Legislation: Federal Courts Act, 1789 (Passed)

[Donerail]

Mr. Speaker,

I rise in opposition to the legislation. The "High Constitutional Court," as proposed, would empower a small group of unelected judges to overrule the decisions of our democratically-elected National Assembly, a broad power that may quickly lead to tyranny. In England — no model of liberty! — the decisions of their highest court are reviewable by the House of Lords. Any supreme judicial body in our country ought to be similarly liable to some other body of men, ideally some body that depends upon the people for its place. I believe the Senate would be a natural body for such a role; alternatively, the justices of the court may simply be elected in a fashion similar to our President.

[Donerail]

Mr. Speaker,

The desire of the opposition to insulate judges from all forms of politics seems to me a fool’s errand. Are they not today seeking to establish the judiciary through a political process? Would not their judges, in the legislation they propose, be appointed on the advice of the First Secretary, with the consent of the Senate? Do they not charge their High Constitutional Court with the task of reviewing the actions of governments?

They claim their Court to be independent of politics, but its origins are political, and its duties are certainly so. The question before our body today is not whether we are to have an apolitical court — such a contradiction is incapable of existing. The question, rather, is of the powers of the judiciary, and the power of the people to hold the judiciary accountable.

The esteemed gentleman from New York proposes that the majority of the American people may sanction a course of action contrary to our grand experiment. Such an idea merely betrays that the gentleman misunderstands the nature of this experiment. Given his past suggestion that a monarchical despot ought to rule this union, this misunderstanding is not particularly surprising, but it is disappointing all the same.

The unique character of our project is derived from recognizing that all powers of government are derived from the people, and that a just government ought to be exercised solely for the benefit of the people. This differs from the monarchies of Europe, where governments are exercised for the benefit of a King, with little regard paid to the liberty of the public.

The creation of an unelected high court capable of striking down the laws justly enacted by the representatives of the people is entirely antithetical to the nature of this American republic. Given that the objections of the member for Suffolk & Queens pertain entirely to the idea of a directly elected judiciary, I present the following amendment, which would ensure the court remains accountable in some fashion to those elected by the public:

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I yield back the balance of my time.

[Donerail]

Mr. Speaker,

As much as any other member, I do not wish to see the Court turned into a proxy for legislative squabbles. I believe the 2/3 majority — which in our present Assembly would require the combination of the four largest factions, or an even broader coalition of smaller factions — is sufficient to ensure that a faction would only dedicate their platform in the legislature to overturning a decision when it is clear the Court has erred. This is not an attempt to establish the judiciary as yet another political battlefield; rather, it is merely a recognition that judges, like deputies, err from time to time. In the interest of preserving a functional system of laws, it is far better that such errors be corrected quickly by the National Assembly, rather than waiting years or decades for the Court to revisit its past thinking.

I yield.