Major campaign underway to nullify Electoral College

[beneficii]

The pace to nullify the EC is picking up, so far this year:

Colorado House Passes National Popular Vote Bill
Oregon House Passes National Popular Vote Bill
New Mexico House Passes National Popular Vote Bill
Arkansas House, Washington House, and Vermont Senate Pass National Popular Vote Bill


I think there is a good chance this plan will be in effect by 2012

Even if enough states pass it, don't forget that tthis is done by state statute. Any legislature that doesn't like the way 2012 might turn out can just as easily repeal their state law before the electors would be certified. Only a constitutional amendment can change the system and not leave it open to partisan whim.

Not true.  A state may not break a compact it has signed onto.  An interstate compact is like an international treaty and supersedes state law:

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(emphasis added)

https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=49+Fla.+L.+Rev.+1&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=04a01655420564f0c293e096df74fc67

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http://books.google.co.jp/books?id=qWehEho4Vu4C&lpg=PA34&ots=6cgZc015m8&dq=impairment%20clause%20interstate%20compacts&pg=PA34#v=onepage&q=impairment%20clause%20interstate%20compacts&f=true

[beneficii]

With all due respect....the fact that most Americans approve of the system is hardly an argument in favor of said system

That is true, but it is also true that there 70%+ public support for a direct national election of the president:

http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/polls.php

[beneficii]

Hm. To me, it seems that there's a problem with a bare majority of the states deciding to completely change the way we elect a President, especially if the other states have opposed this compact. I really don't want half the states telling the other half of the states that they don't have a say anymore, especially if they have rejected this compact.

But they are not completely changing the way.  We have been electing the president the same way since 1804 and this compact does not propose to change that.  It simply allows for a group of states to sign onto a compact where they will use their plenary powers to decide the method of the appointment of their respective electors.

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U.S. Const., Article II, Section 1.

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McPherson v. Blacker (1892), SCOTUS

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Bush v. Gore (2000), SCOTUS

These sources were taken from nationalpopularvote.com in their FAQ.

[beneficii]

The compact would not need Congressional consent to take effect.  SCOTUS has ruled that the requirement for consent cannot be read literally:

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U.S. Steel Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission, SCOTUS

This would be a compact among those states to exercise powers that already exist within the exclusive domain of the states, that of the method of appointing presidential electors.  The Court's rulings have only required consent where the compacts encroach on the supremacy of the U.S. government.  Would such a compact need consent, if it is only to coordinate the exercise of a power the states already have exclusively?

Either way, just to be safe, the NPVIC advocates are seeking such consent.

Sourcing taken from this page:

http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/answers/m15.php#m15_4

You may want to try reading through this, as it is well-sourced. 

[beneficii]

Neither Virginia v. Tennessee nor United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n would be applicable in a the case of an irrevocable binding agreement between the States as to how they choose electors.

In Virginia v. Tennessee, the Court found that the Congress had given its assent, albeit informally, to the border agreement made by the States.  In mentioned in passing that there were classes of interstate agreements that did not require Congressional approval.

In the other case, since a state may withdraw from the Multistate Tax Commission at any time, it is not cogent either.

Certainly the States may choose to jointly agree on a method of choosing electors, but that agreement cannot be made irrevocable, nor can it be made enforceable absent Congressional approval of the compact.  States would be free to leave at any time.

First, the NPVIC is not an irrevocable binding agreement, as a state would be free to withdraw at any time; the only proviso is that if the state enacts a withdrawal within six months of the end of a presidential term, the withdrawal may only take effect when a new president-elect shall have qualified:

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http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/misc/888wordcompact.php

Under the Impairments Clause of the Constitution, because a compact is like a contract a state cannot just violate the terms of the contract.

The other question is one of whether Congressional consent is required for the compact to take effect.  In the case of U.S. Steel named above, that compact at the time of the SCOTUS ruling had not received even implied consent from Congress, yet the Court upheld the compact.  (That the compact had not received that consent was at the heart of the controversy in that case.)

Of course, the NPVIC is likely to be challenged anyway, so the case bears watching, but in accordance with previous cases, since the compact is limited to one subject and is simply an agreement between states concerning how they will use powers that are already exclusively in their domain, consent would likely not be required.  Either way, so that D.C. can become part of the NPVIC and just to be sure, the supports of the NPVIC are still seeking either implied or express Congressional consent.

[beneficii]

... a state would be free to withdraw at any time; the only proviso is that if the state enacts a withdrawal within six months of the end of a presidential term, the withdrawal may only take effect when a new president-elect shall have qualified:

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http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/misc/888wordcompact.php

Under the Impairments Clause of the Constitution, because a compact is like a contract a state cannot just violate the terms of the contract.

Without Congressional approval, the six month deadline is non-enforceable as the contract would not have been validly entered into.

The other question is one of whether Congressional consent is required for the compact to take effect.  In the case of U.S. Steel named above, that compact at the time of the SCOTUS ruling had not received even implied consent from Congress, yet the Court upheld the compact.  (That the compact had not received that consent was at the heart of the controversy in that case.)

State withdrawal was not at issue in the U.S. Steel case.  From the syllabus of that case:

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(Bold and underline emphasis added.)

The six month withdrawal proviso of the NPVIC does not meet the standard of the holding in the U.S. Steel case.

Of course, the NPVIC is likely to be challenged anyway, so the case bears watching, but in accordance with previous cases, since the compact is limited to one subject and is simply an agreement between states concerning how they will use powers that are already exclusively in their domain, consent would likely not be required.

As I pointed out, that six month proviso is invalid without Congressional consent.  The rest of the NPVIC should survive any court challenge.  Besides, the six months is more like three and a half months.  If any State tried to change its method of selecting electors after Election Day, it wouldn't meet the standard for incontestability in the Congress.

Just because there are provisos on withdrawal in the law does not mean the compact requires Congressional consent for those provisos to have force of law.  For example, the Multistate Tax Compact (MTC) does have a proviso on withdrawal, signifying where the compliance of states would matter the most for the purposes of that compact.  Here is the MTC on the matter of withdrawal:

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http://www.mtc.gov/About.aspx?id=98

The presence of such provisos does not make the compact require Congressional consent.

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If a compact requires Congressional consent, then none of it can take effect without that consent.

I agree with you, however, on the period following Election Day.  The NPVIC would provide some redundancy for that period.

EDIT: Changed "approval" to "consent" to be more consistent with terms.

[beneficii]

Just because there are provisos on withdrawal in the law does not mean the compact requires Congressional consent for those provisos to have force of law.  For example, the Multistate Tax Compact (MTC) does have a proviso on withdrawal, signifying where the compliance of states would matter the most for the purposes of that compact.  Here is the MTC on the matter of withdrawal:

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http://www.mtc.gov/About.aspx?id=98

The presence of such provisos does not make the compact require Congressional consent.

That proviso is a simple restatement of the Constitutional ban on ex post facto laws.

If a compact requires Congressional consent, then none of it can take effect without that consent.

Not so.  The NPVIC includes a severability clause.   If the limitation on withdrawal were held to be invalid, then the rest would still apply, assuming that there were still 270 EVs in the agreement.  Not that I think the NPVIC will go into force any time soon.  It won't be in place for 2012 and until we get another case where the popular vote and electoral vote disagree there won't be much impetus for it.

At best, advocates of a national popular vote have something in place that could be quickly enacted after the next time the EV and the PV disagree.

Here is a discussion that should give a good introduction to the question:

http://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008-R-0221.htm

[beneficii]

Here is a discussion that should give a good introduction to the question:

http://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008-R-0221.htm

Not really, because it does not touch upon the sole point of disagreement between us concerning the constitutionality of the NPVIC, the six month waiting period to revoke membership.  The rest of the NPVIC is constitutional, but the severable provision that bars a State from exiting the Compact in that six month window is not unless Congress gives its assent to the Compact.  That limitation on when a State can withdraw is what makes the NPVIC a delegation of sovereign power, which under the holding of the U.S. Steel makes it a compact that requires Congressional approval.

I found a source that didn't bring it up.  Perhaps it was just an omission?  Here is another source:

http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/pdfs/108/1/Gringer.pdf

The author at this source is opposed to the NPVIC.  It's published at the Columbia Law Review, so you would expect a pretty well-detailed essay, and it is 230 pages long, but the article did not mention your concern at all, or at least I couldn't find it.  Perhaps he didn't find it that substantial, or perhaps he just forgot?

This detailed book, written by proponents of NPVIC, seems to omit mentioning it as well.  One would think it would be found in one of the following places:

http://www.every-vote-equal.com/pdf/EVECh5new_web.pdf

http://www.every-vote-equal.com/pdf/EVE-CH-8.pdf

http://www.every-vote-equal.com/pdf/EVECh10new_web.pdf

This is a document that was jointly written by at least a couple lawyers, and a political science professor who has published books on interstate compacts:

http://www.every-vote-equal.com/pdf/EVEBios_web.pdf

Perhaps that was just an omission too?

I mean, where in the literature could one find this concern?  None of my sources seem to be any good, but they do seem to be otherwise good sources on the subject, both supportive and opposed.  Perhaps you know where to find this concern?

EDIT: Modified with some slight wording changes, and then here is the book published online:

http://www.every-vote-equal.com/tableofcontents.htm

[beneficii]

To be fair, it is a very minor concern, as it would be unlikely that the timing issue would be significant unless a State were already in the process of considering withdrawing from the NPVIC at the time before the July 20 deadline but did not do so until after July 20, and such State's withdrawal would affect whether the agreement was in force.  I don't see a State likely considering withdrawal from scratch after July 20.

In any case, my main objections to the NPVIC aren't constitutional at all, rather they are:
1. Ballot Access
The NPVIC strongly assumes that only the Republican and Democratic parties matter.  The agreeing States are not having to adopt identical ballot access rules (and even if they did, the non compacting States are not).  Not only that, but in the circumstances that major (i.e. they got EVs) third party efforts have been made, they regularly do not end up on the ballot in every state, and in some cases have displaced the major party candidates from the ballot in that State so that they were not on the ballot everywhere.

2. Close Elections
The NPVIC makes the problem of a close election national and provides no mechanism to effectively deal with it. In 1960, the national PV margin was less than 0.2%, a margin that in many States would trigger an automatic recount and in the remainder would usually allow the loser to demand a recount.  In 1880, the margin was less than 0.1%. Yet there is no provision for recounts being triggered in such a close election, and even if they were, no way to get the noncompacting states to join in on a recount.

You keep raising the question.  Is your concern even valid?  What is the source for your concern?

[beneficii]

To be fair, it is a very minor concern, as it would be unlikely that the timing issue would be significant unless a State were already in the process of considering withdrawing from the NPVIC at the time before the July 20 deadline but did not do so until after July 20, and such State's withdrawal would affect whether the agreement was in force.  I don't see a State likely considering withdrawal from scratch after July 20.

You keep raising the question.  Is your concern even valid?  What is the source for your concern?

My concern over the six month limit is valid, and I've quoted the parts of previous Supreme Court rulings that support my opinion on the issue.  Granted, it is unlikely to be a concern that will matter since a very specific set of circumstances would have to happen for it to matter, even assuming the NPVIC effort ever crosses the 270EV threshold.

Are you talking about the leap of logic where you take this paragraph:

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and make it say that Congressional consent can be required for just the part that puts provisos on withdrawal, if there's a severability clause, but where there are cases the rest of the compact can just go ahead and take effect, because of the severability clause?  Tell me, have you ever heard of a court case where the argument was that only part of a compact required Congressional consent to take effect, and the rest could just take effect, as long as there is a severability clause?

And then, you dismiss the one proviso on withdrawal that did exist in the case the Supreme Court quotation came from by saying it is simply a restatement of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution, so it is not a real proviso on withdrawal?  (The proviso in the MTC keeps the states from throwing away their obligations when it matters the most to the operation of the compact, just like the proviso in the NPVIC does.  That is, it simply binds the states to their compact while they are part of it, which is like a contract, one which they cannot break or else they violate the Contract Clause.)

EDIT: Slight wording change that better clarifies what I'm saying.

[beneficii]

If the compact gets 270 EV worth of states signed on, it should become a lot easier to amend the Constitution to have the same effect as the compact.

Only problem is that it is far easier to repeal a national popular vote if it doesn't work, when you only have to get enough states to jump ship on the NPVIC versus having to repeal an Amendment to the Constitution.

EDIT: Also, the threshold of support is lower, using the flexibility of the electoral college.

[beneficii]

To be fair, it is a very minor concern, as it would be unlikely that the timing issue would be significant unless a State were already in the process of considering withdrawing from the NPVIC at the time before the July 20 deadline but did not do so until after July 20, and such State's withdrawal would affect whether the agreement was in force.  I don't see a State likely considering withdrawal from scratch after July 20.

You keep raising the question.  Is your concern even valid?  What is the source for your concern?

My concern over the six month limit is valid, and I've quoted the parts of previous Supreme Court rulings that support my opinion on the issue.  Granted, it is unlikely to be a concern that will matter since a very specific set of circumstances would have to happen for it to matter, even assuming the NPVIC effort ever crosses the 270EV threshold.

Are you talking about the leap of logic where you take this paragraph:

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and make it say that Congressional consent can be required for just the part that puts provisos on withdrawal, if there's a severability clause, but where there are cases the rest of the compact can just go ahead and take effect, because of the severability clause?  Tell me, have you ever heard of a court case where the argument was that only part of a compact required Congressional consent to take effect, and the rest could just take effect, as long as there is a severability clause?

And then, you dismiss the one proviso on withdrawal that did exist in the case the Supreme Court quotation came from by saying it is simply a restatement of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution, so it is not a real proviso on withdrawal?  (The proviso in the MTC keeps the states from throwing away their obligations when it matters the most to the operation of the compact, just like the proviso in the NPVIC does.  That is, it simply binds the states to their compact while they are part of it, which is like a contract, one which they cannot break or else they violate the Contract Clause.)

EDIT: Slight wording change that better clarifies what I'm saying.

The court has routinely used the presence of a severability clause to decide whether to toss an entire law or just parts of it, so once a part that causes a constitutional problem is severed, the rest would be acceptable.  The compact clause makes its clear that enforceable contracts between States require the Consent of Congress.  The only provision of the NPVIC that males it a enforceable contract instead of State law is the withdrawl proviso. The Constitution and existing federal law allow a State to change its method of choosing electors up until election day.  Setting an earlier date makes it a compact that requires Congressional approval instead of being a collection of States that have chosen to use the same method of selecting electors.

So it's not just about imposing some limits on withdrawal, it's about enforcing the whole thing.  So now, it seems, not only have you taken the quoted paragraph from the Supreme Court decision to make it say that, hey, there can be no provisos on withdrawal or when a state can withdraw, but that now in order for any compact to be enforceable, it must be consented to by Congress.  So, where the compacting states come together, but don't intend to seek Congressional consent, they don't care if it's enforceable or not?  I mean, I guess sometimes someone may enter into a contract, where they don't care where it's enforceable.

Also, I'm still waiting for that court case which wrestles with question about whether only part of a compact needs Congressional consent (because of the severability clause), but not the whole thing.

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True, but you yourself quoted the case mentioning withdrawal.  Clearly, withdrawal was used in that case.  If you read back, the main concern of the court in deciding the question of whether consent was needed was not whether it placed provisos on withdrawal, though of course being able to withdraw at any time helped the case for the compact not needing Congressional consent, but whether the provisions of the compact had the effect of increasing the member states powers "quoad the national government."  The court looked at several aspects in that case.

Also, you seem to have returned to saying that a compact is enforceable, by saying that the MTC can cause a state to incur liability, but only if it does not limit the withdrawal at all, while ignoring the fact that there are provisos in the MTC relating to withdrawal, as well.

You also bring up again that seemingly ridiculous ex post facto point, while ignoring the fact that the state cannot do it because it cannot violate the Contract and Impairments Clause, and without providing any source yourself in support.

Please tell me, What have you read regarding Interstate compacts?  Make sure to include what supports your points.

[beneficii]

Why would a Court case deal with whether severability is applicable to state compacts in particular?  Severability clauses, such as that included in the NPVIC are a standard feature of most legislation so that if a portion is ruled invalid what remains can still take effect.  The only time a severability clause isn't included is if the law is so simple there is only one issue at stake, or the drafters want it to be all or nothing.  Once the withdrawal limitation is severed from the NPVIC, what remains is not a contract, but a bunch of identically worded State laws, that would still be valid in any State that hadn't repealed the law that caused the State to adopt the NPVIC.

Do you have that court case talking about where only part of a compact clause needs Congressional consent?  Or even barring that, do you have any academic source that states that compacts may only partly need Congressional consent if they have a severability clause?  And for academic sources that do mention the severability clauses, what do they say?  Every source I've read on Interstate compacts, including every source I've provided here, only ever deals with whether a compact as a whole requires complete Congressional consent.

If you look more closely at the wording of such severability clauses, you see that severability applies in cases where that part is found to be "invalid"?  But would you consider a part of a compact to be "invalid" just because Congress has yet to give consent to it?  Would you consider an amendment to a bill that has passed only one house of Congress, even though the bill itself has passed both houses of Congresses, do be "invalid" until the other house passes it too?

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Again, why would states enter into a compact if there is nothing to enforce, (EDIT: if there is nothing they want to make sure that the other states provide in return for what they provide)?

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Your behavior in this thread has been appalling.  You again bring up the clause dealing with ex post facto laws, when I already asked for a source on your assertion of its relation to the MTC, and when it clearly is because of the Contracts and Impairments Clause instead that a state cannot just shirk its liability incurred under the MTC (and I have presented reliable sources mentioning the Contract Clause), meaning that the MTC is/has been enforceable, even though it has not obtained Congressional consent.

Your attempts to make the ex post facto laws apply to a compact that doesn't have anything to do with ex post facto laws are worse than your attempts to stretch the meaning of the quoted paragraph in the SCOTUS's ruling on the MTC case to make it so there can be no provisos on withdrawal.  Do you have any desire to seriously read up on the subject, or to read and understand the sources that introduce the concepts of interstate compacts and how the NPVIC falls under the law, that I have posted?

[beneficii]

True Federalist,

If you're looking to read further, read this by the Council of State Governments:

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http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/CompactEducation/Congressional_Consent_and_other_Legal_Issues-CSGNCIC.pdf

This restates the concern of the SCOTUS relating to whether the compact increases powers quoad the national government, but does not rip some phrases from the last sentence relating to time limits from the opening sentence of the quoted paragraph we have discussed so much from the context set by the first, as you have done.  Congressional consent being required or not, it is still a contract, and so the member states are subject to the Contract Clause regarding it.

EDIT: Forgot to add link.

[beneficii]

Even if one takes the view that the NPVIC is a contract does not require Congressional approval, it does not follow that if a State broke the contract before Election Day that the State could be obligated to cast its votes for the NPV winner, so long as the other States still have the option of selecting their electors the old way.

If a State withdraws between July 20 and Election Day, thereby causing the number of agreeing EV's to fall below 270, what action would the other States had done in anticipation of the withdrawing State remaining in the NPVIC?  None, as electors aren't appointed until after Election Day.  Hence, there is no harm done, as the remaining States can appoint electors using their own popular votes.

It may well be that one or more of the candidates is inconvenienced, but they aren't a party to the agreement.

The state in question would have violated the Contract Clause of the Constitution ("No State shall...pass any...Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts") and been subject to suit by other member states seeking enforcement.  If the Supreme Court says that no Congressional consent is needed for the Compact to take effect (or the Compact has received consent) and the Compact is constitutional, and the court finds that the defendant is violating the Compact, then the Court will order that the violating state comply with the Compact.  (Now, if all member states unanimously agreed to ditch the Compact, that would be different, as there would be no state that would seek enforcement; therefore, no one would have standing.)

It's just like a contract.  If you're party to a contract, and the other side isn't keeping up their end of the bargain, wouldn't you seek enforcement and wouldn't you have the right to bring suit requesting that enforcement?  But if all parties agree to ditch the contract, that would be the end of it, right?

[beneficii]

So long as the other States have not already selected their electors, and know that the withdrawing State will not be using the national popular vote to select its electors, what harm has been caused? Even if there were a harm, why must the redress be enforcement of the NPVIC?

Good God!  Your behavior has gotten even more appalling, as you are now denying knowledge of the basic principles of contracts!  Of course the redress would be the enforcement of the NPVIC, because that is the contract the state signed!  The state agreed to do it, and now the state would be violating the contract they signed!  Sure, the suing states wouldn't be able to get money out of it, but assuming the conditions I laid out in my previous post were true they'd get enforcement of the contract.  That is, they'd get an injunction ordering the state to follow the contract, exactly what they would have sought.

Why are you being like this on this issue?  Are you that opposed to the NPVIC that you'd thought to encourage opposition with bogus statements?  You are a moderator and you seem to be present yourself as someone with good knowledge of the Constitution and other matters!  What is with your behavior!  Until you explain to me this, I refuse to engage in any more discussion with you on this matter!

[beneficii]

I am not a lawyer, nor have I ever claimed to be one.  I do have a strong respect for individual State sovereignty, and July 20 deadline is an arbitrary, capricious restraint on that sovereignty.  This discussion has proved useful, as it has given me a chance to refine my gut feeling on this side issue of the NPVIC.

If were I making a fresh argument against the validity of the July 20 proviso,  it would be as follows.

1. Article II Section 1 Clause 2 provides that "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors".

2. Article II Section 1 Clause 4 provides that "The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors".

3. Congress has used its Clause 4 power to provide in 3 USC 1 that "The electors of President and Vice President shall be appointed, in each State, on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November, in every fourth year succeeding every election of a President and Vice President."

4. Congress has further reinforced the importance of Election Day in by providing in 3 USC 5 that "If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State,"  (Emphasis mine.)  Clearly Congress has provided that States are free to change the method used to select electors up until Election.

Therefore, any purported State contract or State law that prevents a State from changing the method of selecting electors at any time prior to Election Day, infringes upon Congress' power under Article II Section 1 Clause 4 to determine when Electors will be chosen.

Hence, the July 20 provsio in the NPVIC can only be enforceable if Congress assents.  This is not only because of any implications of the Compact Clause, but because that proviso touches upon Congress' authority under Article II Section 1 Clause 4.

True Federalist,

If you're looking to read further, read this by the Council of State Governments:

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http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/CompactEducation/Congressional_Consent_and_other_Legal_Issues-CSGNCIC.pdf

As I have shown, there is a federal interest being intruded upon by the July 20 proviso of the NPVIC.

In your post you fail to distinguish directing the manner in which the electors are appointed and the choosing of electors.  After the day for choosing electors has passed, of course a state can't change its manner of appointing the elections, because the day for choosing the electors has passed, unless it intends to have that enactment be for the following election!  So if a state failed to choose its electors on that day, of course that would be an issue for Congress to be involved in.

But we're focused on the period before the day for choosing electors, and we're talking about the manner that the state legislature may direct to be used, which is granted to that legislature.  When a state legislature signs onto the Compact and the Compact takes effect and it is now 6 months until the next Presidential inauguration, it is agreeing that from 6 months before the inauguration until a president-elect shall have qualified, it will keep its state's manner of appointing electors the same as specified in the Compact.  The Supreme Court has ruled repeatedly, and the Impairments Clause shows, that a Compact is the same as a contract and a state cannot violate it.  The electors would still be chosen on the day selected by Congress, so there would be no infringement on Congress's power under Art. II, Sec. 1, Cl. 4.

Also, as I have repeatedly pointed out and provided supporting evidence for, there are compacts that do not need Congressional consent to take effect.  If this Compact does require Congressional consent, it would not be because of infringement upon Congress's power under Art. II, Sec. 1, Cl. 4.

You also bring up the issue of state sovereignty, but fail to note one of the important aspects of that sovereignty, the ability to enter into compacts with other sovereigns.  2 or more parties will not enter into a contract unless the agreement is somehow binding on the other parties.  If states could not reasonably expect to hold other states accountable for the compacts they signed, then the compact system would fail, and states would either be forced to solve many of their problems in an uncoordinated manner or Congress would be forced to directly regulate those issues that have an effect on interstate commerce for which a compact might have been more effective or doable instead.

As pointed out in the case of regarding the MTC, the Compact Clause applies to those compacts that would tend to increase state power relative to federal power, or would interfere with the exercise of federal power.  The NPVIC does not do that--it is an agreement among state legislatures for a certain period to direct a specific manner for appointing electors, which is within the power of those legislatures.

As for the date July 20th, here is a good introduction to the reasons behind the choosing of that date, and why it isn't arbitrary and capricious, but is rather necessary to the proper functioning of the NPVIC:

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http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/answers/m9.php#m9_2

[beneficii]

Tell me, in 2004 and 2008, which party did the electoral college favor relative to the popular vote?  I think that by doing so you can dispel a lot of myths Republican opponents of the NPV have on this issue, namely the idea that the electoral college structurally favors Republicans or the idea that implementing a NPV would favor the Democrats.

Bush nearly lost the 2004 election despite winning a majority of the popular vote!

Here are some more:

http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20041112.html

[beneficii]

Very few people support this on principle, most just do because of bitterness over 2000.

Very few people support the popular vote determining who wins the election? I doubt that. Now granted, this is just a way to achieve that goal.....but the principle behind the idea is the same.

But again, some latte liberal in Massachusetts will support this until his state's electoral votes go to Sarah Palin.

The electoral votes are irrelevant under this system....they don't count for anything.

Actually they do count, they are just assigned differently than in the current system. Assume the compact is in force and take the given example of Palin over Obama. Under the compact MA would seat a slate of Palin electors to vote in the EC. The compact guarantees that if no electors are faithless, then the candidate with the highest popular vote total would command a majority of electors. The slates of electors remain a real part of this system, that's how it survives a constitutional challenge.

The electors, now and as they would be under the NPVIC, are like the Queen of England.

EDIT: To clarify, not many care (or even really know) about the electoral college today, and consistently polls have shown a supermajority of Americans supporting the adoption of a national popular vote system.  It's just like the Queen of England.

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Earlier in this thread it was claimed:
"As was lengthily debated already in this thread, the only portion of the NPVIC that makes it Constitutionally suspect are the limitations on State withdrawal once it goes into force. "

There is another Constitutional argument against the Compact.  
The 12th Amendment provides a Constitutional process if no single candidate gets a majority of EVs, such as could occur when three candidates split EVs.   This compact makes it impossible for the 12th Amendment to ever be used.  Thus the states in the Compact, through state laws, prevent all states (and citizens) from using a Constitutional process.   I do not think states can pass laws to get around Constitutional protections.

Although the 12th amendment has not been used since the early 1800's it just might affect the 2012 race.  If 2012 is a Palin-Obama contest, there are strong hints Bloomberg would run, and with his Billions to spend, might win enough states to prevent anyone from winning 270 EV, and hence the President would be determined via the 12th Amendment.

But the 12th amendment is used (and whether it is used is irrelevant), and nothing in the 12th amendment overrides the state's plenary powers to determine the manner of selecting electors.

[beneficii]

There is another Constitutional argument against the Compact. 
The 12th Amendment provides a Constitutional process if no single candidate gets a majority of EVs, such as could occur when three candidates split EVs.   This compact makes it impossible for the 12th Amendment to ever be used.  Thus the states in the Compact, through state laws, prevent all states (and citizens) from using a Constitutional process.   I do not think states can pass laws to get around Constitutional protections.

That's a totally fallacious argument. If passed, the NPVIC would de facto nullify the 12th Amendment, but absolutely nothing in the NPVIC is explicitely contrary to the 12th Amendment. The 12th Amentment never states that there must be cases where its provision applies. Imagine the constitution says "any flying pig shall have its wings cut". If you interpret it the same way you interpret the 12th Amendment, it would imply "flying pigs shall exist".

You answered this way better than I did.

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It'll probably pick up California and maybe New York but not much else in the 2011-12 cycle.  But after that, it won't pick up much more for now.  Rightly or wrongly, the NPVIC is perceived as favoring the Democratic Party right now.

That is correct, but for the medium-term I think the chances are very good.  Polling has consistently shown that about 70% of Americans support, with consistent majorities in every state, since World War II.  Evidence also shows a lot of support from moderate Republicans and former politicians who are Republican (such as Bob Dole), such as statements and recorded votes (see the votes in the NY State Senate).

In my view, once the NPVIC crosses a certain threshold of EV's, such as 150-200, then with the increased national coverage and people caring about it, it should take off like a rocket and would be adopted, or lead to the adoption of a constitutional amendment modifying the presidential election process.

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I think any such attempt would be filibustered.

[beneficii]

I wouldn't be surprised that if the GOP retakes the White House in 2012 that repeal of DC's adoption of this was forced upon the District.

I think any such attempt would be filibustered.

That assumes the Democrats have 41 Senators in the 113th Congress.  If the 2012 election is as bad for the Democrats as the 2010 election is shaping up to be, it is quite conceivable that the GOP will have a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate by then, even if they don't retake control of the Senate in this election.  In a perfect election year for the GOP there are by my count 14 currently Democratic seats (CA, FL, MI, MN, MO, MT, NE, NJ, ND, OH, PA, VA, WA, and WI) that are potential GOP gains in 2012, tho some of those would likely require the current incumbent to not seek reelection and have the race be for an open seat.

Even if the Republicans did get a filibuster-proof majority, I would not think all Republicans would be on board.  60 Republicans in the Senate = 5-10 Mike Castles in the Senate.

[beneficii]

In my view, once the NPVIC crosses a certain threshold of EV's, such as 150-200, then with the increased national coverage and people caring about it, it should take off like a rocket and would be adopted, or lead to the adoption of a constitutional amendment modifying the presidential election process.

I could definitely see it getting a huge burst of publicity once we reach the point at which it only takes one or two more states to reach 270.  But that might not happen for some time.  And I'm not exactly sure how this issue will play politically once it reaches that stage.  A national popular vote might be popular in the abstract right now, but once such a radical change in the electoral system comes close to reality, the people who benefit from the current system will come up with all sorts of creative reasons for why this has to be stopped.

Agreed.  This being at the 150-200 EV stage will mean that this will remain a wonkish issue that only political insiders care about, and they will largely vote in their party's self-interest rather the public perception.  Plus, until we have another election where the PV and EV results diverge, this won't be on the public radar.  At most, the NPVIC has done the groundwork for something to be quickly done the next time the PV winner does not win the EV.  Given how infrequently that has occurred, it may well not be until the 22nd century that it happens (in which case the NPVIC may well have been completely forgotten by then).

What about those people in California and Texas and New York who, despite their large populations, are practically ignored by presidential candidates in the general election?  It isn't just about elections where the EV winner happened to differ from the PV winner, but rather that the possibility exists in every election--that is why candidates focus on a few swing states and just about entirely ignore the rest.  (EDIT: Need I remind you that the national popular vote has had consistent majority support in polls?)

It's an injustice that the NPVIC supporters have been beating the drums about, and if the NPVIC gets to 150-200 EV, I think they can gain momentum on it.  In the eyes of the public, once they are actually aware that many of them have been getting ignored by presidential candidates they will want a change.  This already impacted the 2008 election, where the candidates promised to campaign across the country equally (though it turned out they lied and did the usual way anyway).

Not only that, it isn't just something Democrats support, as I've stated before, but there are many moderate Republicans who have supported it as well, as evidenced in the roll call votes of many states that have considered and passed it.  Essentially, this has been and is something that is supported by Democrats and moderate Republicans, which suggests in the long run it will win or will spur the adoption of a constitutional amendment relating to the matter.

[beneficii]

Here's an article written by a tea partier on the issue:

http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/blogs/charlsteaparty_20100823.php