its activists are quite energetic, with experience from 2013-2014 and the numerous environmental protests.

Why they will not be in parliament:  The YB candidate lists show incredible diversity, ranging from lawyers to TED talkers to lawyers, who are also TED talkers. Outside of Sofia, YB has no campaign infrastructure at all – and the efforts to build one lead to reports from the campaign trail that read like anthropological field notes: “Even the natives of [small town] show a distaste for corruption! Who would have thought?!” There is self-righteousness about the party and its out-of-touch base that must come across as off-putting.  And of course, there is strong competition for the Sofia center-right vote, where they need to break 12% to stand a chance of having 4% countrywide.

Note: I am voting for Yes Bulgaria – for one, it is impossible to fight corruption without a reliable justice system (as I’ve seen first hand), but, more importantly, their out-of-touch base is my people.

[Beagle]

ABV-M21 (leader: Tatyana Doncheva + some dude; 2014: 4%+1%, 11 MPs; 2016: 3%+2%)

♪ Brave Parvanov ran away… yes, brave Parvanov turned about and gallantly he chickened out... ♫
Ex-President Parvanov abandoned ship passed the torch to a new generation of leaders after the ABV’s disastrous showing in the presidential election. Many of the party’s local branches have returned to the BSP fold. The remainder are trying to stake out a place as reformist leftists alongside Doncheva’s personal project.

Coalition:  ABV and ,Movement 21 (sic)

Chances of being in parliament: slim to none

Why they will be in parliament: Their combined vote in the presidential election was more than 200k – easily surpassing the 4% threshold.

Why they will not be in parliament:   The vote for president was highly personal and both parties nominated the best candidates they could. For the first time in years there is no dispirited BSP electorate to capture. A few big businessmen cut off their ABV contributions after Parvanov gave up.

DOST (leader: Lyutvi Mestan; 2014 & 2016: N/A) 
Dost in Turkish (and in some dialects of Bulgarian) means close/intimate friend

The union of cast-offs from the DPS is really proving to be one of the biggest challenges to the Bulgarian political status quo for years, which is not necessarily a good thing. Up to now, the DPS’s dominance among the Bulgarian Turks has been taken for granted – while rapaciously corrupt, at least they have never really stoked separatism. After Mestan got toppled from the DPS leadership for following the Turkish line in the 2016 Putin-Erdogan conflict, however, there has been a steadily growing agitation for a confrontation on some very divisive issues.

Coalition: Mestan’s DOST party, the Turkish party that used to be in the Reformist Bloc… and AKP. Yes, Turkey’s AKP. Several AKP cabinet ministers have called on dual Bulgarian/Turkish citizens to vote for DOST and the Turkish ambassador is making campaign appearances and clips on their behalf. Turkish officials have promised to, uh, facilitate the voting process in the precincts located on their territory and will ensure a smooth passage to and from Bulgaria for people who will vote for DOST, even if their papers aren’t quite in order.

Chances of being in parliament: None. After the DPS split, their friends from the nationalist parties hurriedly passed a law limiting voting precincts for Bulgarians abroad to 35 per country (after some protests, it changed to 35 per non-EU country). If this (likely unconstitutional) limit wasn’t in place, it would have been quite possible for DOST to pass the threshold on the votes from Turkey alone. With the DPS intimidating (or worse) the DOST people in Bulgaria and with the caretaker Interior minister cracking down on DOST vote buying (but not on DPS vote buying), they will not be able to gather the needed votes from within the country.

Polls and likely outcome: It is fairly unusual for Bulgarian polls to be this unanimous, but everybody sees an extremely close election with GERB and BSP within the MoE. Unless something radically changes in the next two weeks, we seem to be heading for a parliament that will be split roughly 1/3 GERB, 1/3 BSP and 1/3 Others. Who the Others will be is an open question, but the likeliest outcome is a 5 or 6 party parliament. Over the course of the next couple of weeks, I will probably expand on the likely coalitions and my personal prediction, but it is quite possible that the election results in an ungovernable parliament (see absurd pledges above).

If you’re interested in doing  the who-should-I-vote-for questionnaire, remind me to translate/explain the questions in a week. As of today, the creators are still waiting for several parties’ responses (including GERB, UP, DPS etc.) and will only fill out their positions (based on their public statements) with a week to go.

[Beagle]

What was the former iteration of Mareshki party? RZS?

Not quite - Before Volya, Mareshki's party used to be called the National Movement for Freedom and Democracy (2005-2009) and the Liberal Alliance (2009-2017). But he was in coalition with RZS between 2007 and 2009 - the 2007 local election is when he first got elected to the municipal council in Varna - and for 3 months just before the 2013 election. A few weeks before that election the RZS-Mareshki coalition fell apart amidst mutual accusations that Mareshki was part of the criminal coalition ruling Varna and that the RZS strongman had requested that Mareshki pay to selected media for positive press coverage.

[Beagle]

The VoteMatch/who-should-I-vote-for questionnaire is now fully active, with 19 of the 21 parties/coalitions submitting their positions - and the two parties not included are irrelevant anyway. P

Green + is approve, red - is disapprove, gray O is neutral.

The questions, since Google Translate mangles some of them horribly, with my comments in italics, feel free to ask for any clarification.

1. Tacit consent by the administration this bugs me as a lawyer - tacit consent already is and has been in place. Extending it would mean that regulatory approval can be granted through tacit consent and that would be prone to abuse - "Well, I applied to build a shopping mall in this park, and since I didn't hear from the municipality in time, I've bulldozed it"

2. A state-funded investment fund for private businesses

3. The Belene Nuclear Power Plant should be completed with state funding It's worth mentioning that some of the equipment has already been bought from Russia - after the Bulgarian negotiator defied explicit orders by the Energy minister and signed the contract without authorization

4. Mandatory quota of Bulgarian-produced groceries in supermarket chains

5. Targeted state funding for the development of the most impoverished areas of the country

6. The energy efficiency state funded program should continue and be expanded This program is a linchpin of the GERB program. It funds the renovation of multi-family residences built before 1995 (insulation, windows etc). Proponents argue that it saves a lot of energy, allows families to save enormous amounts of money and creates jobs. Detractors point out that it is a giveaway to GERB-friendly construction companies and that public resources are used for the benefit of very few people.

7. Key infrastructure (airports, highways etc.) should be operated by the state and not rented out as a concession

8. Stop the efforts to adopt the Euro

9. Speed up efforts to enter the EU banking union

10. The budget should be as balanced as possible

11. Annual incomes above 120 000 leva should be taxed at 20% as opposed to the current 10% flat tax

12. A level of income under a certain minimum should be exempt from taxation

13. A family social insurance scheme should be introduced for family businesses

14. Bulgaria should oppose efforts to synchronize tax rates within the EU

15. Introduction of a mandatory labor service between 3 and 6 months for 18 year olds who have left school without a basic education

16. Minimum wage should increase automatically at the rate of the average wage

17. Ratification of CETA

18. Block further EU sanctions against Russia, regardless whether Russia adheres to the Minsk agreement on Ukraine

19. All persons who have entered the country and have no formal refugee status should be kept in closed camps next to the border with Turkey

20. Asylum seekers should be removed from major cities and relocated to small towns

21. Reintroduction of military conscription for 6 months for 19-year olds

22. The Chief Prosecutor must present quarterly reports to Parliament The current Chief Prosecutor, who is tied to certain factions of the oligarchy, argues that any efforts by Parliament to hold him accountable go against the separation of powers

23. Establishment of a new specialized anti-corruption prosecutor using the Romanian model

24. No immunity from prosecution for members of parliament

25. A new electoral system with single member districts and two round of voting  i.e. the electoral system approved in the referendum

26. Indirect introduction of education qualifications for voting, such as machine voting or remote electronic voting The idea is to make voting difficult to impossible for illiterate people or those who don't speak Bulgarian - i.e. the Roma and the Turks

27. There should be only a single textbook for each subject in school, but there can be numerous coursebooks An arcane issue to include in a votematch and not really a pressing one - it would take too long to explain in detail, think of it as "should the teachers/schools have the right to set a textbook for their classes, even though they may take a bribe to choose a more expensive one"

28. Teachers' salaries to be tied to the quality of educational service they provide i.e. test results

29. Families whose children are not in school should not receive any form of social assistance from the state

30. Textbooks should be provided by the state free of charge

31. The state Health Insurance should no longer have a monopoly and there should be a choice of health insurers The idea is to introduce the German Krankenkasse model

After answering the 31 questions, you can pick any that are of particular importance, then you need to pick which parties are to be included - choose the blue "Изберете всички" (select all) above the list.

[Beagle]

I've got something called ДРОМ, not really clear on what that is, but I suspect it's tiny.

Haha, ДРОМ/DROM is one of the Roma parties - specifically the party of the Kalderash subgroup, which, for whatever reasons, tends to generate most of the Roma crime in Bulgaria and Romania. Earlier they used to align themselves to DPS, but got a better deal with GERB. However, after the DROM leader got indicted for embezzlement, GERB kicked them out, so they are running alone this time. No real chance of getting anywhere near 4%, but they might win a few precincts in the Roma ghettoеs. Who was your second choice?

[Beagle]

Thanks for the encouragement.

1. DOST
2. Coalition of dissatisfied
3. Movement for Rights and Freedoms
4. DROM
5. New Republic

Great work in this thread Beagle!

1. Volya
2. Reformist Bloc
3. GERB
4. New Republic
5. WHO - Bulgarian Left and Green Party

Curiously diverse sets of parties for both. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms = DPS, for the avoidance of doubt.

What does Mareshki and Volya think of the EU? Are they Eurosceptics or more like Babis in CZ with opposition against refugee quotas and bureaucracy, but not that sceptic?

Ah no, this is Bulgaria we're talking about, populist does not equal euroskeptic here. Mareshki wouldn't want to appear hostile to the EU while it enjoys at least 60% approval, and is far more euro-friendly than Babiš. From the Volya platform (hey, they have their own website now - when I started writing the wall-of-text above, they were still using the old Liberal Alliance domain):

• Inclusion of Bulgaria in the core of European integration (Eurozone and Schengen);
• Support and participation in the initiative of France and Germany to create a common European army;
  
• Initiative for revision of the Dublin Regulation on refugees and establishment of a common European immigration policy;
• Active participation and interaction with the European Union, preparation and conduct of a successful Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2018, and use the Presidency to prioritize important issues for the country as prevention of illegal migration into the EU through Bulgaria and Greece as well as European policies for SMEs;
• Have more Bulgarians work in the EU structures with a view to strengthening their expertise and improving opportunities for lobbying for the interests of Bulgaria;

Of course, Mareshki is a Marxist of the Groucho tendency - "These are my principles. If you don't like them I have others" - and it certainly wouldn't be a surprise if he abandons this platform. But as of now, this is his public position.
 

[Beagle]

The campaign is drawing to its close and polls are coming in thick and fast. Wiki does an admirable job of collecting them, including sample sizes and MoE, which is something none of the papers report on.
We should get at least three other reputable pollsters have their say in the next couple of days, but it's unlikely they will show something substantially different - the agreement between pollsters is remarkable this time around.
 
While the campaign has been noticeably more intense than usual, no party has managed to land a major blow. In fact, all major parties have found it easier to concentrate on the existential threat that Bulgaria (ostensibly) faces - Turkey's unprecedented interference in this year's election - than on their opponents. The national security apparatus (which is under the complete control of the DPS) has ratcheted pressure  by expelling several Turkish (minor) officials, who were campaigning for DOST and/or separatism.  An open letter by Ahmed Dogan - DPS founder/honorary chairman and chief hydrologist of the Republic* -  has caused a lot of buzz. A plea for unity and patriotism in the time of crisis, it essentially said "The DPS may be thieves, but at least we are not a threat to Bulgaria's integrity".  The letter may make the DPS a viable coalition partner in the formation of the future government after all. DOST chairman Mestan promptly produced a 2013 letter from Dogan to Erdogan, which directly contradicts several of Dogan's claims of patriotism and even more so his claim of opposing Erdogan's seizure of power.

* Dogan, who has a degree in philosophy, infamously received several million as a consultancy fee for the construction of a dam

Needless to say, this discord among the Turks has been exploited by all the Bulgarian parties. GERB has Boyko Borisov pleading for stability as the Balkans are becoming Europe's powder keg again, BSP are pointing out how Borisov has not kept us safe and the United Patriots are rubbing their hands and are organizing (sham) barricades at the border crossings with Turkey in order to block the chartered buses of Bulgarian Turks coming back to vote. The UP, along with many of the minor parties have called on the caretaker government to not hold a vote in Turkey even in the 35 polling places the electoral code allows. While all this is unfolding, the general election skulduggery goes on as usual.

I don't know if I should make predictions - after all, I failed pretty miserably with the presidential first round. In any event, I will wait until Alpha Research issues their poll results.

[Beagle]

This is bound to be ideologically incoherent, but where do I stand? And what is the first party ("Movement for Radical Change Bulgarian Spring?") like? Disappointing to see Yes Bulgaria this low, but unsurprising.

How on earth did you manage this score?! Did you skip a lot of questions? I'm afraid it isn't ideologically incoherent - it shows a very marked preference for radicals (Jacobins, if I am using the term correctly), with a strong lean towards the extreme left. I am amazed that it is even possible to score both GERB and BSP this low.

To answer your question, Bulgarian Spring is the Syriza-lite party founded by a former diplomat/spy, who became a Patriotic Front MP in 2014, but left them after they supported the Borisov II government. They are the sole Bulgarian party running in this election that is explicitly anti-NATO and make it very clear that the US is at the root of everything bad in the world today. Bulgarian Spring is also an outlier in the sense that they are not social liberals - the rest of your top choices are all more or less socially liberal (in Bulgarian terms).

The National Republican Party is crazy people - a low-cost, low-effort personalist project of a pre-1989 Bulgarian emigree to the US, who is convinced that what Bulgaria needs is a Reaganite Republican party, alongside a steady diet of conspiracy theories.

The Coalition of the Dissatisfied is this year's iteration of Alexander Tomov's (see aad) leftist project.



Please take the other voting test*. IMO it is inferior to the glasovoditel - it basically places you on the left-right axis, without taking into account many of the intangibles which separate the parties on the right (or BSP from ABV/,m21), nor the very pressing issues re: Turkey, Russia and the EU, but at least it should produce more coherent and/or plausible results. It also does not include the fringe parties (and DOST). Google Translate does a decent job of translating it, but I will clarify a few questions below:

* you'll need to use Chrome or Microsoft browsers

Question 1: Flat tax should be abolished and a progressive tax should be introduced.
Question 9: The state policy on income (i.e. minimum wage and state sector salaries should be determined only by real economic growth
Question 15: A new constitution must be adopted
Question 16: A new voting system with single member districts must be implemented

Ask if you need any further clarification.

[Beagle]

These were my results for the other test, quite different -- though apparently still terrible parties on top of the list... Not much overlap with any party at all. I don't understand why it says I focus on "stabilnost" rather than reform when I "support" (strange to say for a country whose politics I barely know, but you know what I mean) pretty radical anti-corruption measures and higher taxes... but maybe it has to do with my disapproval of implementing a single-member district system.

Whoomp, there it is! Your weird test score was bugging me this whole time - glasovoditel was pretty accurate for me and for people I know - but this explains a lot, not only in your results, but also for all the people who had DROM pretty high up. You see, support for higher taxes automatically places you on the fringes of Bulgarian politics - nobody who's likely to be in parliament wants taxes raised. When Ninova replaced Mikov as BSP leader, even the Socialists dropped their platform plank for progressive taxation. The BSP now wants the symbolic introduction of a 20% tax rate for incomes above 120k, which would affect somewhere between 7 and 10 thousand people and raise next to nothing, and will not touch the corporate tax rate at all. Remember, it was the BSP-led government of 2005-2009 that introduced the flat tax after all.

ABV is the only mainstream party that advocates higher taxes, but they have been marginalized (and hold other viewpoints that makes them difficult to support). Anybody who is looking to support another party that wants progressive taxation would also need to subscribe to the view that the Jews/the CIA/the lizard people did 9/11 and/or other tinfoil hat positions.

I guess it is also why the 'ethnic' parties score so high among the Atlas forum people - they are probably the most interventionist among the (relatively) sane spectrum. Their electorate certainly needs all the help they can get, but while DPS and DOST have social spending vastly increased in their platforms, they do not provide any information how it would be paid for. Well, I suppose DROM calls for higher taxes, as their voters do not pay any, but it is extremely unlikely DROM breaks 1%. I think it is fair to say that they do not actually intend to implement much if any of their proposed policies - even if they do get into government, they can always wash their hands with their coalition partners.

 

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Yeah, you're right. There is also the ancestral communist/anticommunist tribal division, which results in some rather counter-intuitive voting patterns. It would be wrong to say that ideology plays no role in Bulgaria's politics, however. And the ethnic identity factor is, well, debatable, but this debate is something that I don't have time for - I said that I am not writing 6000 words on corruption in my first post in this thread.

What happened to Bulgaria without Censorship?

Ugh... it disintegrated within months of entering parliament? Bulgaria without Censorship was such a rogues gallery that I can't muster the will to go into details (see above re: the 6000 words on corruption), but you deserve an answer, however schematic:

The oligarch owner of Corporate Commercial Bank* thought it'd be cheaper to have his own party than to have to bribe every new incoming government - especially since he also had the opposition on his payroll too. His choice for party leader and personality vehicle was TV presenter Nikolay Barekov. Between 2012 and 2014 vast amounts of money from the bank - between 50 and 100 million by trustworthy estimates - were pumped into the political project. No expense was spared to hire the best consultants and the best vote buyers. Leaders of minor parties found themselves handsomely rewarded for aligning themselves with BwC - both financially and by getting top positions on the party lists. The zenith for the party was the 2014 EU Parliament election, when they collected about 240k votes (11% share) in a coalition with VMRO, Lider and at least 10 other parties. Between the EU election and the early parliamentary election in October, however, the bank had gone bust in the biggest political and economic scandal in decades. The BwC coalition began shedding parties and supporters, but they did get into parliament on fumes. As Barekov was in no position to determine the party lists, all but 1 of the MPs was a member of one of the minor parties. They promptly dissociated themselves from the disgraced project and formed two groups - one around Lider (Bulgarian Democratic Center with 9 MPs) and one grouping of SDS/NDSV splinter parties (People's Union with 5 MPs). The sole Barekov loyalist sat as an independent for the duration of the entire parliament, while the rest served as a sort of vote bazaar. Barekov's party (now called 'Reload Bulgaria') is sitting out the 2017 election, as is the Bulgarian Democratic Center (technically they are running, but with a list of one candidate in every region). The People's Union has mostly gone to the RB Mk.2, with some joining up with GERB and BSP.

* the wiki entry is horrible, by the way, hopefully you can read between the lines

[Beagle]

First leaked exit polls as of 12:00 (another 8 hours to go)

GERB: 32.5/33.5
BSP: 29.6/28.7
DPS: 11.4/9.6
UP: 8.5/9.1
Volya: 5.2/5.2
RB: 3.9/4.0
DOST: 2.3/2.2
New Republic: 2.3/1.4
ABV/,m21: 2.2/1.8
Yes Bulgaria: 1.8/2.0

There are another 3 pollsters, at least one has the BSP ahead, at least one has Volya under the threshold... we'll see.

[Beagle]

Yeah, you're right. There is also the ancestral communist/anticommunist tribal division, which results in some rather counter-intuitive voting patterns. It would be wrong to say that ideology plays no role in Bulgaria's politics, however. And the ethnic identity factor is, well, debatable, but this debate is something that I don't have time for - I said that I am not writing 6000 words on corruption in my first post in this thread.

Could you elaborate on this?

It's rather straightforward, really - many, if not most, Bulgarians identify either as 'communist*' or as 'anticommunist' based on their family's 1944-1989 experience (and for a substantial part of the 'communist' camp - of their family's experience post-1989 too). That is not to say that there are no defections, but for many people voting either for or against the BSP - as the successor of the communist party - forms the entirety of their political identity.

* communist in the sense of belonging to the Bulgarian Communist Party

Turnout as of 17:00 is hovering around the 43% range - a couple of percentage points lower than the 2016 presidentials, but a couple of percentage points higher than the two previous parliamentary election in 2014 and in 2013. The abstention in Sofia is particularly noteworthy - all 3 Sofia districts are running at least 4 to 5% behind where they were at this time last year. This is probably a good sign for the BSP.

Leaked exit polls as of 16:30:

GERB: 33.2/31.5
BSP: 27.8/28.8
UP: 9.3/9
DPS: 8.7/8.6
Volya: 5/4.4
RB: 4.2/3.5
Yes Bulgaria: 3.0/3.3
DOST: 2.0/3.0
New Republic: 2.8/2.4
ABV/,m21: 2.5/2.3

Surprisingly, if you've been reading the pro-government/DPS press, there has been no horde of Turks invading our borders to vote for DOST. However, lines at the polling places in Turkey are huge and 'electoral tourism' has been reported... in Germany, where busloads of Bulgarian Turks living there have showed up at polling places. Of course, those 3-400 votes are unlikely to have any effect on the result, but is a noteworthy innovation.

Edit: Now I see that the electoral commission has published an aggregated turnout report, which pins it at 40.88%, mirroring the two previous parliamentary elections exactly. With the weather taking a turn for the worse, it is unlikely to improve.

[Beagle]

Exits all show 32/28 GERB lead.

Indeed they do. The turnout looks to be like I predicted earlier - a couple of points higher than the previous parliamentary elections, a point lower than the presidential election.

GERB: 31.8 to 32.8
BSP: 28 to 29
DPS: 7.7-9.5
UP: 8.5-9.5
Volya: 4.6-5.1
RB: 3.8-4.2
Yes Bulgaria: 2.9-3.6
Dost: 2.7-2.8
New Republic - 2.6-3
ABV/,m21 - 2.4-2.6
NONE OF THE ABOVE - 2.5

Of course, we don't even have the parallel count yet, but tomorrow's papers will look something like this:

Winners: GERB, who have scored a much clearer win than expected; DPS, who have against all expectations retained their traditional 3rd place and much of their votes; Dost, who may yet get over 3% when the votes from abroad are tallied

Losers: United Patriots, who have underperformed massively and apparently will have at least 4-5 less MPs than the previous parliament - a significant surprise, considering the election backdrop and their presidential result; the 'Old Right', for obvious reasons; to a lesser extent - Volya, who have lost a lot of their early support to GERB and BSP.

BSP are obviously disappointed, but they will probably have doubled the number of their MPs from 2014.

[Beagle]

What kind of coalitions can be formed with GERB? Or can BSP form a government even though they placed second?

On the basis of the parallel counts, the RB falls below the threshold. This allows GERB quite a bit more flexibility in coalition building. Crucially, this means that they get around 95 out the 240 MPs, so in the likeliest scenario (by far) of a coalition with United Patriots and Volya, they can be safe in knowing that even when the UP coalition falls apart - as it inevitably will - they should still be able to get to 121 with Volya and the NFSB people. It will be a paper thin majority, of course, but the dominant GERB faction will also have DPS's support on many issues. I imagine that the first test will be the new electoral system (single member districts), which will probably pass with GERB, DPS and Volya support.

Of course, RB, Dost and (to a much lesser extent) Yes Bulgaria can still pass the threshold, which would scramble the coalition building. Still, at this point I'd say there's at least a 70% chance of a GERB-UP-Volya coalition.

A formal coalition between GERB and DPS is out of the question. A grand coalition (which would start off with 6 (six)% approval rate, according to polls) is also impossible. There is a small chance of a GERB minority government (with or without Volya), a minimal possibility for a "national salvation" government composed of all parliamentary parties and, in my estimate, about a 10-15% chance that government is not formed and we go to the polls again in 3-5 months.

[Beagle]

With the parallel counts completed and with a smattering of reports from actual polling places, it must be noted that Volya is teetering precariously closely to the 4% threshold. If the voting abroad goes badly for them, as expected, it is not impossible that they will fall out. Conversely, Dost still can hope that a strong result from the overseas vote can bring them above 4% - they will have just under 100k votes from Bulgaria and if they can manage more than 30% from elsewhere, they'll probably get in. The problem, of course, is that at best he'll get 30k votes from Turkey, which will not suffice.

GMantis, nice to hear from you! Are you doing a results by municipality map this time around? I will try to reply to the issues you raised tomorrow.

[Beagle]

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I will need the final results in tabular form, which might take a week. Which reminds me that I still haven't made the maps of the presidential elections and referendums...

The new format of the electoral commission's result page should make it easier. And as to the presidentials, I guess the second round map will be rather easy to do, haha. Tsacheva ended up losing Dospat municipality by 5 votes instead of winning by 7 (or thereabout), but she picked up a couple of random Shumen region municipalities where I didn't even bother checking. I suppose it will be a sight for your sore eyes to see the map painted red

[Beagle]

The final - well, 99% final - results:

GERB: 32.64%
BSP: 27.12%
United Patriots: 9.06%
DPS: 9.04%
Volya: 4.15%
RB: 3.02%
Yes Bulgaria: 2.91%
Dost: 2.89%
New Republic: 2.50%
ABV/,m21: 1.55%
Revival: 1.08%

9 other parties and coalitions with less than 0.3% each

Revival is an Ataka/VMRO offshoot, encompassing extreme leftists and clerical fascists.

I'll go into more detail later. 

[Beagle]

Before the mandatory retabulation, but with 100% of the vote in, the number of MPs in the 240-seat parliament is, as follows:

GERB - 95 +11, compared to 2014
BSP - 80 +41
United Patriots - 27 -3
DPS - 26 -12
Volya - 12 new

This gives GERB and the UP a majority of 122 - far too tender for Borisov to really consider it as an option, unless he has assurances from DPS that they will not raise any trouble.

An unofficial seat distribution has sprung a few surprises. Most notably, the speaker of parliament and 2016 presidential candidate Tsetska Tsacheva has lost her seat after she got displaced through preference votes. All in all, at least 4 GERB and 7 BSP MPs will get a seat through the "double vote" phenomenon - where the voter marks the same number both on the party list and on the preference list. DPS and UP are also likely affected, but I haven't had the time to go through their results, or to check on the preference vote picture in general.

The unofficial seat distribution has VMRO and Ataka at 8 seats out of the 27 of the United Patriots coalition, NFSB at 7 and another 4 are difficult to place. For instance, there is the Democrats for Strong Bulgaria founder, who then became Boyko Borisov's parliamentary secretary in the Borisov I government, who then switched to Kuneva and the RB, but has now switched to the NFSB. Or the minor party leader, who previously has been affiliated to Ataka, RZS and BSP, is in a coalition with Ataka in the Burgas municipal council, but is a business partner with a DPS MP... Ah, the joys of Bulgarian party life.

In any event, it is clear that for the first time in post-communist Bulgaria's history, a PM has been reelected immediately after stepping down. Any coalition the BSP may lead would be a suicide pact. Borisov will wait until Monday next week to start coalition negotiations, but even in a minority government situation, nobody (who is in parliament) wants new elections, so Borisov will certainly form his 3rd cabinet.

Is there any interest in the crosstabs of the exit-polls (the breakdown in education, age and ethnicity)?

[Beagle]

Response time:

A Bulgarian acquaintance of mine voted RB because "GERB is too pro-Turkish" (in international politics) and said "the Bulgarian left is pro-Russia, the Bulgarian right is pro-Turkish." To what extent would you say there is a meaningful difference between RB and GERB in this regard, and would you say the second characterization is broadly correct?

Huh.The first question on the difference between RB and GERB is rather easy: after the Turkish party (NPSD, "Popular Party for Freedom and Dignity") that had been a founder of the RB left that coalition to join up with Dost, the RB Mk. 2 jumped on the 'Fear the Turk' bandwagon, for instance being the first to call for the vote in polling places in Turkey to be canceled/suspended after a particularly provoking statement by some Republic of Turkey official. The RB Mk.2 tried to score points in the battle for the Old Right by blaming Radan Kanev, the leader of DSB/New Republic, for inviting the NPSD in the first place. GERB, afaik, have always claimed that 'GERB is open to all Bulgarians, regardless of ethnicity or creed' and their tone in this campaign has been conciliatory. At several points Borisov said that (paraphrasing) anything that Erdogan perceives as mistreatment of Bulgarian Turks can serve as a pretext for Turkey to unleash the refugees upon us.

The second question is much more difficult to answer and GMantis as an outside observer will probably give a more honest appraisal of the Bulgarian Right. In general it is true that the 1997-2001 Old Right government put a special priority on good relations with Turkey. As Borisov came to power, the balance on the Balkans had changed in Turkey's favor and while he has never been particularly pro-Turkish according to me, he has always afforded Turkey the respect a next-door neighbor with 10 times the population, 14 times the GDP, 25 times the military forces etc. deserves. After the refugee crisis began, Borisov has constantly sounded the alarm that Europe and Bulgaria in particular can be flooded with refugees on Erdogan's whim and that good relations with Turkey are sine qua non (and also that he, Borisov, is the only one who can preserve the good relations). Following the 2016 coup attempt, Bulgaria turned away asylum seekers and in one particularly notorious case, detained and shipped seven Turkish officers to a very uncertain fate in Turkey. Still, I wouldn't say that GERB are particularly pro-Turkish in comparison to BSP, though of course the last time BSP governed without a coalition with DPS was over 20 years ago.

As to the left being pro-Russian - the BSP base is overwhelmingly pro-Russian, but the GERB base isn't that far behind according to most surveys. It is a fact that BSP gets institutional support from Russian sources and they tend to be the ones who initiate multi-billion energy projects for the benefit of Russia (such as Belene NPP). However, the 'Patriots' are the ones who wave white-blue-red flags alongside the white-green-red, and when it comes to money, it is the dominant DPS faction that works with Vneshtorgbank to consolidate their stranglehold on telecommunication and a few other lucrative sectors. GERB themselves have turned a blind eye on Lukoil tax evasion for years. BSP (which basically is the Bulgarian left now) can be called pro-Russian, but they are far from alone.

Before the mandatory retabulation, but with 100% of the vote in, the number of MPs in the 240-seat parliament is, as follows:
[...]

Why BSP picked up so many votes

The BSP rebounded from a historic low in 2014. At least 200 thousand traditional BSP voters, who abstained or voted for ABV last time, returned to the fold. Also, if I may quote myself from the first post in this thread:

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What did Lider do this election and also what did Volya do last election?

Lider:
From the 'Whatever became of Bulgaria without Censorship' answer:

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They received just over 3000 votes - 0.09% of the national vote.

Volya: Did not run. According to some rumors Mareshki supported GERB in 2014 in return for allowing him to name several important officials in the pharmacy regulator. Also... he was under arrest. For punching out the leader of the Revival party mentioned above.

Btw, the Revival party is the only non-parliamentary party which will receive a subsidy now, and if they break their promise to donate the subsidy to charity, they stand a good chance of getting into parliament next time around if/when the United Patriots have been tainted by government. Apparently there are enough people who consider Ataka to have gone soft :/

It is too late, but I will tackle Mantis' post tomorrow. He raises several valid points and has been proven quite correct that 'most GERB voters could not care less about who was in the lists as long as Borisov is leading the party'.

Edit: I see that tonight's episode of Slavi Trifonov's show (the talk show host behind the Electoral Rules Referendum Pt. 2: Electric Boogaloo) has been pulled by the TV station, who have refused to air it. Earlier today he had published an open letter reminding Parliament of his demands to take up and pass the referendum's agenda - although he had softened his stance and now gives them 2 months to do so. Call me cynical, but I think this has been scripted somewhere.

[Beagle]

As I understand, the government have some form of agreement with Volya to give them a safer majority, but maybe one of the Bulgarians can expand slightly?

Not much to expand on. Obviously I was extremely naive when I wrote

Volya (leader: Vesselin Mareshki; 2014: N/A; 2016: 11%)

[...]

Why they will not be in government: It is not 100% certain that Will makes it into parliament. Even if they do, Mareshki’s, um, colorful past and murky present do not make him into the ideal coalition partner.

Mareshki's colorful past and murky present make him a perfect coalition partner. It just took a slight reminder that he's still out on bail on the assault charge and he has now declared full and unconditional support for the Borisov III government (GERB+UP). Well, technically, Borisov didn't even allow Mareshki to declare it on his own - it was announced to the public through a GERB press release.

[Beagle]

With Mercury no longer in retrograde, the GERB-UP government has now (finally) taken over from the caretakers. The Borisov III cabinet sees quite a few holdovers from Borisov II, but with some strange twists - i.e. the justice minister moving to foreign affairs in order to make space for Tsacheva, the former speaker of parliament and failed 2016 presidential and 2017 parliamentary candidate. The United Patriots were supposed to bring in some change, but... well, judge for yourselves. The VMRO leader Karakachanov is deputy PM and defence minister, the NFSB leader Simeonov gets to be deputy PM without any actual powers, and then there are three ministries that are supposed to be the UP quota, but have been filled by people who have never been associated with any of the three parties in the coalition and who reportedly never even met with the UP leaders before now:
The ostensibly UP portfolios of agriculture and economy have gone to two long time associates of PM Borisov, who have both been implicated in major corruption scandals. The new environment minister is an Old Right figure, who is a global warming denier and who views environmentalism as misguided at best and as a trillion-dollar fraud at worst.

As already reported, Volya also supports the government. So does the first (of many, one presumes) renegade of the new parliament - a DPS MP, who got elected through the 'double vote' phenomenon (see above), refused to step down and got promptly expelled by his party. This produces a majority of 135 (with Volya) or 123 (without).

It is important to note the final distribution of seats within the UP parliamentary group - 11 VMRO (+2 compared to 2014), 9 Ataka (-2) and 7 NFSB (-3). The coalition's underwhelming result means that only VMRO (barely) can form a parliamentary group on their own if/when the three parties fall out. Having a parliamentary group is a condition for receiving state funding, having access to parliament resources and numerous other bonuses, so there will be added pressure on the nationalists to stick together. This distribution, along with Volya's support, means that Borisov can afford to lose any one of Volya/VMRO/NFSB/Ataka and still have a stable majority, so he can divide and rule as he pleases. This should make the government more stable and I'd be very surprised if it falls before 1. July 2018 when Bulgaria's term at the helm of the EU Council ends. However, I think it is unlikely it will last the full 4 year term.