Communist Party of China Congress, 2017

[Vosem]

I have little to add, unfortunately, but I'm reading with rapt interest. Your coverage here is one of the most fascinating and explanatory things I've read on the entire Internet for some time.

[Foucaulf]

In terms of official procedure, Friday marked the second meeting of the 19th Party Congress Presidium, a collection of incumbent and retired party leaders. Their official role was to approve the proposed changes to the CCP Constitution and the list of candidates to major party organs for representatives to vote on. That's what they did, shockingly.

In terms of what's behind the scenes, I've found the following:

- The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong's newspaper of record, published on Sunday morning China time their predictions for the PSC (based on "sources," naturally). Since I based my new PSC list on the last page off of partial leaks from the SCMP, my order is identical to theirs today.


- When it comes to the candidate approval process for the Central Committee and Politburo, veteran China watchers have focused up to now on increasing democratization and competition - the growing ratio of candidates to available seats. With Xi's moves at this Congress, this is no longer the central issue.

Rumors reported by the HK tabloid paper Apple Daily, linking back to Chinese expat media figure Ho Pin (more about him here), claim the candidate selection process for the 19th Central Committee was not centered on "factional horse trading" at all. Instead the first step was questioning candidates about "Loyalty to the Party Centre with Xi Jinping as its Core."

Central Committee candidates were grilled by Zhao Leji (Head of the Party Organization Department, key player in Xi's anti-corruption campaign focused on middle-ranked officials). PSC candidates were personally interviewed by Xi. Only candidates who passed these tests were submitted for approval to the Presidium this week. (If this is the truth, then not surprising Zhao was slated to join the PSC the whole time!)


- This is not really "behind the scenes," but top financial regulator Liu Shiyu upped the stakes Thursday by accusing the corrupt high-ranking officials Xi took care of of launching a coup. This includes former Chongqing head Sun Zhengcai, relieved this July, and the "big four" arrested on corruption in 2014. Look, party officials do not say things like these off the cuff - so why now?


- In more amusing news, CIA Director Mike Pompeo claims he has "old-school guys who used to do Kremlin work" analyzing elite Chinese politics during the Congress. Let's hope they do a better job than someone who just reads expat Chinese twitter.

[Foucaulf]

(Crossposted from AAD)

Huge WSJ bombshell that dropped this evening about Guo Wengui and the Chinese manhunt for him. It claims the negotiations over his extradition or asylum has been going for multiple months. This is the most important single piece of reporting about Chinese politics during this month.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

Naturally the damn thing is paywalled, but you should try your hardest to read the whole thing somehow...

Tl;dr context: since early October, Guo has tried to get out his claims that Chinese agents were after him. This resulted in one foiled press conference at the Hudson Institute, followed by another later. Right after his presser major publications like the NYT or WSJ did not publish the story, even though they were clearly on the Guo beat, judging from past articles written as well as leaked taped convos between NYT journalists and Guo.

The journalists who did react quickly to the presser were found on right-wing media (Breitbart, of all places, has a China beat with writers like John Hayward). Another one who's been public about his beat is Washington Examiner reporter Bill Gertz, who has experience on this previously in NatSec reporting. It was Gertz who arranged the dinners between Guo and Steve Bannon, followed by Guo praising Bannon as a "genius" on his twitter.

At the moment Guo started a self-imposed twitter leave of absence during the Congress, which became involuntary as his twitter was blocked for a week. That doesn't matter anymore, as he clearly has been working with WSJ on this story (critically, providing interrogation tapes).

Since the article shows the discussion over Guo took place in the White House as early as June, this really strengthens the case that Bannon is actively intervening in this dispute. He would have gone and met with Wang Qishan last September to get dirt about the Chinese position on treating Guo, and Wang may or may not have anticipated this. Since Trump's knowledge of this situation is clearly minimal, as shown in the article, I bet Bannon wants to keep his connections among Chinese expats in order to better attack the country that stands in the way of his nationalist ideology, then try to influence Trump to actually do something.


What is the strategic value of dropping this story now, literally less than 48 hours before the Politburo Standing Committee is set to be announced? I don't know if there is one, but let me propose one: by making the Chinese government's failed attempts to get Guo public, this is like a public kneecapping of Xi and his anti-corruption campaign. If Trump is pushed by the media coverage to actually guarantee asylum for Guo, the kneecapping is even worse! If one person got away, what's stopping others from trying - or using Xi's weaponry against him in a counter-campaign?

[Foucaulf]

Took me a bit to realize that the Party Congress is closing tomorrow (the nomination of the Politburo and the PSC is technically a plenum of the Central Committee), so I have to rush out some analysis of the Politburo before it's too late.

(I'll be editing this post regularly tonight, so stay tuned...)

Let's first count the number of Politburo members slated to leave. No one has questioned ten of them retiring: everyone on the PSC not named Xi, Li or Wang Qishan, two vice-premiers under Li, CMC vice chairman Fan Qinglong, Internal Security Chief Meng Jianzhu, legislator Li Jianguo and former Beijing Party Secretary Guo Jinlong.

In addition Sun Zhengcai was purged in July and Wang Qishan's retention on the PSC is increasingly viewed unlikely by the usual rumor channels; that makes twelve. It is possible that the two non-Xi affiliated Politburo members at age 67 will also be pushed to retire: Sun Chunlan (one of two women in the Politburo) and Li Yuanchao. Hence we're looking at 11-14 retirements, out of 25 seats.

Does Xi have enough minimally qualified confidants to fill all those spots? I think so. Let's divide that pool of candidates into groups:

Signalled Allies. These are the people that should enter the Politburo because Xi reshuffled Party Secretary positions in key provinces/the four "direct-controlled municipalities" for them during his first term. They are Cai Qi (Beijing Secretary), Chen Min'er (Chongqing Secretary), Li Qiang (Jiangsu Secretary), perhaps Li Xi (Liaoning Secretary).

Brain Trust. We've already covered Li Zhanshu and Wang Huning, who belong in this group and are favorites to enter the PSC. Also in this group are Xi's economic adviser Liu He; Ding Xuexiang, right-hand man to Li Z. in the CCP General office; Xi's "scribe" He Yiting (vice-president of the Central Party School); and CCDI deputy Li Shulei.

Everyone else. Two people who is close to Xi working at the Party Centre are Chen Xi, deputy to Zhao Leji at the Organizations Department, and Huang Kunming, who knew Xi since his days in Fujian province and now is a senior official in the Propaganda Department.

Some of Xi's younger allies elevated into key positions include Ying Yong (Mayor of Shanghai, 2017-), Ma Xingrui (Provincial Chief of Guangdong and "Party Secretary Designate," 2017-), maybe Bayanqolu (Jilin Party Secretary, worked in propaganda in Zhejiang under Xi).

We also need to add someone in the PLA loyal to Xi to take the vacancy on the CMC. That's 14 candidates by my count!




Does that mean Xi will pack the Politburo to his heart's content? Clearly not; especially outside of positions related to Party Affairs, there is a line of succession built into the Politburo positions before Xi came to power.

At this time, this infographic of Politburo responsibilities from Harvard's Fairbank Center is extremely helpful. To describe it verbally, it highlights names outside of the current Politburo to look out for:

- Key Party Secretaries: Li Hongzhong and Chen Quanguo, Party Secretaries for Tianjin and Xinjiang respectively. The catch is that Li has very publicly displayed his fealty to Xi, especially after getting Tianjin in a reshuffle, but the two are really from Jiang and Hu's camps respectively. In particular, Chen is close with Premier Li Keqiang.

- Yang Jing is the youngest Secretary on the Party Secretariat, a key organ within the Party, and also reportedly close to Li Keqiang. In a somewhat similar situation is Zhou Qiang, a young Tuanpai leader who missed out on the Politburo in 2012 to some surprise and then served as Chief Justice. But who knows what will happen to these two; to this day, we have no idea if Zhou Qiang is even on the list of delegates to the Congress.

Along those lines is also a Hu Jintao protege, the 60-year old Shen Yueyue, one of the rare females in top leadership.

- Both Guo Shengkun and Cao Jianming are part of the judicial-security complex said to be stacked with allies of Zeng Qinghong and Zhou Yongkang. Guo, in particular, should get a pass to succeed Meng Jianzhu as the "internal security czar," having been Meng's deputy in this office. If he doesn't, it would be quite a shock.

- Then there are the provincial secretaries who have survived Xi's reshuffles: Fujian Secretary You Quan and Sichuan Secretary Wang Dongming. Also count in this group promoted Tibet Secretary Wu Yingjie.

I count ten people in this list of other top officials not part of Xi's circle, though a fair share of them will gladly profess loyalty to Xi to save their skin.

I had to compile this list pretty hastily, but consider it a watching guide for when the Politburo lineup first comes out. And let's be clear - the Politburo could also expand beyond 25 people, so Xi can quite literally stack his people in top leadership. That said, the most members the Politburo could ever said to have had was 28 people from the 12th Congress, so there is real precedent against this speculation.

[Simfan34]

This is on par with anything I've read in The Diplomat or Foreign Affairs. Truly first-rate analysis. Kudos, Foucaulf.

I see Chen Min'er has been left off your latest list. I assume this would preclude any advancement to the top of the party, even though the NYT, WSJ, FP, etc are already proclaiming his ascent. Which seems premature.

This will sound really trite, but it's amusing how the House of Cards arc with asylum-seeking Chinese billionaire Xander Feng seems to have presaged this whole affair with Guo Wengui. Particularly since he wasn't really on anyone's radar back then.

[Foucaulf]

Let me prepare a watch guide for the next 24 hours anyway, as the Congress closing ceremonies are taking place right now:

The biggest question (and sorry if I have underemphasized this): will Xi Jinping get a "named ideology" in the CCP Constitution, on par with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping? If he does, then all the other crazy questions people have wondered - whether he stays for a third term, takes up Mao's Party Chairman position, stacks the PSC and Politburo with allies, start purging party elders - become valid.

If he does, then you can then ask all those questions I brought up above.

Next question: how will Xi's revamped military leadership after this Congress look like? This is a much more difficult question for Western press to answer given the lack of public paper trails for those in the PLA, so take your time with this.

After that: is Xi really going to not include a potential successor in the PSC? The "consensus list" first kicked off by SCMP, NYT and others do not include either Hu Chunhua or Chen Min'er. Now, if Xi doesn't get a named ideology, you can assume a lack of a successor in the PSC is due to party consensus and someone will be elevated in a mid-Congress reshuffle (Deng Xiaoping did this).

After that: where exactly is Wang Qishan going again? Reports are converging that he will retire from the PSC, but the prospect of him joining that National Supervisory Commission I mentioned is also fading. The rumors converge on him joining the mysterious National Security Commission that Xi pioneered (maybe along with Li Zhanshu?). We won't know this for a few weeks after either.

After that: what happens to all the retired party leaders, or any of the non-Xi Politburo candidates that miss the cut? With Xi's anti-corruption campaign still going, you can never know for sure.

[○∙◄☻¥tπ[╪AV┼cVê└]

Let me prepare a watch guide for the next 24 hours anyway, as the Congress closing ceremonies are taking place right now:

The biggest question (and sorry if I have underemphasized this): will Xi Jinping get a "named ideology" in the CCP Constitution, on par with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping? If he does, then all the other crazy questions people have wondered - whether he stays for a third term, takes up Mao's Party Chairman position, stacks the PSC and Politburo with allies, start purging party elders - become valid.

If he does, then you can then ask all those questions I brought up above.

Next question: how will Xi's revamped military leadership after this Congress look like? This is a much more difficult question for Western press to answer given the lack of public paper trails for those in the PLA, so take your time with this.

After that: is Xi really going to not include a potential successor in the PSC? The "consensus list" first kicked off by SCMP, NYT and others do not include either Hu Chunhua or Chen Min'er. Now, if Xi doesn't get a named ideology, you can assume a lack of a successor in the PSC is due to party consensus and someone will be elevated in a mid-Congress reshuffle (Deng Xiaoping did this).

After that: where exactly is Wang Qishan going again? Reports are converging that he will retire from the PSC, but the prospect of him joining that National Supervisory Commission I mentioned is also fading. The rumors converge on him joining the mysterious National Security Commission that Xi pioneered (maybe along with Li Zhanshu?). We won't know this for a few weeks after either.

After that: what happens to all the retired party leaders, or any of the non-Xi Politburo candidates that miss the cut? With Xi's anti-corruption campaign still going, you can never know for sure.

"Xi Jinping Thought" has been put into the constitution.

[Foucaulf]

"Xi Jinping Thought" has been put into the constitution.

Yeah, I'm getting a drink as we speak... This BBC article is punchier than what I can say right now.

It looks like the list for the Central Committee has been sent out/leaked already. Biggest point of note is that Wang Qishan is not on the list, so assuming this is accurate we know he retired for good.

Some shockers: Li Yuanchao is out - that means 13 vacancies on the Politburo.
As far as I can tell Yang Jing is not on the list. The two brain trust members I gambled on - He Yiting and Li Shulei - are not on it. Liu He is (corroborating earlier reports).
Zhang Youxia is on the list - he is what one or two sources I read predicted would be appointed by Xi to lead the CMC. Smart money is on him, I guess.
One guy I forgot completely was Yang Jiechi, former US ambassador and a high-ranking "State councillor" in the formal Chinese government. Reaching 67 this year, he was someone I thought would just step down. Instead, he is on the Central Committee list and will probably cap off his career serving directly under Li as vice-premier.
Also didn't mention Li Xiaopeng, who is finally on the Central Committee list; he is an "arch-princeling" because he is former Premier Li Peng's son. Having quit his job leading a major state-owned electric utility corporation, he has bummed around for a decade in party politics with middling success.

The Congress voted on a separate list just for the Central Committee for Discipline and Inspection - the only current Politburo member also on that committee's list is Zhao Leji. This is as strong a signal as you can imagine that he really will enter the PSC as the "Corruption Czar."

[○∙◄☻¥tπ[╪AV┼cVê└]

"Xi Jinping Thought" has been put into the constitution.

Yeah, I'm getting a drink as we speak... This BBC article is punchier than what I can say right now.

It looks like the list for the Central Committee has been sent out/leaked already. Biggest point of note is that Wang Qishan is not on the list, so assuming this is accurate we know he retired for good.

Some shockers: Li Yuanchao is out - that means 13 vacancies on the Politburo.
As far as I can tell Yang Jing is not on the list. The two brain trust members I gambled on - He Yiting and Li Shulei - are not on it. Liu He is (corroborating earlier reports).
Zhang Youxia is on the list - he is what one or two sources I read predicted would be appointed by Xi to lead the CMC. Smart money is on him, I guess.
One guy I forgot completely was Yang Jiechi, former US ambassador and a high-ranking "State councillor" in the formal Chinese government. Reaching 67 this year, he was someone I thought would just step down. Instead, he is on the Central Committee list and will probably cap off his career serving directly under Li as vice-premier.
Also didn't mention Li Xiaopeng, who is finally on the Central Committee list; he is an "arch-princeling" because he is former Premier Li Peng's son. Having quit his job leading a major state-owned electric utility corporation, he has bummed around for a decade in party politics with middling success.

The Congress voted on a separate list just for the Central Committee for Discipline and Inspection - the only current Politburo member also on that committee's list is Zhao Leji. This is as strong a signal as you can imagine that he really will enter the PSC as the "Corruption Czar."

More powerful than Deng is some crazy stuff. Yeah, it sounds like "8 down" won't apply to Xi in 5 years.

[Foucaulf]

For those of you watching at home, the PSC will officially be revealed at 11:45 China time (so 11:45 PM Eastern). That said, I do agree with Bill Bishop's take in this article:

You must be logged in to read this quote.

In that sense, what people mean by "factional balance" on the PSC does not apply anymore. The new committee is no longer one where dissent among top leadership is aired out and consensus is reached. Everyone on the PSC will, more or less, iron out the kinks in Xi's agenda as codified during this Congress.

Let me sum up the current consensus predictions anyway.

Certain to enter (99% confidence in my mind)
Zhao Leji as CCDI chief, "Corruption Czar." What other proof do we need given his appointment to the CCDI?
Li Zhanshu as "Chief Legislator," No. 3 on the PSC. There's no hard evidence Li will take such a high spot, but I'll go out on a limb. Maybe he could take No. 5 (Head of Central Secretariat).

Confident of entry (80% confidence)
Wang Yang as executive vice premier of China (No. 7 in past PSCs). In a "factional balance" scenario you would see him at No. 3 (as I mentioned when I started this thread).
Han Zheng as chair of the People's Political Consultative Conference (No. 4).

Certainly out of contention
Wang Qishan, retired.
Li Yuanchao, retired.

Confident out of contention
Hu Chunhua. I originally pegged his chances of entering the PSC as less than Wang's, and given the consensus position that Wang will be No. 7 in the PSC, there's nowhere to go down for Hu. Maybe he'll be given some vice-premier position or even Vice-president, like the arrangement for Li Y. in 2012?

Who's left? The only doubt I have in my mind is whether Wang Huning or Chen Min'er will get the number 5 spot. IMO Wang H. at No. 4, replacing Han, and Chen at No. 5 is beyond my "line of plausibility."

The consensus pick is that Wang Huning will be picked over Chen, which I would buy except Wang has made literally zero appearances at the Party Congress and treated with no fanfare... "Seniority" would suggest Wang gets in, but "future leader in PSC" suggests Chen will make it.

One last thing: if Li and Zhao are placed where they are, and Hu Chunhua doesn't make it, these two outcomes combined is just as norm-breaking as keeping Wang Qishan on, if not more.

See you all in a few hours.

[Vega]

Is Xi's unique power something that is unique to him and his skills in gaining it, or was it a vacuum that could have been plumed by anyone in his position? What was stopping Hu Jintao from doing the same thing several years ago, was it a lack of broader ambition?

[Foucaulf]

Is Xi's unique power something that is unique to him and his skills in gaining it, or was it a vacuum that could have been plumed by anyone in his position? What was stopping Hu Jintao from doing the same thing several years ago, was it a lack of broader ambition?

Tough question. For a more established perspective you should read this piece: "The Resistible Rise of Xi Jinping."

I think something that is easily lost among all this China-watching: The Party in everyday Chinese life has decreased in influence over the last thirty years. The Party has power over the media, but people just go to the internet and apps instead. Party leadership is not a prestige position as society pays greater attention to celebrities or entrepreneurs. Top students and workers will still be awarded with Party membership, but how many take that very seriously?

The grounds were fertile for a Xi-like takeover in the early 2010s, because the Party does seem caught up in this gross insecurity; that they could not project strong leadership and become a government with no real vision. If you read the article I linked, people sound glad it was Xi who made it instead of Bo Xilai (at least Xi is amassing all of his power to accomplish objectives that are really quite staid).

Xi's personal talent seems to be choosing good advisers and allies in his major campaigns; he wouldn't have reached the top without good connections anyway. The anti-corruption campaign is, after all, a team effort.

There is also something particular Chinese IMO about lowering your head down after you've been barked at by your leader enough. That's what Xi did, using his platform to first demand codes of ethics from politicians, which later segued into professions of loyalty.

Why Hu didn't do the same thing years ago is probably explained by my earlier post on "factional stability." The system as it was set up after Deng motivated leaders to wait and expand their influence after their formal retirement. Now the situation looks pretty bad for Hu, as his close allies in leadership face a culling in a few hours' time.

[Foucaulf]

Watching the PSC introduction feed now... this should be posted as soon as the 7 members come out (or 5 or 9, who knows at this point)

1. Xi Jinping
2. Li Keqiang
3. Li Zhanshu
4. Wang Yang
5.  Wang Huning
6. Zhang Leji
7. Han Zheng

They are just coming out on the red carpet now, but Xinhua leaked the list about 4 minutes before the PSC walked out.

Xinhua also showed the Politburo list. Total victory for Xi's faction.

Pro-Xi: 12 (Xi, Li Z, Zhao, Ding, Liu H, Li X., Li Q., Chen X. Chen M. Huang, Cai, Wang Chen)
Pro-Xi PLA: 2 (Xu, Zhang Y.)
Loyal to Xi: 4 (Han, Li H, Wang H. Yang Xiaodu )
Pro-Hu: 5 (Li K., Hu, Chen Q., Wang Y., Sun)
Pro-Jiang: 1 (Guo S.)
??: 1 (Yang Jiechi, the diplomat)

We can do a seat change count of sorts. Using Cheng Li's classification of factions on the 18th Politburo and my knowledge of pro-Xi people, I can construct a factional side-by-side of the 18th Politburo. Brackets name only those who were in both Politburos.)

Pro-Xi: 4 (Xi, Zhao, Li Z., 1 retiree) (+8 in 19th Politburo)
Pro-Xi PLA: 1 (Xu) (+1)
Loyal to Xi: 3 (Han, Wang H., 1 retiree) (+1)
Pro-Hu: 9 (Li K. Hu., Wang Y., Sun, 5 retirees) (-4)
Pro-Hu PLA: 1 (1 retiree) (-1)
Pro-Jiang: 7 (all retired) (-6)
?? : 0 (+1)

Turnover ended up at 15 people leaving the Politburo... Liu Qibao (former propaganda chief) and Zhang Chunxian (former Xinjiang Secretary) also given early leave.

Other tidbits: the Party Secretariat, a major organ of power within the party, is stacked with Xi's people (6/7).
Since the predicted order of the PSC was switched, Han Zheng is going to be senior vice-premier of China and Wang Yang will be PPCC head. It'll be interesting to see which small groups in the Party Wang will get assigned to.
Li Shulei, who I mentioned in my earlier posts, was promoted to vice-secretary on the CCDI under Zhao Leji's supervision.


What is there left to say? "Total victory" is not an exaggeration: every major party organ is now packed with Xi's confidantes across the years. He has a named ideology in the Constitution. Xi's overhaul of the military is evident and close to completion.

In his speech given after the PSC was revealed, Xi has already made note of
1) several historically meaningful deadlines before 2022: 2018 (40 years since Deng's initial "reform and opening up) and 2021 (Centennial of the CCP's foundation).
2) Xi on the CCP: "If you're large and in charge, then you've gotta behave like it."

There really is no significant political opposition to Xi's agenda now. When he mentioned 1), it's to signal the next five years will be about changing regulation and his particular style of balancing state corporations and the market. When he mentioned 2), it's about forcing the Party back into the centre of Chinese society and culture, no matter if people are down with it.

Whatever Xi's true political beliefs are, we're gonna start seeing them in action very soon.