Punishments for 'Attempted' crimes

[Gustaf]

Gabu,

Why we punish people is a much broader discussion. There are generally considered to be three reasons: preventing crime, rehabilitating criminals and punishing criminals. These are three different philosphies about justice. You put forward the one you believe in as if it were a given, and I honestly think that was your mistake. Me pointing that out is not a "vague attack". But, allright, if you want to go there, we can go there.

If the purpose of justice, as you hold, is to prevent crime from occurring there a number of things to consider. There are two sides of prevention: on the individual level and on the general level. The last one is what is usually meant, so I will focus on that for now. Now, the first principle that goes is the notion that punishment should stand in proportion to the crime committed. The purpose of punishing is to deter people from committing crimes, so if slapping down hard does the job, why not? Secondly, there is the idea that only guilty people are to be punished. But if our goal is to deter people from committing crimes, convicting as many as possible is much more efficient. That way, people will go out of their way and keep as far away from crimes as possible. Thirdly, there is no real point in caring about factors such as intoxication, or even intent. If we want to prevent people from committing murders while being drunk the best way is probably to let them know that they will get just as harsh a punishment as if they were sober for everything they do. That way they will think twice before getting drunk in the first place.

Now, if we're talking about the individual level the easiest way is probably death penalty for every crime. That is the safest way of guaranteeing that the criminal does not strike again.

But what makes the preventionist stand really interesting is when we get to people who we can quite safely say will not relapse. Dictators are usually the best examples here. Imagine, for instance, the trials against the Nazi leaders. Was there any risk of Goebbels, Hitler, Goering et al restarting the Third Reich? Not really. Looking at other dictators, most tend to live quite, peaceful lives after they lose power. In many cases perpetrators from these regimes become productive members of society.

But we still punish them, and the reason is that our legal systems, all over the world, throughout history are based on the retributive principle. If you've done something wrong you deserve punishment for it. That is why we consider it essential that only the guilty are punished, that a good excuse can get you off the hook, the the severity of the punishment is proportional to the crime and so on. And most people, once they realize how important the retributivist principle is to our concept of justice, accept that I think. Stating that is not being sinister, it is merely refuting your stating your own position as a given, when it in fact isn't. Now, if you want to debate the principles underpinning the legal systems in the world, that is fine by me, but it isn't what the topic was about exactly, and I hence did not think it fully appropriate. Now, I have some work to attend to, so I won't have time with all the rest just now, unfortunately.

[Gustaf]

The example was obviously not tailor-made to suit the current discussion. It was not constructed by me and not for that purpose.

It is however linked to the idea that the results of an action should not matter but only the intent. The intent in this case is the intentional drunk driving. The question is whether persons should be judged differently if their intentional action (drunk driving) leads to different consequences.

And, Carl, I can't help but get the impression that both you and Sam are talking an awful deal about what the law currently says. I understand that there are various provisions for covering all these things. The question at hand is what it should be like, not how it actually is.

And I would also like to point out, because almost everyone here seem to be referring to it, that there is a difference between motive and intent. We've had a long discussion before where everyone except me believed motive was of no consquence to the status of a crime. I find it amusing that so many of you now believe it is of vital importance in trials. Intent and motive are two different things. If I do something and I'm not intoxicated, insane, etc and the consequences of my actions are such that I should be able to foresee them then I am acting intentionally. Intention can thus be relatively easily established. Motive is a whole other issue. What motivates people to do what they do is much harder to establish and it is never really vital to the process of justice. Motive is what prosecution tends to use when they lack substantial evidence but is never really of chief importance. Everyone has a motive to kill someone else, but they do not necessarily do it. So establishing a motive does not carry the weight that, say, establishing the means of the accused to have committed the crime.

[John Dibble]

They intentionally broke the law. The argument you have deployed is that intent rather than consequences is what matters. Thus, it shouldn't matter whether a person actually dies from intended negligence or not.

They intentionally broke the law against drunk driving - for that their punishment should be equal. However they had no intent of killing anyone. If we were to punish them for every conceivable consequence of their actions it would be quite silly. Another drunk driver rammed into a building killing a family of five. Should we punish the other two the same? Another one caused a ten care pile up killing twenty or thirty people - should we punish the others for killing that many? Of course not. That would be going too far. We punish drunk driving because the potential consequences are likely and we can use the law to discourage the behavior, but the consequences themselves should be treated as a seperate matter.

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And I can tell you that I have good reasons to believe that someone intended to kill another person, even if they failed in the attempt - that's the point Gabu and I are trying to make. Those reasons are what we call evidence! You have evidence that the probability the sun will set tommorow approaches 100%, though by your own admission you can't know for sure. Does that mean you should be skeptical about the sun coming up tommorow?

We might not know for 100% certain, but then again as you said we can't know for absolute certain of a lot of things. That's why we have courts, juries, and evidence in the first place.

[Gustaf]

They intentionally broke the law. The argument you have deployed is that intent rather than consequences is what matters. Thus, it shouldn't matter whether a person actually dies from intended negligence or not.

They intentionally broke the law against drunk driving - for that their punishment should be equal. However they had no intent of killing anyone. If we were to punish them for every conceivable consequence of their actions it would be quite silly. Another drunk driver rammed into a building killing a family of five. Should we punish the other two the same? Another one caused a ten care pile up killing twenty or thirty people - should we punish the others for killing that many? Of course not. That would be going too far. We punish drunk driving because the potential consequences are likely and we can use the law to discourage the behavior, but the consequences themselves should be treated as a seperate matter.

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What does "treated as a separate matter" mean here? These consequences were unintentional. Your argument here has been that unintended consequences do not matter. Whether you choose to let the guy who killed 30 off with the same punishment as the one who caused nothing or slam down with latter with the same harsh punishment as the former is another issue. You may use an average of the effects if you like. But I do not see how you can treat them differently, given that there is no difference in intent.

The funny thing is that it wasn't very long ago that you argued that the difference between motive and intent was enormous. Now you don't seem to recognize that anymore. I agree that we can establish whether an act was intentional or not. But I disagree that we can do anything beyond speculate when it comes to motive. And it's not the kind of speculation on which you can convict a person.

[CARLHAYDEN]

The example was obviously not tailor-made to suit the current discussion. It was not constructed by me and not for that purpose.

It is however linked to the idea that the results of an action should not matter but only the intent. The intent in this case is the intentional drunk driving. The question is whether persons should be judged differently if their intentional action (drunk driving) leads to different consequences.

And, Carl, I can't help but get the impression that both you and Sam are talking an awful deal about what the law currently says. I understand that there are various provisions for covering all these things. The question at hand is what it should be like, not how it actually is.

And I would also like to point out, because almost everyone here seem to be referring to it, that there is a difference between motive and intent. We've had a long discussion before where everyone except me believed motive was of no consquence to the status of a crime. I find it amusing that so many of you now believe it is of vital importance in trials. Intent and motive are two different things. If I do something and I'm not intoxicated, insane, etc and the consequences of my actions are such that I should be able to foresee them then I am acting intentionally. Intention can thus be relatively easily established. Motive is a whole other issue. What motivates people to do what they do is much harder to establish and it is never really vital to the process of justice. Motive is what prosecution tends to use when they lack substantial evidence but is never really of chief importance. Everyone has a motive to kill someone else, but they do not necessarily do it. So establishing a motive does not carry the weight that, say, establishing the means of the accused to have committed the crime.

First, let me note that you are correct that motive and intent are not the same thing.

Second, I pointed out existing American law on the matter of intent because American law is largely derived from experience.

Third, let me give you an example of inferred intent.  A couple of teen-age boys go up to a highway overpass and begin hurling large rock down on passing motor vehicles.  One of them strickes a vehicle and results in a fatality.  While the boys maintained that it was not their intent to cause the fatality, their intentional action (there is an old legal term which I like called "abandoned and malignant hear") was so unreasonable as to impute the necessary intent.

[Sam Spade]

Gustav:

You are presuming that I am quibling with your opinion of how "attempt" crimes should be punished.  I have not said anything on this subject.  Actually, at common law, attempt crimes were punished as misdemeanors, so your position has support in Anglo-American criminal history, not to mention for a number of policy.

What I am quibling with is your example of drunk drivers.  If there are two persons who go into a bar and get themselves voluntary intoxicated, they are both clearly doing each action intentionally.  Similarly, if each gets into a vehicle and starts driving, each one is pursuing the act intentionally, if under the influence of intoxication.

However, if one driver strikes a little girl and the other one doesn't, you cannot hold one driver for vehicular homicide or manslughter and the other for attempt.  Attempts, by their nature, require "intent" and there is no evidence that either driver intended to run over that particular little girl.  To hold that one could "intend" what is inherently a "reckless" act (driving while intoxicated) in this situation would constitute a gross miscarriage of justice.  Besides, logically, it is just facially ludicrous to make such an assertion.  You can't intend to do a reckless act.

[John Dibble]

What does "treated as a separate matter" mean here? These consequences were unintentional. Your argument here has been that unintended consequences do not matter. Whether you choose to let the guy who killed 30 off with the same punishment as the one who caused nothing or slam down with latter with the same harsh punishment as the former is another issue. You may use an average of the effects if you like. But I do not see how you can treat them differently, given that there is no difference in intent.

"Treated as a seperate matter" means just that. Getting into the car and driving it drunk is a crime of intent. Hitting the girl on accident is a result of the first action, yes, but it is a seperate crime by itself, and is a crime of negligence due to the fact that the driver is drunk. There was no intention to commit the crime of vehicular homicide, but it did happen. The driver would be charged with driving drunk and vehicular homicide, whereas the driver who just drove drunk but didn't hit anyone would only be charged with driving drunk.

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You're confusing me with someone else methinks - I never mentioned motive, though I do think the two are different. Motive is a reason to do something, not an intent to do it. Motive might give weight to deciding whether an intention existed, but it is certainly not the only factor to consider and if it's the only evidence you're not likely to convince a judge and jury.

But yes, I think we can establish beyond reasonable doubt whether an act was intentional or not. If someone stabs another person with a knife repeatedly would you doubt it was intentional? And after said multiple stabbings is death not the forseeable likely result of that action? I mean seriously, who stabs a person multiple times with the intent of that person surviving?

[Gustaf]

Gustav:

You are presuming that I am quibling with your opinion of how "attempt" crimes should be punished.  I have not said anything on this subject.  Actually, at common law, attempt crimes were punished as misdemeanors, so your position has support in Anglo-American criminal history, not to mention for a number of policy.

What I am quibling with is your example of drunk drivers.  If there are two persons who go into a bar and get themselves voluntary intoxicated, they are both clearly doing each action intentionally.  Similarly, if each gets into a vehicle and starts driving, each one is pursuing the act intentionally, if under the influence of intoxication.

However, if one driver strikes a little girl and the other one doesn't, you cannot hold one driver for vehicular homicide or manslughter and the other for attempt.  Attempts, by their nature, require "intent" and there is no evidence that either driver intended to run over that particular little girl.  To hold that one could "intend" what is inherently a "reckless" act (driving while intoxicated) in this situation would constitute a gross miscarriage of justice.  Besides, logically, it is just facially ludicrous to make such an assertion.  You can't intend to do a reckless act.

I don't know if I made that assumption. Since I'm basically debating 4 people and you're all pursuing somewhat different lines of reasoning AND I am too lazy to quote everyone's posts in a clear manner my responses become somewhat mixed.

Now, I understand that one person cannot be held responsible for intentionally killing a girl while driving drunk and the other cannot. Yes, one cannot intend to do something like that. That is exactly the point. The question is how one then assigns blame. If we believe that the two drivers should be punished differently we're essentially saying that the consequences matter, not just the intent. I don't know whether you read all the posts, but the argument put forth by Gabu and others was that intent was the sole basis of punishment, so that the consequences had no importance at all. Thus, someone could get executed despite not having harmed anyone in the slightest. This is an example where I would say the consequences of this principle becomes absurd.

Of course, if you take a real negligence crime, such as not driving well enough and causing an accident, etc one could argue then that there should be no penalty because there was no intent. However, I would say that there is always a point of intentional action that carries responsibility with it. So, if I'm a poor driver I should never have gotten into the car and so on.

[Gustaf]

What does "treated as a separate matter" mean here? These consequences were unintentional. Your argument here has been that unintended consequences do not matter. Whether you choose to let the guy who killed 30 off with the same punishment as the one who caused nothing or slam down with latter with the same harsh punishment as the former is another issue. You may use an average of the effects if you like. But I do not see how you can treat them differently, given that there is no difference in intent.

"Treated as a seperate matter" means just that. Getting into the car and driving it drunk is a crime of intent. Hitting the girl on accident is a result of the first action, yes, but it is a seperate crime by itself, and is a crime of negligence due to the fact that the driver is drunk. There was no intention to commit the crime of vehicular homicide, but it did happen. The driver would be charged with driving drunk and vehicular homicide, whereas the driver who just drove drunk but didn't hit anyone would only be charged with driving drunk.

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You're confusing me with someone else methinks - I never mentioned motive, though I do think the two are different. Motive is a reason to do something, not an intent to do it. Motive might give weight to deciding whether an intention existed, but it is certainly not the only factor to consider and if it's the only evidence you're not likely to convince a judge and jury.

But yes, I think we can establish beyond reasonable doubt whether an act was intentional or not. If someone stabs another person with a knife repeatedly would you doubt it was intentional? And after said multiple stabbings is death not the forseeable likely result of that action? I mean seriously, who stabs a person multiple times with the intent of that person surviving?

I am fairly sure you lectured me on it...I could be wrong but most of the posts directed at me at that time were from you, so the odds are on my side.

Now, to the point: if I understand you correctly you do mean that unintended consequences of one's actions is something one can be held accountable for then. In that case I don't see why you think it is so strange to apply this to murder? You seem to agree with me that consequences and not just intent matters when a punishment is decided.

As to the second part of your post...maybe part of the animosity here derives from the fact that I believe we're thinking of somewhat different cases. I'm not really imagining a case like the one you describe, but rather a case where nothing happens at all. Imagine for instance someone who is aiming with a gun, fires and misses. Saying that the perpertrator clearly would have murdered the victim and should be tried as a murderer would then be unfair.

In the case you present, some of my arguments disappear, I grant you that. But why was the deed not carried out in this case? My point has been, all along, that yes of course we can say that the stabbing was intentional. We can always establish (in theory) whether acts that HAPPENED were intentional. But you're not saying that. You're claiming that you can decide whether acts that never occurred would have been intentional, had they occurred. That's another issue for me. Maybe in an extreme case, yes, the penalty could be the same. If A stabs B, says "Damn, I missed the heart! Well, this time I'll get you" but is stopped in mid-stab by police officers, yeah, then maybe the difference isn't all that great. But I'm not fully convinced even of that. The idea that we can decide for other people what they would have done and then condemn them for what we believe they would have done bothers me all the same.

[Sam Spade]

You're still not getting my point, though keeping a whole lot of arguments up at the same time is difficult.  I might not be making it clear enough.

First, in your example, we need to get the term "intent" off the board.  It is not present in vehicular homicide, nor any crime where voluntary intoxication is an issue.  It only confuses, it does not help.

Because "intent" is off the table, any "attempt" at a crime cannot occur, because an "attempt" requires an "intentional" mens rea.  Either the crime happens or it doesn't in that case.

Under modern standards of mens rea, three types exist:  "knowingly", "recklessly" or "criminally negligent".  Vehicular homicide is normally considered "reckless" under statute, because driving while drunk is considered dangerous to society. 

One could not knowingly commit vehicular homicide, unless one "knew" one's actions would cause the death of that specific girl, which is highly unlikely.  And then, voluntary intoxication would negate the "knowingly" mens rea.

[Gustaf]

You're still not getting my point, though keeping a whole lot of arguments up at the same time is difficult.  I might not be making it clear enough.

First, in your example, we need to get the term "intent" off the board.  It is not present in vehicular homicide, nor any crime where voluntary intoxication is an issue.  It only confuses, it does not help.

Because "intent" is off the table, any "attempt" at a crime cannot occur, because an "attempt" requires an "intentional" mens rea.  Either the crime happens or it doesn't in that case.

Under modern standards of mens rea, three types exist:  "knowingly", "recklessly" or "criminally negligent".  Vehicular homicide is normally considered "reckless" under statute, because driving while drunk is considered dangerous to society. 

One could not knowingly commit vehicular homicide, unless one "knew" one's actions would cause the death of that specific girl, which is highly unlikely.  And then, voluntary intoxication would negate the "knowingly" mens rea.

Maybe you're arguing that there are different groups of crimes then? Because I see nothing inherently strange in saying that all crimes should be judged from intent and that acts currently considered crimes where intent does not play a part should not be considered crimes at all. Now, if I understand your agument correctly you're saying that there are areas where intent can be discussed (and where one can argue that consequences are of no importance) and areas where it cannot (and where one HAS to look at the consequences). I think you will have to come up with some sort of argument for that though, because I don't see it as a given.

And, yes, I understand that ATTEMPTED crimes aren't part of the drunk driving thing. The question of intent is still there though and is relevant. Are we only responsible for intentional actions and if so, where does intent end if intentional actions have unintended consequences, etc. See, the discussion isn't limited to attempted crimes because the underlying issue we're disputing is more about the link between intent and punishment.

[John Dibble]

I am fairly sure you lectured me on it...I could be wrong but most of the posts directed at me at that time were from you, so the odds are on my side.

You can go back and confirm that since it's written down.

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Murder is an intentional act, not an unintentional one. That's not to say someone who kills someone accidentally can't be held liable, but they should not be treated in the same manner as someone who does it on purpose. Punishment may still be warranted, but not necessarily the same one as the intentional act.

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Which is why I mentioned the burden of proof being on the state - the prosecution must show intent beyond a reasonable doubt. The question assumes the burden of proof has been met to a sufficient degree. In a situation where no damage is actually done(like the one you describe) the burden of proof is likely greater than one where damage is done.

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Perhaps the perpetrator was caught, heard someone coming and left, or mistakenly thought the victim was dead(or that he would die from the wounds). I didn't give specifics, but again - if someone stabs someone multiple times how am I to think that murder wasn't the intention? Unless you can show me that every stab wound was in the arms or legs or something, I don't think the idea that it wasn't holds much weight.

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Again, we can use logic and evidence to deduce intent, and of course the further the attempted action goes the easier it is to deduce. Yes, it's all theory when it comes down to it, but if the evidence is sufficient to quell reasonable doubt about the intention then I see no reason not to believe that the theoretical action was going to occur. In the case you presented where the man was stalking another man with a knife and is caught before anything happens there is not likely enough evidence to dispel reasonable doubt, thusly a lesser charge is likely appropriate. If an attempted crime warrants the same punishment as the successful version of the crime, the burden of proof must be at least as high if not higher.

[CARLHAYDEN]

You're still not getting my point, though keeping a whole lot of arguments up at the same time is difficult.  I might not be making it clear enough.

First, in your example, we need to get the term "intent" off the board.  It is not present in vehicular homicide, nor any crime where voluntary intoxication is an issue.  It only confuses, it does not help.

Because "intent" is off the table, any "attempt" at a crime cannot occur, because an "attempt" requires an "intentional" mens rea.  Either the crime happens or it doesn't in that case.

Under modern standards of mens rea, three types exist:  "knowingly", "recklessly" or "criminally negligent".  Vehicular homicide is normally considered "reckless" under statute, because driving while drunk is considered dangerous to society. 

One could not knowingly commit vehicular homicide, unless one "knew" one's actions would cause the death of that specific girl, which is highly unlikely.  And then, voluntary intoxication would negate the "knowingly" mens rea.

Maybe you're arguing that there are different groups of crimes then? Because I see nothing inherently strange in saying that all crimes should be judged from intent and that acts currently considered crimes where intent does not play a part should not be considered crimes at all. Now, if I understand your agument correctly you're saying that there are areas where intent can be discussed (and where one can argue that consequences are of no importance) and areas where it cannot (and where one HAS to look at the consequences). I think you will have to come up with some sort of argument for that though, because I don't see it as a given.

And, yes, I understand that ATTEMPTED crimes aren't part of the drunk driving thing. The question of intent is still there though and is relevant. Are we only responsible for intentional actions and if so, where does intent end if intentional actions have unintended consequences, etc. See, the discussion isn't limited to attempted crimes because the underlying issue we're disputing is more about the link between intent and punishment.

First Gustav, let me say that it has NOT been my intent to 'gang up' on you, and I think the other posters on this thread have been thoughful, informative and polite.

Second, let me agree with you in opposing strict liability felonies.  In my mind, no offense should be a felony without the requisite mens rea.

Third, it seems to me that you are looking at actions, more partictularly actions are criminal as a continuum with respect to penalties.  I on the other hand are looking at the actions to see if they fit the caterories of offenses for which NOTICE has been given.

Let me illustrate this with a few  old (and well known examples):

In hypothetical 1, an obnoxious turd (lets call him offender A) approaches another individual (lets call him victim B) and tells him that unless he gets out of A's way he will hit him.  B declines to move and A hits B.  Now unless A has some legal defense (not included in the facts cited), A would (in common law) be guilty of Assault (the threat couple with the present ability to accomplish it) and Battery (the actual blow). 

Hypothetical 2 includes facts in hypothetical 1, plus the additional fact that B had a 'glass jaw,' and dropped dead as a result of the blow.  In this example, A (again, provided no affirmative defenses to the contrary) would presumably be guilty of criminal homocide (murder or voluntary manslaughter).

In hypothetical 3, A not only threatens to hit B, but attempts to do so, unsucessfully (B ducks).  We would have a presumable assault, and attempted battery.

In hypothetical 4, all the facts in hypotherical 3. are included but, in addition, A is professional boxer, who has killed others with his fists, aned who was paid by C to kill B (and C testifies to the contract in the trial).  Here  a charge of attempted criminal homocide (murder or voluntary manslaughter) would be appropriate.

The key here is NOTICE.  As part of notice (in addition to the elements of the offense) is the classification of the offense (which involves the potential penalties for the offense).

Oh, BTW, this has been a very interesting thread.  You are to be commended for starting and sticking with it.

 

[Gustaf]

You're still not getting my point, though keeping a whole lot of arguments up at the same time is difficult.  I might not be making it clear enough.

First, in your example, we need to get the term "intent" off the board.  It is not present in vehicular homicide, nor any crime where voluntary intoxication is an issue.  It only confuses, it does not help.

Because "intent" is off the table, any "attempt" at a crime cannot occur, because an "attempt" requires an "intentional" mens rea.  Either the crime happens or it doesn't in that case.

Under modern standards of mens rea, three types exist:  "knowingly", "recklessly" or "criminally negligent".  Vehicular homicide is normally considered "reckless" under statute, because driving while drunk is considered dangerous to society. 

One could not knowingly commit vehicular homicide, unless one "knew" one's actions would cause the death of that specific girl, which is highly unlikely.  And then, voluntary intoxication would negate the "knowingly" mens rea.

Maybe you're arguing that there are different groups of crimes then? Because I see nothing inherently strange in saying that all crimes should be judged from intent and that acts currently considered crimes where intent does not play a part should not be considered crimes at all. Now, if I understand your agument correctly you're saying that there are areas where intent can be discussed (and where one can argue that consequences are of no importance) and areas where it cannot (and where one HAS to look at the consequences). I think you will have to come up with some sort of argument for that though, because I don't see it as a given.

And, yes, I understand that ATTEMPTED crimes aren't part of the drunk driving thing. The question of intent is still there though and is relevant. Are we only responsible for intentional actions and if so, where does intent end if intentional actions have unintended consequences, etc. See, the discussion isn't limited to attempted crimes because the underlying issue we're disputing is more about the link between intent and punishment.

First Gustav, let me say that it has NOT been my intent to 'gang up' on you, and I think the other posters on this thread have been thoughful, informative and polite.

Second, let me agree with you in opposing strict liability felonies.  In my mind, no offense should be a felony without the requisite mens rea.

Third, it seems to me that you are looking at actions, more partictularly actions are criminal as a continuum with respect to penalties.  I on the other hand are looking at the actions to see if they fit the caterories of offenses for which NOTICE has been given.

Let me illustrate this with a few  old (and well known examples):

In hypothetical 1, an obnoxious turd (lets call him offender A) approaches another individual (lets call him victim B) and tells him that unless he gets out of A's way he will hit him.  B declines to move and A hits B.  Now unless A has some legal defense (not included in the facts cited), A would (in common law) be guilty of Assault (the threat couple with the present ability to accomplish it) and Battery (the actual blow). 

Hypothetical 2 includes facts in hypothetical 1, plus the additional fact that B had a 'glass jaw,' and dropped dead as a result of the blow.  In this example, A (again, provided no affirmative defenses to the contrary) would presumably be guilty of criminal homocide (murder or voluntary manslaughter).

In hypothetical 3, A not only threatens to hit B, but attempts to do so, unsucessfully (B ducks).  We would have a presumable assault, and attempted battery.

In hypothetical 4, all the facts in hypotherical 3. are included but, in addition, A is professional boxer, who has killed others with his fists, aned who was paid by C to kill B (and C testifies to the contract in the trial).  Here  a charge of attempted criminal homocide (murder or voluntary manslaughter) would be appropriate.

The key here is NOTICE.  As part of notice (in addition to the elements of the offense) is the classification of the offense (which involves the potential penalties for the offense).

Oh, BTW, this has been a very interesting thread.  You are to be commended for starting and sticking with it.

 

Yes, I don't feel persecuted or anything. I agree that everyone have been polite (with the possible exception of Gabu when he used words like vague and sinister. But he's usually nice so that's not a big deal )

I will answer Dibble as well in this post. I do not believe that we can honestly know what a person would have done and use our professed knowledge of that to judge him. If it can be established that the reasons for the murder only being attempted and not successfull were completely out of the control of the murderer, then yes, I would agree that as far as my argument goes there would be no reason not to give equal punishment.

However, another line of argument, is that the consequences of an act does matter. One could say, for instance, that part of the punishment is a sort of reward for the victim or the victim's family, and so on. In that case a death hurts more than a non-death, obviously, and that perhaps should warrant a higher penalty. This is where the reckless crimes and all that comes in. If we should charge people for things that happened on their watch or were caused by them, but were completely unintentional, it seems that we judge people not just based on their intentions (which may have been perfectly innocent) but also based on the consequences of their actions.

Of course, actual law is quite complicated and legal systems differ from country to country. I'm reasonably well educated on Swedish law, but I'll profess to not knowing a great deal about American law. So don't expect lucid answers from me regarding that. I'm looking at it in a much more general way. I do believe, however, that the legal systems of most countries, including the US, basically adhere to the principles I support.

[Reignman]

Yes.

[Frodo]

Did you, by any chance, get this idea from the 'Minority Report'? 

[John Dibble]

Did you, by any chance, get this idea from the 'Minority Report'? 

No, rather from some novel I read some time ago where the idea was discussed, forgot which one. Basically a guy tries to kill a woman while she's sleeping - stabs her in the bed she's sleeping in but it turns out she's not even in the bed, he stabbed a fake. He's caught in the act and his intentions were quite clear, so he get's executed for it. Some people question why since nobody actually died, and the reasons discussed are similar to some of the discussion in this thread.