ROC President and Legislative elections Jan 11 2020

[jaichind]

One last theory has to do with the social conservationism of the pro-independence bloc.  There are two types of Taiwan Independence.  Left Independence and Right Independence.  Left Independence is a lot larger and mostly are for Independence due to different social economic and political systems between ROC and PRC.  They tend not to reject their ethnic identity as Chinese but view Taiwan as a separate Chinese state (like Egypt is a separate Arab state) and does not rule out unification if the PRC and ROC social systems somehow converge.  Right independence are socially conservative and tend to reject the Chinese identity at the ethnic and for some even at the biological/genetic level.   Right Independence size are small but a lot more organized and contains a bunch of wealthly individuals.  It is Right Independence that make up most of the money and organisation of the pro-independence bloc.  This group at some level is resentful of Tsai as a women (and unmarried at that) leader and earlier in 2016-2017 also held pro-gay marriage positions which she mostly quietly retracted.  Of course the Right Independence bloc knows that DPP is the only game in town to make progress on Taiwan Independence and part of the DPP coalition does include urban progressives so Right Independence tends to keep quite about their socially conservative views.  But what they can do is to overthrow DPP leaders that does not jive with their socially conservative views  using the excuse that they are not "pure" enough on Taiwan Independence.

Interesting. I was under the impression that many Left independence activists are anti-Chinese identity as well.

Depends on the word Chinese.  Chinese can be mapped to two different words: 中國 which is political or 中華 which is cultural and ethnic.   Left Independence, especially those in leadership, have no problem with  中華 but object to 中國 as 中國 has a connotation of a authoritarian centralizing political superstate that has political control of all ethnic Chinese.  Many Left Independence leaders, at least of the older generation, started their political careers as Left unification before shifting over. Right Independence really denies their ties to 中華  either by talking up the their ethnic ties to Taiwanese aborigines or talking up Japanese cultural influence.

My own views on this are unique in so far I was Right Independence in junior high school not because of concerns of  Chinese identity but more because of virulent hatred of Communism and Leftism drove me to have as anti-PRC position as possible.  Then in high school I discovered the wonders of Chinese nationalism and realized I can be  still have virulent hatred of Leftism and still have a strong Chinese identity.  I also realized what made me hated the PRC was their rejection of a traditionalist Chinese nationalism (understand this was the CCP of the 1970s and early 1980s.)  In fact I used my  Chinese nationalism  to further build my  virulent hatred of Leftism.  This type of transformation is quite unique.    There usually are very little shift between Right Independence and Right Unification but plenty of shift between Left Independence and Left Unification.  

[jaichind]

Storm Media Group poll done by TISR (which has a slight pro-Green lean)

KMT candidate preference
Han   31.6
Guo   29.5
Chu   13.0

3-way matchup
KMT Han 35.7
DPP Tsai  26.7
Ko           21.2

KMT Guo 30.9
DPP Tsai  23.3
Ko          18.1

DPP Tsai  25.0
KMT Chu 24.5
Ko          23.1

So this poll also have Han with the lead.  The main problem for the KMT is that if Ko is really running third place he could end up not running.  1-on-1 versus Tsai, Guo is stronger than Han. But the poll numbers will have the KMT nominate Han.

[jaichind]

Xfutures for KMT nomination

Guo continues free fall

Han   67
Guo   29
Chu    4

[jaichind]

Green Party poll

Party support

KMT     34.8
DPP     31.7
NPP     13.5
PFP       2.9
GP        1.5
TSU      0.9


2-way
DPP Tsai   51.9
KMT Han   37.6

DPP Tsai   42.5
KMT Guo  41.3

3-way
DPP Tsai   34.4
KMT Han  29.6
Ko            27.2

DPP Tsai   32.4
KMT Guo  27.3
Ko           25.0

This is clearly a very Green biased sample (the Blue Green balance is 37.7 to 46.4 when all signs are it should be around the other way around) still it shows that Guo is better than Han at attracting Centrist and Pan-Green voters than Han.

[jaichind]

CNEWS poll done my 趨勢 (Trend Polling) (has a pro-Green and urban/youth lean)

Han ahead of Guo.  Guo has to hope for last minute Chu collapse as most Chu supporter second preference are much more likely to lean Guo.  Guo also has to hope for Chu supporters voting for Guo in the trial heat versus Tsai and Ko while not backing Han in the trial heat versus Tsai and Ko.  Fairly unlikely.

This poll party ID seems a bit too Blue sample but overall not off the mark.  And that most likely can be explained by pan-Green voters claiming to be pan-Blue to make sure their preference is being counted even though the KMT primary is "open" and not "closed" where they will not filter out pan-Green preferences.

KMT candidate preference

Han  35.2(+4.8 )
Guo  28.4(+0.5)
Chu  17.3(-0.1)



3-way

KMT Han 38.4(+5.0)
DPP Tsai 25.5(-6.4)
Ko          25.0(+4.6)



KMT Guo 28.8(+3.2)
DPP Tsai 24.1(-7.1)
Ko          19.9(+0.1)



KMT Chu  25.6(+2.0)
DPP Tsai  25.5(-7.7)
Ko           23.4(+1.7)



Party ID

KMT   41.3(+5.
DPP   19.9(-6.1)
NPP    12.2(-1.7)



Would you support Guo to run as an independent if he loses the KMT primary

Yes  36.7
No   52.7



If Guo ran as an independent without Ko in the race

KMT Han  36.4
DPP Tsai   27.5
Guo         26.4
 

4 way race with Han Tsai Ko Guo

KMT Han 35.5
DPP Tsai  22.2
Guo        18.3
Ko           16.3

[jaichind]

Guo is trying to become the youth and middle class candidate.  In the final debate he proposed that a non-means tested government program be created to pretty much pay for all childcare for ages 0-6.  He was attacked by Chu as being Socialist (note Guo is a billionaire) and that such a program be means tested or else it will break the government.  Han is trying to target the elderly by proposing the expansion of the social security program. 

Frankly while I oppose all these programs the level of taxation and scale of the welfare state outside of healthcare is fairly meager so even if these programs are enacted (which even if the KMT wins only a watered down version will) most the impact on the overall economy will be limited, for now. Of course if DPP doubles down on their welfare expansion then these ideas will be dire for ROC's economic future.

[jaichind]

All internet voting on KMT primary has massive leads for Guo over Han highlighting Guo's youth advantage over Han.

The dynamics of this race and the general elections are now clear.  If Ko is not going to run then the KMT should run Guo who can pick up a lot of the anti-DPP  youth support that are now backing Ko.  If Ko is going to run then Guo is unlikely to capture much of that support from Ko and then the KMT should run Han who is better to turn out the KMT base. 

On the flip side, if Guo is nominated by the KMT then Ko is less likely to run as Guo will cut into his youth vote making Ko a spoiler at best.  If Han is nominated by the KMT then Ko is more likely to run since he can keep his youth base and if Tsai stumbles he is in good position to capture the anti-Han DPP tactical vote.

Of course Ko has last mover advantage as the KMT primary is in a week or so while Ko has until Aug-Sept to decide if he will run.  To some extent KMT voters have accepted that Ko will likely run ergo Han has the edge given that fact.  Han being nominated would of course make Ko run much more likely.

So a game theory analysis of the situation says we are headed toward a DPP Tsai vs KMT Han vs Ko general election in 2020.

[jaichind]

So the  趨勢 (Trend Polling) poll show the skewed nature of ROC "primaries".  The same  pollster 趨勢 (Trend Polling)  that had Tsai ahead of Han by 10% back in early June now has Han ahead of Tsai by 10%.  This is not rigging but more because of the Observation effect where the people being polled are aware what it might be for and shift their  preferences to back the relevant candidates which are dramatically different in the DPP and KMT primaries polls.

[jaichind]

The polling process for the KMT will last 7 days versus 3 days for the DPP primary. The reason why is the KMT is a stickler for the rules when it comes to polling.  When pollsters make a call their system randomizes on who they should speak to (oldest male adult, youngest female adult etc etc).  The DPP primary dispenses with those rules and if someone picks up, collect the response and then weight the results appropriately.  The KMT insist on getting the right randomized person of said household so even if someone picks up the person the system indicates they should speak to is not in the call is ended. So to get the right sample size the KMT primary polling process just takes a lot longer.

[jaichind]

KMT primary polling started

pro-Green pollster 山水(Focused Survey research) that was part of the DPP primary but not KMT primary did a poll on KMT primary and has a Han victory

KMT candidates preference
Han 32.6
Guo 31.4
Chu  17.3

3-way matchup
KMT Han  37.0
DPP Tsai  26.1
Ko           25.0

KMT Guo  31.4
DPP Tsai   24.9
Ko            20.9

Xfutures trading has stopped since the KMT primary poll started.  The closing prices are

Han 73
Guo 23
Chu   4

which I think underestimates Guo.

[ملكة كرينجيتوك]

One last theory has to do with the social conservationism of the pro-independence bloc.  There are two types of Taiwan Independence.  Left Independence and Right Independence.  Left Independence is a lot larger and mostly are for Independence due to different social economic and political systems between ROC and PRC.  They tend not to reject their ethnic identity as Chinese but view Taiwan as a separate Chinese state (like Egypt is a separate Arab state) and does not rule out unification if the PRC and ROC social systems somehow converge.  Right independence are socially conservative and tend to reject the Chinese identity at the ethnic and for some even at the biological/genetic level.   Right Independence size are small but a lot more organized and contains a bunch of wealthly individuals.  It is Right Independence that make up most of the money and organisation of the pro-independence bloc.  This group at some level is resentful of Tsai as a women (and unmarried at that) leader and earlier in 2016-2017 also held pro-gay marriage positions which she mostly quietly retracted.  Of course the Right Independence bloc knows that DPP is the only game in town to make progress on Taiwan Independence and part of the DPP coalition does include urban progressives so Right Independence tends to keep quite about their socially conservative views.  But what they can do is to overthrow DPP leaders that does not jive with their socially conservative views  using the excuse that they are not "pure" enough on Taiwan Independence.

Interesting. I was under the impression that many Left independence activists are anti-Chinese identity as well.

Depends on the word Chinese.  Chinese can be mapped to two different words: 中國 which is political or 中華 which is cultural and ethnic.   Left Independence, especially those in leadership, have no problem with  中華 but object to 中國 as 中國 has a connotation of a authoritarian centralizing political superstate that has political control of all ethnic Chinese.  Many Left Independence leaders, at least of the older generation, started their political careers as Left unification before shifting over. Right Independence really denies their ties to 中華  either by talking up the their ethnic ties to Taiwanese aborigines or talking up Japanese cultural influence.

Sounds like the R Independence bloc is the more radical and more “idpol” (ethno-nationalist/xenophobic) branch, while both are conflicting ideas/groups within the DPP/Pan-Green bloc.

Is Lee Teng-hui associated more with the R Independence bloc? I’ve heard he’s one of the more pro-Japan Taiwanese politicians.

[jaichind]

Sounds like the R Independence bloc is the more radical and more “idpol” (ethno-nationalist/xenophobic) branch, while both are conflicting ideas/groups within the DPP/Pan-Green bloc.

Is Lee Teng-hui associated more with the R Independence bloc? I’ve heard he’s one of the more pro-Japan Taiwanese politicians.

Re-posting stuff I wrote on this topic years ago

Net net Lee Teng-hui had all 4 positions depending on what era it was.

For me it is obviously a big no since this is one more my core issues that I am for Chinese reunification and oppose to Taiwan Independence.

Of course this would be a good time to discuss various variations of Unification and Independence and how they evolved over the years.  There are four basic clusters of view on this.  I have family members and family friends back on Taiwan Province of ROC that is represented in all four groups.  They are Right Unification, Left Unification, Right Independence and Left Independence.   Of course the nature of each position has evolved over the last few decades

Right Unification:  This is my position.  The core of this position is anti-Communism/Socialism and the preservation of Chinese traditionalism/nationalism based on the Republican Period of 1911-1949 and/or free market capitalism.  The people of this position was actually against reunification before the 1980s and some, like myself, considered supporting Taiwan Independence or at least Two China as a way to preserve the social system of Taiwan Province under the KMT of the 1950s-1980s as the PRC was seen as devil incarnate and incapable of changing.  This was especially true of those on this view that did not see any hope of defeating the PRC in a military sense.  People of this view before the 1980s actually saw those which supported Left Unification as CCP fifth columnists and both Right Independence and Left Independence as implicit and not explicit agents of the CCP as a part of a greater CCP plot to undermine the KMT regime on Taiwan Province.  This group made no qualms about using alleged ties to the CCP as a way to undermine all three other rival positions.   As the 1980s and 1990s came around, and this group saw that the CCP led PRC actually changing into a 1950s KMT clone and at the same time promoting Chinese traditionalism of the Republican era if not before that and seeing their political rivals which supported Right Independence and Left Independence gaining support on Taiwan Province, the most rabid anti-Communists did a 180 degree turn and became rapid collaborators of the CCP and strong supporters of unification.  Some of them support reunification based on the PRC terms (usually those capitalist class) while some like me who are more focused Chinese nationalism insist on PRC making structural changes (new name for a reunited China like Federal Republic of China as well as giving up formally Communism as the ruling ideology) as a condition for unification.  Starting from the 1990s Right Unification views began to merge with Left Unification views into one united front.

Left Unification: This position is for socialist idealists that to different degrees identified with the cause of the Chinese Revolution beyond the Republican stage and into the Socialist and to some extent Communist stage.  Many are actually Chinese nationalists as well but saw Chinese nationalism in term of social reform as the way to save the Chinese.  They were opposed to the KMT regime and often were jailed for their views.  Their push for social reform and sympathy for the CCP was seen as a threat.  While many did see through the hypocrisy of the egalitarianism of the PRC many still support unification to work on the common vision of the Socialist reform which the PRC/CCP did represent.  Some supported unification on PRC terms while others were for unification with a reformed PRC to the true vision of social democracy.  Left Unification was often in league with Left Independence in the 1950s to 1980s period.  Both were opposed to the KMT social and economic system and those supporting Left Independence were actually flexible on their position of Independence during this period which made collaboration between Left Unification and Left Independence possible. As the PRC/CCP changed in the 1980s to a right wing authoritarian capitalist regime, some in Left Unification drifted toward Left Independence while others who supported socialism as a tool for Chinese national revival  took pride in the economic successes of the new PRC post economic reform and felt that this current PRC is the true final state of the goals of the Socialist revolution in terms of national revival.  This bloc continued their support for unification despite their left wing roots and the clear right wing nature of the PRC regime

Right Independence:  This group is alone in rejecting the Chinese identity in perusing Taiwan Independence.  There is several variation of this.  One which uses to be large bloc of Right Independence but now tiny is a bloc that rejects the social reforms of Republican China and harks to the social norms of pre-Republican China.  For them what the KMT represents which is variation of Republican China modernism is an anathema let alone the CCP.   For this group the Chinese identity is dead which is destroyed by the barbarians of the KMT and CCP.  A new Taiwanese identify must be formed that actually keeps the pre-Republican Chinese Han traditions and a new Taiwan state formed.  This view was dominated with rural elites on Taiwan Province in the 1950s that resisted the KMT while other rural elites collaborated with the KMT.  This view is quite tiny today.   Another variation would be the pro-Japanese variant.  For this group the Chinese identity was a disaster and a new identify be found with Japan as a model.  Where possible this variant ties to tie Taiwan to Japan and Taiwan Independence might actually lead to union with Japan.  This view has strong support among certain elites on Taiwan Province but not particularly popular.  There is pro-American variation with swaps out Japan with USA.  This is more popular at an implicit level and is mostly about recreating a new Taiwan identity using Western civic democratic virtue as the basis of this new ethnic formation.  The last variant pretty much denies that from a racial point of view that Taiwanese are Chinese at all.  This group which is tiny wants to change the written language away from Chinese to some phonic version of the MinNan dialect.  This is mostly non-workable and not practical and flies in the face of scientific evidence.   Right Independence is not that popular as to out right away people on Taiwan are not Chinese from an ethnic point view is not viewed as realistic but does enjoy support at some elite levels.   Because the elite nature of Right Independence, this group actually mostly avoided persecution of the KMT regime during the 1950s to 1980s period as the KMT tried to co-op this group to serve its own political needs.  

Left Independence:  This group does believe in the Chinese identity but felt that other values such as Social Democracy should override these values.  Because both values exist at the same time for this group, dependence how they view the PRC regime, they could be open to unification or a Two China solution versus outright independence.  Left Independence is merely those who were for Left Unification but were disillusioned by the PRC.  There are some which are turned off by the hypocrisy of the PRC during the 1950s to 1980s in terms of betraying the democratic part of the ideals of the Chinese revolution.  Others are more alarmed by the swing of the PRC toward a cut-throat capitalist system as well as its regression on various parameters of social justice (like gender roles and gender equity.)   This bloc of views is the largest of all of the four views, especially for the youth, and is quite changeable depending on the evolution of the PRC.  As those on Taiwan Province age and deal with the real world of economics some do drift from this position to timid Right Unification (at least will be consider unification) as such a position will benefit them from an economic point of view.

Sorry to hijack this thread.  I guess I will also give some representative figures from each of the 4 groups (Left Unification, Right Unification, Left Independence, and Right Independence), that way people can pick which one of these groups makes sense to them but looking at it from the Taiwan Province point of view.

Left Unification

Li Ao 李敖

Born on mainland China but moved to Taiwan Province in 1949 during the Chinese civil war.  As a historian and political commentator he was an early advocate of Social Democracy as a way to revive China and perennial opponent of the KMT style of politics.  He also support the ideals of the CCP revolution and strongely supported Unification.  We as arrested in the 1960s by the KMT regime for the crime of ... "Supporting Taiwan Independence" which is quite ironic.  What took place was that he supported his fellow Left Independence opponents of the KMT on the ground of common front against the KMT and for free speech ideals.  Li today is currently a strong supporter of the PRC and the PRC economic accomplishments and is for unification on PRC terms.  He seems to whitewash the fact that these accomplishments are achieved by betraying those social democratic ideals that led him to back the CCP in the first place.    

陳映真 Chen Yin-Tsen

Famous play-write and author and strong supporter of the social democratic ideas of the CCP revolution.  Also a strong supporter of Taiwan regional cultural identity but only in the context of Greater Chinese nationalism.  Long time opponent of the KMT and supporter of Chinese Unification.  See by Right Unification bloc as a CCP agent and was arrested in the late 1970s along with other Left Independence activists by the KMT regime.  Strong supporter of Chinese reunification on PRC terms.

李登輝 Lee Teng-hui (1946-1950)

Former ROC President and KMT Chairman.  Lee was influenced by Marxism and Socialist ideals when he studied in Japan before 1945.  After Taiwan Province was returned to ROC, Lee joined the underground CCP and worked for the complete victory of the CCP over all of China including Taiwan Province.

Right Unification

郝柏村 Hau Pei-tsun
 
Former head of ROC armed forces and ROC Premier.  Hau joined the ROC armed forces, fought against the CCP on Mainland China and retreated to Taiwan Province in 1949.  He was a strong opponent of CCP and the ideals of Communism/Socialism based on his support for Chinese traditional social norms and Chinese nationalism.  He was seen by the CCP during the 1950s-1980s as representative of the Fascist Right and their main ideological opponent.  As the PRC changed the relationship between the CCP and Hau changed toward a more guarded tactical alliance as the idealogical differences faded throughout the 1990s.  Hau broke with President and KMT Chairman Lee Teng-hui over his suspicions that Lee was a crypto-Taiwan Independence backer.  Today he is for Unification only on what he feels is ROC terms and not PRC terms and while he praise the CCP for their new found support of Chinese nationalism he still attacks the CCP when he feel they distort Chinese history to serve their interests such as the nature of the KMT and CCP role in the war against Japan 1931-1945.

王永慶 (Wang Yung-ching)
 
A rages to riches legend that became a tycoon based on the petrochemical industry.  He and his family are representative of big capital.  Wang has a moderate sense of Chinese nationalism and was not very political during the 1950s to 1980s period other than to support the KMT regime in their capitalist development efforts.  For Wang during this period, keeping the CCP at bay is critical to protect his business empire.  As the PRC changed to be more capitalist friendly in the 1980s and 1990s, he expanded his business empire to PRC and as a result became much closer to CCP.  He advocated breaking down economic barriers between ROC and PRC and rediscovered his Chinese nationalist roots.  He advocated for eventual unification based on common economic interests based on political compromise between the two sides.  All this of course could only benefit his business interests and other interests of big capital on Taiwan Province.  

李登輝 Lee Teng-hui (1950-1993)

Former ROC President and KMT Chairman. Lee was arrested by the KMT for being a CCP agent.  Lee then turned in his CCP comrads and threw in his lot with the KMT.  During this time Lee became a devout Christian and advocated for a Western Rightist fusion with Chinese nationalism as a way to combat the PRC threat.  He also advocated for Taiwan regional identifies within the context of Chinese nationalism which he saw as a way to keep the CCP at bay.  He rose in the ranks of the KMT and was eventually made Vice Preisdent of ROC and then President.  He beat out other KMT rivals by actually being more of a hardliner in his opposition to Taiwan Independence claiming they are traitors of the Chinese.  He advocated Unification based on Western Modernist and Chinese nationalist ideals and demanded the PRC make adjustments to make such Unification talks possible.  To this end as ROC President he created the "Chinese Unification Council" with the goal that this body pushed his line on a negotiated unification deal with PRC.

Left Independence

施明德 (Shih Ming-teh)

Long-time socialist activist and Taiwan Independence supporter.  Core values based on social democracy and opposition to authoritarianism.  Supported Independence as Shih saw both the KMT and CCP as two sides of the same coin of authoritarianism.  Tried to trigger a armed revolt for Taiwan Independence in the 1960s and was put in jail.  Was released and rearrests for anti-KMT activities.  As the DPP came to power in ROC Shih broke with DPP and started to ally himself with Left Unification elements now that KMT was defeated.  While Shih still holds to Left Independence views he now is willing to consider alternative compromise arrangements such is a loose confederation with PRC.  Main concern for Shih is that any arrangement with PRC does not destroy the social democratic accomplishments of the ROC.

陳為廷 (Chen Wai-Ting)

Student activist of the just concluded Sunflower Student movement.  The current ROC KMT regime negotiated a free trade agreement with the PRC and Chen worked to block its passage mostly on concerns that greater economic integration with the PRC will bring the cut-throat capitalism and social regression of the PRC to Taiwan Province leading to Unification.  Chen is not necessary against Unification per say but is for Independence to protect the social democratic gains of the last few decades.  

李登輝 Lee Teng-hui (1993-2001)

Former ROC President and KMT Chairman.  As the PRC shifted to the right on economic policy Lee focused on the social democracy as a core value and shifted to a more anti-Unification and timid Independence stance.  He is still for Chinese nationalist identity but felt that Social Democracy on Taiwan Province had to be protected from the growing economic might of the PRC.  Lee felt also that economic integration with the PRC was dangerous as it threatened democracy.  Lee wanted to build an new Chinese social democratic model on ROC and at this stage was more of a Two China advocate than the Taiwan Independence advocate.    He wanted this Chinese social democratic state to be a model for all Chinese in the world and painted the authoritarian capitalist cut-throat PRC as the enemy of greater Chinese progress.

Right Independence

辜寬敏 (Gu Quan-Min)
 
Scion of a large business empire on Taiwan Province. Gu is the son of prominent pro-Japanese politician/businessman during the Japanese occupation era and brother of a prominent KMT Right Unification politician.  But Gu went his own way from his brother and advocated that the Taiwanese should identify with Japan and form a new Taiwanese state with pro-Japan identities and throw off the Chinese identity completely.  Gu actually has fairly conservative views on social relations and especially in the issue of gender equity and role of homosexuals in society.  He is for a socially conservative free market Taiwanese state based on affinity to Japan.  He has held this view consistently since the 1950s although due to pressure to keep his business interests there was a period in the 1960s to 1980s Gu was politically inactive as part of a deal with KMT.

蔣為文 (Jiang Wei-Wen)

Jiang is an advocate that from a racial point of view the Taiwanese are not ethically Chinese and instead is made up of Taiwanese Aborigines plus some Han Chinese, Dutch, Japanese, and Spanish blood.  Jiang wants to remake Taiwan in the image of a non-Chinese state and rejects the Chinese language as a tool of Chinese cultural oppression.  Jiang advocates the use of a phonic version of the MinNan dialect [example 「Tâi-oân chok-ka ài iōng Tâi-oân-gí chhòng-chok」] to replace the Chinese language.  This is not that far fetched as Vietnam pretty much went through the same process where most of Vietnamese used to be written in a Siniform (Chinese-like) script but switched to a phonetic form as a way to break from Chinese cultural domination.  Whether such a plan by Jiang is economically viable is another story.  One way or another this approach of Taiwan Independence by the way of a complete cultural and racial break from the Chinese is another variation of Taiwan Independence.  This view often collides with the Left Independence supporters many of whom still holds some moderate Chinese identify views at least on the cultural level.

You guessed it
李登輝 Lee Teng-hui (1927-1945) and (2001-?)

Former ROC President and KMT Chairman.  Before the return of Taiwan Province to ROC Lee lived under Japanese occupied Taiwan Province.  Lee strongly identified with Japan and saw himself as Japanese and adopted a Japanese surname.  In the context of today such views would count as Right Independence with a Japanese tilt.  
Fast forward to 2000, after Lee stepped down as President of ROC and KMT chairman he had a falling out with KMT and created TSU.  TSU back in the early 2000s was mostly a Far Right Taiwan Independence party that sought to create a new Taiwan identity based on the 400 years of historical experience on Taiwan itself.  Lee started to deny that he is Chinese and insisted that the 400 years of Taiwanese living on Taiwan Province plus the cultural influences of Western Modernism created a new nation and new people which formed the basis of an Independent Taiwan state.  Many in TSU holds very conservative social views which often puts them at odds with Left Independence supporters who hold more "progressive" views on social issues.

[jaichind]

Yet another CNEWS KMT primary poll done my 趨勢 (Trend Polling) (has a pro-Green and urban/youth lean) on top of the one they did  4 days ago.

KMT face-off (diff from same poll 4 days ago)
Han  34.3 (-0.9)
Guo  29.5(+1.1)
Chu  14.9(-2.4)


3-way
KMT Han 41.7(+3.3)
Ko          23.8(-1.2)
DPP Tsai 21.5(-4.0)

KMT Guo 31.1(+2.3)
Ko          21,8(+1.9)
DPP Tsai 21.0(-3.1)

KMT Chu  27.1(+1.5)
Ko           25.6(+2.2)
DPP Tsai  20.9(-4.6)



This is the same pattern as the 2012 DPP and 2016 KMT "primaries"  The closer polls are being done to the primary of said party, these is a heavy skew toward said party's candidate

After the KMT primary is over, the winner's lead over Tsai and Ko will go down from these levels in polls which will be used to claim that this primary is "rigged" (just like the DPP primary earlier in June)  When in fact it is the Observation Effect.

[jaichind]

If you take the most recent pro-Green 趨勢 (Trend Polling) polling result and do a relative swing against the  趨勢 (Trend Polling) result for DPP primary a month ago you get

KMT Han 41.7(+18.5)
Ko          23.8(+1.0)
DPP Tsai 21.5(-14.2)

I do not the relative strength of Han and Tsai moved that much.  The impact of the DPP primary poll artificially increasing Tsai's strength and now the KMT primary poll artificially increasing Han's strength produced this sort of result.

If I had to guess, given the pro-Green biases of 趨勢 (Trend Polling) the true strength of these candidates is most likely around

KMT Han 34.5
DPP Tsai  26.6
Ko          23.3

[jaichind]

Pro-KMT Pro-Han Chinatimes poll on KMT primary

KMT matchup
Han  36.2
Guo  28.2
Chu  12.8

3-way matchup
KMT Han  44.8
Ko           21.8
DPP Tsai   17.8

KMT Guo  33.3
Ko           20.1
DPP Tsai  16.3


There is also a poll of if Guo runs as an independent with Ko in the running as well
KMT Han 36.4
Guo        21.7
Ko          15.5
DPP Tsai  14.7


Of course this is a pro-KMT pro-Han pollster in the middle of the KMT primary which produces massive leads for Han.

[jaichind]

National Chengchi University (somewhat pro-Green) semi-annual poll shows that the pro-unification/pro-Independence ground has shifted toward the pan-Green bloc since Dec 2018 given first the Xi-Tsai battle of words in early 2019 plus the HK protests.  The KMT does face a tough battle ahead to win 2020 despite what seems like a clear KMT lead in the polls

% of ROC population identifying as Taiwanese only rose to 56.9% from 54.5% which has been falling since 2014.


Unification-Independence

                    Unification  Open to both  Pan-U Status quo forever Independence Pan-I
End of 2015       9.6              34.0         43.6          25.4                 22.2             47.6
End of 2016      10.2             33.3         43.5          26.1                 22.9             49.0
End of 2017      12.4             33.1         45.5          25.3                 22.3             47.6
End of 2018      15.9             33.4         49.3          24.0                 20.1             44.1
June 2019         10.4            30.6          41.0          26.9                25.7              52.6

Pan-Independence views are up to beyond 2015-2016 levels.  KMT has to hope the HK protest dies down and falls off the headlines or else the DPP could swamp the KMT on an anti-Beijing platform despite the clear poor record of the Tsai regime.

[jaichind]

Yet another CNEWS KMT primary poll done my 趨勢 (Trend Polling) (has a pro-Green and urban/youth lean) on top of the one they did  a few days ago shows a further shift toward Han.

KMT face-off (diff from same poll 4 days ago)
Han  40.9 (+6.3)
Guo  29.0(-0.5)
Chu  13.3(-1.6)

3-way
KMT Han 46.0(+4.3)
Ko          20.9(-2.9)
DPP Tsai 20.6(-0.9)

KMT Guo 31.6(+0.5)
DPP Tsai 18.1(-2.9)
Ko          17.7(-4.1)

[jaichind]

KMT primary results out.  Massive Han landslide

KMT match-up (average of 5 pollsters) and count for 15% of the calculations
Han  52.5
Guo  33.9
Chu  12.6
(the variance seems similar to the DPP primary polls done in June which shows that most likely the DPP primary result were not rigged)

3-way matchup with DPP Tsai and Ko (average of 5 pollsters)
KMT Han  47.7
Ko           18.0
DPP Tsai   15.8

KMT Guo  29.2
Ko           14.6
DPP Tsai   14.1

KMT Chu  20.7
Ko           18.8
DPP Tsai   15.6



There does seem to be a large bloc of pro-KMT and pro-Han voters (around 23%-34% of the polled electorate) that voted Han in the 3 way match but did not respond in when Guo or Chu are on the KMT ballot against DPP Tsai and Ko.  Likewise there seems to be around 5% of the polled electorate that would back Guo over DPP Tsai or Ko but would be for DPP Tsai or Ko if anyone else is on the KMT ballot.  This sort of confirms that Han is better at turning out the KMT base but Guo has better cross-partisan appeal.

The true level of Han's support will be revealed when Ko does enter the race and polls come out in Sept Oct.

[jaichind]

First xfuture ratings for 2020 Prez winner

DPP Tsai   51
KMT Han  35
Ko           14

xfutures usually overestimates the pan-Green candidate but it does seem to me that in a 3 way race right now it is tossup between Tsai and Han and one can make the argument that Tsai might be a slight favorite to win re-election.

[jaichind]

Pollster TISR which has a slight pro-Green lean had also done their own survey during both the DPP and KMT primary period debunked the theory that Han's massive lead has to do with DPP voters voting for Han on the premise that he is the more radical and polarizing candidate.  TISR indicated their polling clearly shows that there is a significant bloc of Pro-Han voters that were so dedicated that they pretty much waited by their phone waiting to be called to vote for Han.  pro-Han supporters did not vote for Tsai or Ko when Han was not presented as a choice but voted NULL.

TISR said that polling during the DPP primary and KMT primary period has dramatic respondent rate from pro-DPP and pro-KMT supporters.  The raw numbers after weighting for demographics and region had
                       Pan-Blue    Pan-Green
DPP primary       28.8            36.1
KMT primary      47.7             22.2


The true Blue-Green balance is most likely somewhere in between the DPP primary and KMT primary balances.

[jaichind]

At this stage Chu has accepted the result and most likely will be working with Han.  There is a chance Chu might become Han's running mate but most likely Han will be looking for someone that can add to his appeal to Independents and Light Green voters.  It is more likely Chu might become PM in a Han administration if Han wins.  Guo congratulate Han but is unclear what is next steps are.  There is a chance that Guo and try to form an alliance with Ko and run a Guo-Ko ticket.  Guo might also try to reconcile with Han.  One thing is for sure, if both Guo and Ko run as independents separately then with 3 candidates with urban appeal (DPP Tsai, Guo, Ko), Han will have the upper hand.  So if Guo cannot form an alliance with Ko he will for sure consolidate behind KMT Han.

For the DPP the path is clear. They have to push for a high turnout election to defeat Han.  What is dangerous about Han is that he is the first KMT Prez candidate that can united the Deep Blue bloc and the KMT local faction bloc.  1996 KMT ran Lee Teng-Hui who mostly won by consolidating the KMT local factional vote and swept the independent as well as ate into the Pan-Green vote while the Deep Blue vote went to KMT rebels.  In 2000 KMT's Lien got the KMT local factional vote and KMT rebel Soong won the Deep Blue vote.  In 2004 Lien-Sung ticket sorted by got both but only with both Lien and Soong on the ticket.  In 2008 Ma got a huge Deep Blue turnout but had lukewarm KMT local factional vote.  In 2012 it was the same story but the KMT local factional vote turnout decreased even more.  The 2016 KMT disaster was both the Deep Blue vote not turning out (due to the replacement of Hong by Chu) and the KMT local faction vote not turning out due to anger against Ma.  In 2020 it seems for the first time Han will get high turnout from both Deep Blue AND KMT local factional vote at the same time even as his appeal with independents and Light Green votes is low.

With the KMT Deep Blue and KMT local factional vote not what it used to be Han is not assured victory.  But in a 3 way race and high turnout by KMT Deep Blue and KMT local factional vote will give Han a large advantage.   Tsai can defeat this but it cannot be the 2016 DPP campaign which focused on a low turnout election and avoided Blue-Green polarization.  This time to defeat Han the DPP has to shift gears and run a high turnout election more like 2004 based explicit Blue-Green polarization and hope pro-Ko Pan-Green voters tactically vote for Tsai to stop Han.

[Conservatopia]

In 2020 it seems for the first time Han will get high turnout from both Deep Blue AND KMT local factional vote at the same time even as his appeal with independents and Light Green votes is low.

What has lead to this happening for the first time?

[jaichind]

In 2020 it seems for the first time Han will get high turnout from both Deep Blue AND KMT local factional vote at the same time even as his appeal with independents and Light Green votes is low.

What has lead to this happening for the first time?

Han's experience is quite unique.  He was a Deep Blue MP back in the 1980s and 1990s before his political career went downhill and he went into retirement.  He was on the radical flank of the KMT and even came to blows with then DPP MP Chen Shui-Bian (later DPP Prez of ROC 2000-2008.)  Last few years Han re-invited himself more as a outsider of the KMT Deep Blue mainstream and winning over the support of the KMT local factions.   Given the disdain of the KMT Deep Blue base toward DPP Prez Tsai they overlooked Han's transformation and still viewed him as one of their own.  As a result Han is able to appeal to both the Deep Blue and KMT local faction blocs of the KMT.

[jaichind]

Apple Daily post-KMT primary poll shows a Han lead but not by astronomical margins

KMT Han  36.4
DPP Tsai   23.2
Ko           19.8



1-on-1
KMT Han  41.1
DPP Tsai   30.2

[jaichind]

Pro-Blue (mostly pro-Guo) TVBS post KMT primary poll

1-on-1
KMT Han  48
DPP Tsai   44

3 way
KMT Han 40
DPP Tsai  28
Ko          27

KMT Han 37
DPP Tasi  30
Guo        27

4-way
KMT Han 34
DPP Tsai 23
Guo       20
Ko         19

This poll make it clear that high floor low ceiling nature of Han's support.  So the more candidates in the race the better.  Han's lead over Tsai is ironically larger even with Guo who mostly appeal to Pan-Blue voters in the race.  Tsai somehow has to convince Ko to stay away from the race.  If not she has to avoid the possible Guo-Ko ticket since such a ticket could drive her to third place and she becomes the victim and not the beneficiary of last minute anti-Han tactical voting.  

The KMT Han vs DPP Tsai and KMT Han vs DPP Tsai vs Ko breakdown by age is interesting

                Total    20-29  30-39    40-49   50-59    60+
KMT Han     48        32        27        51        69       52
DPP Tsai      44        65        64       44        26       33

                Total    20-29  30-39    40-49   50-59   60+
KMT Han     40        20       19        38        63       49
DPP Tsai      28        34       34        22       20       30
Ko              27        45        42       37        15        8

Net loss     Total   20-29   30-39   40-49   50-59    60+
KMT Han      -4      -12       -8       -11        -6        -3
DPP Tsai     -16      -31      -30      -22        -6        -3

So Ko entering into the race is mostly about him eating into the Tsai's urban youth and middle aged youth base.  Ko is very little appeal with the 50 and older age groups.

The KMT Han vs DPP Tsai and KMT Han vs DPP Tsai vs Guo breakdown by age

                Total    20-29  30-39    40-49   50-59    60+
KMT Han     48        32        27        51        69       52
DPP Tsai      44        65        64       44        26       33

                Total    20-29  30-39    40-49   50-59   60+
KMT Han     37        17       19        36        57       45
DPP Tsai      30        55       36        24       17       28
Guo            27        27       40        38        24      13

Net loss     Total   20-29   30-39   40-49   50-59    60+
KMT Han     -11     -15       -8       -15       -12        -7
DPP Tsai     -14      -10      -28      -20        -9        -5

Guo has more middle age appeal.   Guo tends to eat into pro-KMT youth and has less of an impact on Tsai with the youth vote but does hit Tsai in the middle age cohort.   With older votes Guo has greater appeal than Ko and that appeal tends to be with pan-Blue voters.  Guo CEO image might be pulling in pan-Green but "economic voters" that are frustrated with the current economic situation but  are not willing to vote a KMT hardliner Han


The KMT Han vs DPP Tsai and KMT Han vs DPP Tsai vs Guo vs Ko breakdown by age  

                Total    20-29  30-39    40-49   50-59    60+
KMT Han     48        32        27        51        69       52
DPP Tsai      44        65        64       44        26       33

                Total    20-29  30-39    40-49   50-59   60+
KMT Han     34        11       15        31        53       45
DPP Tsai      23        33       23        16       16       28
Guo            20        21       25        29        21      11
Ko              19        35       33        22         8        6

Net loss     Total   20-29   30-39   40-49   50-59    60+
KMT Han    -14      -21      -12       -20       -16       -7
DPP Tsai     -21      -32      -41       -28       -10       -5

Is really both Guo and Ko affect at the same time.   A Guo-Ko ticket could be powerful they they join their youth and middle age appeal.


The last chart would be given the fact that Ko is likely to run, what is the impact on the 3 candidates if Guo were to join the race.  That would be

                Total    20-29  30-39    40-49   50-59   60+
KMT Han     40        20       19        38        63       49
DPP Tsai      28        34       34        22       20       30
Ko              27        45        42       37        15        8

                Total    20-29  30-39    40-49   50-59   60+
KMT Han     34        11       15        31        53       45
DPP Tsai      23        33       23        16       16       28
Guo            20        21       25        29        21      11
Ko              19        35       33        22         8        6

Net loss     Total   20-29   30-39   40-49   50-59    60+
KMT Han      -6        -9        -4        -7       -10      -4
DPP Tsai      -5         -1      -11        -6        -4       -2
Ko               -8       -10      -11      -15        -7       -2

Guo seems to eat into the Pan-Blue base of KMT Han but also gets some of the youth and middle age economic voters that would otherwise vote DPP Tsai or Ko.