NATO

[Big Abraham]

indeed, which is why I was referring to 2004

Are you kidding me? Daniel Fried, an official in the U.S. State Department, rushed to Ukraine following the "Orange Revolution" in 2004 and, in no uncertain terms, emphasised unambiguous American support or Ukraine’s NATO and Euro-Atlantic aspirations, and then you want to turn around and talk about "Russian rigging", for which there is no evidence? And despite whatever Daniel Fried or Yuschenko wanted, NATO was extremely unpopular with the Ukrainian population.

Russia is going to start a war it can't possibly win because they got surrounded by liberal democracies?  That's a million times more foolish.

This has nothing to do with being "surrounded by liberal democracies"; this is about bringing American red-lines to the Russian border. It's no different than if the Warsaw Pact had expanded up to American borders, despite Russian assurances to the contrary, only to then hear the Russians talking about how the Americans just need to learn to accept their fate.

did that spinning make you dizzy?  "Just because we've taken over part of your country, ethnically cleansed it, administrate it, won't let you come here, we haven't actually announced it publicly yet, so that makes it totally yours!"  That's crazy man.

Georgia is not being administered by Russia; after 2008 Russia withdrew its troops from there, including the South Ossetian and Abkhazian buffer zones, and handed over its oversight to the EU. It is, therefore, decidedly different than the situation in the Crimean Peninsula, which Putin saw fit to carve two Russian federal subjects out of and doesn't even pretend like it's Ukrainian territory.

non-expansion of NATO was talked about, it was never part of any deal.  They lost, they were not in a very good position to make deals, they should be thankful we let them keep as much control as we did.  If the shoes were switched I wouldn't imagine their leaders would have been as understanding.

It depends on how you define "deal". There were never any binding treaties, but it's misinformed at best to portray NATO expansion as anything other than a broken promise on the part of the United States. The Secretary of State at the time, on three separate occasions, assured that NATO would "not move an inch towards the east" and that NATO expansion would also be unacceptable even for the United States, with the "end result" (in his own words) not expanding the jurisdiction of NATO in exchange for the re-unification of Germany. Keep in mind this was a central point in the negotiations regarding Germany at this time. In fact, one of the things that caused Gorbachev to agree to German re-unification was the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance at a NATO summit, which maintained that, though NATO forces could be present in West Germany, they would not move beyond this.

all they have to do is stop being douche bags, it's not hard.

Once again, your lack of self-awareness is astounding.

[Big Abraham]

Unless one thinks Russia is going to unilaterally pick a fight with NATO, there is no reasonable reason to believe locking in more free nations behind collective defense would increase the chance of world war.

The worsening of relations between Russia and the West brought about as a result of NATO expansion certainly doesn't increase the likelihood of peace; and all history and evidence (and, quite frankly, common sense) indicates that, the more and more that two hostile powers increase their hostility towards one another, the likelihood of world war increases.

To hit the 'but NATO said they wouldn't move East' thing - first of all, this was a 'promise' made by an individual policymaker who left office in 1992, not by 'the United States'. Second, it was made to the leader of the Soviet Union, not to a Russian leader and certainly not to 'Russia'.

That "individual policymaker" was the Secretary of State, who in his official capacity represented the position of U.S. foreign policy during international talks and negotiations, which is exactly what this was an example of. And yeah, it was made to the leader of the Soviet Union, who also represented the position of Soviet foreign policy during international talks and negotiations. And since Russia is pretty clearly the successor state to the USSR (hence why they inherited their permanent seat on the UNSC), it really seems like you're grasping at straws here.

There's a reason public support for NATO accession was so high in Eastern European countries in the early 2000s.

It wasn't. As a pointed out in my response to dead0man, NATO was decidedly unpopular among Ukrainians, according to a 2008 poll which showed an abysmal 21% of the population favouring NATO membership, compared with 53% who were opposed. And this was after the deterioration of relations between the pro-Western Ukrainian government and Russia.

[MASHED POTATOES. VOTE!]

Disbanded, Russia isn't really a threat anymore, it's in its last throes. 

In a long-term yes, but we're still away from that point. The history clearly shows decaying powers can be pretty aggressive in order to reassert their diminishing position, and Russia's aggressive tendencies are pretty clear.

I dare say that if not for the NATO/EU membership, Estonia, with its large share of Russian population, might've experienced fate similar to Ukraine by now.

Russia isn't just decaying, but utterly screwed.  It's economy is garbage, and there are major ethnic tensions within Russia. 

I have no problems with the Ukraine, Belarus, and Transnistria joining back up with Russia.  It's what they wanted in the referendum in 1991, if we could get Russia to back away from the Baltics and stop screwing with American and European politics.

I assume you're refeering to the Union of Sovereign States project, which of course had real support in most of the Soviet republics, but the opinion dramatically switched after the August coup, with everybody opting for the independence. Of course there were possibilities of integration after that, but in Ukraine's case Crimea/Donbass pushed the country decidively away from Russia.

[MASHED POTATOES. VOTE!]

If we talk so much about Russia's fears, how about we take a minute to think about why the post-Soviet countries in Europe are afraid of Russia in first place.

I'm sorry, but believing that if there was no NATO/EU expansion in the East, Russia would leave these countries alone and fully respect their sovereignty is a wishful thinking.

Also, for all that "Putin is so rational" nonsense let's go back in time to the Orange Revolution, when he actually acted rationally: resisted the hawks pushing for some sort of an action in the east Ukrainian regions and dealt with the new government in Kiev, thus preserving the Russian influence, weakened for a while but soon rebuilt. What happened in 2014 not only irreversibly pushed Ukraine away from Russia, but was also extremely costly for the latter as well, politically and economically. If the naval bases in Crimea were the issue, I have little doubt Russia would've retained them under the usual arrangements.

[Karpatsky]

Unless one thinks Russia is going to unilaterally pick a fight with NATO, there is no reasonable reason to believe locking in more free nations behind collective defense would increase the chance of world war.

The worsening of relations between Russia and the West brought about as a result of NATO expansion certainly doesn't increase the likelihood of peace; and all history and evidence (and, quite frankly, common sense) indicates that, the more and more that two hostile powers increase their hostility towards one another, the likelihood of world war increases.

To hit the 'but NATO said they wouldn't move East' thing - first of all, this was a 'promise' made by an individual policymaker who left office in 1992, not by 'the United States'. Second, it was made to the leader of the Soviet Union, not to a Russian leader and certainly not to 'Russia'.

That "individual policymaker" was the Secretary of State, who in his official capacity represented the position of U.S. foreign policy during international talks and negotiations, which is exactly what this was an example of. And yeah, it was made to the leader of the Soviet Union, who also represented the position of Soviet foreign policy during international talks and negotiations. And since Russia is pretty clearly the successor state to the USSR (hence why they inherited their permanent seat on the UNSC), it really seems like you're grasping at straws here.

There's a reason public support for NATO accession was so high in Eastern European countries in the early 2000s.

It wasn't. As a pointed out in my response to dead0man, NATO was decidedly unpopular among Ukrainians, according to a 2008 poll which showed an abysmal 21% of the population favouring NATO membership, compared with 53% who were opposed. And this was after the deterioration of relations between the pro-Western Ukrainian government and Russia.

1. This is why we have training for foreign policy experts instead of relying on 'common sense'. 'All history and evidence', most significantly the contrasting history of the Second World War and Cold War, as well as the Obama 'reset', show that appeasement fails to prevent conflict, while deterrence succeeds. I would also ask you to read the last paragraph of my previous post and stop claiming that Russian aggression is the 'result' of NATO expansion, given it is empirically false.

2. What individuals say, especially term-limited individuals, does not have legal or really even ethical force, especially when there is as significant an institutional break as there was in 1991. For the record, when states make 'promises', they sign documents. Since we're discussing the grounds on which Russia can be considered "the" successor state to the Soviet Union, here's a good example.

3. Must have missed Ukraine being admitted to NATO in 2008. Would have nice, because a seventh of the country wouldn't be under hostile occupation today had they been.

[MASHED POTATOES. VOTE!]

Why does this discussion reminds me of the Soviet justification for attacking Finland in 1939?

[Karpatsky]

Why does this discussion reminds me of the Soviet justification for attacking Finland in 1939?

You don't understand - the Soviet Union has a historical right to Finland because the Tsar under the old regime was also Grand Duke of Finland. Also, Finland is being aggressive by refusing to destroy its border fortifications, and anyways the West is making the Soviets do it by being mad at them for invading Poland.

[MASHED POTATOES. VOTE!]

Why does this discussion reminds me of the Soviet justification for attacking Finland in 1939?

You don't understand - the Soviet Union has a historical right to Finland because the Tsar under the old regime was also Grand Duke of Finland. Also, Finland is being aggressive by refusing to destroy its border fortifications, and anyways the West is making the Soviets do it by being mad at them for invading Poland.

Come to think of this, the Tsar was also "King of Poland". Checkmate, imperialists.

[Big Abraham]

Unless one thinks Russia is going to unilaterally pick a fight with NATO, there is no reasonable reason to believe locking in more free nations behind collective defense would increase the chance of world war.

The worsening of relations between Russia and the West brought about as a result of NATO expansion certainly doesn't increase the likelihood of peace; and all history and evidence (and, quite frankly, common sense) indicates that, the more and more that two hostile powers increase their hostility towards one another, the likelihood of world war increases.

To hit the 'but NATO said they wouldn't move East' thing - first of all, this was a 'promise' made by an individual policymaker who left office in 1992, not by 'the United States'. Second, it was made to the leader of the Soviet Union, not to a Russian leader and certainly not to 'Russia'.

That "individual policymaker" was the Secretary of State, who in his official capacity represented the position of U.S. foreign policy during international talks and negotiations, which is exactly what this was an example of. And yeah, it was made to the leader of the Soviet Union, who also represented the position of Soviet foreign policy during international talks and negotiations. And since Russia is pretty clearly the successor state to the USSR (hence why they inherited their permanent seat on the UNSC), it really seems like you're grasping at straws here.

There's a reason public support for NATO accession was so high in Eastern European countries in the early 2000s.

It wasn't. As a pointed out in my response to dead0man, NATO was decidedly unpopular among Ukrainians, according to a 2008 poll which showed an abysmal 21% of the population favouring NATO membership, compared with 53% who were opposed. And this was after the deterioration of relations between the pro-Western Ukrainian government and Russia.

1. This is why we have training for foreign policy experts instead of relying on 'common sense'. 'All history and evidence', most significantly the contrasting history of the Second World War and Cold War, as well as the Obama 'reset', show that appeasement fails to prevent conflict, while deterrence succeeds. I would also ask you to read the last paragraph of my previous post and stop claiming that Russian aggression is the 'result' of NATO expansion, given it is empirically false.

2. What individuals say, especially term-limited individuals, does not have legal or really even ethical force, especially when there is as significant an institutional break as there was in 1991. For the record, when states make 'promises', they sign documents. Since we're discussing the grounds on which Russia can be considered "the" successor state to the Soviet Union, here's a good example.

3. Must have missed Ukraine being admitted to NATO in 2008. Would have nice, because a seventh of the country wouldn't be under hostile occupation today had they been.

1. Even Kissinger, Shultz, and Perry no longer care for deterrence theory, which should go to show how thoroughly repudiated it has become. The least violent parts of the Cold War were during détente; when tensions escalate over states, or when you try to pursue a "containment" strategy, you have the Cuban missile crisis, proxy wars in Vietnam and Korea, etc. And since Russia and America are both nuclear powers, any chance of war is therefore also a chance of nuclear war.

2. States can make promises when they sign documents, but also when they make verbal agreements. Both in national jurisdiction and international politics, verbal promises can also acquire legal validity, and even legally non-binding agreements are regarded as essential instruments in international politics, as was especially the case during the Cold War. And regarding the point on Russia being the successor state of the Soviet Union (which seems fairly self-evident; look at the START I Treaty, for instance), it still doesn't diminish the fact, one way or another, that the United States went against its assurance not to move eastward, and so I'm sure you can understand why the Russians would regard this as a slight.

3. The poll was on the hypothetical question of NATO membership, a policy which the Ukrainian government was then attempting to pursue.

[MASHED POTATOES. VOTE!]

2. States can make promises when they sign documents, but also when they make verbal agreements. Both in national jurisdiction and international politics, verbal promises can also acquire legal validity, and even legally non-binding agreements are regarded as essential instruments in international politics, as was especially the case during the Cold War. And regarding the point on Russia being the successor state of the Soviet Union (which seems fairly self-evident; look at the START I Treaty, for instance), it still doesn't diminish the fact, one way or another, that the United States went against its assurance not to move eastward, and so I'm sure you can understand why the Russians would regard this as a slight.

Which led the to committ even greater breach of the international commitments by invading a sovereign country and annexing part of its territory, despite being a part to the Budapest Memorandum, among other things.

[Big Abraham]

2. States can make promises when they sign documents, but also when they make verbal agreements. Both in national jurisdiction and international politics, verbal promises can also acquire legal validity, and even legally non-binding agreements are regarded as essential instruments in international politics, as was especially the case during the Cold War. And regarding the point on Russia being the successor state of the Soviet Union (which seems fairly self-evident; look at the START I Treaty, for instance), it still doesn't diminish the fact, one way or another, that the United States went against its assurance not to move eastward, and so I'm sure you can understand why the Russians would regard this as a slight.

Which led the to committ even greater breach of the international commitments by invading a sovereign country and annexing part of its territory, despite being a part to the Budapest Memorandum, among other things.

The United States breached the Budapest Memorandum by meddling in the affairs there during the 2013 uprising by sponsoring and defending with American money the coup which overthrew Yanukovych.

[Karpatsky]

Unless one thinks Russia is going to unilaterally pick a fight with NATO, there is no reasonable reason to believe locking in more free nations behind collective defense would increase the chance of world war.

The worsening of relations between Russia and the West brought about as a result of NATO expansion certainly doesn't increase the likelihood of peace; and all history and evidence (and, quite frankly, common sense) indicates that, the more and more that two hostile powers increase their hostility towards one another, the likelihood of world war increases.

To hit the 'but NATO said they wouldn't move East' thing - first of all, this was a 'promise' made by an individual policymaker who left office in 1992, not by 'the United States'. Second, it was made to the leader of the Soviet Union, not to a Russian leader and certainly not to 'Russia'.

That "individual policymaker" was the Secretary of State, who in his official capacity represented the position of U.S. foreign policy during international talks and negotiations, which is exactly what this was an example of. And yeah, it was made to the leader of the Soviet Union, who also represented the position of Soviet foreign policy during international talks and negotiations. And since Russia is pretty clearly the successor state to the USSR (hence why they inherited their permanent seat on the UNSC), it really seems like you're grasping at straws here.

There's a reason public support for NATO accession was so high in Eastern European countries in the early 2000s.

It wasn't. As a pointed out in my response to dead0man, NATO was decidedly unpopular among Ukrainians, according to a 2008 poll which showed an abysmal 21% of the population favouring NATO membership, compared with 53% who were opposed. And this was after the deterioration of relations between the pro-Western Ukrainian government and Russia.

1. This is why we have training for foreign policy experts instead of relying on 'common sense'. 'All history and evidence', most significantly the contrasting history of the Second World War and Cold War, as well as the Obama 'reset', show that appeasement fails to prevent conflict, while deterrence succeeds. I would also ask you to read the last paragraph of my previous post and stop claiming that Russian aggression is the 'result' of NATO expansion, given it is empirically false.

2. What individuals say, especially term-limited individuals, does not have legal or really even ethical force, especially when there is as significant an institutional break as there was in 1991. For the record, when states make 'promises', they sign documents. Since we're discussing the grounds on which Russia can be considered "the" successor state to the Soviet Union, here's a good example.

3. Must have missed Ukraine being admitted to NATO in 2008. Would have nice, because a seventh of the country wouldn't be under hostile occupation today had they been.

1. Even Kissinger, Shultz, and Perry no longer care for deterrence theory, which should go to show how thoroughly repudiated it has become. The least violent parts of the Cold War were during détente; when tensions escalate over states, or when you try to pursue a "containment" strategy, you have the Cuban missile crisis, proxy wars in Vietnam and Korea, etc. And since Russia and America are both nuclear powers, any chance of war is therefore also a chance of nuclear war.

2. States can make promises when they sign documents, but also when they make verbal agreements. Both in national jurisdiction and international politics, verbal promises can also acquire legal validity, and even legally non-binding agreements are regarded as essential instruments in international politics, as was especially the case during the Cold War. And regarding the point on Russia being the successor state of the Soviet Union (which seems fairly self-evident; look at the START I Treaty, for instance), it still doesn't diminish the fact, one way or another, that the United States went against its assurance not to move eastward, and so I'm sure you can understand why the Russians would regard this as a slight.

3. The poll was on the hypothetical question of NATO membership, a policy which the Ukrainian government was then attempting to pursue.

1. I think you are confusing nuclear deterrence with deterrence through collective balancing. I actually posted a thread about the former recently, which I'd be interested to hear your take on given it didn't get much attention. Re: your second sentence, I don't think you're completely thinking through the causal mechanism on where the great power war is going to come from. I think it's fairly clear that the odds of Korea or Vietnam escalating to nuclear war between the superpowers was quite low, because neither side valued victory enough to escalate it to such an extent. Where the threat of war arises is where there is a miscalculation of these priorities, as in Cuba: Soviet leaders did not believe the Americans were willing to go to war over it, when in fact they were (this is exactly the same causal mechanism which led to WWI, by the way). This is exactly why collective defense is so important to prevent wars: it formalizes these 'red lines' and makes such a miscalculation less likely. For this same reason, introducing doubt into collective defense, as the current administration has, greatly increases the chance of such a miscalculation. The only scenario in which weakening collective defense would decrease the chance of war is if one believes a country like Russia will attack an ally even with the certainty that the alliance will hold, in which case the better option would be to strengthen the alliance to change these calculations. Fortunately for everyone, I think it's clear that Russia is neither powerful enough nor aggressive enough to do so.

2. It remains that the 'United States' did not make any assurances to 'Russia'. It's clear that Russian policymakers claim to see it that way, but given that Russia has obviously not been an advocate for the formalization of verbal assurances in the past, this is no reason to take what they say at face value nor to particularly care about it.

3. But they didn't? I'm not sure what you mean to get at here.

2. States can make promises when they sign documents, but also when they make verbal agreements. Both in national jurisdiction and international politics, verbal promises can also acquire legal validity, and even legally non-binding agreements are regarded as essential instruments in international politics, as was especially the case during the Cold War. And regarding the point on Russia being the successor state of the Soviet Union (which seems fairly self-evident; look at the START I Treaty, for instance), it still doesn't diminish the fact, one way or another, that the United States went against its assurance not to move eastward, and so I'm sure you can understand why the Russians would regard this as a slight.

Which led the to committ even greater breach of the international commitments by invading a sovereign country and annexing part of its territory, despite being a part to the Budapest Memorandum, among other things.

The United States breached the Budapest Memorandum by meddling in the affairs there during the 2013 uprising by sponsoring and defending with American money the coup which overthrew Yanukovych.

Start watching less RT before you embarrass yourself again yet again like this. I really don't mind discussing these issues with people who disagree with me, because I find them interesting, but I would appreciate it if you are going to continue engaging on them that you make at least a minimum effort to separate fact from blatant and transparent propaganda lines.

[Big Abraham]

1. I think you are confusing nuclear deterrence with deterrence through collective balancing. I actually posted a thread about the former recently, which I'd be interested to hear your take on given it didn't get much attention. Re: your second sentence, I don't think you're completely thinking through the causal mechanism on where the great power war is going to come from. I think it's fairly clear that the odds of Korea or Vietnam escalating to nuclear war between the superpowers was quite low, because neither side valued victory enough to escalate it to such an extent. Where the threat of war arises is where there is a miscalculation of these priorities, as in Cuba: Soviet leaders did not believe the Americans were willing to go to war over it, when in fact they were (this is exactly the same causal mechanism which led to WWI, by the way). This is exactly why collective defense is so important to prevent wars: it formalizes these 'red lines' and makes such a miscalculation less likely. For this same reason, introducing doubt into collective defense, as the current administration has, greatly increases the chance of such a miscalculation. The only scenario in which weakening collective defense would decrease the chance of war is if one believes a country like Russia will attack an ally even with the certainty that the alliance will hold, in which case the better option would be to strengthen the alliance to change these calculations. Fortunately for everyone, I think it's clear that Russia is neither powerful enough nor aggressive enough to do so.

Nuclear deterrence and "deterrence through collective balancing" are based on one and the same premise; namely, that by virtue of their armed forces, a nation can deter an adversarial force by threat of attack or invasion. Whether the fighting is done with nuclear or conventional weapons is only incidental. The mere notion of any "collective balancing" arrangement being conducted by the United States is absurd, considering that Russia has so greatly diminished in power and international influence following the collapse of the Soviet Union that America has since remained the sole undisputed superpower. If there is anything to be balanced in the global balance of power, it is American military hegemony.

The poll in Political Debate I never had the chance to look at when it was first posted, unfortunately. I would post a more in-depth response here but I don't want to de-rail this thread too much, but suffice it to say I am of the belief that the existence of nuclear weapons makes the entire world less safe and that total nuclear disarmament worldwide should be a priority for the near future. At the very least, steps must be taken to reduce nuclear stockpiles, and the possibility of them ever being used in a military engagement.

2. It remains that the 'United States' did not make any assurances to 'Russia'. It's clear that Russian policymakers claim to see it that way, but given that Russia has obviously not been an advocate for the formalization of verbal assurances in the past, this is no reason to take what they say at face value nor to particularly care about it.

What else would you call the leader of United States foreign policy three times declaring there would be no expansion? What else would you call the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance? And I can assure you informal verbal agreements were used many times during the Cold War, being frequently employed in the policy of negotiations between both countries.

3. But they didn't? I'm not sure what you mean to get at here.

I know, I wrote that in response to your "must have missed Ukraine being admitted to NATO in 2008". I was just trying to clarify what the poll was about.

Start watching less RT before you embarrass yourself again yet again like this. I really don't mind discussing these issues with people who disagree with me, because I find them interesting, but I would appreciate it if you are going to continue engaging on them that you make at least a minimum effort to separate fact from blatant and transparent propaganda lines.

My position is not the same as that of the Russian government. The Kremlin maintains that the Euromaidan was almost entirely an external force; something engendered solely by the U.S. and NATO-backed forces to prop up an anti-Russian regime in Kiev. My position, one well within the mainstream of international journalism, is that the 2013 uprising was mostly an internal force that nevertheless had strong Western backing and interference. We know, for example, that the United States had been involved in the Ukrainian crisis by funding pro-Western organisations and by investing billions of dollars in the region, and furthering to economically intervene in the country and integrate it closer with the West. By having such a heavy-handed play in the Ukrainian transfer of power, Ukraine's sovereignty was certainly undermined. Not that this, of course, absolves Russia of blame for the Crimean annexation; all it serves to do is shine some light on the matter.

[Karpatsky]

Nuclear deterrence and "deterrence through collective balancing" are based on one and the same premise; namely, that by virtue of their armed forces, a nation can deter an adversarial force by threat of attack or invasion. Whether the fighting is done with nuclear or conventional weapons is only incidental. The mere notion of any "collective balancing" arrangement being conducted by the United States is absurd, considering that Russia has so greatly diminished in power and international influence following the collapse of the Soviet Union that America has since remained the sole undisputed superpower. If there is anything to be balanced in the global balance of power, it is American military hegemony.

I don't see how you can possibly argue this. The fundamental problem with nuclear deterrence is not that it doesn't usually work, it's that if you screw it up, everyone dies.

It is correct that American power is significantly stronger than Russian power. Do you not see the different ways those powers use their influence and what it results in, especially in Europe? That is, do you understand why states like Estonia and Ukraine are more interested in balancing against Russia than against the United States? If you don't, I really cannot help you.

What else would you call the leader of United States foreign policy three times declaring there would be no expansion? What else would you call the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance? And I can assure you informal verbal agreements were used many times during the Cold War, being frequently employed in the policy of negotiations between both countries.

Yeah, I'm not denying that leaders talk to each other in the course of negotiations. But such statements do not constitute a bindable assurance, particularly when the state which the recipient represented ceased to exist. Again - not denying that Russian leaders use this as an excuse to play the victim, just saying that there's no reason to care.

As for that document, I honestly do not know what you think it says or means.

My position is not the same as that of the Russian government. The Kremlin maintains that the Euromaidan was almost entirely an external force; something engendered solely by the U.S. and NATO-backed forces to prop up an anti-Russian regime in Kiev. My position, one well within the mainstream of international journalism, is that the 2013 uprising was mostly an internal force that nevertheless had strong Western backing and interference. We know, for example, that the United States had been involved in the Ukrainian crisis by funding pro-Western organisations and by investing billions of dollars in the region, and furthering to economically intervene in the country and integrate it closer with the West. By having such a heavy-handed play in the Ukrainian transfer of power, Ukraine's sovereignty was certainly undermined. Not that this, of course, absolves Russia of blame for the Crimean annexation; all it serves to do is shine some light on the matter.

Excellent backtrack, but not quite far enough. Funding for civil society does not constitute "sponsoring and defending a coup", especially when  there was no coup.

I also think the fact that you consider investment and Western integration as some sort of hostile move 'shines some light' on the direction you are coming from. What this constitutes, to repeat, is increased freedom of expression, stronger civil society, greater rule of law, and broader economic liberties. Again, if you prioritize the self-defined geopolitical influence of autocratic regimes over a country's chance to achieve this, you should not be surprised that your position is unpopular.

[Big Abraham]

I don't see how you can possibly argue this. The fundamental problem with nuclear deterrence is not that it doesn't usually work, it's that if you screw it up, everyone dies.

It is correct that American power is significantly stronger than Russian power. Do you not see the different ways those powers use their influence and what it results in, especially in Europe? That is, do you understand why states like Estonia and Ukraine are more interested in balancing against Russia than against the United States? If you don't, I really cannot help you.

Of course I do; that's what the Cold War was. And new a newer, albeit more moderate one has emerged in Europe between Russia and the West, with its primary catalyst being NATO expansion. I can full well understand why Estonia and Ukraine are more interesting in tipping the scales towards the United States; America has poured a large sum of money into both those countries, and maintains a large military presence there, so no doubt the Baltics will show their gratitude.

Yeah, I'm not denying that leaders talk to each other in the course of negotiations. But such statements do not constitute a bindable assurance, particularly when the state which the recipient represented ceased to exist. Again - not denying that Russian leaders use this as an excuse to play the victim, just saying that there's no reason to care.

As for that document, I honestly do not know what you think it says or means.

That document was a crucial and decisive one in persuading Gorbachev to allow the dissolution of the GDR and the re-unification of Germany with NATO membership. But, I see your confusion. I actually had that document confused with another one, which was the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, which was signed in Moscow in 1990. Article 5 of the treaty maintains that, though German forces assigned to NATO could be stationed on the territory of the East, there would be no foreign forces east of West Germany.

At any rate, what does matter is that there was an explicit message from the leaders the United States that they would not be moving into Eastern Europe, and even you have not contested this. They clearly have not lived up to this message, which, I would hope, you can understand why many in Russia would view as a betrayal.

Excellent backtrack, but not quite far enough. Funding for civil society does not constitute "sponsoring and defending a coup", especially when  there was no coup.

I also think the fact that you consider investment and Western integration as some sort of hostile move 'shines some light' on the direction you are coming from. What this constitutes, to repeat, is increased freedom of expression, stronger civil society, greater rule of law, and broader economic liberties. Again, if you prioritize the self-defined geopolitical influence of autocratic regimes over a country's chance to achieve this, you should not be surprised that your position is unpopular.

It wasn't a backtrack; you can compare my previous two posts side by side and find they in no way disagree with each other. My position, as I mentioned months ago on that Ukrainian Support Act thread, is that the West bears a lot of responsibility for meddling in the affairs of the Ukraine by funnelling money to them, instigating a propaganda campaign, and helping to further the 2014 Ukrainian uprisings. This is a violation of Ukrainian sovereignty. That's not to say the Russians haven't done anything there either; I'm sure they have. Let's not just continue to adhere to the silly "we're the good guys, they're the bad guys" mentality that you seem to have in the NATO/Russia debate.

At any rate Karpatsky, I do also want to say that I appreciate your time in responding to my posts; our relations may not always be the most cordial, but I always appreciate having an interesting discussion.

[dead0man]

Yeah, the only reason the Baltics like us more than Russia is that we've poured large sums of money at them and have a "large military presence" (it's got nothing at all to do with how Russians treated them for the last 300+ years) and what the west has done (give money, "propoganda") in Ukraine is totally comparable to what the Russians have done (invaded, murdered, shot passenger planes out of the sky, give money, "propoganda", Holodomor). 


I mean, good job here, you're arguing from an impossible position and you're doing it with vigor and gusto.  You're not making any sense or moving anybody to your position, but you're doing it with so much energy!

[MASHED POTATOES. VOTE!]

I've been very critical of the U.S. foreign policy for long time. I've opposed the Iraqi War from day one and participated in numerous demonstrations. I opposed the intervention in Libya. But I'm consistent enough to see which side is the aggressor in this conflict, and which side poses bigger threat.

You can't play a staunch anti-imperialist if this means making apologies for Russia here. Otherwise it's just plain hypocrisy, and that attitude is no diffrent from the attitude of American neocons, just a diffrent master. Invoking "Russia's sphere of influence, NATO expansion in the east" is no diffrent than the U.S. invoking the Monroe Doctrine. 

[Karpatsky]

Let's not just continue to adhere to the silly "we're the good guys, they're the bad guys" mentality that you seem to have in the NATO/Russia debate.

At any rate Karpatsky, I do also want to say that I appreciate your time in responding to my posts; our relations may not always be the most cordial, but I always appreciate having an interesting discussion.

Since dead0 and Kalwejt have already responded to your post, I want to focus on this in particular because I think it is at the core of the issue, and if it can't be overcome there is little value to be had in further discussion. "Good guys-bad guys" is clearly an oversimplification. Like Kalwejt, I am not an unquestioning supporter of US foreign policy. I do not hold that US foreign policy makers always make good decisions, nor even that they never make unethical decisions. However, broadly speaking, and especially clearly when talking about NATO and Russia, it is true. Whether it is truly 'benevolent' or not is irrelevant and not really answerable (there are both internationalists and primalists in the US foreign policy establishment) - empirically, US influence advances human rights, rule of law, democracy, and anti-corruption.

Russian influence, by contrast, advances corruption, patronage, repression, and hyper-capitalist oligarchy.  Again, whether it is 'malevolent' is an irrelevant and ideological question - Russian foreign policy makers tend to be nationalists or Eurasianists, neither of which consider any of these things particularly important. This is not at all to claim that there is no corruption, patronage, repression, hypercapitalism, or oligarchy in the United States or its allies, but it is not at all comparable to the situation in Russia and its allies. In saying this, I am not relying on anything which could be called 'western propaganda' by any stretch. I have lived for years in Ukraine. I had the misfortune to live for a few years in Russia. I have met democrats and nationalists from both countries. I have relatives and friends who have participated in events like Euromaidan, and who have fought and died in the Donbass. I have heard at length the financial consequences for ordinary people of the war in Ukraine and of sanctions in Russia. I have been to grocery stores with no milk and thirty-dollar apples. I have met and listened to talks by American, Russian, and Ukrainian policymakers. I have nearly been run over by sports cars and limousines with blue sirens on top of them. I have paid bribes to policemen. I have seen protesters beaten and arrested. And I have for years on end listened to people like you in America or on the internet tell me that they know better what is right for these people.

I am not saying this to tell you you should just shut up and listen to me, but to put in perspective on what grounds I believe what you seem to see as naivety. To be honest, I do simply ignore most people who have the views you do, because to draw a moral equivalence between these two systems requires deep ignorance and misinformation about empirical reality. I understand that this is a difficult thing to discern from afar, because on top of the US media being extremely uninterested in foreign policy in general, the Russian government has gone to great lengths to spread misinformation, and it is clear from the tropes you use to discuss these issues that you are a victim of these efforts. This is neither surprising nor your fault - these efforts have unfortunately been quite successful in left-wing circles because of the preexistence of rightful criticism of US policy in other areas. I myself was banned from /r/LSC, on which I used to be an active participant, for pushing back on disinformation lines regarding a Ukrainian political event which I had been to. I'm not going to tell you for obvious reasons that you should go spend a few years in Russia and Ukraine, although that would be an extremely effective way to rid you of your current opinion. Instead, I would just ask you to take a step back from your ideological sources and shortcuts, even if you think they are reliable in other cases, and take a new view at what is happening and what outcome you actually think is best.

[_]

I realize there's a giant argument here over whether NATO should even exist, but I had a question on expansion.

North Macedonia and Bosnia & Herzegovina are both in the "Membership Action Plan," does this mean they're both close to membership?  I know that the big issue with Macedonia was the name with Greece, with that gone will they be granted membership soon?  And what of Bosnia?

Finally, I realize this could belong in the Ukrainian election thread, but what are the odds of an actual referendum on NATO Membership in Ukraine?  And what would be it's chances of passing?

[Big Abraham]

Yeah, the only reason the Baltics like us more than Russia is that we've poured large sums of money at them and have a "large military presence" (it's got nothing at all to do with how Russians treated them for the last 300+ years) and what the west has done (give money, "propoganda") in Ukraine is totally comparable to what the Russians have done (invaded, murdered, shot passenger planes out of the sky, give money, "propoganda", Holodomor).  

I did not say that was the only reason. There are without a doubt others factors at play. However, it's pretty hard to deny that America has a vested interest in keeping the Baltic republics and Ukraine non-neutral and aligned towards NATO, and thus the United States has taken steps to ensure this.

I've been very critical of the U.S. foreign policy for long time. I've opposed the Iraqi War from day one and participated in numerous demonstrations. I opposed the intervention in Libya. But I'm consistent enough to see which side is the aggressor in this conflict, and which side poses bigger threat.

You can't play a staunch anti-imperialist if this means making apologies for Russia here. Otherwise it's just plain hypocrisy, and that attitude is no diffrent from the attitude of American neocons, just a diffrent master. Invoking "Russia's sphere of influence, NATO expansion in the east" is no diffrent than the U.S. invoking the Monroe Doctrine.

I think you mistake for apologism what I see plainly as trying to understand the root of the matter. It's very common in U.S. media and in the political discourse to portray Russia as the aggressor because "they're evil", "they just want power", "Putin is a dictator", whatever. And sure, many Americans will admit that America has at times been the aggressor, but whenever we were, we had a reason, a just cause. Not the Russians, they're simply evil.

Except the Russians too have a cause, and I think it rests on a very good point, a point which is often overlooked. I'm trying to draw attention to that point, show that there are things the U.S. is doing to persuade Putin to act the way that he does by making the situation in Eastern Europe a more dangerous political chessboard, and am calling on the U.S. and NATO to turn their eyes away from this region to keep it neutral and not fan the flames of conflict. This is of course based on the precondition that Russia, for better or for worse, sees these countries at their border (the Baltics, Ukraine) as being a part of their sphere of influence and sees the campaign to peel them away from Moscow and towards the West as a provocation. And sure, Russia maybe shouldn't feel that way about those countries, just like the U.S. shouldn't feel that way about Latin America. But they both do. That's geopolitics. And if there's a war, the residents of both regions at the end of the day aren't going to care about the Russia/NATO debate, because they just want to survive.

I have condemned Russian acts of aggression, nor am I a fan of Putin. I have called the Russian annexation of Crimea a crime under international law. I'm not trying to make excuses for Russia everywhere and always. But, the reason I have much more of a focus on attacking American imperialism than I do on Russian imperialism is because I consider the former a much more serious global threat, and the evidence bears that out.

Let's not just continue to adhere to the silly "we're the good guys, they're the bad guys" mentality that you seem to have in the NATO/Russia debate.

At any rate Karpatsky, I do also want to say that I appreciate your time in responding to my posts; our relations may not always be the most cordial, but I always appreciate having an interesting discussion.

Since dead0 and Kalwejt have already responded to your post, I want to focus on this in particular because I think it is at the core of the issue, and if it can't be overcome there is little value to be had in further discussion. "Good guys-bad guys" is clearly an oversimplification. Like Kalwejt, I am not an unquestioning supporter of US foreign policy. I do not hold that US foreign policy makers always make good decisions, nor even that they never make unethical decisions. However, broadly speaking, and especially clearly when talking about NATO and Russia, it is true. Whether it is truly 'benevolent' or not is irrelevant and not really answerable (there are both internationalists and primalists in the US foreign policy establishment) - empirically, US influence advances human rights, rule of law, democracy, and anti-corruption.

Russian influence, by contrast, advances corruption, patronage, repression, and hyper-capitalist oligarchy. Again, whether it is 'malevolent' is an irrelevant and ideological question - Russian foreign policy makers tend to be nationalists or Eurasianists, neither of which consider any of these things particularly important. This is not at all to claim that there is no corruption, patronage, repression, hypercapitalism, or oligarchy in the United States or its allies, but it is not at all comparable to the situation in Russia and its allies.

That is more or less taking a "good guys bad guys" approach. Sure, it's more fine-tuned than that, but you've stated in no uncertain terms that you see U.S. global influence is for the benefit of all parties because of "spreading democracy and human rights" and you see Russian influence as to the detriment of world development.

This is, far and away, the single biggest dividing factor in our worldview, because I cannot agree to your sanguine portrayal of American foreign policy. I can outline a few reasons why — the most important is that the U.S. cannot tolerate operating anyone outside of the American-managed system (which includes the entire globe, not just the countries located near its shores), hence interventions in Guatemala, Laos, Nicaragua, and Grenada, countries that posed no military threat to the United States. Channelling what I said in my above response to Kalwejt, the motives must be understood. It's not enough to portray the Cold War, for example, as an ideological standoff between the two superpowers. The reasons why America and Russia acted the way that they did was the the goals of the domestic elites in each country. Russia saw it as a war against their satellites; America saw it as a war against the Third World, and it had a functional utility for both (which is why it lasted so long).

I agree that the fact that the American citizens enjoy so many civil liberties, relative to other countries, is a good thing. However, I have not seen the expansion of these liberties borne out when America takes to the world stage, probably because the highest rungs of the managerial class in the U.S., who largely direct foreign policy, aren't interested in it. Nor are they interested in it in Moscow, for that matter.

In saying this, I am not relying on anything which could be called 'western propaganda' by any stretch. I have lived for years in Ukraine. I had the misfortune to live for a few years in Russia. I have met democrats and nationalists from both countries. I have relatives and friends who have participated in events like Euromaidan, and who have fought and died in the Donbass. I have heard at length the financial consequences for ordinary people of the war in Ukraine and of sanctions in Russia. I have been to grocery stores with no milk and thirty-dollar apples. I have met and listened to talks by American, Russian, and Ukrainian policymakers. I have nearly been run over by sports cars and limousines with blue sirens on top of them. I have paid bribes to policemen. I have seen protesters beaten and arrested. And I have for years on end listened to people like you in America or on the internet tell me that they know better what is right for these people.

I am not saying this to tell you you should just shut up and listen to me, but to put in perspective on what grounds I believe what you seem to see as naivety. To be honest, I do simply ignore most people who have the views you do, because to draw a moral equivalence between these two systems requires deep ignorance and misinformation about empirical reality. I understand that this is a difficult thing to discern from afar, because on top of the US media being extremely uninterested in foreign policy in general, the Russian government has gone to great lengths to spread misinformation, and it is clear from the tropes you use to discuss these issues that you are a victim of these efforts. This is neither surprising nor your fault - these efforts have unfortunately been quite successful in left-wing circles because of the preexistence of rightful criticism of US policy in other areas. I myself was banned from /r/LSC, on which I used to be an active participant, for pushing back on disinformation lines regarding a Ukrainian political event which I had been to. I'm not going to tell you for obvious reasons that you should go spend a few years in Russia and Ukraine, although that would be an extremely effective way to rid you of your current opinion. Instead, I would just ask you to take a step back from your ideological sources and shortcuts, even if you think they are reliable in other cases, and take a new view at what is happening and what outcome you actually think is best.

I don't see you as particularly naive, and it's one of the reasons I enjoy having these kinds of discussions with you. However, I really do not think you have given much thought to the motives of the directors of American foreign state policy. The people in the State Department and executive branch see the undeveloped and unaligned parts of the globe as free to open up and exploit it, as they did in the Third World. They see Eastern Europe no differently. It has little, if anything to do with "human rights and freedom". America has been willing to tolerate social reform only when the labour is kept in a weakened position and a climate favourable to foreign investment is preserved. We have consistently opposed democracy if its results can't be controlled.

[Omega21]

I realize there's a giant argument here over whether NATO should even exist, but I had a question on expansion.

North Macedonia and Bosnia & Herzegovina are both in the "Membership Action Plan," does this mean they're both close to membership?  I know that the big issue with Macedonia was the name with Greece, with that gone will they be granted membership soon?  And what of Bosnia?

Finally, I realize this could belong in the Ukrainian election thread, but what are the odds of an actual referendum on NATO Membership in Ukraine?  And what would be it's chances of passing?

Bosnia & Serbia will not join NATO, at least in the foreseeable future (our lifetime).

Bosnia would need all 3 Representatives (Bosniak, Serb, "Croat"/Bosniak number 2) to agree, and the Serbian representative would never agree, no matter who is in charge since it would be a glorious political suicide.  

Plus, Serbia regularly gets free stuff from Russia like Mig29's, SAM's, Hind's etc.

[Karpatsky]

I don't see you as particularly naive, and it's one of the reasons I enjoy having these kinds of discussions with you. However, I really do not think you have given much thought to the motives of the directors of American foreign state policy. The people in the State Department and executive branch see the undeveloped and unaligned parts of the globe as free to open up and exploit it, as they did in the Third World. They see Eastern Europe no differently. It has little, if anything to do with "human rights and freedom". America has been willing to tolerate social reform only when the labour is kept in a weakened position and a climate favourable to foreign investment is preserved. We have consistently opposed democracy if its results can't be controlled.

OK, now we are getting somewhere, though I find dubious your claim to know the hidden motives of people in the State Department. I'd be extremely interested to know where you get your insider information. Fortunately, as I said, what they think isn't relevant to come to a conclusion. Let's start with this: do you think ordinary people have a better chance of achieving a good outcome in a liberal democracy such as Latvia, or in a plutocracy such as Belarus?

[Karpatsky]

I realize there's a giant argument here over whether NATO should even exist, but I had a question on expansion.

North Macedonia and Bosnia & Herzegovina are both in the "Membership Action Plan," does this mean they're both close to membership?  I know that the big issue with Macedonia was the name with Greece, with that gone will they be granted membership soon?  And what of Bosnia?

Finally, I realize this could belong in the Ukrainian election thread, but what are the odds of an actual referendum on NATO Membership in Ukraine?  And what would be it's chances of passing?

NM has crossed most of its hurdles to accession, though it will still be a few years. Bosnia is a no-go because of their tri-ethnic presidency, part of which is controlled by Serbs who (rightly) believe that NATO accession would permanently end their revanchist ambitions. Zelensky has come out in favor of a NATO referendum in Ukraine, which would probably pass, but there's almost no chance NATO would accept it because of the active conflict.

[Big Abraham]

I don't see you as particularly naive, and it's one of the reasons I enjoy having these kinds of discussions with you. However, I really do not think you have given much thought to the motives of the directors of American foreign state policy. The people in the State Department and executive branch see the undeveloped and unaligned parts of the globe as free to open up and exploit it, as they did in the Third World. They see Eastern Europe no differently. It has little, if anything to do with "human rights and freedom". America has been willing to tolerate social reform only when the labour is kept in a weakened position and a climate favourable to foreign investment is preserved. We have consistently opposed democracy if its results can't be controlled.

OK, now we are getting somewhere, though I find dubious your claim to know the hidden motives of people in the State Department. I'd be extremely interested to know where you get your insider information. Fortunately, as I said, what they think isn't relevant to come to a conclusion. Let's start with this: do you think ordinary people have a better chance of achieving a good outcome in a liberal democracy such as Latvia, or in a plutocracy such as Belarus?

The motives of the American leaders aren't secretive. I mean, on occasion they are recorded only in classified documents, which then become leaked to the public through Wikileaks or something similar, but more often than not the directors of imperial policy directly and plainly state their intentions while framing them in the context of "national security" and "preservation of our freedoms". Take the war in Kuwait, for example. The State Department made it no secret that the potential loss of oilfields was a major catalyst in the decision to go to war, because this meant that Wall Street and their allies would no longer be in control of oil prices. The State Department is on record as saying that Near Eastern oil is a "stupendous source of strategic power" and "one of the greatest prizes in world history". So naturally America should have control over it, right?

I do think that ordinary people have a better chance of achieving a good outcome in Latvia than in Belarus, and I'd much rather live in Western than in Eastern Europe. This much I have never disputed. I don't necessarily object to the form of government these countries have, nor do I wish to have their independence threatened by an external force. What I believe, which is quite dissimilar to the pragmatism which you seem to adhere to, is a commitment to the principle of self-determination and non-provocation towards other states. I do not believe it is incumbent upon America or NATO to "protect" anyone from plutocracy, and attempting to do so will objectively lead to a worse standard of living for these people, which is what we see happening in the Donbass.

[Karpatsky]

The motives of the American leaders aren't secretive. I mean, on occasion they are recorded only in classified documents, which then become leaked to the public through Wikileaks or something similar, but more often than not the directors of imperial policy directly and plainly state their intentions while framing them in the context of "national security" and "preservation of our freedoms". Take the war in Kuwait, for example. The State Department made it no secret that the potential loss of oilfields was a major catalyst in the decision to go to war, because this meant that Wall Street and their allies would no longer be in control of oil prices. The State Department is on record as saying that Near Eastern oil is a "stupendous source of strategic power" and "one of the greatest prizes in world history". So naturally America should have control over it, right?

That American foreign policymakers don't ignore strategic considerations doesn't mean they don't care about moralistic ones. This is the very next paragraph in the cable you quote:

It seems to us to be important that this area, because of its resources and geographical position athwart the sea and air routes between East and West, should be in the hands of a people following the paths of democratic civilization rather than those of Eastern dictatorships. The British publicly and officially admit that they are no longer able to keep the Middle East in order without our help. We are inclined to believe that a policy of inactivity or “drift” on our part will result in a progressive deterioration of the influence of democratic civilization in the Near East.

I do think that ordinary people have a better chance of achieving a good outcome in Latvia than in Belarus, and I'd much rather live in Western than in Eastern Europe. This much I have never disputed. I don't necessarily object to the form of government these countries have, nor do I wish to have their independence threatened by an external force. What I believe, which is quite dissimilar to the pragmatism which you seem to adhere to, is a commitment to the principle of self-determination and non-provocation towards other states. I do not believe it is incumbent upon America or NATO to "protect" anyone from plutocracy, and attempting to do so will objectively lead to a worse standard of living for these people, which is what we see happening in the Donbass.

Well, to start off with, dictatorships by definition are not 'self-determining', but more importantly, yet again, why do you prioritize what you call 'non-provocation' of aggressive powers (when, yet again, there is no reason to believe their aggression is the result of Western 'provocation') over the self-determination of democratic states? These states and their people evidently want to be part of NATO, and with good reason. Re: Donbass, this case exactly contradicts the rest of your position. NATO is exactly the reason there is no Donbass in Latvia. Had Ukraine been part of NATO, there would not be a war in Donbass.