Protests In Colombia

[PSOL]

https://apnews.com/24a948559d134afaaa8c272626ed5ead

Colombians angry with conservative President Iván Duque hoped to channel Latin America’s wave of discontent as they took to the streets by the tens of thousands on Thursday with a long list of grievances, from persistent economic inequality to violence against social activists.

Students, teachers and labor union organizers took part in protests across the country in what appeared to be one of the nation’s biggest demonstrations in recent years, testing an unpopular government as unrest grips the region.

Police estimated 132,000 people overall took part in protests in several cities.

[Peanut]

A couple of friends of mine (teachers) have participated in these protests. South America is really chaotic right now, and while this hasn't escalated to the level of, say, Chile, I really hope for a swift end to the unrest, unrealistic as that might end up being.

[Dr. MB]

Latin America made some big mistakes voting in all these right wingers across the continent. Hopefully this is gonna end up changing who's in power at the next election.

[Hash]

As some background:

These protests were initially called over a month ago as a national strike by Colombia's main labour union confederations (CUT, CTC, CGT) but eventually the movement far surpassed the fairly narrow ranks of the labour movement as several other groups and social movements - the left-leaning opposition parties, university students, campesinos, environmentalists, indigenous groups, Afro-Colombians, the LGBT+ community, feminist groups - and more broadly a whole lot of people (including, notably, several artists or the recently elected Miss Colombia) joined to support the movement. This was made much easier by Iván Duque's unpopularity (as seen by the results of the local elections on October 27 or the latest poll where his approval is down to just 29%) and what has been a pretty horrible month (if not year) for a government which can't seem to get anything right.

Although the government keeps putting on a remarkably tone-deaf show about how everything is great and the country is doing better, few people are buying what they're trying to sell and most people hate the salesman (Duque), deriding him as an inept and incompetent 'sub-president' (the implication being that he is still the puppet of his mentor, Eternal President Álvaro Uribe). There is certainly no shortage of reasons to protest, and as a result the protests lack a single unifying message or grievance.

For the labour unions and a lot of other protesters, their main message was opposition to Duque's neoliberal economic policy (branded as the paquetazo) -- namely tax reform try 2 (currently being debated in Congress, after the Constitutional Court struck down last year's tax reform on procedural grounds, which among other things cuts the corporate tax rate from 33% to 30%), the creation of a centralized 'state financial holding', the government's privatization plans and opposition to the much-anticipated (but not yet officially announced) pension and labour reforms which has already stirred controversy because of proposals from certain ministers and private sector lobby groups (who are very powerful and influential in this administration). The government argued that the national strike was driven by misinformation, misleading claims and lies - as it has not officially announced the pension and labour reforms, and has in fact come out against many of the more 'radical' proposals put forward by the private sector lobbies (like paying young workers under 25 75% of the minimum wage). On the other hand, the organizers retorted out that some of the proposals against which they are protesting come from comments made by cabinet minister (like finance minister Alberto Carrasquilla's comments about reforming the defined benefits publicly-administered pension system Colpensiones, which led to claims that they want to eliminate Colpensiones in favour of the private pension funds) or bills tabled by the governing party and Álvaro Uribe (a proposal for labour flexibilization including contracts by the hour, which the government says it doesn't support).

Another major common rallying cry is defending the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC, which the current government (which opposed the peace agreement at the time, and ran against it in 2018) has been accused of failing to fully implement. The government has been relatively good at implementing the basic parts of the agreement (reintegration of demobilized ex-combatants) but clearly has an ideological opposition to the more revolutionary parts of it (illicit crop substitution, democratic/political reform, comprehensive rural reform, transitional justice) and has therefore dragged its feet (at best) on these points of the agreement. Duque objected to six articles in the statutory law for the transitional justice system (JEP) earlier this year, although that came back like a boomerang in his face when Congress rejected his objections and forced him to promulgate the law as is. They have cut funding for several agencies responsible for implementing key parts of the peace agreement. Duque appointed a far-right academic who has denied the existence of an armed conflict to the National Centre of Historial Memory. In the same vein, another common theme in the protests was denouncing the systematic assassination of hundreds of social and community leaders/human rights defenders in the past years (which the government only seems to intermittently care about), as well as the assassination of over 100 demobilized ex-FARC guerrilleros since 2016 (which the government clearly doesn't give a crap about).

Several scandals this year have further exacerbated criticisms of the government's peace (renamed "legality")-security strategy: the extrajudicial assassination by the military of Dimar Torres, a demobilized reincorporated ex-guerrillero, which the then-defence minister initially tried to cover up and mislead the public about; or the return of 'false positives' (the extrajudicial assassinations of unarmed civilians by the military to be passed off as 'terrorists'), or at the very least the return of the sort of bodycount military directives which made false positives possible in the first place under Uribe. Just earlier this month, the astoundingly incompetent defence minister Guillermo Botero was forced to resign as he was set to lose a motion of no confidence vote in the Senate after senator Roy Barreras (Partido de la U) revealed that the government had failed to mention that in a military bombing operation against FARC dissidents in Caquetá in August, at least eight minors (including a 12-year old girl) were among those killed. As if that wasn't bad enough, Duque managed to make things even worse with an astonishingly tone-deaf reaction: when asked by a journalist about the bombing, Duque answered "de qué me hablas, viejo?" (what are you talking about?). De qué me hablas, viejo? may have become the infamous phrase which will come to encapsulate his incompetence and disconnect from the country's reality: indeed, de qué me hablas, viejo? was one of the more popular phrases on demonstrator's placards on 21N...

Finally, for a lot of protesters, the protests were also about... guaranteeing their right to peaceful protest and rejection of the excessive use of force against demonstrators by riot police (the loathed Esmad). The government claims to respect 'peaceful protests', but has also repeatedly said that it is considering a law to 'regulate' protests. To add insult to injury, former defence minister Botero repeatedly stigmatized protests in the past - most notably the indigenous Minga earlier this year - by falsely claiming that the protests were infiltrated by terrorists/guerrillas/criminals.

The plethora of groups which joined the strike on 21N also demonstrated for their own causes, with their own specific grievances against the government. University students, who led large protests last year and earlier this year, demand that the government fulfill its agreement with them, signed following last fall's protests, in which the government committed to increase education spending by 4.5 trillion pesos. Indigenous peoples protested to bring attention to the upsurge in violence against indigenous peoples in the Cauca over the last few weeks, and to demand that the government fulfill the agreement signed this spring after the Minga. Environmentalists protested against fracking (there is a moratorium, but Duque, breaking a campaign promise, has allowed a pilot project to go ahead), mining projects in the páramos, the government trying to restart aerial fumigation of coca crops with glyphosate and a recent regulation from the agriculture minister on shark hunting quotas (although the quotas have been the same since 2011).

In a state of mass panic, the government and uribismo at first tried to preemptively discredit and stigmatize the strike, with Uribe claiming that it was infiltrated by the left-wing Foro de São Paulo (and his lackeys sharing similar fake news). However, doing so only seems to have further emboldened demonstrators and egged them on. Duque went on an unprecedented PR offensive and media blitz, giving a bunch of TV, radio and newspaper interviews, launching a new TV program 'Conéctate con Duque' and hosting a Facebook Live to aggressively publicize the government's achievements and to claim that the strike is driven by lies and inaccurate/misleading claims. All while still continuing to preemptively scaremonger about potential violence. Colombia closed all of its land and fluvial border crossings for over 48 hours from midnight on Nov 20 and Duque issued a decree authorizing mayors, if necessary, to restrict circulation, decree curfews, restrict or ban the sale and consumption of alcohol and seek the assistance of the armed forces. The government's heavy-handed preparations were criticized by many as being excessive.

[Hash]

As for the protests they are now a week old and are unlikely to go away anytime soon.

The crowds on 21N - the day of the actual national strike - were huge. Likely the biggest in Colombia since the 2008 marches against the FARC (which were supported and promoted by the government). The police says 200,000-230,000 people demonstrated across the country, but that is very much a massive underestimation of the actual crowds: a crowd-counting exercise by El Espectador for just Bogotá, Medellín, Bucaramanga instead suggests those three cities alone may have seen an estimate 440,000+ people. In any case, tens to hundreds of thousands of people demonstrated in all major cities in Colombia: even those which have the reputation of being politically apathetic (Cartagena, Barranquilla), and even Medellín which is (?) the uribista stronghold. The vast majority of them, to the hard right's chagrin, peacefully despite early incidents in Cali and Bogotá with blockades. Peaceful protesters chased off vandals and encapuchados (hooded violent demonstrators) to cries of 'no violence', some even stepping in to clean up graffiti or repair damages. As the usual crowds of vandals, criminals, looters and other infiltrators came out in the late afternoon, things did however turn sour - especially in Cali, where the mayor decreed a curfew from 7pm. Fuelled by social media and WhatsApp, Cali descended into chaos and mass anxiety with stories of violent gangs of looters attacking apartment complexes and compounds, with residents arming themselves to defend their properties.

In other cities (mainly Bogotá), however, the night of 21N saw an unprecedented and spontaneous cacerolazo, the likes of which Colombia had never really seen. The spontaneous cacerolazo was the first sign that what began as a national strike on 21N would not be a one-day event. Yet, Duque didn't seem to understand what he was facing: his short televised address that evening focused mostly on the acts of violence during the day (although he did differentiate between peaceful protesters and violent ones), praising the work of the police, and merely saying that his government 'is listening' to Colombians without making any actual substantive announcements. His pointless and empty speech was very poorly received by most.

Protests, with more violence than the day before, continued on Nov. 22. In Bogotá, for example, violent protesters stole a public transit bus and used it to loot a grocery store, while other protesters attacked police officers in a TransMilenio station. The Esmad intervened to disperse peaceful demonstrators staging another cacerolazo in Bogotá's central Plaza de Bolívar using stunt grenades and tear gas. Bogotá mayor Enrique Peñalosa decreed a curfew from 8pm in three southern localities where most of the violence had been concentrated, but Duque went one step further and pushed him to decree a citywide curfew from 9pm - the first citywide curfew in Bogotá since 1977. What happened in Cali the night before happened in Bogotá: a chaotic climate of fear, panic and anxiety fuelled by (largely false) rumours on social media of violent gangs of looters attacking apartment complexes and compounds. The city could not confirm the veracity of the bulk of the alleged incidents reported in 3,000+ emergency calls received that night, and Peñalosa claimed that there was an orchestrated plot to spread fear among residents. By decreeing a citywide curfew, Duque essentially put vandalism and peaceful protests in the same basket, so the measure was criticized as excessive.

On the evening of Nov. 22, Duque gave another, slightly longer, televised address in which he offered somewhat more substance than the night before: while still adopting a hard line against any acts of violence in protests (he announced the citywide cur, he announced that he would begin a "national conversation" - initially set to begin on Nov. 27, but in the face of criticism for taking so long to begin his "national conversation" amidst mass protests, he pushed it forward. The "national conversation" seems to be inspired by Emmanuel Macron's "Grand débat" following the yellow vests protests - Duque's concept is just as vague, gaseous and all-encompassing as Macron's debate, and will probably end with the same result (i.e. nothing).

Meanwhile, Gustavo Petro, annoyed that no one was paying attention to him, began trying to take credit for the protests and appear as the leader, or at least spiritual father, of the protest movement. This, on balance, is bad news: Petro's egotistical narcissism alienates a bunch of people, and the mere mention of his name whips uribistas and their enablers in a wild frenzy -- the end result being that it distracts from the protagonists of the protests (students, spontaneous protesters) and the real issues and turns the whole thing into yet another Uribe/Duque vs. Petro schoolyard brawl.

Protests, seemingly primarily in Bogotá (that may be a function of the Bogotá-centric nature of the national media) and mostly led by students, continued on Saturday Nov. 23. They were largely peaceful, although the Esmad again intervened to disperse peaceful demonstrators in downtown Bogotá. The police/Esmad's excessive use of force became tragically obvious. In downtown Bogotá, the Esmad shot an unarmed, peaceful 18-year old protester, Dilan Cruz, in the back of the head, critically injuring him.

On Sunday, Duque began his "national conversation" by meeting with governors-elect and departmental capitals' mayors-elect. Medellín mayor-elect Daniel Quintero Calle, who seems to have been following Chilean news a bit too much, proposed a constituent assembly, which he argued would allow for major structural changes and a chance to consolidate peace. His idea generated a lot of debate, but there is little demand for a constituent assembly outside of the radical fringe (far-right and far-left) and most are worried that a constituent assembly is opening Pandora's box. Besides, the entire process is very lengthy.

Duque angered protesters on Sunday by issuing the decree which creates the 'state financial holding', which will manage the assets of 18 state-owned financial institutions (making it the country's third largest financial conglomerate). While the government argues that this financial holding, which fulfills a recommendation from the OECD, will generate greater efficiency, for the leaders of the strike movement it's part of the paquetazo which will lead to mass layoffs and privatizations.

The government gave some more details of the "national conversation". It will run between now and March 15, and would include thematic round-table meetings (with experts, relevant sectors) coordinated by moderators, regional conversations as well as some kind of online platform for citizens' input. It will be organized around 6 themes: "transparency and the fight against corruption", education, "peace with legality" (how the government calls the peace process), the environment, strengthening institutions and "economic growth with equity". Reactions to Duque's "national conversations" have been lukewarm as best. It is criticized for its long timeline (when most agree the grievances expressed since 21N require urgent responses), many suspect that the vague claptrap about "encounters with citizens" seeks to dilute the voice and influence of the sectors/organizations behind the national strike (especially as Duque failed to make any explicit reference to them) and many are skeptical about whether this will yield any results. Indeed, the government has said that while they'll be listening, they'll keep implementing their policies...

New protests on Monday coincided with International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women. Late Monday evening, Dilan Cruz, the 18-year old peaceful protester shot in the back of the head by the Esmad on Saturday, passed away. There was an outpouring of emotions in the streets on Monday night as the news of his death spread. "Dilan didn't die, Dilan was murdered [by the state]" has become a popular rallying cry.

On Tuesday morning, Duque *finally* accepted to meet directly with the strike's national committee, which is composed of the labour unions (CUT, CTC, CGT, oil workers' union USO, teachers' union Fecode), students' unions (Acrees and Unees), agricultural groups (Cumbre Agraria and Dignidad Agropecuaria), indigenous communities (ONIC and CRIC) and pensioners' associations. The national committee insisted that Duque meet with them, and them alone - while Duque wanted to meet with them alongside businessmen and other groups. The meeting was very unproductive: the national committee gave Duque a list of 13 demands, which will be very difficult (if not impossible) for the government to meet, and left the meeting. They're refusing to meet with him again until he has considered their list of demands. They called for another national strike the next day, Wednesday Nov. 27.

On Tuesday, however, Duque did make his first conciliatory move towards the strike movement: he changed tack on the unpopular tax reform mk. 2, revamping it as an "economic growth law" including four concessions aimed at lower-income families, young people and pensioners. The government's messaging on tax reform try 3 - which needs to be adopted by Congress in a hurry before Christmas - is now focused on its ostensible 'social' benefits rather than the tax cuts and exemptions for businesses. Duque announced that this new tax reform will include a VAT refund for low-income families (I believe the poorest 20%), reduce healthcare contributions for pensioners from 12% to 4% by 2022, 'three days without VAT' (actually one of Duque's campaign promises last year) and tax deductions for companies which hire young people between 18 and 28.

Yesterday's protests, convened by the national committee, were much, much smaller than 21N and may indicate that the movement may be running out of steam, although apparently streets became far more crowded with demonstrators in the evening, as has become common now over the past week. In any case, although the Esmad needed to rough up some students last night (and, seemingly, have very badly injured another one) because that's what those thugs do, the protests were peaceful - and, in fact, characterized by a "symphonic cacerolazo" in Bogotá yesterday evening, with musicians (led by the director of the national symphonic orchestra) and to the tune of Beethoven's Ode to Joy. Meanwhile, Duque and Petro called one another arsonists.

Today, Medicina Legal (the forensics authority) ruled that Dilan Cruz's death was an homicide, and that the cartridge fired by the Esmad's shotgun was a 'bean bag' munition (lead pellets in a cloth bag).

[Hash]

Another day of nationwide protests called by the strike committee yesterday. Thousands of people in the streets again, with tensions rising as night fell. Turnout not as impressive as on 21N, but comparable to (or perhaps slightly higher than) 27N.

The government has agreed in principle to direct negotiations with the strike committee but also insisted that the strike committee call off yesterday's strikes. At the same time, the government is clearly indicating that its national conversation is a sham and that it has no real intention in changing course. Interior minister Nancy Patricia Gutiérrez pissed off a bunch of people with some pretty incendiary tweets against the protests on Sunday. On Tuesday, the tax reform try 3 (sweetened with Duque's fake concessions) passed its first debate in Congress, despite continued opposition from the opposition parties and the strike committee. Having reached some kind of (temporary?) agreement with CR and Germán Vargas Lleras, the government's tax reform now appears likely to be adopted quickly (in exchange, it will support some of CR's legislative agenda). As I expected, the government is counting on protest fatigue + Focus on Christmas to weaken the protests' momentum and, as a result, not be forced to do anything.

In the latest Invamer-Gallup poll released yesterday, with fieldwork in the midst of the protests, Duque's approval collapses even lower to 24% with 70% disapproval. Pessimism in the country's direction (79%) is at its highest since the 2013 agrarian strike (and before that the darkest days of Pastrana's presidency). Álvaro Uribe's unfavourable numbers reach an all-time high: 66% unfav. vs only 26% favourable (!) -- this is a guy who had 80% approvals during his presidency.