French election maps

[Hash]

I was bored so I made this map for a forgotten but interesting episode in electoral history



The traditional patterns, but mixed in with interesting favourite son effects -- some of which are rather noticeable here. See if you can spot a few.

[Franknburger]

Just discovered this thread today. Obviously, you have already been posting quite a number of maps, but going through 630 posts can become a bit tiring. Thus, can you maybe point out relevant maps (side number is sufficient) that allow me to trace:

1.) Spatial evolution of Les Verts (and related groupings / candidates) - I read somewhere that the movement evolved simultaneously and together with the German anti-nuke / Grüne movement on the Upper Rhine, and it would be interesting to see whether this holds true, and some kind of territorial spread from the Alsace can be traced on electoral maps.

2. Front Nationale - historical strongholds and their evolution over time.

[Hash]

Since you've provided me with actual requests, the firsts in months, I might as well put some effort into this (but it will take longer)

Note: please pay attention to the keys; the colour scheme is the same, but the values/scale change depending on the national result

2. Front Nationale - historical strongholds and their evolution over time.

1956 Poujadists


1965 (Presidential) Tixier-Vignancour


1984 (European Parliament) FN


1988 (Presidential) Le Pen


1995 (Presidential) Le Pen


1995 (Presidential) Change in Le Pen vote since 1988

1.) Spatial evolution of Les Verts (and related groupings / candidates) - I read somewhere that the movement evolved simultaneously and together with the German anti-nuke / Grüne movement on the Upper Rhine, and it would be interesting to see whether this holds true, and some kind of territorial spread from the Alsace can be traced on electoral maps.

1974 (Presidential) Dumont


1979 (European Parliament) Greens list (Solange Fernex)


I will do some stuff about 2002, 2007 and 2012 for the FN next.

Please feel free to ask away from clarifications/questions etc.

[homelycooking]

Great! Why the poor Poujadist performance in Eure? Or is that drop-off relative to surrounding areas merely exaggerated by the color scale?

[Franknburger]

Since you've provided me with actual requests, the firsts in months, I might as well put some effort into this (but it will take longer)

I will do some stuff about 2002, 2007 and 2012 for the FN next.

Please feel free to ask away from clarifications/questions etc.

Thanks for the maps!

I'm curious about the 1984 EU Parliament map for the Greens, it seems there is quite some overlap of FN and Green strongholds (except for Normandy, I guess the Green's strength there was owed to La Hague).

Forgive my ignorance of pre-1980s French politics - could you explain in a few sentences why you have started the FN series with Poujadists and EXD?
The FN belt between Montpellier and Bordeaux - is it including Toulouse or running north of it?

I have the impression that some historical patterns are still shaping regional party allegiances. If it isn't too difficult, could you indicate the main medieval dvisions (English / Aquitaine, France proper, Burgundy/ Holy Roman Empire) with red lines on your maps (yeah, I know, borders changed quite often, and its a hell of a work unless you are using a SVG editor, so this is really only in case you have time for it and feel it might add some explanation of patterns).

[Hash]

Great! Why the poor Poujadist performance in Eure? Or is that drop-off relative to surrounding areas merely exaggerated by the color scale?

The Poujadists did indeed do rather poorly in the Eure (5.4% of reg'd voters). PMF's Radical list won 37% of the vote there, thoroughly dominating the department (outside Broglie, a old right-wing stronghold; and the working-class PCF area around Gisors etc). It might have checked a Poujadist wave, but this is only a guess.

Forgive my ignorance of pre-1980s French politics - could you explain in a few sentences why you have started the FN series with Poujadists and EXD?
The FN belt between Montpellier and Bordeaux - is it including Toulouse or running north of it?

Poujadism and the Tixier candidacy are often seen as forerunners of the FN. They were both far-right movements, and Le Pen was closely associated with both (he was a UFF deputy for the Seine in 1956, and Tixier's campaign manager in 1965). Poujadism, in its social base (small shopkeepers/artisans/petite bourgeoisie; 'forgotten' people swept up by change) and its rhetoric was similar to the modern FN. Tixier's candidacy, with its French Algeria focus, was obviously influential on the early FN - and their electorate was also pretty much the same.

I have the impression that some historical patterns are still shaping regional party allegiances. If it isn't too difficult, could you indicate the main medieval dvisions (English / Aquitaine, France proper, Burgundy/ Holy Roman Empire) with red lines on your maps (yeah, I know, borders changed quite often, and its a hell of a work unless you are using a SVG editor, so this is really only in case you have time for it and feel it might add some explanation of patterns).

The FN belt in the Garonne Valley extended into Haute-Garonne; the FN used to poll strongest in urban areas and inner suburbs so it did well in Toulouse in the early elections, by 1995 the FN was at 12-13% in Toulouse and strongest in the outskirts.

I have the impression that some historical patterns are still shaping regional party allegiances. If it isn't too difficult, could you indicate the main medieval dvisions (English / Aquitaine, France proper, Burgundy/ Holy Roman Empire) with red lines on your maps (yeah, I know, borders changed quite often, and its a hell of a work unless you are using a SVG editor, so this is really only in case you have time for it and feel it might add some explanation of patterns).

I only use MS Paint, so I can't edit in other boundaries unless I do it by hand (and I won't). I'm sure the apparent links with Medieval maps are merely coincidental, and certainly nobody has seriously suggested that there's any kind of direct link or correlation between the two. The bases of regional political allegiances are, despite everything, still heavily influenced by the religious divide.

I'm working on the Greens in 1984, a fairly weird map; but I feel there might be an error in the data ( France)

[Franknburger]

I have the impression that some historical patterns are still shaping regional party allegiances. If it isn't too difficult, could you indicate the main medieval dvisions (English / Aquitaine, France proper, Burgundy/ Holy Roman Empire) with red lines on your maps (yeah, I know, borders changed quite often, and its a hell of a work unless you are using a SVG editor, so this is really only in case you have time for it and feel it might add some explanation of patterns).

I only use MS Paint, so I can't edit in other boundaries unless I do it by hand (and I won't).

Completely understood and accepted

I'm sure the apparent links with Medieval maps are merely coincidental, and certainly nobody has seriously suggested that there's any kind of direct link or correlation between the two. The bases of regional political allegiances are, despite everything, still heavily influenced by the religious divide.

Let me again apologise for my only superficial knowledge of French history - I am exploiting you to improve on it - but which religous divide? I always assumed the Huguenots were almost completely driven out of France after St. Bartholomew's Night.

I remember to have read somewhere (probably in a travel guide, so not neccessarily one of the most credible sources) that historic Cathar strongholds for quite some time have displayed specific political patterns. I also heard somewhere that the historic Anglo (Aquitanian) - French divide had reappeared during the French Revolution, which in turn has shaped political patterns until more recently. But let's have the maps first, then we may discuss on what is behind certain regional patterns.

I'm working on the Greens in 1984, a fairly weird map; but I feel there might be an error in the data ( France)
[/quote]

[Hash]

Let me again apologise for my only superficial knowledge of French history - I am exploiting you to improve on it - but which religous divide? I always assumed the Huguenots were almost completely driven out of France after St. Bartholomew's Night.

The religious divide I am referring to is the Catholic (clerical) vs. anticlerical divide. Its roots are pretty clear; the RCC was the enemy of the Revolution and republicanism from day one and there was mutual hatred between the two. The Church was seen as incompatible with the values of the Revolution and the Republic; the Republic and the Revolution were anathema to the Church and its definition of Catholicism. The religious cleavage was particularly important in the first era of the Third Republic between 1871 and 1905 (the separation of Church and State) because the clericals directly opposed the Republic itself. A lot made their peace with the Republic, either through the development of a new non-monarchist right (the Ralliés, post-1892) -- which became, eventually, the FR > moderates/CNI > liberals/Giscardians/PR; or the birth of the social Christian/humanist tradition with Marc Sangnier's Jeune République/Le Sillon -- parts of which became the PDP/MRP/CDS and the modern Christian democratic centrist tradition.

But, needless to say, the religious cleavage between clericals/political Catholics and anticlericals (Radicals mostly, but also the SFIO -- although many Socialists at the outset played a double game in order to appeal to monarchists/right-wingers in runoffs against RadSocs -- and obviously the PCF) remained very important after 1905. Religion or lack thereof, obviously, results in different mindsets and sets of values which result, naturally, in very different political opinions.

This map is the basic map to understand French politics:


Or similar maps such as Chanoine Boulard's famous map:


The religious cleavage is less important these days (but still quite central despite everything; Sarkozy would have won reelection by a big margin if only self-defined Catholics had the vote). It was obviously far more important in the past: 1936 is the best example (as it predates the realignment of anticlerical rural areas in eastern France in 1946); in the maps of the 1965, 1974 and 1981 presidential runoffs it is very striking.

NB: There is still a Catholic vs Protestant difference in those regions with Protestant minorities, but the Calvinists don't vote like Lutherans at all.

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I should restate what I said. I did not mean to deny any links between Revolutionary and pre-Revolutionary maps/events to current voting patterns. On the contrary, Revolutionary and pre-Revolutionary events are still quite present on the maps and explain many political traditions. Lozère (obviously... ahem... less so today) is the classic example, voting patterns have always been based on the War of Religions/Camisards rebellion over there. In Basse-Bretagne, the Bonnets rouges rebellion obviously played a role in forming the political tradition in the Trégorrois/Cornouaille.

The religious cleavage is informed in large part by Revolutionary-era (or pre-revolutionary) traditions -- among a whole slew of other factors (or are they causes?). For example, this map of priests who swore an oath to the Revolution in 1791... no comment!


Two other important factors that I can mention (besides the obvious and international class/income stuff) in passing include settlement type (nucleated vs. dispersed population/habitat) and land ownership patterns.

[Filuwaúrdjan]

Family structure patterns as well, of course.

[homelycooking]

I guess that whole "Cult of Reason" phenomenon wasn't be a big hit among the vendéens du bocage, eh?

NB: There is still a Catholic vs Protestant difference in those regions with Protestant minorities, but the Calvinists don't vote like Lutherans at all.

Do you have any data or maps on the geographic/socioeconomic divide amongst Protestant groups? I'd be interested to know what's going on there.

[Hash]

1984 (EU Parliament) - Greens (Didier Anger)



Notes: I strongly suspect something is fishy in the official results in those weird constituencies in Haute-Savoie and Lot-et-Garonne but I am pretty sure the mistake comes from the official results ( lol France) rather than my source. Still, a rather bizarre map which is not at all the traditional green map. I will need to make a map for the 'ERE' vote (a list led by Olivier Stirn and Brice Lalonde which had centrists, centre-right, greenies and the MRG).


2002 (Presidential) - Le Pen, round one



2002 (Presidential) - change in Le Pen vote since 1995



Note: low results in the Somme estuary and other regions due to Saint-Josse (primarily)

2007 (Presidential) - Le Pen



2007 (Presidential) - change in Le Pen vote since 2002



2012 (Presidential) - Le Pen



2012 (Presidential) - change in Le Pen vote since 2002



2012 (Legislative) - FN candidates, round one

[Hash]

In the greens series...

1981 (Presidential) - Lalonde



1988 (Presidential) - Waechter



1988 (Presidential) - Juquin



Pierre Juquin was a communist 'rénovateur' (reformist) who was backed by a mix of red-greens, reformist commies, Trots, New Left/far-left hippy types. Note his rather distinctive map.

[Hash]

If anybody still cares...

[All Along The Watchtower]

Just discovered this thread. As someone who knows precious little about French politics, I have enjoyed learning more from this thread and others of yours, hash!

[Franknburger]

Just to let you know - I am reading, looking at patterns, trying to comprehend them, and will sooner or later come up with questions.

O.k.-maybe a few observations / questions already:
1) Following your approach on the clerical / anti-clerical divide, FN and the Greens both appear to be 'clerical' parties. Or - maybe that is a better interpretation - for both parties it has been easier to gain footholds in the clerical than in the non-clerical part of the electorate (probably because the latter is quite loyal to PS and the Communists). Why is party loyalty less pronounced among 'clericals'?
2.) Aside from the 'clerical' regions, both FN and the Greens also had pretty good results in the wider Paris periphery. Why?
3.) FN is having obvious problems in Brittany and Nomandy, even though both are 'clerical' regions. I understand to some extent that autonomy-minded Brittany might not be too keen on voting FN, but what is keeping the FN down in Normandy?
4.) Same question for the Greens as concerns the South-west.
5.) Out of curiosity - what were the Green and FN 'high watermarks' in Chambery (my daughter just returned from a student exchange there, her exchange partner will arrive here after Easter)? I was also surprised about the Green's lacklustre performance in the Larzac, since comparable areas in Germany like the Wendland are green strongholds. Any reasons?

[Hash]

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On the contrary, the FN and the Greens are NOT clerical parties; I realize that based on basic comparison from the two maps, there are overlaps but they are misleading and deceptive. It must be noted that the religious cleavage is less relevant these days, and even in Catholic regions the percentage of practicing Catholics is low. Those two maps date from 1951 and 1960, when tons of people went to Church weekly. Only a few hardcore conservative Catholics still go to church weekly, to the point where practicing Catholics today are those who go to church at least monthly. As in other countries, the far-right and greens benefited from secularization and the declining relevance of political Catholicism/religious cleavage. But traditions persist...
 
The vote for the FN and Greens has little to do with religion.
 
The FN had a small traditionalist and ultraconservative Catholic wing (Bernard Antony, former FN MEP who left the party post-Marine), but the FN has little to do with traditionalist Catholicism - social conservatism and traditionalist political Catholicism is associated with Philippe de Villiers or Christine Boutin. You do have a small number of ultra-conservative Catholics of the Bernard Antony/Mgr Lefebvre variety who tend to vote FN, but they're a tiny minority. The FN's voters are usually Catholics, but not either non-practicing or those who practice irregularly/occasionally; it also has been doing quite well with irreligious/non-religious/agnostic voters. In 2012, Panzergirl won only 12% with regularly practicing Catholics (Sarko won 54% by the first round) but 21% with those who practice occasionally, 20% with Catholics in name only (who don't practice) and 16% with those without a religion. In 1984 (Euros), the FN did better than average with practicing Catholics -- but the 1984 FN electorate was very different from its electorate in any other year (even 1988), and since then the FN's numbers with practicing Catholics have been below average. The Catholic Church itself, since the FN's creation, has almost always opposed the FN despite any common positions the two might have shared on stuff like abortion or gay marriage.
 
The Greens have little support with devout Catholics, weak support with Catholics in name only and their strongest support almost always comes from irreligious/non-religious voters (unsurprising). In 2009 (Euros), according to CSA, the Greenies won 9% with practicing Catholics, 11% with occasionally practicing Catholics, 12% with non-practicing Catholics, 19% with non-Catholic religious voters (Prods, Muslims) and 23% with irreligious/non-religious folks. It was basically the same (at much lower levels) in 2012, 2010, 2007, 2002 etc. The Greens likely have some rather religious voters, no doubt about it, but most Green voters are very distant from Catholicism (like a lot of left-wing voters).
 
Furthermore, a closer comparison of both maps and analysis of the vote at a more micro level (cantons) also shows that the apparent link between clerical regions and a strong FN/Green vote is an illusion. For the FN, notice how - since the 1990s when the FN's vote adopted the contours of its current shape (less 'right-wingers' and more 'ni-ni' protest votes) - it has performed consistently poorly in rural Catholic heartland regions (bocage vendéen, Vannetais, Léon, far-eastern Brittany, Maine and Anjou, bocage normand, Aubrac, Margeride, Jura plateau, Basque Country). There are exceptions of course: the Sundgau (but notice how in 2012 Panzergirl didn't do as well there), Alsace-Lorraine, the Yssingelais, Forez, Lyonnais, Flanders. But those results owe more to other factors (urbanization, immigrant population, working-class discontent, industrial decline/deindustrialization) than to clerical support. It is also those regions - more open to external influences/urbanization than aforementioned rural areas - where secularization was most pronounced. And in Alsace, a finer analysis shows that the FN vote is traditionally stronger in Lutheran cantons than in Catholic cantons.
 
For the Greens - their strength is unsurprisingly concentrated in urban areas, particularly secular tertiary/white-collar middle-class cities like Rennes, Nantes, Grenoble, Annecy, Chambéry, Paris, Lyon, Toulouse or Strasbourg; and suburban areas which surround those cities. The 'rural' areas where it does well tend to be coastal or mountainous areas which either have environmental concerns/threats or are well 'integrated' and economically vibrant regions  (often touristy) which have attracted some professionals (the 'néo-ruraux' for example in the Ardèche, Isère, Drôme) or hippies. In the Catholic heartland regions, the Greens do very poorly.

[Hash]

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For the FN -- the thing to take away in Ile-de-France is that the FN vote has dropped significantly in the region, particularly in Paris and its western suburbs, since 1984. In 1984, it won 14.5% in the region and 15.3% in Paris; in 2007, at the same level nationally, it won 7.5% in the region and 4.6% in Paris. Even in 2012, Panzergirl won only 12.3% in the region and 6.2% in Paris -- which is lower than what Daddy had won in 2002 (14.6%, 9.5%). You can clearly see this on the 88-95, 95-02, 02-12 swing maps. In 1984 - and 1986, 1988 to a lesser extent - the FN was strong with an upper middle-class, right-wing and bourgeois electorate particularly in Paris and some of the affluent suburbs in 92 and 78 (note the strong result in Neuilly); but at the same time it always had a composite nature in that it was also strong in the working-class suburbs of eastern Paris and parts of the Red Belt, where the FN won voters who had voted Mitterrand in 1981 and in many cases still voted for the left in left-right runoffs. In 1995, it dropped in the older inner suburbs but did particularly well in new working-class/low-income towns like Mantes-la-Jolie (22%) or Gonesse (21%) which concentrated problems such as rising criminality, immigration, low incomes, unemployment, "poor whites" and white flight. The FN vote is now very low in the affluent suburbs, weak in the older suburbs - even working-class and low-income areas of the 93, and even in places like Mantes-la-Jolie (11.5% in 2012). The FN has been the victim of white flight (lower income working-class whites leaving the region for crime/immigration/brown people reasons) and rising property prices/gentrification in Paris and the inner suburbs (even parts of the 93) which has forced them out. The towns where the FN was strongest in the 1980s and early 1990s now either have a large non-white population or have been gentrified quite extensively.

In 2012, Panzergirl did best in what researchers have branded the "périurbain subi" -- lower middle-class outer suburbs/exurbs (notably in the Seine-et-Marne, now the FN's best department in the region), populated by whites forced out (or who willingly left because of white flight reasons) of the major cities/inner suburbs because of rising property prices, but who still commute long distances to work in those major cities because exurbs have no jobs of their own and are pretty dreary places. So they are concerned about bread-and-butter stuff (gas prices, mortgages, household debt, jobs) and immigration/crime. In their mindset, the inner cities and suburbs concentrate what they hate the most in the world: immigrants (who took their jobs, allegedly) and liberal tolerant whites (l'élite bien-pensante)/the devilish bobos. The périurbain subi phenomenon and the associated collapse of the FN vote in the urban cores is one of the most important takeaways of 2007/2012, and it is not only a Parisian thing. I can link you to the sh**tload of pre and post-electoral studies/analysis done on the FN vote by distance to urban cores.

For the Greens -- the Greenies are, like in Germany and most other countries, a urban party so naturally they would do best in the country's largest urban/metropolitan area. Besides, Paris and its region concentrate all you need for a high Green vote: young population, educated and secular white-collar professionals, bobos, students, academics, journalists and middle-class families. Eastern Paris and the inner former Red Belt have seen major gentrification in recent years, it is not really noticeable at first sight because it hasn't abated the strongly left-wing nature of those places (on the contrary...) so few people seem to realize that eastern Paris and the old Red Belt are not working-class regions. Paris proper has really high property prices, which means that few low-income or working-class people can afford to live there besides in the few HLM tracts on the outskirts of the city. Which isn't to say that everybody in Paris earns tons of money; but incomes are higher than average, even in the east. But the right's favourite boogeyman (a filthy rich liberal bobo who earns tons but votes for the left and bashes the right) doesn't exist. The left-wing base of Paris in good part now consists of not overly affluent but highly educated young professionals (or students, academics, journalists etc) who are the perfect Green electorate. Many of the old Red Belt suburbs have been gentrified a whole lot too, becoming attractive for young professionals or young families because of lower property prices. Some places like Gennevilliers, Aubervilliers, La Courneuve, Drancy, Bobigny etc remain very low-income and deprived areas, but even in those and similar cases, the proportion of 'ouvriers' is low and most jobs are low paying jobs (clerical, employees etc) rather than the old 1950s industrial stuff. The Greens, as a left-wing party, are very strong in gentrified and solidly left-wing areas in the Parisian region: Montreuil (29% in 2009, the largest city with a Green mayor), for example. They are also very strong in the Paris-Orsay "knowledge corridor" which has a lot of prestigious research centres/unis: 27% in Orsay, 25% in Palaiseau, 24% in Sceaux, 25% in Cachan (2009 results). The Greens also perform well in some new cities (villes nouvelles), particularly those with a largely leftist middle-class/white-collar population (a lot of them public servants). It explains, for example, why the Greens are so strong in the Cergy-Pontoise area and the Marne-la-Vallée 'ville nouvelle' conurbation. On the other hand, the Greens still struggle in cité populaires and low-income towns (aforementioned towns, Melun, Meaux, Argenteuil, Grigny, Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, Trappes) and the exurbs where the FN is strong.

[Hash]

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Of course, as you read above, the 'clerical' factor should be expected to play against the FN, on balance. In Brittany and the inner west (Normandy less so, the clergy was never strong there outside the bocage normand), the religious tradition and clericalism was a factor which kept the FN low, and it should not be underestimated. Brittany, and most of Normandy, are also pro-European regions. Brittany and most the west are, nowadays, fairly economically vibrant and relatively well-off regions because they have transitioned fully to the white-collar/tertiary/service economy of today (de-industrialization was not as huge as in the east).

If you look at the map, it is clear than the FN vote has been heavily concentrated east of an imaginary line from Le Havre to Saint Etienne to Perpignan (I have redefined it, to reflect the new map, as the Le Havre-Meaux-St Etienne-Perpignan axis). Though since the early 1990s (especially in 2012), the tendency has been a 'nationalization' of the FN vote (Panzergirl did really well in a bunch of ruralish cantons west of that line). The areas east of the line, not entirely but in good part, include most of France's most heavily industrialized regions (including the mines) and also major post-industrial urban cores which have attracted large foreign/immigrant populations since the 1970s/1980s. The FN vote developed, in 1984, in places located close to large concentrations of foreigners and that factor has remained quite potent to this day. Of course, since the 1990s the FN does very well (often best, in fact) in places with no brown people; but even those places are influenced by immigration since it is often close to them and they are in direct contact with it (often through work and commuting to work in those places). At the outset, in places such as Brittany or the west which did not have lots of immigrants, the FN did not really have much to grown on.

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The southwest, as you'll see once I get to the later Green maps, is no longer a 'dead zone' for the Greens, but large parts of central inland France remain very weak for the Greens.

Most of the southwest, outside major cities (Toulouse, Bordeaux, Montpelier), are fairly ruralish areas -- not a whole lot of white-collar professionals, young families, academics, students, bobos or urban lefties for the Greens to feed on, besides the various 'neo-rurals' in various places (mostly the touristy places). It's mostly a mix of old small industrial centres, small towns, and traditionally rural areas; none of which are places where the Greens do particularly well (but their arch rivals, CPNT, did very well in the rural areas). It also doesn't help, especially along the Mediterranean, that a lot of the 'urban' people there are either retirees, lower middle-classes or other right-wing types who are either concerned about security/crime or who just want to build tall ugly buildings along the coast. Unsurprisingly the heliotropic retirees and the various other peoples in those places have little time for the Greenies.

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My data at the communal level goes back to 1995, unfortunately--
Chambéry:
FN peak in 2002 (prez, first round): 16.7%
FN, 2012 prez (R1): 13.8%
Green peak in 2009 (Euros): 22.4%
Hollande won 56.8% in Chambéry in the runoff.

The Greens, actually, didn't do all that bad in the Larzac in 1988, 1995, 2009 (well, obviously) or 2012. But, yes, definitely not a Green stronghold, even compared to other rural areas. I don't know the insides and outs, but the Larzac doesn't really have the factors for a strong Green vote, despite the history of activism and social movements in the area. It doesn't have many neorural types which makes the Greens so strong in other rural regions, it remains a fairly agricultural and clerical as well (both factors limit the Greens).

thanks for your questions, I hope my answers make sense

[Hnv1]

What makes the German border regions go so strongly right? local farmers are very Christian?

[Franknburger]

What makes the German border regions go so strongly right? local farmers are very Christian?

Yep - I wanted to come to this point as well. You, Hash, have already mentioned one factor - strong Arab immigration to work in the Mulhouse car plant, which seems to be something the locals in this fairly traditional, small-town region had to get used to (looking at the maps, it seems the FN vote is on steady decline in southern Alsace since its 1995 peak).

Another factor I suspect is the FN taking up some votes of 'French immigrants' in this still culturally quite German area (comments welcome!).
[A few years ago, I organised a study-tour for a Moldavian-Romanian delegation on cross-border cooperation in the EU. We visited Gorlitz - Zgorcelec, and Kehl - Strasbourg, talking to Mayors, Chambers of Commerce, businesses, customs officials etc. In the final evaluation, I asked participants to sum up their impressions. They felt the German-Polish cooperation going much more smoothly, as both sides had no problems to accept each other as being different in terms of culture, economic profile etc.  Conversely, in spite of much higher economic integration, they felt the Strasbourg area - Ortenau cooperation hampered by the fact that both sides were so similar to each other culturally that they rather focused on working out their differences, than exploiting cooperation potentials. Asked which of the two experiences was more useful, they pointed at the German-French one, because it pretty much reminded them on their own.]

As to the other, very detailed comments:

ad 1.) I had formulated my question in a bit misunderstandable way. Of course, the FN is not a clerical party. The German Greens have a quite strong religious element, dating back to their roots in the West German peace movement, and the East German church-based opposition,  signified by people like former party head Petra Kelly or current top candidate Katrin Göring Eckardt, who is also head of the German Lutheran Synod. So it was quite interesting to learn that this element does not play that much of a role for the French Greens.
However, the question was not only why it was easier for FN and Greens to gain support in 'clerical regions' (you have answered this - because many of these regions have become much less clerical than they have been in the 1960s), but also why both are struggling in south-central France. You have given one reason already - their socio-economic base (disenfranchised blue-collar in the case of FN, younger high-educated urban in the case of the Greens) is not really strong there. Presumably, a second factor is continuous strong allegiance to 'red' parties, rooted in the anti-clerical tradition.

ad 2.) I had by intention used the term "wider Paris periphery' instead of Ile-de-France, because the area I wanted to refer to also includes Oise and  Eure, and, for FN, Eure-et-Loir, Loiret, and parts of Yonne, especially Sens. I am not sure whether these areas still belong to the "périurbain subi", or there are other factors at work. Compiegne, e.g., was quite a Green stronghold in 1989,  but has also been voting heavily FN in 2007 and 2012.

ad 4.) My question was more related to the Atlantic south-west, which in principle should  have some similarity to Brittany (tourism, strongly pro-European, etc.), possibly also some eco-minded young winegrowers. I don't know, however, how strong Basque autonomist parties, which might sap up some of the Green vote potential, are there. Anyway, I wait for the more recent maps, probably the picture will get clearer.

ad 5.) When I visited the Larzac back in 1985, it felt quite similar to the Wendland (well, as similar as the North German plain and the Massif Central can get), with hippie-type small businesses selling pottery or local honey, etc.. However, I tend to get the feeling that the French Greens are more of a pure ecological party, while the German Greens evolved from a coalition of ecologists, peace movement and euro-communists. in other words - the type of activist that in Germany would definitely have voted Green in the 1990s (today maybe also Linke), might have other preferences in France.

[big bad fab]

- Hash, as for Green results in Lot-et-Garonne in 1981 and 1984, I'm not so sure that there is a mistake.
I remember that, in these years, there were very lively structures of organic farming (there are still a lot) in Lot-et-Garonne and many local rallies of anti-nuclear, pacifist, environment-friendly structures.
Well, between 2.6 and 4.1%, it might be an explanation...

- homely, about Poujadists' results in Eure, well, Mendès-France was pretty popular among rurals, especially among shopkeepers and tradesmen but also among peasants.
Locally, he was a moderate Radical, not a leftist one, and, as PM, he made decisions which were good for this electorate (free milk for pupils in schools, for example: a good market for breeders and for grocers).

These are "micro"-explanations, but reasonable ones.

- As for 1984 and the list with Lalonde and Stirn, it was a list with Lalonde, Stirn AND François Doubin, MRG leader of the time. It was so dubbed the LSD list
I was too young (13) to vote, but old enough to litterally force my parents to vote for them

[Hash]

- Hash, as for Green results in Lot-et-Garonne in 1981 and 1984, I'm not so sure that there is a mistake.
I remember that, in these years, there were very lively structures of organic farming (there are still a lot) in Lot-et-Garonne and many local rallies of anti-nuclear, pacifist, environment-friendly structures.
Well, between 2.6 and 4.1%, it might be an explanation...

My issue is that the official results gave the Greens 5.95% in Lot-et-Garonne 1(Agen) when they got 2.5% and 3% in the other ones; likewise, the results gives them 0.35% in Haute-Savoie 1 (Annecy), where their results were very strong in 1979, and 4% and 3.6% in the other ones. I seriously suspect something is up with that.

I don't see anything fishy in 1981.

[big bad fab]

Well, the hierarchy between the 3 constituencies was the same in 81 and 84.

And a 3 point gap in a constituency in a European election, with low turnout (though it's 84, not the 21st century), it's not that impossible.
Sure, I can't remember about local big guns for the Greens...

I have another idea, FWIW: the new nuclear plant of Golfech which was being built during these years.

[Hash]

Well, the hierarchy between the 3 constituencies was the same in 81 and 84.

And a 3 point gap in a constituency in a European election, with low turnout (though it's 84, not the 21st century), it's not that impossible.
Sure, I can't remember about local big guns for the Greens...

I have another idea, FWIW: the new nuclear plant of Golfech which was being built during these years.

Although the gap between the three constituencies might be a bit on the high side (definitely higher than in 1981) it is indeed not impossible, and a local factor like those you mentioned could explain it. Clearly my main concern is about the 0.4% in Annecy's constituency, which you will agree is basically impossible.

[Hash]

What makes the German border regions go so strongly right? local farmers are very Christian?

Yep - I wanted to come to this point as well. You, Hash, have already mentioned one factor - strong Arab immigration to work in the Mulhouse car plant, which seems to be something the locals in this fairly traditional, small-town region had to get used to (looking at the maps, it seems the FN vote is on steady decline in southern Alsace since its 1995 peak).

Another factor I suspect is the FN taking up some votes of 'French immigrants' in this still culturally quite German area (comments welcome!).

Alsace-Moselle is a peculiar and interesting reasons. Here are a few reasons, non-exhaustive and likely incomplete, to explain its politics:

1. First and foremost, Alsace and Moselle are clerical regions (in the Catholic cantons) where the RCC maintained a very strong social and political influence until the 1960s. Places like the Sundgau, an old Hapsburg dominion, have always been devoutly Catholic. The religious cleavage has also remained more important in the region because, having been German in 1905, it is not covered by the separation of Church and State and Alsace-Moselle is still governed by the Concordat: the state recognizes the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish faiths, ministers are paid by the states as 'public servants', there are religious classes in public schools and the Catholic archbishop of Strasbourg and bishop of Metz are appointed by the President. The Concordat was a major political issue under the Third Republic, when the French left (Radicals but also SFIO) wanted to abolish it; today, almost all politicians - including the left - support the status-quo on the Concordat in Alsace-Moselle. However, the left's opposition to the Concordat badly hurt the socialists (and Radicals) in the region, leaving them crippled after a brief era of socialist success (in 1919).

The religious tradition and strong clericalism has trumped class factors in Alsace and Moselle. Alsace-Moselle is a very industrialized and fairly working-class region; besides the very important coal basin (bassin houiller) of eastern Moselle (Forbach, Faulquemont, Stiring-Wendel, Freyming-Merlebach, L'Hôpital, Saint-Avold), there are the potash mines north and west of Mulhouse in the Haut-Rhin, a smaller (extinct) iron ore mining area in the Val d'Argent (Sainte-Marie-aux-Mines), long-dead mining in the Saales and Shirmeck area (Bas-Rhin), small industrial towns (Thann, Cernay, Sarre-Union, Bouxwiller etc) throughout the region and also a local tradition of 'ouvriers-paysans' (blue-collar workers with a foothold in agriculture) particularly in l'Alsace bossue (Sarre-Union/Bouxwiller/La Petite-Pierre area). But, the left has generally been weak in those areas - even if stronger than in surrounding Catholic rural areas - and especially weak if you compare to the Pays Haut. Even in 1981, Giscard won (not by a landslide or anything but still) in the bassin houillier or Alsace bossue. The largest and leftist union (formerly close to the PCF) CGT is weaker in Alsace-Moselle, and the Christian union (CFTC) tends to be very strong, especially in northern Bas-Rhin and eastern Moselle. The PCF has never been strong in Alsace or eastern Moselle since 1945 (in fact, it has always been its weakest region); outside of a few holdouts in urban areas. Alsace-Moselle is really a region where you can find those 30% of ('not too bright' sayeth Melenchon) ouvriers who voted for the right when the left won 70% of working-class votes in the peak years of the 50s/70s.

2. In Alsace, there is a fairly strong regionalist/localist tradition, influenced in part by the Alsatian dialect (widely spoken in most rural areas until the 1950s) and the special legal regime which applies to Alsace-Moselle since reintegration into France in 1918. Because it is a regionalism tied to Catholicism or Protestantism, and attached to local traditions it is largely right-wing (or far-right). Autonomism and regionalism  was extremely strong in Alsace and Moselle during the Third Republic: almost all Alsatian deputies were from local parties, either the Catholic UPR (the remnants of the German Zentrum), the largely Protestant liberal autonomist Fortschrittspartei led by Saverne deputy Camille Dahlet, Charles Frey's Democrats or the autonomist local Communists led by the pro-Nazi Charles Hueber and Jean-Pierre Mourer. The collaboration of many autonomists (including most local communists) with the Nazis discredited the autonomist movement, but regionalism remained fairly influential. The UPR integrated into the MRP which was dominant in Alsace-Moselle, and many centrist and right-wing politicians in Alsace - to this day - have been fairly regionalist or at least lobbied for regional interests quite well. There is also a far-right regionalist movement, Alsace d'abord, which has won 5-9% in regional elections in recent years (5% in 2010, 9% in 2004).

3. Alsace is a relatively wealthy region: particularly Strasbourg suburbia, the wine making countryside or the area bordering Switzerland (Basel) in the Sundgau. This, alongside the Christian democratic/centrist tradition, has contributed to making Alsace a very pro-European region (see the 1992 and 2005 referendums). This might appear contradictory given the simultaneously high FN votes, but there is a very strong negative correlation between FN votes and pro-European votes (OUI in 2005) at the cantonal level.

4. While the MRP, and later UDF, remained very strong in Alsace throughout the post-war era; Alsace and Moselle were also Gaullist strongholds - de Gaulle won huge majorities in 1965, and the RPF had done very well in 1951. In the early Gaullist years, Gaullism also had a strong cross-class appeal and won lots of working-class votes. In rural Alsace, until the FN changed matters around, most elections were fought between Gaullists and Christian dems. The left (PS, PCF) were irrelevant, and they still are.

5. A number of the SFIO's regional bigwigs in the post-war era were moderate, anti-communists and some had Christian left roots. A large number of local socialists rejected the Programme Commun and the alliance with the PCF in the 70s, and formed the Social Democratic Party (MDSF, PSD) which was a component of the UDF. These included Emile Muller, deputy and longtime mayor of Mulhouse (1956-1981); Joseph Klifa, deputy and mayor of Mulhouse (1981-1989); Jean-Marie Bockel, deputy/senator, Sarkozyst cabinet minister and mayor of Mulhouse (1989-2010); and Alfred Muller, mayor of Schiltigheim (1977-2008).

6a. Royal and Hollande did horribly in Alsace and eastern Moselle (outside Strasbourg and Mulhouse); Lionel Jospin did much better than both of them. Sarkozy performed very well in Alsace in both 2007 and 2012, and he took a lot of Le Pen 2002 voters in 2007. Working-class and industrial regions where the PS had been strong in the past (particularly the Potash basin in the Haut-Rhin, Cernay or Saint-Amarin) have swung hard to the right and far-right (Hollande did much worse than Mitterrand, 1981, in the Potash basin/Cernay/Saint-Amarin area).

6b. Related to the point above, the FN's vote in Alsace-Moselle is very much a working-class vote since 1988. It has done best in isolated/marginalized/"forgotten" working-class and/or industrial regions - l'Alsace bossue (great article on that region here), Sarrebourg/Plateau Lorrain (in Moselle), Saales/Schirmeck (an interesting case: these have always been Francophone vosgiens cantons, and the left has been quite strong here and held up better since the 80s/95; but the FN is also very strong), Sainte-Marie-aux-Mines (the current CG, now UMP, used to be far-right and Alsace d'abord), the Potash basin, Cernay/Thann/Saint-Amarin and Mulhouse. They took a lot of votes from the PS, particularly in the Potash basin, where gaucho-lepenisme was strong in 1995; but also took a lot of right-wing voters. A number voted for Sarko by the first round in 2007 and even in 2012, and Sarko swept even ertswhile leftie places (Potash basin) with big margins in the 2007 and 2012 runoffs. At the same time, the FN's decline in urban and inner suburban areas since the peaks of 1995 is quite striking in Alsace (Strasbourg: 20% in 1995, 12% in 2012; Mulhouse: 27% in 1995, 17.5% in 2012). They have also lost a lot of "right-wing FN" voters (to use Nonna Mayer's terminology) in the wine making region (notice weaker performance in the Alsatian Plain from Molsheim to Colmar/Kayersberg).

Immigration - there are large foreign (Muslim - Turkish or North African) communities in Mulhouse (car factories) and Strasbourg, is an important factor and there have been problems with foreign integration in Alsace. Even in lily-white towns not directly affected by crime/unemployment, anti-immigration resentment is quite high. The local FN electorate's high prioritization of immigration/security (rather than economic/social issues) explains why Sarko made huge inroads with it in 2007 (and 2012, to a lesser extent).

7. Slightly more unrelated to the original question now, but whatever. The confessional (Catholic vs Protestant) cleavage is not visible at first sight, but has remained relevant. It was far more important in rural Alsace in the 50s and 60s: the MRP won huge majorities in Catholic communes but did poorly in Protestant communes, where the vote was more dispersed (stronger support for the SFIO, Radicals, PCF, Gaullists, regionalists). It abated somewhat as the UDF and RPR became 'multi-confessional' in their Alsatian electorate, but Protestant communes still showed a more dispersed vote - and a higher vote share for the PS, Greens and particularly the FN. The FN, even in 2012, has been very strong in Alsace bossue and Protestant cantons of northern Bas-Rhin (27-30%): it is clear that demographic reasons play a big role, but confessional roots and traditions likely are a factor as well.

I *think* that's all I wanted to say, but I certainly forgot something and will feel like a douche when somebody brings it up or if I remember it later...

Other questions tomorrow! (still welcome other questions/requests, I love doing this and French electoral geography is the best thing on earth)