Sun and Moon - The Presidential Election of 2040

[P. Clodius Pulcher did nothing wrong]

AAAAAHHH

[Unapologetic Chinaperson]

Chapter 4: Into the New World

“China? There lies a sleeping giant. Let him sleep! For when he wakes, he will move the world.”

 - Napoleon Bonaparte

“American dominance of the world ended on Trump’s election to president. What will take its place I didn’t know, and we were scared to find out.”

 - John Kerry, in an interview with CNN, January 25, 2023

February 12, 2040, New National Performance Center, Beijing, China

According to Chinese mythology, there used to be ten suns in the sky. The people below didn’t know that, though, since the ten suns all looked alike and they all rose and set one at a time. But one day, the ten suns decided to all rise at once, scorching the Earth and roasting many living things to death. Angered, the gods sent the god-archer Hou Yi down to Earth to shoot them, and so he did, until one remained, the sun that warms the Earth today.

Li Meixi thought about that story as she grabbed the trapeze bar. The Year of the Monkey was about to begin, and she was the singular focal point of her entire country. He shot down nine suns, she thought, and I have nine flights to make.

On that thought, a burst of adrenaline, produced by artificial adrenal glands that were implanted in her, shot through her blood like fireworks. And with that came a burst of confidence. I can do this. And she let go, and she flew.

She flew - nay, floated - like a crane in front of one and a half billion eyes, all watching her on the CCTV New Year’s Gala. One by one, she caught herself on each successive trapeze, her augmented reflexes making sure of that, as red and gold confetti dropped around her like a forest of autumn leaves.

She caught the other bar, to a stupendous round of applause. Eight flights left. Like water, she flipped her body around, swung herself, and let go, her implanted glands giving the extra physical and psychological boosts she needed.

But augmentations weren’t everything. She still gave up her life for gymnastics, training for years on end, with few breaks and no weekends. But it was worth it, especially considering where she came from.

Her parents operated a traditional Chinese medicine shop in Tunxi, at the foothills of the world-famous Huangshan Range. Her parents told her stories about the hardships both they and their grandparents faced, especially in the few years before her birth when the 危机 - the Crisis - was in full effect. It was why her parents named her Meixi - Beautiful Hope. It had hope that she would escape their old struggles and forge a new and better life.

But for her, all she remembered from her early childhood was fun and games. Every day she would jump and make cartwheels, to entertain herself and her friends. Her parents were never pleased when she knocked down shelves in their store, but they saw her talent and enrolled her in a state gymnastics school in Shanghai.

Seven left, Meixi thought as caught another trapeze bar, to another round of audience applause.

When she arrived in Shanghai, she saw a city of change. It was the city that never slept; if she could make it here, she could make it anywhere. Nary a day went by when a new skyscraper, let alone a new restaurant or supermarket, opened to the public. So many places to be, so many sights to visit! And the people - the people! How they were so diverse, coming from across the country and the globe in the hopes of making it big.

Six.

Not that she got to savor the city much; her training regimen was intense. From sunup to sundown she had to exercise her muscles and practice her techniques, repeating the same moves for hours at a time. She also had to maintain her academics; though athletes like her were outside the infamously tough Chinese school system, she and her teammates had private tutors to teach everything from math and science to art and history.

Five.

She thought about these history classes, how they painted a past of terror and pain. She learned about the Century of Humiliation, how Western powers invaded China’s sovereignty and nearly destroyed it, before Japan came in and destroyed everything. She learned about how Mao Zedong founded the People’s Republic, and she learned how her country finally found its place in the world under Deng Xiaoping and Xi Jinping.

Four.

But Meixi’s China was different. Whenever she had a (very rare) day off, she saw the future. She visited the Shanghai Stock Exchange and listen to the beats and flutters of the heart of the world economy. She saw the ships of the PLAN that plowed the high seas and saw the spacecraft that landed the first Chinese man on the Moon.

To Meixi, it seemed inconceivable to her that the China she grew up in was the same land of destitution her ancestors lived in. It seemed inconceivable that the China of today was the same country infamous for making cheap toys and poisoned milk, where the air was so thick with smog that not even the sun - the one sun that survived Hou Yi’s arrows - could shine.

Three.

Because today, China rules the world.

Two.

But it doesn’t rule alone.

One.

Meixi made her final grab and tunneled gracefully to the ground. Applause flowed upon her success, but soon enough, the gravity of the room began to shift. Several huge men in suits entered from stage left. Behind them a small woman, probably only a few centimeters taller than her, appeared onstage, smiling and waving to great applause.

Sun Meiyu, the President of the United States, had arrived.

[P. Clodius Pulcher did nothing wrong]

That Napoleon quote is so impresionante

[Cold War Liberal]

IT'S BACK!!!

[Unapologetic Chinaperson]

Author's Notes for Chapter 4:

Names: For some Asian names, e.g. Li Meixi's, the family name is placed before the given name, unlike in most Western cultures where it's the other way around. As a rule of thumb, Western characters (including Asian-Americans) will use the Western naming convention of [given name] [surname], while for East Asian characters they go by [surname] [given name].

Sources: A lot of the material for this chapter is based on two sources (which I cite here because plagiarism is bad). One is this amazingly unfinished timeline by Mathuen, which is centered around a China-centric future. The other is "When China Rules the World" by British historian Martin Jaques. Since I based a lot of the material from these sources, they may contain spoilers, but I do recommend giving them a look.

[Unapologetic Chinaperson]

Sun arrives in Beijing, begins 4th Sino-American Dialogue

February 12, 2040

Beijing (CNN) - President Crystal Sun has arrived in Beijing today, kicking off the Chinese New Year and beginning her two-week tour around the world.

“On behalf of the American people, we wish everyone peace and prosperity in the Year of the Monkey,” Sun announced during her appearance on the CCTV Spring Festival Gala, the world’s most watched annual broadcast. It marks the start of not only the Year of the Monkey but also the week-long Dialogue, in which Sun will meet and discuss pertinent issues with high-ranking Asian politicians, including Chinese President Xie Guang.

The eyes of the world will be closely observing how the Dialogue unfolds. The relationship between China and the United States, the largest and second-largest economies in the world respectively, is seen by most pundits as the most important bilateral relationship in history. East Asia is considered the principal nexus of the world economy, with China acting as the economic center of gravity of the region.

During the 4th Dialogue, Sun hopes to continue her “Sunshine Policy” towards China. Notable achievements of the Sunshine Policy, as touted by the Sun Administration, included the lowering of long-standing tariffs on Chinese imports, the formal American recognition of PRC sovereignty over Taiwan under the “One China, Two Systems” policy, US investment into North Korea for the first time, and the repeal of most restrictions on joint Sino-American space ventures.

However, challenges still remain between the two superpowers. The Sunshine Policy has continued to receive harsh criticism from the Democratic Party, which accuse Sun of putting business interests above human rights and democracy. Some Democratic politicians go as far as accusing her of putting Chinese interests over American ones and call for a re-opening of the investigation of possible collusion between the Chinese Communist Party and the Sun campaign.

Sun herself has resisted a number of Chinese demands as well, such as the expansion of the Chinese Community into the United States and the removal of the remaining American military bases from Japan. Continued American expansion into the African Wars, where both the United States and China fund and assist opposing sides in the multi-sided conflicts, is likely to be another point of contention between the two nations.

After the six-day Dialogue, Sun will spend the second week visiting multiple countries, starting with South Korea and continuing with Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Poland, where she will discuss the continued rebuilding of the Korean Peninsula and Japan, the threat of Russia, the African Wars, migration, and climate change.

[jojoju1998]

How is Vietnam doing with China and the US ?

[Unapologetic Chinaperson]

Xie Guang


Xie during the 3rd Sino-American Dialogue in 2039

Xie Guang (谢光; pinyin: Xiè Guāng, born January 7, 1985), also known by his English name Richard Xie, is a Chinese politician who is the current General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, the President of the People’s Republic of China, and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. As the holder of the top offices in the PRC, he is often referred to as the paramount leader of China; he is also a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, the top decision-making body in China.

Born in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province to a upper-middle-class family, Xie received degrees from Tsinghua University and the University of California, Berkeley, before joining the Chinese Communist Party. Rising up through the Party, Xie served as Minister of Finance from 2027 to 2032, before serving as the Vice-President of China from 2032 to 2037.

Since assuming the title of President of China in 2037, Xie has worked to consolidate Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan under the “One China, Two Systems” policy; he has made a number of visits to the island during his tenure. A member of the Social Progressive wing of the Party, Xie has worked to increase the living standards for China’s minorities, as well as the rights of women and the LGBTQ community. Under his rule, China saw the legalization of gay marriage in 2039.

As part of the government’s efforts to address the nation’s ongoing demographic crises, Xie has worked to expand the use of robots in Chinese businesses and society, particularly in the nation’s rapidly-expanding nursing facilities. In addition, he has loosened restrictions on immigration from Asian and African countries, and has cracked down on hate speech through tightened Internet and media censorship. Xie has also overseen an expansion in Chinese space capabilities, including the establishment of the world’s first Venusian colony.

In terms of foreign policy, Xie has been instrumental in the detente between China and the United States, to the extent that he is often described as having a “special relation” with US President Crystal Sun. Xie has worked to increase Chinese soft power at home and abroad, popularizing the conception of China as a “civilizational state” into mainstream discourse and expanding the Chinese Community worldwide. Xie has also expanded Chinese influence in Central Asia and Africa, including increasing the extent of its participation in the African Wars.

[Unapologetic Chinaperson]

More author's notes, then another guessing game!

For those who have trouble with pronunciation, President Xie Guang's surname is pronounced like "ship," but with the final "p" sound dropped. (So the x is pronounced somewhat like "sh," not like a "ks" or a "z" or what-have-you.) "Guang" is a bit easier to say, but the "a" is pronounced like a British short "a."

Now for the game! President Xie's name actually references a major character in another Atlas timeline.

Easy Mode: Straight up answer with who that other character is. Hint: Xie's English name makes this straightforward (hence "Easy" Mode).

Hard Mode: Determine how Xie's Chinese name corresponds with the other guy's name. Hint: It's not straightforward; after translating the meaning of the characters into English, you then have to solve a pun. Enjoy!

Bonus: Determine the celebrity whose pic I'm using for Xie. (Double bonus if you do it without Google Image Search.)

Remember, PM me your answers so that you don't spoil other peoples' fun.

[Unapologetic Chinaperson]

What does everyone think of Chapter 4 so far? What questions do people have? What aspects of the 2040 global stage (particularly China) should I focus on in this chapter - economics, politics, history, etc.? Should I even spend so much time on countries that aren't the US in the first place?

I also noticed that so far, nobody has attempted to do the guessing game (even on Easy Mode), in stark contrast to last time.

[Unapologetic Chinaperson]

The Chinese Economy of 2040
Report by PriceWaterCoopers

Basic Facts about China:
Area: 3.705 million mi²
Population: 1,364,700,000
GDP (PPP, 2017 USD): $ 50,253,407,130,000
GDP per capita (PPP, 2017 USD): $ 36,824
GDP by sector: 1.2% (agriculture), 28.3% (industry), 70.5% (services)
HDI: 0.861

Area, population and GDP figures do not include Hong Kong, Macau, or Taiwan.

1978 was the year that changed the world. That was when China, under Deng Xiaoping, opened up to the world, marking a break from the disastrous Maoist experiments of the 50s and 60s. In the half-century since, China’s economy grew from $600 billion in 2039 US dollars - a quarter of the size of Alibaba or Amazon today - to today’s $90 trillion, a growth of 150-fold.

Over that time period, China transformed from a backwards agrarian society to an industrializing power to a service and AI-driven civilization. It’s common for Western tourists, used to their grandparents’ dirt-poor China, to be surprised that the Middle Kingdom is a solidly developed country, with excellent schools, world-class healthcare, and very low crime rates.

China’s rise shocked economists who believed that such large economy couldn’t grow so fast. Economists witnessed Japan and the Asian Tigers - Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan - grow at rates on the order of 10 percent per year. They did not, however, expect these rates to carry over to China, which has a population an order of magnitude larger than its neighbors. Obviously, they were proven wrong, as China grew at double digit rates between 1980 and 2010.

In part because of this incredulity, many predicted China’s collapse. Political pundit Gordon Chang has repeatedly argued that China will collapse for the past three decades, and geopolitics analyst George Friedman predicted that China will fragment and Japan will gobble up the pieces. (Amusingly, he also predicted that Turkey and Poland will become the 21st century superpowers.) Despite all of these predictions, and despite an economic slowdown that began in the second decade of the 21st century, China’s economy mostly kept chugging along.

Then the Crisis hit. The economy contracted by nine percent in one year, due to a near collapse of trade with its devastated neighbors and the United States. The initial shocked dominoed as China’s overleveraged banks lost trillions in equity, the renminbi tumbled, and millions of businesses large and small collapsed. People protested to an extent not seen since Tiananmen as a result of the freefalling economy, to ugly results.

Yet China didn’t collapse, the Communist Party held on, and growth rebounded by late 2022, a sharp contrast to the continued funk the West found itself in. With each crisis comes opportunity.

The Crisis caused the capital-R Realignment in the United States, but China also used the moment for extensive reforms. Among other actions, the government temporarily suspended stock trading, purged shadow banks that provided junk loans, and restructured many of its state-owned banks and enterprises. Officials in the Communist Party who resisted these reforms were replaced by technocrats who guided China on the road to recovery.

Meanwhile, the Xi Administration enacted a reprise of the Marshall Plan, known as the Phoenix Plan, which over the course of a decade injected nearly $2 trillion in investments into Korea and Japan. Because of this, the two East Asian nations were able to stage impressive comebacks, and Phoenix Plan assisted China’s own recovery by inducing demand for Chinese infrastructure. It also cemented China’s dominance in the East Asian arena.

By 2023, the Chinese economy was growing at six percent per year again as the world crawled itself out of the Crisis. As it did, the Party prepared itself for an ever bigger problem - an aging population and declining workforce. Like Japan and Korea, China had invested heavily in robotics and AI, which helped maintain economic productivity. But it was not enough, forcing the government to open the country up to immigration to fix its dependency ratio and gender imbalance.

And so, even today in 2040, challenges remain. India is catching up as a economic competitor, its purchasing power parity GDP having exceeded the United States’ in 2035 and briskly approaching China’s. The United States and European Union remain formidable Western rivals. And the threat of China’s demographic problems and future economic crises cannot be ignored. However, even in the worst of times China bounced back and prospered. As the leader of the world once again, it Middle Kingdom prepares itself for a new decade of challenges and opportunities.

Author’s Note 1: For the data blurb, it doesn’t really make sense to use 2017 dollars for a 2040s story, but I did it to avoid audience confusion.

Author’s Note 2: I partially based this report on PriceWaterCooper’s “The World in 2050” projections, if you want to take a look. Of course, PwC uses different assumptions, e.g. it doesn’t include the Crisis, and even professional economists often get things wrong, so take the report with a grain of salt.

[Unapologetic Chinaperson]

How is Vietnam doing with China and the US ?

Despite initial resistance, Vietnam by 2040 is solidly within China's sphere of influence due to the Chinese economy's gravitational pull, just like the rest of Southeast Asia. That said, it is the "maverick" of the region, sometimes defying China whenever it is convenient.

I'll explain more once I post the "World System of 2040" update.

[Kingpoleon]

Is Vietnam becoming the “Prussia of Southeast Asia,” then, as predicted?

[Unapologetic Chinaperson]

Is Vietnam becoming the “Prussia of Southeast Asia,” then, as predicted?

I would not describe Vietnam like that. Misadventures such as what Prussia did in the 19th century or what Vietnam did with Cambodia and China in the 20th century would not be tolerated. China is Vietnam's main trading partner and biggest source of foreign direct investment, and the Chinese Community in Vietnam plays a significant role in Vietnam. But Vietnam is careful not to be overly reliant on China, unlike Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and (to some extent) Thailand, which are often referred to as Chinese satellite states by Western observers (or tributary states, if you're a Chinese nationalist).

[Unapologetic Chinaperson]

What is China?

By Caroline Hong

China is not a nation state.

Or at least it is not just a nation state. Sure, it acts like a nation state. It has nation state borders, nation state statistics - world’s largest economy, second largest population, third or fourth largest area, depending on who you’re quoting - and it even has a modern system of governance. And it also has recognition from other sovereign states, something that’s self-evident, especially after the Reunification. These are facts that we all know.

But these facts belie something deeper about what is China. First of all, we must define what is a nation state. As we all know, there are two parts to that definition - “nation” and “state.” “State” is easy - it’s a jurisdiction whose government is sovereign over its own affairs and is not responsible to a higher governing power. “Nation” is a bit more fuzzy. Does it depend on ethnicity and race? Or does it depend on institutions and common values?

Regardless of how you define the nation-state, it is a new arrival to our history. Most academics have its start be the Treaty of Westphalia, which was signed four centuries ago. But China has existed in some form ever since Qin Shi Huang founded the first imperial dynasty more than two thousand years ago. Since then, there’s always been a common Chinese identity. When China was disunited, it always managed to reunite under that identity. The Chinese language, Chinese art, the Chinese system of imperial governance, Confucianism, and other crucial aspects of Chinese civilization persisted for millenia. In other words, Chinese civilization has had a history whose scope and continuity is unlike any other in the world.

For that reason, China is not a nation state, but a civilization state. Most Westerners think that the term “civilization state” is a buzzword invented by a British Marxist and promoted by the Chinese president to puff the country up. But it does capture the uniqueness of the Chinese state that results from this unique two thousand (or five thousand, as most Chinese students are taught) year-old history.

So what does this mean? So what if China is a civilization state, especially if the rest of the world can interface it as a traditional nation state? Because the fact that China is a civilization state informs the nature of the Chinese government and Chinese society.

First of all, Chinese people identify themselves with a greater Chinese civilization. This is distinct from the ethnic nationalism that most European citizens identify with, or the identification with class and race in the US, or with caste and religion in India. China is dominated by one ethnic group, the Han, but the Han themselves are extremely diverse. A northern Han Chinese would look different, speak a different Chinese dialect (which are mutually unintelligible between each other), and have a different outlook on life than a Chinese person from the south. What binds them together is a shared civilization, characterized by its own writing system, art, philosophies, and history.

Perhaps the most important practical consequence is the Chinese government’s upmost concern for China’s unity. As I mentioned before, China has experienced many periods of disunity and weakness, and these were never good times. For example, during the Century of Humiliation, Qing China had its territory chipped away by Europeans who got its people hooked on opium. When that and corruption led to the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the resulting Warlords Era and the Japanese occupation resulted in the deaths of millions. Thus despite the tragedies they themselves caused, the Chinese Communist Party is still seen positively as the unifier of China after a century of disunity.

This priority placed on unity was why the reintegration of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan were central national goals. To the West, the Reunification between the mainland and Taiwan is seen as a tragedy for democracy and self-determination, but in China, it is seen as the completion of a reunification process that took nearly a century. Once again, all of China was under one ruler, one government, under heaven.

This unity doesn’t apply just to China proper, however. It also applies to all Chinese, all over the world. It explains why an entity like the Chinese Community even exists. Regardless if a ethnic Chinese person lived their whole lives in Manila or Munich, they would be part of that shared Chinese civilization, an identity that transcends national boundaries and political systems.

Furthermore, unlike in the West, where the state has been checked by competing institutions like the Church and the media, the Chinese state had no such competing institutions. In addition, Confucianism describes the relation between the individual and the state as an extension of the relationship between child and father. For this reason, the role of the Chinese state in society is much, much greater than that of Western states. Obviously this has its limits - one cannot rule a country the size of a continent with an iron fist, so Beijing must always compromise with the provincial governments. But it explains why China has not transitioned to Western-style democracy, even after becoming a developed country, and why the CCP still maintains such control over Chinese society.

The fact that China was and is the most powerful country in the world, save for the 18th and 19th centuries, creates a sense of superiority in the Chinese consciousness. Historically, other societies, such as the Mongols, the Japanese, and the Europeans, were seen as barbarians. This sense of superiority is fertile ground for tension between Han Chinese and other ethnic groups, which explains the tense relations between the Han and both China’s minorities and China’s immigrants.

On the other hand, Chinese culture is open to multiculturalism. In the past, Buddhism and Taoism had existed alongside the dominant Confucian tradition. Today, we are also seeing a nascent culture of Chinese anti-racism, feminism, and LGBTQ acceptance gaining steam. Which brings up an important point: within Chinese civilization, there is incredible diversity between ideologies and subcultures. Look at the vast differences between Mainland China and Taiwan, or between any two Chinese provinces, or between the different Chinese Communities around the world. There is, after all, no one “correct” way to be Chinese.

Likewise, neither Chinese culture or Chinese civilization is static. Chinese society to this day continues to be profoundly reshaped by technology, globalization, and migration. Chinese civilization influences the rest of the world, and the world shapes China in turn. This has been so for millenia, whether it takes the form of Qin Shi Huang’s empire to today’s modern superpower. What form China will take on next is anybody’s guess. But as an culture and polity with no parallel on this Earth, we need to understand it, as we journey slowly but surely into this new world.

Caroline Hong is a professor of Political Science at the Paul H. Nitze School of International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

[Unapologetic Chinaperson]

China and the World, in 10 Visuals
By Sungyoung Lee
This article was first published in Visual Capitalist

With President Crystal Sun kicking off the Fourth Sino-American Dialogue, it’s easy to remember that China is the most powerful nation in the world. But exactly how powerful is it?

As the saying goes, a picture says more than a thousand words. People have written thousands of articles and think pieces about the Middle Kingdom, but there’s nothing better to explain the country than humble images and maps.

As in many fields, the Chinese were cartography pioneers; the earliest known Chinese maps date back to the 4th century BCE, during the Warring States period. Today, we present ten maps and infographics that show the extent of China’s power and how it influences our world.

1. The $2 Trillion Club



Regular maps are decent for showing areas and shapes (never perfectly, though!), but they usually fail in showing  more interesting facts like population and GDP. That is solved with what is known as a cartogram, which change the size of territories depending on whatever data is being shown. This cartogram, created by journalist Hyeonson Bambini, represents every country with a GDP (PPP) of over $2 trillion as an appropriately sized dot. China is obviously the largest dot, with India and the US each having economies a little more than half that of China. While developed country dots form a good chunk of the remainder, there are plenty of developing country dots, representing the rise of the “Global South” as they converged with the “Global North.”

2. The People’s Republic of Earth



There are other ways to appreciate the sheer scale of the Chinese economy. This is a map by Stanislav Minatozaki that shows China’s provinces, but not their actual names; instead, it names them after their nearest-sized economies, showing the sheer scale of some provincial economies. And by coloring each province by GDP per capita, it shows the disparities between the coast and the inland provinces that persist despite the government’s best efforts to reduce income inequality (though there has been improvements over the last few decades).

3. China’s Megacities



Economy isn’t everything about China; it also has the world’s largest urban population, as shown by this map made by American-Chinese Hua Joregestein. China’s largest cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou are more populous than many entire nations, while hundreds of millions live in smaller cities most Westerners have never heard of, like Zhengzhou and Shijiazhuang. They also drive the Chinese economy, producing a disproportionate share of the country’s GDP and being the headquarters of some of the largest corporations in the world. Which leads us to…

4. Meet the Megacorps



China has the nearly half of the 50 biggest corporations as measured by market cap, as shown in this beautiful infographic by economist Susan Massey. The United States actually has most of the remainder, with the rest scattered around the world. To absolutely nobody’s surprise, tech companies like Tencent and Alibaba take the top spots. There are also some more subtle points to be made, such as the lack of major US banks on the list (a consequence of all the bank-breaking during the Realignment) and a dearth of Chinese pharmaceutical and biotech firms despite China being the world’s largest market in those sectors.

5. The Chinese Diaspora



The Overseas Chinese form one of the largest and most important diasporas in this world. Overseas Chinese people, whether they are humble merchants in Madagascar or the President of the United States, are in virtually every country in the world. The relationship between the diaspora and the homeland is also unique, thanks to the Commonwealth of Chinese Communities, which links each nation’s so-called Community with the Middle Kingdom. Fatima Kuo beautifully captures the diaspora in one of her characteristic China-centric maps.

6. China’s Railroads



Kuo has also made a map documenting every mile of China’s railroad diplomacy. Said diplomacy varies greatly by country, province, and city. Some rail lines were are built directly by the Chinese; others were merely financed by the Chinese. Some were built by Chinese state-owned entities; others were built by private corporations. A few, like the TAZARA railway in Tanzania, were built in the 1970s; others, like the China-funded Seattle-SF high-speed line currently under construction, utilize the latest in maglev and vacuum technology.

7. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership



As part of China’s rise, the country rejiggered the global institutions that form the basis of our international trade and legal systems. For example, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was established by China, ASEAN, and five other Asia-Pacific states in 2019 after the demise of a similar American attempt, known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a few years earlier. After going through a number of revisions, such as the RCEP II overhaul in 2029, the RCEP today forms the largest trade bloc in the world, covering almost half of the entire world economy in PPP terms.

8. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank



The AIIB, founded in 2015, is another such Chinese-led institution. After the United States became its latest member in 2037, after decades of holding out, the AIIB boasts the membership of every country in the world except for Eritrea and Turkmenistan (and Kosovo, thought the AIIB doesn’t count it as a country). Despite its name and historical focus on Asia, it is today a truly global institution, with AIIB-financed projects going on in every continent, including Antarctica.

9. The String of Pearls



China’s interests extend beyond economic relationships; they are intertwined with its global security strategy. Though it started out as a term coined by American consulting firm BoozAllenHamilton, the “String of Pearls” has become the crux of China’s Indian Ocean strategy. Each “pearl” is a special-use port used (and usually built) by China; they serve as trade hubs, information centers, and peacekeeping bases, though each port’s specific role varies (and is usually classified). Along with China’s Atlantic special-use ports and its military bases in Africa and the South China Sea, the String of Pearls is vital to securing Indian Ocean from terrorists and pirates, though that hasn’t stopped India, Australia, and the US from complaining about it also being tool of the Chinese Navy to contain them.

10. The Southern Africa Group



China itself is not the only entity to act on the world stage; its mega-corporations move and shake the world on their own terms too. And none do so as much as the Southern African Group, a partially-state owned conglomerate that operates in Southern Africa. (Surprise!) Its power is impressive, especially when you consider that it legally controls an entire country and de facto dominates many others. It is obviously a controversial company; many African critics say that it singlehandedly ruins the goodwill that China spent decades cultivating with Africa, though many others disagree, thanks to the economic growth it has spurred in the region.

[Unapologetic Chinaperson]

Author's Note: This was probably the longest update I've ever written, especially since I had to do all of the research/speculation and graphic design myself. Hope you guys enjoy this unique style of timeline update! (Maybe I'll do some US maps as well some point in the future.)

Obviously the default resolution of these infographics are too small for most computer screens, so I highly recommend that you zoom in on them (it's "Open image in new tab" for Chrome; dunno for other browsers).

Also, as further crediting, the RCEP map is a future variant of this map and the AIIB map uses the color scheme of this map. Future GDP projects are partially on PriceWaterhouseCooper's The World in 2050 figures, while future Chinese province population totals (for GDP per capita calculations) are loosely based on these projections.

All dollar figures are in 2040 USD. To convert to 2016 USD, simply divide them by 1.873.

EDIT: I also retconned some figures for VirtualEarth and Barron Trump so that they match the graphics. Now the younger Trump has a net worth of over $820 billion.

[P. Clodius Pulcher did nothing wrong]

This is absolutely stunning. Im blown away! I don't know where to begin, your attention to detail is so impressive. Great job!!!!! I can't wait for more content. This is really becoming one of the best TL's ever. Seeing America brought down from its perch is slightly terrifying but also somehow relieving.

[Cold War Liberal]

Absurdly awesome, keep it up!

[Unapologetic Chinaperson]

The Factions
By Jodi Sima of the Brookings Institute

The Chinese Communist Party is not like Western political parties such as the Democrats or Republicans. Rather than representing particular ideologies or interest groups, the CCP is an institution representing the entire country and is deeply married to the state; the distinction between state and party is fuzzy if not non-existent.

Thus, while inter-party conflict does not exist in China (notwithstanding the Taiwan League, a few minor parties, and banned groups), much conflict occurs within the CCP. Since its inception, the Party has had many factions vying for power, with factional conflicts being a major driving force in modern Chinese history.

While in the past most factions were focused on personal relationships, special interests and the like, the post-Xi CCP saw an emergence of new ideology-based factions, coalescing in the 23rd National Congress of the CCP in 2037. There are many such factions, and the borders between them are often vague and controversial, but in general there are the “Three Bigs” - the Social Progressives, the Traditionalists, and the Capitalists, with “The Taiwanese” forming their own major and distinct faction.

The Social Progressives（适应派）

Also known as “Chinese Liberals” or “White Lotuses,” the Social Progressives, or SPs, are the current dominant faction of the Chinese Communist Party, led by Communist Party Secretary Xie Guang. They are the newest faction of the CCP; during the Xi era, the values that today define the SPs were often mocked and criticized in the Chinese mainstream for being “Western” and idealistic, among other reasons. During the post-Xi years they remained an ill-defined group, but they coalesced during the 23rd Congress as liberal ideas resurged in popularity.

The SP’s views come from diverse sources in Chinese history, from Buddhist prescriptions on morality to the radical equality of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom to Mao’s views of social equality, as well as from the West. They view equality between China’s many groups as a moral goal and the only way to achieve social harmony. As such, they support feminism, gay rights, multiculturalism, bioequality, and even AI rights, and they aren’t afraid of moral engineering. As a faction, they are more comfortable with immigration, governmental openness, and democratic governance, with some even envisioning a transition to full multiparty democracy.

Like the Traditionalists, they are economically left-wing, though this varies between members. Some radical “New Left” types envision a return to Maoism, where the means of production are re-collectivized and all class distinctions are erased. Others support leftist policies within capitalism, with an emphasis on an extensive welfare state buffering against the worst effects of it. In any case, unlike their Western counterparts, Social Progressives do not view any distinction between “social” and “economic” policies; social progressivism without economic justice is illogical, while economic progress without social equality is immoral.

In foreign policy, they support the detente between China and the West. An internationalist faction, they support global human rights, though the rights they promote differ from those in the West. While Westerners promote liberal democracy and press freedom, the Social Progressives emphasize economic development, cultural self-determination, international democracy, and corruption elimination.

The SP’s base of support comes from two places - the cosmopolitan cities of the East (especially among educated and well-travelled youths) and the minority-heavy provinces of the West. Their symbol is a white lotus; the term was originally used as a slur (along with the phrase “white leftist”), but was reclaimed during the SP’s rise; today the lotus flower officially reflects the Buddhist origins of much Social Progressive thought.

The Traditionalists（卫道士）

The opposition faction to the Social Progressives, the Traditionalists follow from the “populist” faction of the Xi years, with much of the core membership made up of the Youth League or “Tuanpai” faction of that era. Like the Social Progressives, they place paramount importance on helping the poorest and most marginalized in China. Their economic policies generally overlap with that of the SPs, though compared to the SPs there is a noticeable preference for collectivist “New Left” models over the “social democracy” ones.

What the SPs and the Traditionalists disagree on are social issues. The Traditionalists see the SPs as promoting moral decline and believe that their ideas run counter to the ultimate goal of preserving the Chinese state. While the Traditionalists are opposed to gay marriage and immigration, typically right-wing positions in the West, they also oppose consumerism and environmental destruction, which are typical left-wing positions. They are the faction most supportive of the current governmental structure; the Traditionalists are the dominant faction in the civil service and most are staunchly opposed to further moves towards democracy.

In terms of foreign policy, they oppose the China-West detente and are suspicious of Western ideologies; as such, they see the SPs as an extension of the West. Instead, they prefer to mend ties with Russia, after the deterioration of relations between the two during the 2030s. While the Traditionalists do not oppose internationalism in principle and are champions of ties between China and the developing world (sans India), they reject the SP’s promotion of “human rights” in their worldview.

Their base of support comes from the relatively impoverished interior provinces of China. They do not have an official symbol, but they are informally associated with the hammer and sickle of the CCP as a whole; associations with Confucian imagery are also common.

The Capitalists（资本家）

The faction of business tycoons, tech CEOs, middle-class entrepreneurs, and “princelings” of historical CCP bigwigs, they support “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” in its, erm, purest form. They distinguish themselves from the other two major factions by being economically right-wing, dropping all pretenses of Communism from the Party. As a faction, they support low taxes, stronger private property rights, relaxed labor and environmental regulations, greater freedom to invest overseas, and a slew of other pro-business policies.

Like the Social Progressives, the Capitalists support immigration, as they view a declining native population is bad for Chinese power and their bottom line; however, they prefer the Dubai model of inviting temporary guest workers without any regard for integration into Chinese culture. They are the most gung-ho about technological progress and have a minimalistic view of ethical regulations. As for foreign policy, their main tool is not the state itself, but rather Chinese mega-corps and NGOs, many of which are comparable to nation-states in terms of power. That said, they are the faction most willing to use the state to restore the tributary system of old.

Their base of support, like that of the Social Progressives, comes from the wealthy coastal cities, which leads to the Capitalists to form shaky alliances with the SPs from time to time. Like the Traditionalists, they don’t have an official symbol, but they are associated with the Yuan sign for obvious reasons.

The Taiwanese（台湾族）

Usually considered the “Fourth Faction,” what’s unusual about this faction is that it partially exists outside of the CCP itself; members are divided between the CCP itself and the Taiwan League, a merger of two minor parties (the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League and the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang) and one of the seven parties that is allowed to exist along with the CCP in the United Front. Their base of support, of course, is the Taiwan Special Province, which was reunited with the Mainland under the “One China, Two Systems” policy in 2035.

Even in 2040, there is still suspicion in Taiwan that the CCP will strip away their rights and individual culture. The Taiwanese Faction is the main group that promotes these interests in Beijing. Besides political interests like maintaining Taiwanese autonomy, they promote business relations between Taiwan and the Mainland, which are essential to restarting Taiwan’s economy after decades of stagnation.

The Taiwanese Faction is notorious for creating alliances with some factions in the CCP while backstabbing others in order to maximize their negotiating position. However, as representing the most socially liberal part of China, the Taiwanese Faction often finds itself allying with the Social Progressives, and dialogues between faction members are commonplace.

[Unapologetic Chinaperson]

Dong Ri

The Dong Ri colony, with Tianhe-class blimp Niu Lang in the foreground and most of the other aerostats in the background. The Zhengren-class aerostat Hai Wang is not pictured.

The Dong Ri Space Science Center (Simplified Chinese: 东日太空科学中心, Traditional Chinese: 東日太空科學中心, lit. Eastern Sun Space Science Center), shortened to Dong Ri and informally known as Cloud City (Simplified: 云城, Traditional: 雲城), is a permanent manned Venusian research center operated by the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA). It is the first manned outpost on a planet other than Earth. Commanded by astronaut Lang Kaili, Dong Ri is a floating colony that does not occupy a fixed location on the surface; instead, it consists of a series of airships, including four large Zhengren-class aerostats and two smaller Tianhe-class blimps used for short-ranged travel.

The concept of Dong Ri was inspired by NASA’s HAVOC plan, which was a concept for a Venusian colony operated by the United States. While plans for a Venusian colony operated by the CNSA languished for years, it gained renewed interest in the 2020s, after several feasibility studies studied the advantages of a Venusian colony over a Martian one. The Zhengren-class aerostats were first launched unmanned in 2036. They arrived at Venus later that year and operated unmanned until 2038, when the first 26 crew members and the first Tianhe-class blimp, Niu Lang, arrived at the colony. A second wave of 14 researchers and technicians arrived in 2039 on the blimp Zhi Nü, and another wave is expected to be launched in December of 2040.

The aerostats that constitute Dong Ri float 50 kilometers above the surface of Venus, where atmospheric pressures and temperatures are similar to that of Earth at sea level. Both classes of aerostats use hydrogen as their principal lifting gas, though the Zhengren-class aerostats also use nitrogen and oxygen to provide lift. As a scientific outpost, Dong Ri researchers study many aspects of Venus, including its atmosphere, geology, and feasibility for long-term terraforming.

[Unapologetic Chinaperson]

Une Communauté Unie
By Victoria Lee of the New Yorker

It was a crisp blue day when Chloe Leung gave me a tour of her restaurant in this corner of the 13th Arrondissement of Paris. Le Dragon Chanceux - The Lucky Dragon - was a small place, easily missed if one was walking briskly on the sidewalk outside. Yet it still made a name for itself, serving an eclectic mix of Parisian pastries and Vietnamese-Chinese cuisine. Chloe and I had to wait a good fifteen seconds for the door to clear, as Parisians and tourists alike swarmed the entrance for a chance to eat there. “Business varies,” she said. “Today is a good day.”

As I walked in, I saw an inside that was just as small as the outside. There was only one main room that was barely big enough for ten tables, whose walls were covered with a red and yellow wallpaper whose floral pattern stretched around the entire perimeter. There was a flight of white stairs that led upstairs, blocked by a chain with an attached sign that said “Employees Only” in English, French, and Chinese. Next to the stairs was a counter that had a hastily-installed wooden door that led to the kitchen. Hung on the door was the Chinese character for luck - 福, or fú - hung upside down, as it should be per tradition.

I saw two women standing at the counter. “They are my sisters,” Chloe said as they coöperated as only sisters could. With remarkable precision, they took orders and gave them to the kitchen staff, and I, being the American I was, marveled at the grace and efficiency with which the sisters switched between languages. In one moment, they spoke perfect Parisian French. Another moment they spoke Chinese; it was the Teochew dialect of southern China, Chloe told me, which many Vietnamese Chinese spoke. When I walked up and placed my order, they switched to English without hesitation. “Two croissants,” I said, ordering the most basic French food item I could think of. “Sure,” they replied.

When I got my two croissants and my cup of green tea, I sat down with Chloe. I told her that I was here to write about the Commonwealth of Chinese Communities, as well as Chinese Community of France, one of ninety such Communities officially recognized by the Commonwealth. Today, the Chinese Commonwealth is the most powerful diaspora organization in the world. Though Communities differ greatly, most assist their overseas Chinese members in similar ways. Many Communities let members have the incredible privilege of holding dual citizenship with China. (For most people, China does not recognize dual nationals.) For those that do not, members have access to special visas that allow for free travel to China. For members who wish to stay put, they still have access to the protective force of the Chinese state, as the Community maintains close relations with it and often serves as the overseas arm of the Chinese government.

Community schools serve as vessels to teach the next generation of overseas Chinese their language, their history, and their culture. Community banks assist member-owned businesses, whether through grants and loans backed by Chinese banks or by helping them access Chinese state patronage directly. Community-sponsored festivals, held year-round, celebrate Chinese culture, while Community-run social media platforms unite members within their Communities and with the wider Commonwealth. Community police forces and neighborhood watches defend members from crime and violence from within the Community and from without. And the Commonwealth operates its own cryptocurrency, E-Yuan, which is permanently pegged 1-to-1 with the renminbi and allows for easy access in the Chinese marketplace.

Most importantly, the Communities provide an identity and a sense of belonging to something greater. In a world where being a minority can be dangerous, this may be the most important benefit of all.

* * *

“I don’t remember that much, but I still have some memories of the Le Pen days,” Chloe said when we began our interview, referring to the five-year presidency of ultranationalist politician Marion Le Pen. To the rest of the world, Le Pen’s fulfillment of her aunt's revenge against the unpopular sitting president Emmanuel Macron was a disgrace to the French nation. But to the French, and especially minorities like Chloe, it was nothing short of Armageddon.

“When I was born, and when my sisters were born, my parents had to keep it all secret from non-Chinese people. My parents said it was part of Chinese culture to keep births secret from outsiders, but I quickly realized that it wasn’t the case. The real reason was to protect us from lynch mobs. There were lots of people that viewed every Chinese birth and every non-white birth as a genocide against white people and were willing to take things in their own hands.”

Chloe continued, despite being visibly upset by recounting her story. “There were demonstrations and riots. People were shouting racial slurs, saying ‘Go back to China’ on the streets and writing anti-Chinese graffiti everywhere. They were throwing stones, smashing skulls, all that stuff. They were emboldened by Le Pen. It was dangerous and we needed protection.”

I took a tiny bite out of my croissant, even though her story and her anguish were making me less and less hungry. “There were lots of French people who wanted to defend us, both white people and other minorities,” she added. “But it wasn’t enough. Blacks and Muslims did all they could to fight back, but in the end they had nobody to turn to but themselves.”

I nodded, fully aware of the pitiful social standings of both groups in France. As soon as Le Pen was elected, no time was wasted in targeting French minorities. Within a month, her party introduced the Lois Spéciales, or the Special Laws, which would discriminate based on nationality or neighborhood, or if one “defied the principles of French culture.” Only a thin veneer covered their blatant racism. Like the Jim Crow laws of the American South, these Special Laws continue to define the French minority experience even after they were mostly repealed or struck down; today; minorities suffer from a malady of ills due to systemic racism in France, from lower incomes and life expectancies to higher unemployment and school dropout rates.

The French Chinese fought back just like every French minority group during these trying times. They established their own police forces and leveraged the support of China, despite the suspicion many had towards their Communist government. It was, to them, a matter of making peace with the far enemy to fight the near one. And it was through this struggle that the Chinese Community of France was born.

[Unapologetic Chinaperson]

* * *

The Community of France followed in the footsteps of the Community of Malaysia, which started in a five-story apartment in Kuala Lumpur, halfway from the City of Light. Like the Community of France, the first-ever Chinese community was also a product of violent ethnic strife, particularly in the Great March Riot, the worst anti-Chinese riot in Malaysia in more than half a century.

Since the early 19th century, when large waves of Chinese immigration came to Malaysian shores, many migrants settled in urban areas and started businesses, which led them to accrue disproportionate amounts of wealth compared to ethnic Malays. Tensions came to a head in the 13 May Incident of 1969, where two to six hundred people, mostly Malaysian Chinese, were killed in ugly race riots in Kuala Lumpur. That incident led to the implementation of the New Economic Policy or NEP, which seeked to rectify the wealth divide between Chinese and Malays through affirmative action. But the NEP, by its very nature, sowed the seeds of the next round of violence.

The policies of the NEP, such as requiring university and public companies to set aside a certain percentage of university seats and stocks, respectively, for Malays, understandably infuriated the Malaysian Chinese, leading many to leave the country for greener pastures. At the same time, while many Malays themselves turned on the NEP and its successor policies, others who benefited from the affirmative action and resentful of Chinese prosperity dug in. Anti-Chinese sentiment flared up in 2015, when around 200 Malays went on a spree of vandalism and assault against Malaysian Chinese.

At the same time, right-wing populism was surging in most of the world, from the United States with Trump to France with Le Pen, in India, in Japan, and, of course, in China. Malaysia was no exception; the ruling political party was more than happy to welcome Malay chauvinism to distract from corruption and government incompetence.

The rise of this ethnic chauvinism populism struck fear into the hearts of millions, and they wanted a solution. Some thought that globalist cosmopolitanism, with people identifying not with a nation or ethnicity, but with all of humanity, was the only solution. Others, such as Jeremy Corbyn and the Realigner, looked to an identity based on class consciousness, uniting their diverse working-class constituencies as a proletariat fighting against the bourgeoisie.

But as Chinese nationalism surged in popularity, a different solution came into being, as Chinese pan-nationalism became popular the national consciousness. China was not merely one nation state among many; it was a civilizational state that transcended national borders. China was a global entity that would encompass every Chinese person in the world, no matter their physical or temporal distance from Mighty Beijing. Any ethnic Chinese person, no matter how long ago their ancestors left the shores of the Mainland, was a descendant of the Yellow Emperor and therefore part of China.

This sort of “civilizational internationalism,” “ethnic globalism,” or however one calls it was nothing new in China. In a 2016 article, the Economist described China’s view of the Chinese diaspora as part of a greater Chinese nation; a little more than a year later, the Chinese government created the first of a series of extended, “no-strings-attached” visas for foreigners of Chinese ancestry.

Nor is it unique to China. Perhaps the best comparison can be made with how many Muslims, identify with a global ummah, or Islamic community, regardless of Sha'b, or nationality. States that claimed to be caliphates, from the historical caliphates of Arabia to modern failed ones like the Islamic State, claimed to be the leader of all Muslims. The idea of such a global, distributive nation has shown up in fiction as well, with the best known example being the Phyles of Neal Stephenson’s The Diamond Age.

With rising Malay ethnonationalism and resurgent Chinese pan-nationalism, it was only a matter of time before these sentiments clashed. And they did with the murder of a shopkeeper.

* * *

On March 1, 2023, Aziz Abdullah, a Malay fruit seller, was severely beaten by Wang Lai, a Chinese chef over a dispute over the price of apples. Though Abdullah was rushed to a hospital, he lost consciousness and died from his wounds. Wang was arrested and sentenced for manslaughter, while Abdullah became a martyr for Malay extremists who were thirsty with vengeance.

Over the next four weeks, rioters across the nation went around vandalizing any Chinese business and assaulting any ethnic Chinese person they could find; they also intimidated any Malay who had a conscience and spoke up against the violence. In one infamous incident, a group of Malay teenagers kidnapped an elderly Chinese man, tied him to a tree, and burned him while watching Top Gear on their smartphones. Despite the heinous nature of these crimes, the Malaysian police allegedly turned a blind eye, with some policemen even coöperating with the agitators and participating in the violence themselves. According to the Malaysian government, the death toll was 73, but the Chinese Community of Malaysia places it at around three hundred, making it comparable if not worse to the 13 May Incident.

Despite the Malaysian government’s best efforts to hide the violence from outsiders, graphic imagery was displayed on TV channels and shared on social media everywhere. While condemnation of the violence was swift and universal, the anger reached new and soaring heights in China. Chinese citizens, aghast at the violence against their ethnic compatriots, vocally demanded that their government do something to stop the bleeding.

If China were a regular nation state, or if the Great March Riot happened a decade ago when China was weaker and a universalistic Chinese identity merely an idea of an idea, nothing much would have happened. The Chinese government would say a few words condemning the violence as “unfortunate” and whatnot and stop there. But instead, the Chinese government took a much stronger stance, recalling its ambassador and demanding that Malaysia stop the riots, lest it would face economic sanctions, cancellation of Malaysian visas, or worse. Under those demands, the Malaysian government ordered a crackdown on rioters, ending a month of misery and suffering.

At the same time, a group of twenty-two Malaysian Chinese leaders met in a Kuala Lumpur apartment to unite the Malaysian Chinese under a single banner. In some ways, they already had elements of the Community working on the ground. They had their own Chinese-language schools, where most Malaysian Chinese children attend for elementary school (though far fewer in secondary school). They had the “Bamboo Network,” the network of Chinese-owned businesses that spanned all of Southeast Asia, they had temples where they practiced Buddhism and Taoism, and they had their own political parties.

Besides unifying these elements into a single Community, there were two main tasks at hand. One was to establish a self-defense force to defend the Community. After all, they were not going to rely on the Malaysian police, who were often corrupt and notorious for their brutality (when they weren’t being willfully ignorant of anti-Chinese violence). The other was to establish ties with China the nation state, so that they could create China the global civilizational state. To do that, a contingent of ten people from those twenty-two leaders travelled to Beijing, where they worked assiduously to establish ties between their Community and the Mainland.

From that first meeting and its initial success of the Malaysian Chinese, Indonesian Chinese leaders, whose group had also faced extensive historical discrimination (especially by the former president Suharto), saw what they did and established their own Community. Furthermore, they saw strength in unity and reached out to the Malaysians, as well as also establishing ties with the PRC.

After that, Chinese Communities started popping up everywhere, radiating out of Southeast Asia. Thailand, where partial Chinese ancestry is common, and Singapore, where three-quarters of the population was Chinese, were the next countries to have Chinese Communities. In other countries, Communities were established to protect ethnic Chinese from racial discrimination, like in France, or to further business and cultural ties with the Chinese mainland and the Commonwealth. Each took a different flair, but in the end they were all one people with the single goal of preserving and promoting Chinese civilization. With that goal in mind, each new Community found the support of other Communities, and so the Chinese Commonwealth began.

[Unapologetic Chinaperson]

* * *

At the time of this writing, introducing a Chinese Community of America remains a hot political issue, one that many Americans, including Chinese Americans like our president, remain staunchly opposed to. But it was surprising to Chloe that the United States didn’t have one, even though the country has one of the largest Chinese diaspora populations in the world.

“You don’t have one?” Chloe said, and I would nod, and she would nod, and it would go on for about a minute before we settled in an equilibrium of mutual culture shock. “How could you not have one?” Chloe would then ask “The Community here protects us and unites the many different groups of Chinese we have,” referring to the tossed salad of Wenzhou Chinese, Chinese of the former French Indochina, and immigrants from the Chinese Northeast that made up the diaspora in the country.

To explain why I, President Sun, and other Chinese-Americans had no Community to call their own, I pointed out that it was not for a lack of trying. Several Chinese-American groups, mostly located in California, tried to set up an American Community during the past decade or so, and their efforts had all ended in ignominious failure. Even the Association of Chinese Heritage, the most successful group to date, only reached about five thousand members in its height and was regarded as a joke by most Chinese Americans. It did not help that Presidents Castro and Sun, the latter of whom is Chinese-American herself, spoke out against such attempts, as did most members of Congress. Similar groups came and went in Canada, Australia, the UK, and New Zealand, despite all four countries having sizable overseas Chinese populations.

One could say that the United States was powerful enough to resist Chinese pressure to cave into their demands. One could also say that the Chinese-American community was simply too big and diverse to unify under a single banner, though that fails to explain how Southeast Asian nations are able to host Communities with memberships of millions. Some say that the political resistance is all due to Monsanto lobbying, after a dispute with a Chinese-Argentine farmer led to a confrontation between the biotechnology giant, the Commonwealth, and the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture.

I gave my preferred explanation to Chloe. “We are a nation of diversity,” I said. “We are a nation of immigrants. Even when Chinese-Americans or Irish-Americans or Cuban-Americans or any other immigrant group wants to respect their heritage and culture, eventually they assimilate into the multicultural American identity.” Same thing for the other Anglo settler colonies; without a single ethnicity to define their national identity, they were able to better integrate their immigrants and lessen the need for a protective Community. And it is why most Chinese-Americans, Chinese-Canadians, and so on identify not as Chinese first, but as American or Canadian.

Chloe was immediately skeptical. “You say you’re American?”

“Yes,” I responded.

“But you’re Chinese.”

“I am Chinese. I consider myself Chinese-American, even though I was adopted and raised by a white household, so I don’t really know about anything Chinese.”

“But people see you as Chinese.”

That was when I looked back. I looked back at my childhood, growing up in a small town in Eastern Tennessee and raised by an adopted family. My mom and dad, both white, loved me very much, but even they could not fully understand the struggles of growing up with a Chinese face in an all-white town. How some of my classmates said “ching chong” to my face. How some people in that town thought I should go back to China or how I belonged in an internment camp, just like the late President Trump in the infamous Nerdgate video.

I knew what she was talking about. I may consider myself American, but to others, I was forever Chinese. And I, as well as my fellow Chinese-Americans, should embrace that.

I explained to Chloe how a Chinese Community in America would only make things worse. Americans have long believed that immigrants would work for a foreign agent to undermine the country. The most famous reaction to this was the anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant Know-Nothing party, made up of Americans who feared that Catholic immigrants would work for the Pope. Likewise with Trump’s Nerdgate video. A Chinese Community would confirm the worst of these suspicions.

“So?” Chloe said. “You think they would create more hate against Chinese Americans? But you’re already hated. You, President Sun, you Chinese Americans will always be viewed as guests who the host can kick out at any time. That could’ve happened under Trump; imagine what would’ve happened if America elected someone smarter like Le Pen. Without a Chinese Community, you all would remain sitting ducks.”

I swallowed the last bit of my croissant and drank the last remaining drops in my cup of tea. We continued on, switching the subject to something less uncomfortable. We talked about how the Community in France worked, with how it balances the interests of the different subgroups of Chinese in France.

“You see, immigrants from the Mainland generally like the People’s Republic,” Chloe said, describing the relationship between the Community and the Mainland. “But the Indochinese Chinese hate it because they hate communism, especially the older generations. It’s the main issue that defines our politics. Either we integrate ourselves with the PRC, or we distance ourselves. Either we seek dual citizenship or official state patronage of our businesses or whatever, or we chart our own course.” Sometimes, she added, the issue results in leaders from both sides physically fighting on the headquarters floor.

Soon, it got dark and I stated my intention to wrap up this meeting. But before I could leave, Chloe told me she wanted to show me something. She rolled up the right sleeve of her blouse and pointed to her wrist. On her wrist was a jade bracelet, colored light translucent green mixed in with milky white. On its glossy surface, I could see our faces as distorted reflections, shimmering under the blue-white LED lighting of the cafe.

“Jade is very important in Chinese culture,” Chloe said, “as you know. To us, as French Chinese, these bracelets mark our membership in the Chinese Community. We use them as our identity cards.” On one level, she meant literally; these bracelets hold their identification information and wearers use them to access Community buildings and services, as well as to pay with E-Yuan. But there was another level to what she said. To wear this bracelet meant that you were part of the Community and the Commonwealth, a Chinese person, a member of a civilization that knows no bounds of time and space.

I noticed something rather odd that unlike a regular bracelet, it was connected to her skin, and it looked as if the bracelet was pinching a bit of it under itself. I asked her about it.

“The bracelet is part of us. At the age of 18, when we wish to join the Community, we have it surgically implanted. It’s just like with any implant or augmentation,” she said, reassuring me.

“If you wish  to leave the French Community,” she said, “we do not remove the bracelet surgically. Instead you get injected with nanoparticles that dissolve the jade into the bloodstream, so that even if you don’t have the bracelet visible, the jade will always course through your veins. The Community will always be a part of your being. China will always be a part of your being. No matter where you are, who you became or what you believe in, you will always be Chinese.

[Cold War Liberal]

It's hard to express how good this TL is. It's unconventional in its focus (China), it's absurdly detailed, and you're very good at getting us to feel for the characters. Great job!

How some people in that town thought I should go back to China or how I belonged in an internment camp, just like the late President Trump in the infamous Nerdgate video.

EXPLAIN PLEASE