Major campaign underway to nullify Electoral College

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

And what State politician in his right mind is going to pass this?  No safe State is going to give the opposing party the chance to claim its electoral votes, and no swing State is going to want Presidential attention diffused away from it.  Possibly this might sneak in via a referendum in a few states, but not enough to reach the 270 electoral vote margin to make this work.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

I wouldn't say that it is unconstitutional Sam.  More like it is unenforceable if a State decides to not choose its electors based on the national vote after having committed to do so.  There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent a State from choosing its electors on the basis of the national vote or any other mechanism that the State chooses.  Heck, they could randomly select electors from among the eligible registered voters, or make being an elector a lottery prize and it would be acceptable.  Certainly would give a whole new meaning to Powerball.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Having a popular vote plurality election to allocate all of a state's electoral votes is a perfectly legal way of doing things should a state choose to do so. It's also 100% against the way the founding fathers intended this rule. Remember that. We're already exploiting a loophole to make things democratic. This just takes it one step further.

I wouldn't argue that the founders intended to be anti-democratic in the selection of the electors.  Except for the 1789 election where the process of choosing the Federal government was still being established, and 1800 where several state legislatures chose to not trust their voters and paid the price as a result, there have been a majority of electors elected by the voters.

What the founders had no conception of was of party politics.  That has had a greater effect upon the Presidential election process than the gradual adoption of universal suffrage.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Let me put this in a different way, if I may. In the Kingdom of Prussia, the Abgeordnetenhaus was divided into three groups, with one-third of the seats being elected by that part of the population that paid one-third of the taxes. The richest thus had one-third of the seats, the middle one-third, and the lower class one-third. Do you have any objection to this?

An economic based republic is as workable as any other, though ideally it should not just be based on taxes, but also expenditures.  If I pay $50,000 in taxes but receive $60,000 from the government, should I be more deserving of ten times the representation of someone who pays $5,000 in taxes but receives $1,000 in government income?.  I'd say not.  (Such a system would effectively eliminate most voting by senior citizens who receive Social Security.)

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

The pace to nullify the EC is picking up, so far this year:

Colorado House Passes National Popular Vote Bill
Oregon House Passes National Popular Vote Bill
New Mexico House Passes National Popular Vote Bill
Arkansas House, Washington House, and Vermont Senate Pass National Popular Vote Bill


I think there is a good chance this plan will be in effect by 2012

Even if enough states pass it, don't forget that tthis is done by state statute. Any legislature that doesn't like the way 2012 might turn out can just as easily repeal their state law before the electors would be certified. Only a constitutional amendment can change the system and not leave it open to partisan whim.

Not true.  A state may not break a compact it has signed onto.  An interstate compact is like an international treaty and supersedes state law:

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(emphasis added)

https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=49+Fla.+L.+Rev.+1&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=04a01655420564f0c293e096df74fc67

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http://books.google.co.jp/books?id=qWehEho4Vu4C&lpg=PA34&ots=6cgZc015m8&dq=impairment%20clause%20interstate%20compacts&pg=PA34#v=onepage&q=impairment%20clause%20interstate%20compacts&f=true

A compact requires the consent of Congress as well. (Article I Section 10 Clause 3 of the Constitution.)  These State laws are as far as I can tell, not being enacted in the form a a compact that would be sent to Congress for approval, and even if they were, I see no chance that this would pass the Senate anytime soon.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Neither Virginia v. Tennessee nor United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n would be applicable in a the case of an irrevocable binding agreement between the States as to how they choose electors.

In Virginia v. Tennessee, the Court found that the Congress had given its assent, albeit informally, to the border agreement made by the States.  In mentioned in passing that there were classes of interstate agreements that did not require Congressional approval.

In the other case, since a state may withdraw from the Multistate Tax Commission at any time, it is not cogent either.

Certainly the States may choose to jointly agree on a method of choosing electors, but that agreement cannot be made irrevocable, nor can it be made enforceable absent Congressional approval of the compact.  States would be free to leave at any time.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

I hop these campaigns succeed.

What do pancakes have to do with politics?

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

... a state would be free to withdraw at any time; the only proviso is that if the state enacts a withdrawal within six months of the end of a presidential term, the withdrawal may only take effect when a new president-elect shall have qualified:

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http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/misc/888wordcompact.php

Under the Impairments Clause of the Constitution, because a compact is like a contract a state cannot just violate the terms of the contract.

Without Congressional approval, the six month deadline is non-enforceable as the contract would not have been validly entered into.

The other question is one of whether Congressional consent is required for the compact to take effect.  In the case of U.S. Steel named above, that compact at the time of the SCOTUS ruling had not received even implied consent from Congress, yet the Court upheld the compact.  (That the compact had not received that consent was at the heart of the controversy in that case.)

State withdrawal was not at issue in the U.S. Steel case.  From the syllabus of that case:

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(Bold and underline emphasis added.)

The six month withdrawal proviso of the NPVIC does not meet the standard of the holding in the U.S. Steel case.

Of course, the NPVIC is likely to be challenged anyway, so the case bears watching, but in accordance with previous cases, since the compact is limited to one subject and is simply an agreement between states concerning how they will use powers that are already exclusively in their domain, consent would likely not be required.

As I pointed out, that six month proviso is invalid without Congressional consent.  The rest of the NPVIC should survive any court challenge.  Besides, the six months is more like three and a half months.  If any State tried to change its method of selecting electors after Election Day, it wouldn't meet the standard for incontestability in the Congress.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Just because there are provisos on withdrawal in the law does not mean the compact requires Congressional consent for those provisos to have force of law.  For example, the Multistate Tax Compact (MTC) does have a proviso on withdrawal, signifying where the compliance of states would matter the most for the purposes of that compact.  Here is the MTC on the matter of withdrawal:

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http://www.mtc.gov/About.aspx?id=98

The presence of such provisos does not make the compact require Congressional consent.

That proviso is a simple restatement of the Constitutional ban on ex post facto laws.

If a compact requires Congressional consent, then none of it can take effect without that consent.

Not so.  The NPVIC includes a severability clause.   If the limitation on withdrawal were held to be invalid, then the rest would still apply, assuming that there were still 270 EVs in the agreement.  Not that I think the NPVIC will go into force any time soon.  It won't be in place for 2012 and until we get another case where the popular vote and electoral vote disagree there won't be much impetus for it.

At best, advocates of a national popular vote have something in place that could be quickly enacted after the next time the EV and the PV disagree.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Here is a discussion that should give a good introduction to the question:

http://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008-R-0221.htm

Not really, because it does not touch upon the sole point of disagreement between us concerning the constitutionality of the NPVIC, the six month waiting period to revoke membership.  The rest of the NPVIC is constitutional, but the severable provision that bars a State from exiting the Compact in that six month window is not unless Congress gives its assent to the Compact.  That limitation on when a State can withdraw is what makes the NPVIC a delegation of sovereign power, which under the holding of the U.S. Steel makes it a compact that requires Congressional approval.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

To be fair, it is a very minor concern, as it would be unlikely that the timing issue would be significant unless a State were already in the process of considering withdrawing from the NPVIC at the time before the July 20 deadline but did not do so until after July 20, and such State's withdrawal would affect whether the agreement was in force.  I don't see a State likely considering withdrawal from scratch after July 20.

In any case, my main objections to the NPVIC aren't constitutional at all, rather they are:
1. Ballot Access
The NPVIC strongly assumes that only the Republican and Democratic parties matter.  The agreeing States are not having to adopt identical ballot access rules (and even if they did, the non compacting States are not).  Not only that, but in the circumstances that major (i.e. they got EVs) third party efforts have been made, they regularly do not end up on the ballot in every state, and in some cases have displaced the major party candidates from the ballot in that State so that they were not on the ballot everywhere.

2. Close Elections
The NPVIC makes the problem of a close election national and provides no mechanism to effectively deal with it. In 1960, the national PV margin was less than 0.2%, a margin that in many States would trigger an automatic recount and in the remainder would usually allow the loser to demand a recount.  In 1880, the margin was less than 0.1%. Yet there is no provision for recounts being triggered in such a close election, and even if they were, no way to get the noncompacting states to join in on a recount.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

To be fair, it is a very minor concern, as it would be unlikely that the timing issue would be significant unless a State were already in the process of considering withdrawing from the NPVIC at the time before the July 20 deadline but did not do so until after July 20, and such State's withdrawal would affect whether the agreement was in force.  I don't see a State likely considering withdrawal from scratch after July 20.

You keep raising the question.  Is your concern even valid?  What is the source for your concern?

My concern over the six month limit is valid, and I've quoted the parts of previous Supreme Court rulings that support my opinion on the issue.  Granted, it is unlikely to be a concern that will matter since a very specific set of circumstances would have to happen for it to matter, even assuming the NPVIC effort ever crosses the 270EV threshold.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

To be fair, it is a very minor concern, as it would be unlikely that the timing issue would be significant unless a State were already in the process of considering withdrawing from the NPVIC at the time before the July 20 deadline but did not do so until after July 20, and such State's withdrawal would affect whether the agreement was in force.  I don't see a State likely considering withdrawal from scratch after July 20.

You keep raising the question.  Is your concern even valid?  What is the source for your concern?

My concern over the six month limit is valid, and I've quoted the parts of previous Supreme Court rulings that support my opinion on the issue.  Granted, it is unlikely to be a concern that will matter since a very specific set of circumstances would have to happen for it to matter, even assuming the NPVIC effort ever crosses the 270EV threshold.

Are you talking about the leap of logic where you take this paragraph:

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and make it say that Congressional consent can be required for just the part that puts provisos on withdrawal, if there's a severability clause, but where there are cases the rest of the compact can just go ahead and take effect, because of the severability clause?  Tell me, have you ever heard of a court case where the argument was that only part of a compact required Congressional consent to take effect, and the rest could just take effect, as long as there is a severability clause?

And then, you dismiss the one proviso on withdrawal that did exist in the case the Supreme Court quotation came from by saying it is simply a restatement of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution, so it is not a real proviso on withdrawal?  (The proviso in the MTC keeps the states from throwing away their obligations when it matters the most to the operation of the compact, just like the proviso in the NPVIC does.  That is, it simply binds the states to their compact while they are part of it, which is like a contract, one which they cannot break or else they violate the Contract Clause.)

EDIT: Slight wording change that better clarifies what I'm saying.

The court has routinely used the presence of a severability clause to decide whether to toss an entire law or just parts of it, so once a part that causes a constitutional problem is severed, the rest would be acceptable.  The compact clause makes its clear that enforceable contracts between States require the Consent of Congress.  The only provision of the NPVIC that males it a enforceable contract instead of State law is the withdrawl proviso. The Constitution and existing federal law allow a State to change its method of choosing electors up until election day.  Setting an earlier date makes it a compact that requires Congressional approval instead of being a collection of States that have chosen to use the same method of selecting electors.

The MTC proviso wasn't litigated in the U.S.Steel case as State withdrawal was not at issue in that case.  However, even if it had been, its withdrawl proviso isn't equivalent to that in the NPVIC.  The NPVIC attempts to control how a State selects its electors for a period of time after the State withdraws from the NPVIC.  The MTC does not attempt to control how a State adjudicates tax cases for any period of time after a State withdraws from the MTC.  It only specifies that rulings prior to the withdrawl (i.e. prior to the change in State law) remain in force, which they would have to as States are forbidden from passing ex post facto laws,  In short, the MTC withdrawl provisio imposes no obligation on a State.  The NPVIC withdrawl proviso does impose obligations on a State and restricts what it can do.  Such restrictions require Congressional approval under the compact clause.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Why would a Court case deal with whether severability is applicable to state compacts in particular?  Severability clauses, such as that included in the NPVIC are a standard feature of most legislation so that if a portion is ruled invalid what remains can still take effect.  The only time a severability clause isn't included is if the law is so simple there is only one issue at stake, or the drafters want it to be all or nothing.  Once the withdrawal limitation is severed from the NPVIC, what remains is not a contract, but a bunch of identically worded State laws, that would still be valid in any State that hadn't repealed the law that caused the State to adopt the NPVIC.

The NPVIC doesn't need enforcing by an outside agency if no State chooses to repeal the law that had it join the NPVIC.  It is a State law in each of the States that adopts it, and as such it is just as enforceable as any other State law would be.

The MTC provisio only details the effects of limitations that arise from the ex post facto prohibition, and would be just as applicable even if they weren't there.  The State would be just as liable for any payment whether that law had specified it was owed to a non-State entity.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Even if one takes the view that the NPVIC is a contract does not require Congressional approval, it does not follow that if a State broke the contract before Election Day that the State could be obligated to cast its votes for the NPV winner, so long as the other States still have the option of selecting their electors the old way.

If a State withdraws between July 20 and Election Day, thereby causing the number of agreeing EV's to fall below 270, what action would the other States had done in anticipation of the withdrawing State remaining in the NPVIC?  None, as electors aren't appointed until after Election Day.  Hence, there is no harm done, as the remaining States can appoint electors using their own popular votes.

It may well be that one or more of the candidates is inconvenienced, but they aren't a party to the agreement.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

In order for there to be a tort, there must be a specific harm.  So long as the other States have not already selected their electors, and know that the withdrawing State will not be using the national popular vote to select its electors, what harm has been caused? Even if there were a harm, why must the redress be enforcement of the NPVIC?  I finally got around to noticing the link you posted to Every Vote Equal.  But in the case it cites, West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, the issue was over money. West Virginia Auditor's decision to not pay, meant that when he was found to be in the wrong, there was a specific harm to redress.

I can't see a non-Congressionally approved the NPVIC overriding "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," in the  case where a State withdraws before Election Day and clearly states it's not going to use the NPV to select electors, then it would be acting in accordance with its Constitutional prerogatives.

Still, as I said earlier, we're bothering with what is an obscure possibility that will likely never come up.  The NPVIC is likely never going to get to 270 until we have another case of the PV and the EV disagreeing, and maybe not even then.  It's no coincidence that every State that has adopted it so far is solidly Democratic, as the Democrats were the ones who were on the wrong end of the split last time.  The farther we get from the Bush presidency, the less important this will seem.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

I am not a lawyer, nor have I ever claimed to be one.  I do have a strong respect for individual State sovereignty, and July 20 deadline is an arbitrary, capricious restraint on that sovereignty.  This discussion has proved useful, as it has given me a chance to refine my gut feeling on this side issue of the NPVIC.

If were I making a fresh argument against the validity of the July 20 proviso,  it would be as follows.

1. Article II Section 1 Clause 2 provides that "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors".

2. Article II Section 1 Clause 4 provides that "The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors".

3. Congress has used its Clause 4 power to provide in 3 USC 1 that "The electors of President and Vice President shall be appointed, in each State, on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November, in every fourth year succeeding every election of a President and Vice President."

4. Congress has further reinforced the importance of Election Day in by providing in 3 USC 5 that "If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State,"  (Emphasis mine.)  Clearly Congress has provided that States are free to change the method used to select electors up until Election.

Therefore, any purported State contract or State law that prevents a State from changing the method of selecting electors at any time prior to Election Day, infringes upon Congress' power under Article II Section 1 Clause 4 to determine when Electors will be chosen.

Hence, the July 20 provsio in the NPVIC can only be enforceable if Congress assents.  This is not only because of any implications of the Compact Clause, but because that proviso touches upon Congress' authority under Article II Section 1 Clause 4.

True Federalist,

If you're looking to read further, read this by the Council of State Governments:

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http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/CompactEducation/Congressional_Consent_and_other_Legal_Issues-CSGNCIC.pdf

As I have shown, there is a federal interest being intruded upon by the July 20 proviso of the NPVIC.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

It's clear neither of us is going to convince the other of the validity of the six month proviso.

However, I will make one last effort on one point, that July 20 clearly is an arbitrary date for locking the method in. There is no reason concerning ease of implementation of the NPVIC, since there is no problem implementing NPV selection of the electors, even if the date were Election Day itself.  If the intent is to prevent campaign strategies from being affected by the adoption of the NPVIC in the middle of the campaign, then the primary season should also be covered.  After all, the later primaries, held after the nominees are usually known, serve mainly to make preparations for the general election campaign in the battleground states.  In the early primaries, one factor that some voters use to choose between the candidates is how electable they believe them to be in the battleground states.  Any change from per state elections to a national popular vote election will impact the primaries.

So why exclude the primary season from coverage?  First off, there is the fact that the longer the lock in period, the harder it would be to sell this.  But also consider when this was put forth.  There were hopes that this could be in place in time for the 2008 election. The time when most Legislatures might pass something like this would be during a second session after having been introduced in the first. , A lock-in date of January 20, 2008 would have made passage impossible in time for 2008.  July 20, 2008 was ambitious, but not impossible.

And now, the NPVIC will go through a long period of somnolence.  Because of the fact that its effect is quite partisan, enough time has passed since 2000, that it will not be adopted soon. (In the current political climate, going to the NPV is advantageous for the Democrats and all of the States that have adopted it so far are Democratic.) The outrage from what happened in 2000 is mostly dissipated.  It likely will pass in California next year if Brown is elected governor, but after that I can't see it reaching even 200 EV's in time for 2012, and 150 EV's, while possible, isn't certain.

It may get adopted after the next 2000-type election, especially if the political landscape has changed by then so that a different set of States form the solid support of the two main parties, so that the dominant party in some the States that adopt it now would be disadvantaged by its adoption then.  The other possibility is that if we enter an extended period in which adoption of the NPVIC would not have a partisan effect, then it might get adopted like the 27th Amendment did.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Those who try to argue that 2004 indicates that the EV isn't currently stacked in favor of the Republicans neglect one salient fact: voter turnout.  The solid states have lower than average voter turnout (measured as a percentage of all who are eligible to register and vote.)  California and New York would have higher participation in Presidential elections if who their State's EV's would be going to wasn't a foregone conclusion.  Greater voter participation is certainly one argument in favor of using the NPV, but it makes a proper analysis of the political implications more complicated than simply applying a uniform national swing, since it will not act uniformly to increase voter turnout.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

The SC should declare it unconstitutional, but historically they have avoided "political" issues, so they may refuse to take a case.  Then again there is Gore v Bush as precedent for intervention, so perhaps they would take the case.
I expect that if they did they do take the case they would strike it down.

The plain language of the constitution would seem to invalidate this compact, (unless Congress approves it):

Article 1 section 8:
"No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State,"

As was lengthily debated already in this thread, the only portion of the NPVIC that makes it Constitutionally suspect are the limitations on State withdrawal once it goes into force.  Otherwise it is just a bunch of identically worded State laws on how to choose Electors.  The specific circumstances that would make that provision applicable are extremely unlikely to happen.  You'd have to have 270 or more EVs signed up to this on the 20 July before the election and then have some State try to withdraw between 20 July and Election Day and reduce the number of EVs pledged to use this method to go below 270.

I agree that absent Congressional assent, the Supreme Court should strike down the anti-withdrawal provisio, but the severability proviso would keep the rest of it intact and operative if more than 270 EVs are agreeing to use that method on Election Day.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

It'll probably pick up California and maybe New York but not much else in the 2011-12 cycle.  But after that, it won't pick up much more for now.  Rightly or wrongly, the NPVIC is perceived as favoring the Democratic Party right now.  I wouldn't be surprised that if the GOP retakes the White House in 2012 that repeal of DC's adoption of this was forced upon the District.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

In my view, once the NPVIC crosses a certain threshold of EV's, such as 150-200, then with the increased national coverage and people caring about it, it should take off like a rocket and would be adopted, or lead to the adoption of a constitutional amendment modifying the presidential election process.

I could definitely see it getting a huge burst of publicity once we reach the point at which it only takes one or two more states to reach 270.  But that might not happen for some time.  And I'm not exactly sure how this issue will play politically once it reaches that stage.  A national popular vote might be popular in the abstract right now, but once such a radical change in the electoral system comes close to reality, the people who benefit from the current system will come up with all sorts of creative reasons for why this has to be stopped.

Agreed.  This being at the 150-200 EV stage will mean that this will remain a wonkish issue that only political insiders care about, and they will largely vote in their party's self-interest rather the public perception.  Plus, until we have another election where the PV and EV results diverge, this won't be on the public radar.  At most, the NPVIC has done the groundwork for something to be quickly done the next time the PV winner does not win the EV.  Given how infrequently that has occurred, it may well not be until the 22nd century that it happens (in which case the NPVIC may well have been completely forgotten by then).

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

I wouldn't be surprised that if the GOP retakes the White House in 2012 that repeal of DC's adoption of this was forced upon the District.

I think any such attempt would be filibustered.

That assumes the Democrats have 41 Senators in the 113th Congress.  If the 2012 election is as bad for the Democrats as the 2010 election is shaping up to be, it is quite conceivable that the GOP will have a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate by then, even if they don't retake control of the Senate in this election.  In a perfect election year for the GOP there are by my count 14 currently Democratic seats (CA, FL, MI, MN, MO, MT, NE, NJ, ND, OH, PA, VA, WA, and WI) that are potential GOP gains in 2012, tho some of those would likely require the current incumbent to not seek reelection and have the race be for an open seat.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Even if the Republicans did get a filibuster-proof majority, I would not think all Republicans would be on board.  60 Republicans in the Senate = 5-10 Mike Castles in the Senate.

Mike Castle won't be in the Senate, he didn't even win the primary.  And even if he were, I suspect while he might not vote for such a measure, that he wouldn't offend the GOP leadership by sustaining a filibuster.

Need I remind you that the national popular vote has had consistent majority support in polls?

No, but except for those States where it could get passed via the initiative process, that's largely irrelevant.  Support on this issue is broad but extremely shallow.  Very few voters will base their decision on who to vote for based upon a politician deciding to support or oppose the NPVIC.

Not only that, it isn't just something Democrats support, as I've stated before, but there are many moderate Republicans who have supported it as well, as evidenced in the roll call votes of many states that have considered and passed it.  Essentially, this has been and is something that is supported by Democrats and moderate Republicans, which suggests in the long run it will win or will spur the adoption of a constitutional amendment relating to the matter.

From what I've seen, what moderate Republican support that there has been on this has mainly been in Democratic States where passage sooner or later was inevitable, or where the other house of the assembly was certain to block it, so why make waves?  I admire your idealism, but I just don't think that without another election such as 2000 that the idealism behind the NPVIC will triumph over the cynicism of that comes with leading a major political party.  The fact that this has so far passed only in solidly Democratic States and is only likely to pass in such States only bolsters my view that at present, this is being voted by the politicians upon a purely partisan basis.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

That there are a few idealistic Republicans (and Democrats) I'll readily admit, but the existing method of electing the President is by and large favorable to the Republican establishment given the current distribution of Republicans and Democrats.  It is also not in the interest of the establishment of either major party to broaden the scope of where a Presidential campaign needs to be fought.  It is easier for the party establishment to have some control over what happens if the battle is fought in a few battleground states instead of nationwide.

By the way, if the GOP goes after DC's approval of the NPVIC in 2013, it won't be as a standalone bill.  If the GOP does get a clean sweep, I fully expect that one of the items they pass will be an omnibus bill overriding the DC government on a whole host of matters.  It'll make the people in DC madder than a nest of hornets, but the GOP has no reason to care what the locals in DC think about them.

The numbers I've seen are around the 70% range.  That's not exactly shallow.  Now you do have a point in that right now most people are only sort of half-aware of the issue, but all it takes is their activation.

The 70% figure is what makes the support broad.  The shallow part of my statement referred to the fact that few people would base their vote on that issue, and I don't see that changing no matter how much publicity the issue gets.  It's a technical issue that rarely has a real world effect, and even when it does it happens in elections that are very close.  Indeed, there has never been a case where a candidate has gotten a majority of the public vote and yet lost in the electoral college.  Aside from 1876, all of the cases to date have involved situations where a candidate received a narrow plurality in the popular vote, but lost in the electoral college.  1876 is special case, as it can reasonably be argued that the election was stolen by Hayes and should have been rightfully won by Tilden in the Electoral College.  Leaving aside the issue of the electoral votes decided by the electoral commission, had Colorado's electors been chosen in the popular vote instead of by the State legislature, there is a good chance that Tilden would have won those 3 votes.