José Padilla, the Northwest Ordinance, and habeus corpus

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

The Ordinance of 1787 (the Northwest Ordinance) is along with the Constitution, the Articles of Confederation, and Declaration of Independence acknowledge as one of the Organic Acts of the United States.  The guarantee of habeas corpus in the Ordinance is stronger in the Ordinance than in the Constitution as it has no provision for its suspension and that guarantee is explicitly stated to be unalterable save by the common consent of the original States and the States formed from the Northwest Territory.

José Padilla was a resident of Chicago before his detention, so my question is, is the stronger habeas corpus provision of the Northwest Territory still in force?  I'm not aware of Illinois (or any of the Northwest Ordinance States) ever agreeing to a reduction in habeas corpus.

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All of those are irrelevant to King George.

[Emsworth]

If the ordinance was merely incorporated into the laws of the state of Illinois, then it has no effect on the federal government as a result of the supremacy clause. If the ordinance was not incorporated into the laws of Illinois, but remained a component of federal law, then it would still have no effect as it would be unconstitutional--the federal government does not have the power to impose one set of habeas corpus protections for one group of states, and another set for another group.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

If the ordinance was not incorporated into the laws of Illinois, but remained a component of federal law, then it would still have no effect as it would be unconstitutional--the federal government does not have the power to impose one set of habeas corpus protections for one group of states, and another set for another group.

That assumes that the Constitution was a revolutionary replacement to the Articles of Confederation, and not merely a successor document bound by it and the acts passed thereof.  However, in that case Lincoln was wrong and the Articles were not a bar to the legality of secession as they were no longer in force.

[Emsworth]

That assumes that the Constitution was a revolutionary replacement to the Articles of Confederation, and not merely a successor document bound by it and the acts passed thereof.

The entirety of current jurisprudence is based on the theory that the Constitution utterly replaced the Articles of Confederation. The Articles, as well as all laws made under it, became void immediately upon the Constitution's adoption. (The only exceptions are treaties made by the United States prior to the adoption of the Constitution, which remain valid as a result of the wording of the Supremacy Clause.)

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The Articles were definitely not a bar to secession, but the Supremacy Clause certainly was. The idea that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land means quite simply that no state can negate the effect of any of its provisions, whether by a declaration of "secession," a declaration of "nullification," or otherwise.